Bangladesh’s energy crisis did not begin with the Iran-US-Israel war. The country was already struggling with a severe shortage of primary fuel, while the challenge of managing rising summer electricity demand had become increasingly dif?cult. The BNP-led alliance government was expected to come prepared with a clear strategy.
instead, it appeared the new administration underestimated both the scale and complexity of the crisis, which was further intensi?ed by the damaging con?ict in the Arab and Gulf regions.
as fuel prices surged in the volatile global market and the Strait of Hormuz disruption threatened supply chains, Bangladesh’s ability to procure fuel came under serious pressure.
the government should have taken carefully planned contingency measures in consultation with all relevant stakeholders.
instead, acting largely on bureaucratic advice, it imposed fuel rationing that sent the wrong signals to consumers.
this triggered panic buying, disrupted the normal fuel supply chain from depots to pumps, and encouraged illegal hoarding by pro?teering syndicates.
the damage was already done before the government realized its mistake and withdrew the rationing policy. Long queues of anxious buyers are still visible at fuel stations. Restricted fuel supply affected transport, disrupting the movement of essential commodities. Farmers suffered from inadequate diesel and electricity for irrigation, ?shermen were unable to take their trawlers to sea, and fertilizer factories shut down due to gas shortages.
even then, nearly 50% of gas-based power generation capacity remained idle during peak summer demand.
this resulted in severe nationwide loadshedding during intense heat waves.
energy and electricity prices, which should have been adjusted gradually by the Bangladesh Energy Regulatory Commission (BERC), were delayed until the government reached a point of no return.
eventually, the new government conceded to opposition demands and agreed to form a parliamentary committee to assess the situation and recommend an appropriate response to confront the crisis. Present Situation Bangladesh’s power and energy sector management remains almost entirely under bureaucratic control.
energy analysts observe that poor management and weak sectoral governance are largely responsible for the failure to anticipate the depth of the crisis. Successive governments neglected the exploration and development of domestic fuel resources such as gas and coal. While policymakers frequently discussed renewable energy, little meaningful action was taken to increase the contribution of solar, wind, and biomass in the energy mix. Signi?cant reserves of high-quality coal remain untapped despite being located at mineable depths.
experts also point to strong potential for unexplored petroleum resources both onshore and offshore.
even the discovered gas reserves of Bhola Island remain largely unused.
instead of developing domestic resources, governments-often in?uenced by opportunistic energy syndicates-opted for increasing dependence on imported fuel and electricity.
the risks of relying too heavily on imports were ignored, despite repeated warnings from analysts and experts.
they consistently cautioned that the volatility of the global fuel market would create major challenges for Bangladesh’s fragile economy and that regional or global con?icts could disrupt supply chains, exactly as is happening now. Bangladesh currently has an installed grid power generation capacity of over 29,000 MW. Previous governments spent billions expanding power transmission and distribution networks across the country.
unfortunately, they failed to ensure sustainable fuel supply.
as a result, the power system has been unable to consistently generate even 16,000 MW, leaving nearly 45% of installed capacity idle.
at the same time, the government continues to bear the heavy burden of capacity payments. Massive subsidies have been paid to both the power and energy sectors. BPDB and Petrobangla have almost become ?nancially crippled while trying to meet payment obligations to fuel suppliers and electricity producers.
experts had long warned about the need to prepare for the summer peak demand of 2026. BPDB projected a peak demand of 18,500 MW. Gas supply constraints were already well known. For this reason, experts recommended maximizing the use of the country’s 7,000 MW coal-?red power generation capacity.
there were also repeated suggestions to import coal on time. However, due to shortages in coal availability, it is currently impossible to generate more than 4,000 MW from coal during peak demand. Petrobangla, through gas rationing for fertilizer plants and staggered supply to industries, can manage only 950-1,000 MMCFD of gas supply to the power sector.
