Category: Sunday Standard

Botswana’s public debt position has edged higher, driven largely by a sharp rise in domestic borrowing, according to the Annual Statements of Accounts (ASA) for the financial year ended 31 March 2023. in 2024, the Accountant General Office also raised concerns about the government’s borrowing practices highlighting a significant rise in total outstanding debt for the fiscal year 2021/22.

Accountant General Tebogo Tumango has now warned that while debt levels remain within manageable thresholds, the composition and pace of accumulation point to growing fiscal pressure, particularly on the domestic market.

‘There was a slight increase in total outstanding debt during the 2022/23 financial year, driven by growth in both external and domestic borrowing,’ Tumango noted in the report.

By the end of March 2023, total gross debt, including guarantees, stood at P50.90 billion, reflecting a 4 percent increase compared to the previous financial year. The rise was largely shaped by increased domestic financing needs, even as external debt recorded a modest decline.

External debt outstanding fell by 5 percent to P21.9 billion. The decrease was attributed to repayments exceeding new disbursements during the period under review, signalling a continued effort to manage foreign exposure and limit external vulnerabilities.

In contrast, domestic debt surged significantly, rising by 16 percent to P28.92 billion. The increase was driven by the continued rollout of the P30 billion Note Issuance Programme, which also saw Government intensifying its presence in the domestic capital market through more frequent auctions, shifting from quarterly to monthly issuances.

The programme was expanded following a 2019 review that identified structural constraints in the local bond market, leading to an increase in its ceiling from P15 billion in 2020. Authorities have since relied more heavily on domestic instruments to finance budgetary requirements.

Despite the increase in borrowing, Botswana’s debt ratios remain relatively low by international standards. The total debt-to-GDP ratio stood at 19.60 percent at the end of the 2022/23 financial year. External debt accounted for 8.46 percent of GDP, while domestic debt stood at 11.13 percent.

Government has also intensified revenue-enhancing measures in response to fiscal pressures. These include the revision of user fees and service charges, with the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development authorised to adjust charges annually in line with inflation or other applicable rates, following consultation with relevant ministries.

Consultations were ongoing during the 2022/23 financial year in preparation for the third phase of revised fees and charges. Officials say the measures form part of broader fiscal consolidation efforts aimed at widening the domestic revenue base and ensuring long-term fiscal sustainability amid rising expenditure demands.

A high net worth tourist spent more than P800 000 of untraceable money on a safari in the Okavango Delta.

Years later, his identity remains unknown and so is the safari operator he paid. The anonymity is not accidental, it is structural. Botswana’s lucrative tourism industry is one of the rare global spaces where illicit wealth easily alchemizes into ordinary luxury.

That is the real story behind a footnote in the enforcement action against Wegelin and Co, a Swiss private bank, prosecuted in the United States of America (USA) for helping rich clients conceal undeclared offshore assets.

Buried in the case file is a single transaction, funds routed through the international banking system and spent on a safari in Botswana. No criminal charge hinges on the transaction. No safari operator has been named and no tourist has been identified. Yet the episode captures something larger than the case itself. It captures how, in a world where financial systems are highly effective at tracking movement but less effective at interpreting consumption, Botswana’s luxury tourism inevitably finds itself at the boundary between visibility and invisibility. It is the vortex where illicit wealth often does not vanish into secrecy, but instead reappears into the world as ordinary luxury.

According to luxury travel trackers like Dataintelo and Global Growth Insights, the Okavango Delta is grouped with locations like Sindalah Island and White Desert because it offers ‘Logistical Exclusivity’

The Dataintelo and Global Growth Insights place the Okavango Delta in a ‘league of three’ that defines the modern pinnacle of Ultra-High-Net-Worth (UHNW) travel.

The ‘League of Three’ is a conceptual classification used by luxury travel analysts and wealth intelligence experts to group the world’s most elite, inaccessible, and ultra-private destinations.

The publications further state that while destinations like St. Tropez or Aspen are for ‘seeing and being seen,’ the Delta, Sindalah, and White Desert are for ‘disappearing with distinction.’

Botswana’s tourism model is deliberately unusual. Unlike mass-market destinations that compete on volume, Botswana competes on exclusivity. Its wilderness areas, especially the Okavango Delta, are managed through a high cost, low volume strategy designed to protect fragile ecosystems.

