The 30th Conference of the Parties (COP30) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is fast approaching. Preparations are underway by the incoming COP30 Presidency of Brazil, which has been issuing a series of letters aimed at encouraging all stakeholders, including UNFCCC parties, to effectively implement the Paris Agreement (PA).
in one such letter, the Presidency expressed hope to avoid the ‘brutality of inaction’ that has characterized many past COPs. Following the subsidiary bodies’ meetings in Bonn last June (SB62), the UNFCCC also held several online consultations with parties and stakeholders, alongside other mandated events in the run-up to COP30, which takes place in just seven weeks.
three of these mandated events on climate finance (CF) were held at the FAO Headquarters in Rome from September 6-11, 2025.
i had the privilege of attending the first event, held on September 6-7, focused on Article 2.1c of the PA, which addresses aligning finance flows with pathways toward low-carbon, climateresilient development (LCCRD).
the event also explored its complementarity with Article 9, which deals with climate finance obligations.
this was the sixth, and apparently final, workshop on the issue. Yet the core debates remain unresolved, particularly regarding the interpretation and scope of Article 2.1c.
this workshop emphasized stocktaking of both domestic and international actions on CF, as well as reflections on progress since the workshops began in 2023.
earlier workshops generated ideas on the scope of Article 2.1c, its operationalization, and its relation to Article 9. But consensus remains elusive. Some contours of the debate are clear, but the real test for the COP30 Presidency will be how it initiates the operationalization of Article 2.1c.
article 2.1c articulates the aspirational goal of achieving LCCRD and can be seen as the outcome of the climate regime.
its scope is broader than Article 9, which is specifically about developed countries providing CF and mobilizing resources through public and private channels, including bilateral and multilateral agencies.
article 2.1c, by contrast, covers broader objectives of achieving LCCRD through sustainable development and poverty reduction.
article 9, therefore, can be viewed as a mechanism for delivering public support and mobilizing additional CF sources-including private finance- to help implement Article 2.1c.
in this sense, Article 9 is a subset of the broader finance flows envisioned for LCCRD. Both articles rest on the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, tailored to national circumstances and respective capacities.
the Co-Chairs of this agenda will prepare a final report for considerationat COP30 and CMA 7 of the PA.
achieving LCCRD involves every sector of the economy and financial systems at both global and national levels.
article 2.1c thus encompasses public and private finance, as well as international and domestic initiatives. From my participation in four of these workshops, I observed that developed countries often try to shift the burden of mobilization from international to domestic financial systems. This underscores the need to build the capacity of national regulators and private sector actors. While capacity building is necessary, domestic finance can only complement-not replace-international support, especially in low-income and least developed countries. When discussing climate change, we cannot overlook its origins: historical emissions from developed countries. While developing countries, including China, now lead in current emissions, this reality should not justify shifting responsibilities from international to domestic and private financial systems. Moreover, robust monitoring and tracking of CF is needed under both articles. Yet without a common definition of climate finance-still absent after more than 25 years of debate- effective tracking remains impossible. Such deadlocks only deepen mistrust between developed and developing countries.
the seventh letter from the COP30 Presidency highlights the role of the private sector and the profitable investment opportunities in addressing climate change.
the private sector is indeed critical for mobilizing CF, particularly given shifting geopolitics, geoeconomics, and shrinking global aid budgets. However, its contributions to CF remain far smaller than those of the public sector. With its strong advocacy of global norms and values, the progressive Brazilian Presidency faces the challenge of ensuring that this COP avoids the ‘brutality of inaction.’ Success will depend on its ability to unite parties and non-parties in providing and mobilizing climate finance to operationalize a roadmap for achieving LCCRD