this allows a maximum generation of around 6,500-7,000 MW. Power imports from the Adani plant may also face disruption because the government owes substantial unpaid bills to the Adani Group.
a similar problem exists with private sector liquid fuel-based peaking plants.
as a result, it is now dif?cult to consistently generate even 15,000 MW. Power de?cits of 2,500-3,000 MW have already created severe suffering across the country.
austerity and ef?cient use can provide only limited relief.
the real burden will continue to come from poor management of the power and energy sector. Why Has the Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant Been Delayed? Experts are raising legitimate questions about why the commissioning of the 2×1,200 MW Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant has been delayed. Was the interim government truly committed to expediting the completion of the remaining plant work and associated evacuation facilities on time? What exactly happened during the ?re at the cargo village of Hazrat Shahjalal International Airport, where some critical equipment for the Rooppur project was reportedly destroyed? Was it simply an accident, or an act of sabotage? Even the availability of just 1,200 MW of nuclear electricity would have signi?cantly helped manage the current power crisis.
it is believed that fuel loading will proceed as planned and the plant may be ready for commissioning by the end of 2026. However, there must be no unnecessary haste. Nuclear power must be synchronized with the national grid with the highest level of caution and technical discipline. Why Is Renewable Energy Development Not Gaining Momentum? The government must professionally examine why renewable energy development has failed to gain the expected momentum.
the caretaker government canceled several concluded contracts and negotiations for solar power projects without properly assessing the consequences. During its 18 months in of?ce, very little progress was made in advancing energy transition.
experts believe the government must create strong incentives for private sector investment in renewable energy. Import duties and taxes on solar equipment should be waived for at least ?ve years. SREDA should be made the single-point contact for investors.
a dedicated government agency should be assigned to ensure quality control of solar panels, inverters, and batteries.
the private sector should also be encouraged to establish solar equipment manufacturing plants in Bangladesh. Local banks should offer soft loans to investors.
the government should develop land and lease it to investors for solar projects while also investing in power evacuation facilities. Fiscal and ?nancial incentives should be extended to rooftop solar installations as well.
even if Bangladesh cannot achieve 10,000 MW of solar generation, it should realistically be able to add at least 5,000- 6,000 MW by 2030.
there was also an initiative for offshore wind development involving a Danish agency and Summit International, which was later canceled by the caretaker government.
that initiative deserves immediate review.
at the same time, Bangladesh must carefully plan for grid integration of variable renewable energy (VRE). Where feasible, renewable energy should be used through distributed generation systems such as mini-grids and microgrids for local supply. Managing Summer Demand in 2026 The immediate challenge is to manage the crisis from now until October. Petrobangla must ensure a consistent supply of 1,000 MMCFD of gas to the power sector to support at least 7,000 MW of gas-based generation. Yet current gas-based generation remains around only 5,200-5,500 MW. More fuel-ef?cient power plants must be prioritized strictly on merit.
the government must ensure that all coal-?red plants maintain suf?cient buffer stock so they can operate at full capacity throughout the summer.
at least 6,000 MW of coal-based generation should remain consistently available. Payment disputes with power exporters, including the Adani Group, must be resolved quickly to secure at least 2,000 MW of imported electricity.
together, these steps could ensure a minimum of 15,000 MW of power supply during peak summer demand.
additionally, 2,000 MW of liquid fuelbased peaking plants should remain ready for peak shaving purposes. Payments to private sector power producers must be made regularly to ensure uninterrupted operation.
at the same time, all efforts should be made to bring at least 600 MW of nuclear electricity online by the end of 2026. Power and energy professionals within BPDB, Petrobangla, and BPC must be allowed to work with proper authority and operational freedom. BERC must be allowed to function independently according to its legal mandate.
the Power Division and the Energy and Mineral Resources Division (EMRD) should focus on policymaking and administrative support, rather than interfering in operational management. Only then can Bangladesh begin to move from crisis management to genuine energy security