The result is a tourism economy defined by scarcity; small camps rather than large resorts, limited guest number per concession, expensive logistics in remote terrain and premium pricing as a structural feature, not an exception.

A single safari can easily cost hundreds of thousands of Pula. Importantly, these prices are not artificially inflated, they reflect the real cost of operating in remote conservation zones with strict environmental controls.

But scarcity has another effect, it normalises high value transactions. When expensive payments are routine, they lose their statistical distinctiveness. That is why the more than P800 000 transfer by the anonymous net worth tourist does not stand out. It fits.

Modern anti money laundering frameworks, shaped by institutions such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), are designed to detect movement, unusual transfers, layered transactions, shell structures or rapid flows between accounts. Botswana’s high cost low volume transactions however fall through the cracks of FATF anti-money laundering framework. The transactions are direct purchase of a real service; they are a one-off transaction consistent with known market pricing and executed to a legitimate commercial entity. By the time the money reaches the Botswana tourism industry in its lifecycle, it has often already passed through multiple layers of banking infrastructure, private banks, correspondent banks and compliance screening systems. What remains is not ‘hidden money’ in motion. It is simply spending. And spending is the weakest signal in the entire FATF detection architecture.

Sunday Standard open source investigation suggests that the clients behind offshore structures like those once held at Wegelin were not necessarily engaged in complex criminal enterprises. Many were wealthy individuals who had accumulated assets during an era when offshore secrecy was normal, and enforcement was minimal or inconsistent.

The enforcement push that followed in the United States and Europe changed the rules. Undeclared wealth became a liability. But it did not disappear. Instead, it shifted from concealment to consumption. This is where Botswana’s tourism economy comes in, not because it enables wrongdoing, but because it is structurally compatible with the final stage of wealth usage.

A safari lodge does not need to interrogate the tax history of its guests. It delivers a service, guiding, accommodation and access to wilderness. The financial transaction is complete at the point of payment. The experience is the product.

The effectiveness of Botswana’s tourism sector as a destination for discreet high value spending is not rooted in opacity. It is rooted in legitimacy. The structural features matter most: High- end safaris are expensive by design and large payments are expected not exceptional. Unlike mass tourism markets, Botswana’s luxury sector processes relatively few but high-value transactions, reducing statistical anomaly detection. And once delivered, a safari leaves no financial residue to trace. It is consumed entirely in experience.

Bertelsmann Stiftung Index (BTI) 2026 Botswana Country Report has warned that emergency procurement measures during the Covid-19 pandemic created conditions that enabled corruption at senior levels of government even as the state battled a once-in-a-generation public health crisis.

According to the report, ‘corruption at senior levels grew following the suspension of public procurement procedures and the direct appointment of companies to supply personal protective equipment.’ The report highlighted how emergency decision-making frameworks weakened oversight mechanisms during the pandemic period.

The BTI assessment argues that the pandemic not only disrupted the economy but also exposed governance vulnerabilities. It states that Covid-19 ‘severely disrupted the economy, forcing the government to prioritize public health and declare a state of emergency,’ while simultaneously accelerating controversial procurement practices that would later draw public criticism and institutional concern.

The report situates the rise in corruption concerns within the broader context of crisis governance, where speed and emergency response took precedence over established accountability systems. The direct awarding of PPE contracts, according to BTI 2026, became a key flashpoint for allegations of abuse and preferential treatment, reinforcing long-standing concerns about transparency in public procurement.

While the report does not frame Botswana as a failed governance state, it warns that crisis conditions exposed structural weaknesses that had previously been less visible, particularly in procurement oversight and senior-level accountability.

The report observes that ‘the administration is committed to shifting from a mineral-based to a knowledge-based economy, promoting electric vehicles and strengthening agriculture,’ signalling an ambition to modernise the economic structure in the post-pandemic era. However, the transition is unfolding in a constrained fiscal environment. The BTI report warns that the current administration inherited ‘a fragile economy, with government investment accounts and foreign reserves nearly depleted,’ limiting immediate fiscal space for reform.

The new administration now faces substantial expectations from the electorate, including ambitious socio-economic commitments. According to BTI 2026, the government must grapple with ‘the mammoth task of implementing many of its electoral promises,’ including a proposed minimum wage of BWP 4,000, an old-age pension of BWP 1,800, and the creation of 450,000 jobs.

While Botswana has made measurable progress in basic service delivery, structural and logistical constraints persist. The BTI 2026 report, drawing on World Bank data, notes access levels of 92.6% for basic water, 80.6% for sanitation, and 75.9% for electricity in 2022.

However, it cautions that service delivery is undermined by ‘limited resources, corruption and bureaucratic inefficiencies,’ while geographic dispersion creates additional cost pressures. The report also points to infrastructure vulnerabilities, including theft of electrical cables that disrupts power supply in some areas.

The United States tax evasion prosecution against Wegelin and Co, Switzerland’s oldest private bank before it collapsed, has stumbled on a US $60, 000 safari expenditure that has exposed a blind spot in Botswana’s financial defence against money laundering.

The money laundering case has further revealed how tourism, one of Botswana’s flagship industries is perfectly structured to be blind to the moment when illicit wealth exits the shadows and enters the real economy disguised as ordinary consumption.

Sunday Standard open source investigation suggests that the US $60, 000 dirty money arrived in Botswana the way clean money often does – quietly, electronically, and with no obvious reason to doubt it.

Somewhere in the Okavango tourism circuit, a safari operator received a series of international payments totaling roughly $60, 000. For luxury safari, it was unremarkable. High-end lodges routinely bill that much for a week in the bush; private guides, charter flights, exclusive concessions. Nothing about the transaction screamed suspicion.

But the money’s journey tells a different story. It began in Switzerland, inside accounts at Wegelin and Co, the country’s oldest private bank before it collapsed under the weight of a US tax evasion prosecution. The client behind those accounts had not declared them to U.S authorities. When he wanted to spend, he didn’t repatriate the funds in his own name. Instead, he instructed the bank to move the money outward – carefully.

The payments were routed through the United States financial system, where dollar transactions often pass, even when neither sender nor recipient is American. That detour proved decisive. U.S investigators, piecing together patterns of undeclared offshore wealth, captured the transfers in court filings. Among them, wires sent to a ‘safari company’ in Botswana.

The name of the Botswana company never appears in the record. It is simply ‘the safari company’ – a placeholder in a legal narrative focused elsewhere.

And the omission is the point.

By the time the money reached Botswana, it had been laundered not through shell companies or fake invoices, but through something far harder to detect, normality. A legitimate business. A plausible expense. A payment size consistent with the market.

The whole transaction flew below the Botswana Financial Intelligence Agency (FIA) detection radar. There were no red flags that a local bank could reasonably act on. No sudden spike in activity, no mismatch between the company’s profile and the transaction. Just a foreign client paying for a safari. This is the structural blind spot. Botswana’s anti-money laundering framework, shaped in part by reforms following its grey-listing by the Financial Action Task Force between 2018 and 2021, leans heavily on risk-based detection. Banks are expected to flag unusual behavior, identify suspicious clients, and report anomalies. But the system is nor designed to question every legitimate looking payment, nor could it function if it tried.

When undeclared wealth is spent on tourism, property or services, rather than hidden, it blends seamlessly into the legal economy. The transaction that paid for a safari in Botswana looked, in every operational sense, clean. The crime existed upstream, in tax evasion and concealment and not in the final payment of safari services.

Detection, in this case, did not happen in Gaborone. It happened because the U.S authorities had visibility into dollar clearing systems and the legal leverage to compel disclosures from a foreign bank. Botswana, like most countries does not have that vantage point.

That dependence on external detection is not unique. It is a feature of the global financial system. Smaller jurisdictions, especially those integrated into international banking networks, rely on larger financial centers to surface risks that originate beyond their borders. But it creates a gap. Tourism, one of Botswana’s flagship industries sits squarely inside that gap. It attracts wealthy international clients, processes cross border payments and delivers high value services that justify large transfers. It is perfectly structured to receive funds that are both legitimate in use and illicit in origin.

There is no evidence the Botswana safari company involved in the Wegelin case did anything wrong. On the contrary, the available facts suggest that it may have simply provided a service and been paid accordingly. Yet its anonymity in the court record underscores a deeper reality; the system had no reason to notice it at all. And that the paradox at the heart of modern money laundering oversight. Regulations can tighten reporting rules, improve financial intelligence units, and demand greater transparency from banks. Botswana has done all that in recent years. But none of those measures fully address the moment when illicit wealth exits the shadows and enters the real economy disguised as ordinary consumption.

Few examples illustrate the transformation better than the importation of 162 cattle from Texas in 2023 under the administration of the former president Mokgweetsi Masisi. At the time, the purchase costing about P25m once transport and logistics were included was presented as a bold effort to improve the national herd.

It was also presented, by those now in power, as something else entirely.

Parliamentary committees were later told that the procurement had not been budgeted for and may have been unlawful. A revelation delivered with admirable bluntness before the electorate rearranged the seating plan.

That change has since required a certain intellectual agility. The cattle have not moved. They remain in Ramatlabama, adapting to local conditions and contributing, at least in theory, to the production of semen and embryos intended to improve the local livestock genetics.

What has moved is the explanation.

The matter resurfaced in Parliament when Dr Kesitegile Gobotswang inquired whether the purchase complied with public finance law, which vote had been used, and what role had been played by the National Agricultural Research and Development Institute.

It was a question that once would have been followed by emphatic agreement. Instead, it was followed by documentation.

The government responded with composure. The cattle, it explained, were not an isolated indulgence but part of a P93m project to refurbish the Ramatlabama Artificial Insemination Centre, an effort approved in March 2023 and designed to elevate the country into a centre of excellence in bovine reproduction. The animals themselves accounted for P22m of this broader ambition.

Embedded within such a framework, the purchase begins to look less like extravagance and more like policy.

The procurement method has undergone a similar rehabilitation. What the then opposition had regarded as suspiciously uncompetitive is now described as direct procurement, permissible under the law when circumstances justify it. In this case, the justification rests on the delicate matter of genetics. Elite cattle, it appears, cannot be expected to participate in open tender processes; they must be selected.

To that end, a multidisciplinary scouting team was dispatched to Texas, an expedition combining procurement oversight, veterinary science, legal expertise and animal breeding, all in pursuit of cows with the correct international outlook. There remain, inevitably, small complications. The absence of NARDI from the process has been acknowledged, though now with the tone of a procedural footnote rather than a constitutional crisis. Earlier claims that Parliament had not approved the expenditure have not so much been disproved as absorbed into a more expansive narrative about development planning and institutional processes.

Such reinterpretations are not unique to Botswana. Across democracies, incoming governments inherit not only policies but also the inconvenient persistence of facts. When reversal proves cumbersome, reinterpretation offers a more elegant solution.

Thus the Texas cattle have completed a journey more remarkable than their flight across the Atlantic. Once a symbol of alleged impropriety, they have become instruments of national development. Once cited as evidence of excess, they are now examples of foresight.

The transformation owes less to any change in the animals themselves than to a change in vantage point. From the opposition benches, they were a scandal. From the front bench, they are strategy. In politics, as in agriculture, perspective is everything.

I am continuing this month with my BlackBerry story.

Yes, BlackBerry today is a leading security company. Yes, its technology is still used by major organisations across the world. But the handset – the very thing that defined its identity – is nowhere to be found. The PlayBook tablet never conquered the market. So what really went wrong?

As I mentioned before, I was an analyst based in Slough while the rest of my team was in Canada. I worked as a Technical Change Analyst within an IT service management environment, and that perspective has stayed with me. From where I sat, BlackBerry was still powerful. It had the brand, the capability, and the story. Which is why the question has never been simple.

Was it management?

Was it IT governance?

Was it the data centre outage in Paris that shook global confidence?

Or was it the pressure to release products like the PlayBook before they were truly ready?

The PlayBook remains one of the clearest examples of pressure overtaking process. It launched without native email, calendar, or contacts – a decision widely criticised at the time and one that contradicted BlackBerry’s core identity as a communication-first company. A stronger release governance model would have delayed that launch until it met minimum viable standards aligned to user expectations.

To this day, I still reflect on that journey. I speak to some of my former peers – including one who worked as a data centre technician – and even now, there isn’t a single, clear answer. How does a company that was once flourishing lose direction?

I get goosebumps thinking about it.

What I do know is this: pressure changes decision-making. Having worked within Fortune 500, FTSE 100 and CAC 40 environments, I understand the level of pressure that comes with operating at that scale. In these organisations, you are not only delivering technology – you are protecting reputation, shareholder value, and public trust. Every incident is visible. Every failure is amplified by global media.

And that is where governance matters.If your IT governance is weak, your foundation is weak. Without strong ITIL practices and disciplined IT service management, you are exposing the very backbone of your business.

Continuous Service Improvement (CSI) is not optional – it is essential. It ensures that lessons are learned, risks are reduced, and services evolve with the market.

That is why I always emphasise the importance of IT governance – and the critical role of risk management within change and release processes.

Every decision to release a product must be interrogated. Why this deadline? Why this product, at this point in the market? Do we have the engineering capability to support it? Do we have the capacity to sustain it under pressure?

And more importantly – if something goes wrong, how quickly can we recover without causing major incidents?

These are not theoretical questions. They sit at the heart of operational resilience.

A well-managed change environment requires more than speed; it requires control. A properly maintained Configuration Management Database (CMDB) should provide visibility of systems, dependencies, and impact – guiding decision-making before, during, and after deployment.

Because when governance fails, the consequences are immediate.

Your brand is questioned.

Your revenue is affected.

And most critically, your customers lose confidence in your technology.

And once trust is lost in technology, it is incredibly difficult to rebuild.

The 2011 EMEA outage, widely reported across global media, exposed exactly what happens when resilience and recovery are not strong enough. A core network failure, combined with limitations in the backup systems, led to prolonged service disruption affecting millions of users. Robust disaster recovery design – including fully independent failover capabilities and clearer communication strategies – could have reduced both the impact and the loss of trust.

I had already moved on to Ericsson at the time, but I remember the shock. The disbelief. Watching events unfold while speaking to former colleagues. Even today, some of them cannot fully explain what went wrong.

For me, that moment symbolised something bigger than a technical failure – it was a breakdown in control, communication, and confidence.

But beyond systems and processes, there is leadership.

Not BlackBerry leadership specifically – but leadership in general.True leadership is not threatened by the people it leads. It listens. It aligns with strategy. It respects the vision of the founders while allowing teams to challenge, innovate, and improve. Your teams are your eyes and ears. If their voices are ignored, the organisation loses its ability to adapt.

Continuous Service Improvement (CSI) depends on that openness.

And yet, despite everything, I do not see this as a story of failure.

BlackBerry was never just about devices. It was about security – a level of encryption and trust that was ahead of its time. While the market shifted towards touchscreens and consumer-driven design, BlackBerry’s strength remained in protecting data and safeguarding communication.

That is why it still exists today.

Do I think BlackBerry will return with a new handset?

I hope so.

Because its design is timeless. You can recognise it instantly. It is classic. And it still works – I even have a friend who still uses their very first device.

But whether it returns to hardware or not, its legacy is secure.

The biggest stakeholder will always be the public. They decide what succeeds. Meeting their needs, responding effectively to incidents, and building resilient systems – that is what sustains any technology company.

I am proud of what BlackBerry was.

And I am proud of what it became.

Most importantly, I am proud of my journey.

I can say this with confidence: an African, a Black girl, walked into a Fortune 500 company that once produced the number one smartphone in the world – and she didn’t just observe.

She contributed. She tested systems. She stopped changes. She was part of something global.

And that is something no market shift can ever take away.

Botswana Development Corporation (BDC) reported a sharply wider half-year loss, as rising impairments, falling loan income and higher funding costs exposed growing strain in its core lending operations.

The state-owned investor posted a group loss of P144.9 million for the six months to December 31, compared with P34 million a year earlier, while total income fell 11 percent to P207.9 million. Operating loss widened to P126.6 million from P27.6 million, signalling a marked deterioration in underlying performance.

A significant portion of the pressure came from expected credit losses, which climbed to P77.5 million from P27.5 million. BDC attributed the spike to a reassessment of credit risk on a single investment exposure under restructuring, highlighting the concentration risk within its portfolio.

At the same time, interest income from loans, a key earnings driver, more than halved to P46.8 million from P113.2 million, reflecting weaker asset performance and reduced cash generation. Finance costs rose to P103.7 million, as the corporation drew down additional funding to support investment activity, further squeezing margins.

Operating expenses increased modestly, with administrative costs rising 9 percent, partly due to ramp-up costs linked to strategic projects including Lobatse Clay Works and Milk Valley.

The balance sheet points to a business leaning more heavily on debt to fund growth. Borrowings increased following a $20 million facility drawdown, while equity declined 3 percent due to cumulative losses. Total assets rose slightly, supported by higher cash balances from undrawn funds parked in interest-bearing instruments.

BDC is now pursuing a one-year turnaround plan focused on capital raising, asset recovery and new investments, as it seeks to reposition itself into a more catalytic investment vehicle ahead of its next strategy cycle.

Top seven (7) in Africa, seventy (70) in the world and COSAFA champions by 2036. That is Botswana Football Association (BFA)’s dream for the country’s senior football national team, the Zebras.

Leading to that, the BFA wants a competitive Zebras that will not wait more than a decade again to qualify for the Africa Cup of Nations (Afcon) finals. The team has to qualify for Afcon and reach COSAFA finals by 2032.

Though admirable, the ambitious vision is bold and difficult, yet not impossible to achieve. As it is, the current senior national team, which did duty at the last Afcon is aging. The team has an average age of 30 years. Fourteen players, making the majority of team, are aged 30-years and above.

Of the remaining twelve, eight are aged between 27 and 29-years. The remaining four players are aged 25-years and under. These are Losika Rathukudu (20), Monty Enosa (22), Tebogo Kopelang (23) and Thabo Maponda (25).

While the BFA’s vision is to have a winning Zebras in ten years, the reality they have to live with is that the current team has short legs to run on. Even four years, let alone two years, is too long to keep the current team as it is. A fusion of new blood is needed quickly to keep it competitive and make the football mad nation happy.

As such, the BFA does not have the luxury of time to develop. Their success in office is closely tied to the Zebras’ performances. Waiting a decade, when the BFA strategic framework 2036 matures to have a competitive national team, is not an option for them.

With this in mind, the BFA has a two-pronged approach to achieve its vision. The long-term approach is to develop young talents aged between twelve (12) and seventeen (17) years for the national team. These players will be aged between 22-years and 27-years and be at their prime in 2036. This is expected to start soon.

The second approach, which is already underway, is to fast track the development of some young talent which can be infused into the Zebras setup. During the recent Mukuru Four Nations tournament, the Zebras fielded a youthful team as part of this plan. As expected, from the Afcon 2025 team, only Kopelang, Enosa and Ratshukudu made it into the that team.

While the team that played in the Mukuru four nations tournament dished out some impressive performances, they are not regular players at team level. They have spent more time on the substitutes’ bench than on the field of play. This has, and continues to hamper their growth and delay their progression to the national team.

This is exacerbated by the absence of development leagues, where they would normally be expected to gain game time and continue their growth. To address this particular problem, new play rules and regulations have been formulated to give the young players much needed game time.

In the coming season, teams in all BFA governed leagues, including the FNB Botswana Premiership, will be compelled to have youth players in their lineups. This is the BFA’s attempt to ensure young players get much needed game time to fast track their development.

According to the new BFA Play Rules and Regulations, it will be mandatory for all clubs to have youth players in their starting line-ups. Premier League teams will have a minimum of ‘three (3) U23 players and minimum two (2) U20 players in the starting eleven.’

For other leagues, First Division League teams will be expected to have ‘minimum two (5) U23 players and minimum three (3) U20 players in the starting eleven,’ Regional Division One teams will have ‘minimum five (5) U20 players and minimum two (2) U17 players in the starting eleven’ and lower Regional League teams will have ‘minimum six (6) U20 players and minimum two (2) U17 players in the starting eleven.’

According to the BFA, these regulations, which come into effect on the 01st of June 2026 are mandatory. ‘A club that fails to meet the minimum starting line-up requirements shall be deemed non-compliant, and the matter shall be treated as an ineligible team selection breach,’ the regulations state.

The regulations further say teams are obliged to give the youth players in the starting line-up minutes. ‘A club shall not circumvent this Article by listing youth players in the starting line-up without intent to play them meaningfully,’ the rules state.

According to the BFA, the purpose of mandatory youth playing minutes ‘is to prevent token compliance and ensure meaningful development exposure.’ ‘Each club shall ensure that at least two (2) of its starting U20 players complete a minimum of forty-five (45) minutes of playing time each in the match.’

‘For avoidance of doubt, the obligation in Article 25.2.2 is satisfied only where: a) the player remains on the field for at least forty-five (45) minutes of match time; or b) the player is substituted due to verified injury, verified concussion protocol, or verified goalkeeper substitution necessity, recorded by the referee and match commissioner.’

‘Substituting a mandatory U20 player within the first forty-five (45) minutes for tactical reasons, time wasting, or token compliance is prohibited and constitutes a breach,’ the new rules state.

They go on to state that ‘where a club starts the required U20 players, but removes them early without permitted grounds, the club shall be deemed to have failed both the development requirement and the participation requirement, and sporting consequences shall apply.’

Where a mandatory U20 player is substituted before forty-five (45) minutes due to injury, the club will be expected to ‘replace that player with another eligible U20 player where available’ and ‘maintain at least the minimum number of U20 players on the field for the remainder of the match, unless additional injuries make this impossible.’

Under the new regulations, ‘sporting consequences,’ for failing to adhere to the rules ‘shall include forfeiture of the match, unless these Regulations expressly provide an alternative outcome or the competent authority determines otherwise on exceptional grounds.’

‘Without prejudice to the BFA disciplinary procedures, the Competition Organiser shall apply sporting consequences in accordance with a published sporting consequences matrix approved by the BFA NEC.’

Commenting on the new regulations in a post-match interview during the recent Mukuru Four Nations tournament, Zebras head coach Morena Ramoreboli said it is a welcome development.

‘It will help us because if these players at their age can play regularly, then we are able to build a strong national team. Secondly, if we are to follow trends and may be policies from other countries, you will realise that in South Africa, they have an under 23 players playing full time in the first division.’

‘It has helped to develop players for the premier league. And there is also the DStv Diski Challenge league. It helps a lot in terms of producing the under 23s, under 21s for clubs that need those players. There’s ABC Motsepe league that also has a policy of making sure that there is age restriction.’

‘So, with us, we have neighbours who are doing something in terms of may be cheating development and it is working for them. We can easily pick it and put it in place and it will work for us. For me, I think it will benefit us a lot.’

‘I think having a policy that will also be emphasising more on development will help us because it means these young boys will get competition playing regularly and it will help us. If it can be done properly, then we are good to go,’ the Zebras gaffer said.

In the space of a single week in late March and early April 2026, four separate government communications highlighted a recurring and deepening pattern in Botswana’s public administration: the use of press releases, and in one striking case a verbal presidential announcement, to give effect to measures that appear to carry regulatory force, rather than following the formal statutory procedures laid down by law. While the intent in each case is commendable, the method raises serious questions about legal certainty and the rule of law. A press release cannot create binding obligations where legislation requires action through statutory instruments published in the Government Gazette. Neither, it follows, can a statement made at a press briefing.

The first instance followed the Botswana Energy Regulatory Authority’s adjustment of fuel prices, effective 28 March 2026. On 27 March, the Ministry of Trade and Entrepreneurship issued a press release asking retailers to apply a temporary fuel surcharge at the point of sale to protect consumers. No details were provided on how the surcharge should be calculated, its duration, or the precise legal basis for enforcement. The communication was issued outside the framework of the Trading Margins Regulations.

On 31 March 2026, Government Notice No. 307 of 2026 was published under the Road Transport (Permits) Act (Cap. 69:03), revising public transport passenger fares with effect from 1 April. The new fares attracted immediate public concern. In response, the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure issued a press release suspending implementation, directing operators to revert to the previous fare structure ‘until further notice’. While a corrigendum later appeared in the Gazette, the initial suspension was conveyed solely through the press statement – raising questions about whether the Minister’s intervention aligned with the statutory allocation of authority under the Act.

On 2 April 2026, the Department of Veterinary Services notified the public, via press release, of a Foot and Mouth Disease outbreak in the Goodhope District, imposing detailed movement restrictions stated to take ‘immediate effect’. No accompanying order had been published in the Gazette under the Diseases of Animals Act (Cap. 37:01), which requires the Director to declare infected areas and prohibit movement ‘by order published in the Gazette’. A binding statutory instrument was only published days later. As with the transport fares, the legal instrument followed the public announcement – when the constitutional order of things requires precisely the reverse.

On 6 April 2026, President Duma Boko announced at a national briefing that the government had waived the requirement for motorists to renew vehicle licences and driver’s licences, citing failures in the renewal system. The Road Traffic Act and its subsidiary regulations are unambiguous: renewal is mandatory and failure to renew attracts daily penalties. Those provisions were not amended. No Statutory Instrument was gazetted. The obligation was suspended by a spoken statement – an instrument that carries no legislative authority whatsoever. This is perhaps the starkest example: a verbal announcement purporting to override an Act of Parliament.

These requirements are not mere administrative formalities. The Statutory Instruments Act (Cap. 02:11) is clear: every statutory instrument must be published in the Gazette and laid before the National Assembly. Botswana’s Constitution embeds the rule of law through its structure – Section 3 affirms fundamental rights including protection of the law, Section 10 guarantees access to an independent court, and Section 86 vests legislative power in Parliament, requiring that executive action remain within statutory bounds. Legal certainty requires that laws be clear, accessible and predictable. When obligations are created or suspended through press releases and verbal announcements, citizens cannot reliably know their legal position, and enforcement risks arbitrariness.

The practical consequences extend beyond individual cases. Unclear pricing rules, unresolved transport costs, and motorists unsure whether their expired discs are lawfully excused all create real exposure for citizens and businesses. Investors rely on stable, transparent legal processes when assessing risk. Repeated reliance on informal communications erodes confidence in the predictability of governance.

None of this suggests bad faith. The pressures of rapid response are real, and public communications serve an important role. Yet they cannot lawfully substitute for the instruments Parliament has prescribed. Where an Act or regulation requires a Gazette order, that instrument must be issued – promptly if necessary – with the press release used to supplement, not replace, it. Legal certainty is not an obstacle to effective governance; it is the foundation that makes governance legitimate and sustainable.*

Roughly 500,000 people in Botswana are experiencing insufficient food consumption, according to real-time monitoring by the World Food Programme (WFP). In a country of just over 2.5 million, the figure represents a substantial share of the population and a stark contradiction to its upper-middle-income status.

The World Food Programme’s Hunger Map indicates that most districts are currently experiencing ‘moderately high’ levels of insufficient food consumption.

Ngamiland records the highest prevalence of insufficient food consumption in the country, at 24.07%, equivalent to an estimated 41,100 people struggling to meet basic dietary needs. Across Botswana, insufficient food consumption rates cluster in a narrow but elevated band of 20% to 25%, underscoring the breadth of the crisis. Ranked from highest to lowest, North East District leads at 24.01% (42,300 people), followed by Kgalagadi District at 23.71% (13,300), Kgatleng District at 23.56% (24,800), and Chobe District at 23.18% (6,400).

Close behind are Central District at 22.98% (154,500), Southern District at 22.93% (53,200), Ghanzi District at 22.78% (12,000), and Kweneng District at 22.7% (83,300). At the lower end, though still above one-fifth of the population, South-East District posts 21.38% (84,200).

While the root causes of Botswana’s food consumption shortfalls are both domestic and external, the pressure is mounting at a particularly difficult time of renewed global food stress. International markets are tightening again, and last week the WFP warned that the Middle East war ‘will inevitably lead to rising food prices and food insecurity.’

For a country like Botswana, where the food system leans heavily on imports, that warning carries real weight on the ground. When global prices rise, the impact is felt quickly in input costs, retail food prices and, ultimately, household budgets. The burden, as the WFP noted, will fall hardest on vulnerable and import-dependent economies, translating locally into higher food inflation and reduced purchasing power for many households.

According to WFP Hunger Map, food insecurity in Botswana is structural rather than episodic, with ‘import dependency’ standing at ‘47.0%’, exposing the country to persistent external supply shocks.

According to the most recent government-backed survey (2022/23, which feeds into the 2024/25 policy cycle), nearly half of Botswana’s population (49.4%) faced moderate or severe food insecurity in 2022/23, underscoring structural constraints in access to adequate nutrition. At the extreme end, 20.2% of the population experiences severe food deprivation, reflecting acute vulnerability tied to income instability and rising living costs.

While government policy responses are scaling up, the persistence of hunger at this scale suggests deeper structural reform may be required particularly in rural livelihoods, food systems, and income distribution.