Category: Business Day

Nigeria is beginning to win the battle over macroeconomic stability but losing the argument at the household level. GDP is growing and government revenues are rising, yet millions still struggle with basic necessities. As 2027 approaches, the test is whether stability is translating into higher purchasing power, better jobs and visible services.

Figures offer hope. Real GDP expanded by 4.43 percent year-on-year in the second quarter of 2026, up from 3.89 percent in the first quarter and the strongest second-quarter performance recently. But growth remains below the administration’s 7 percent ambition. A larger economy does not automatically mean prosperity.

‘The debate should shift from what governments receive to what they deliver. Every state should publish a quarterly revenue-to-results scorecard showing Federation Account receipts, internally generated revenue, major expenditure and measurable outcomes.’

The gap is most visible in the cost of living. Headline inflation fell to 15.43 percent in July, but lower inflation does not mean lower prices; it means prices are rising more slowly. Households do not recover lost purchasing power simply because inflation moderates. The test is whether incomes are rising faster than necessities.

National averages also conceal severe state-level pressures. Adamawa recorded headline inflation of 33 percent and food inflation of 51.4 percent in July, while several other states recorded headline inflation above 20 percent. Nigerians experience the economy where they live, so national improvement can coexist with hardship in particular communities.

Nigeria entered the reform period with a huge poverty burden. The National Bureau of Statistics’ latest Multidimensional Poverty Index, based on 2021/22 data, found that 62.9 percent of Nigerians, or about 133 million people, were multidimensionally poor. Although dated, the figure illustrates the scale of deprivation from which the country is recovering.

Public finances reveal another part of the disconnect. The three tiers of government shared a record N3.007 trillion from the Federation Account in July, taking distributions for the first seven months close to N16 trillion. States alone received N943.35 billion that month. Greater revenues provide space, but allocations are not development. Citizens should see them in better schools, primary healthcare, water, roads, sanitation, transport and local economies.

The debate should shift from what governments receive to what they deliver. Every state should publish a quarterly revenue-to-results scorecard showing Federation Account receipts, internally generated revenue, major expenditure and measurable outcomes. A portion of significant increases in federal transfers should be linked to defined improvements in basic services for public scrutiny.

The government can argue that it has addressed major distortions. Petrol subsidy removal and foreign-exchange reforms have improved fiscal capacity and contributed to macroeconomic stability. But stabilisation was never the destination. It was meant to create conditions for investment, production, employment and higher living standards.

The missing link is transmission. Stronger revenues must reach households through lower production costs, more employment, higher real incomes and better services. Without that transmission, gains remain concentrated in government accounts, financial markets and economic statistics while citizens continue to experience expensive necessities.

Food should be the immediate priority. The government should set measurable targets for reducing post-harvest losses, expanding irrigation and cutting transport and storage costs along major food corridors. Agricultural programmes should publish figures for irrigation, storage capacity, rural roads rehabilitated and produce reaching markets. Security interventions should prioritise food-producing corridors where insecurity constrains supply.

Growth must also become more employment-intensive. Manufacturing, agro-processing, construction, logistics and energy need reliable power, affordable financing, efficient transport and predictable regulation. The government should track jobs created in productive sectors, including wages and retention, rather than relying on aggregate figures. Incentives should increasingly go to businesses demonstrating additional production, investment and decent employment.

The political implications are hard to ignore. Tinubu enters 2027 with the advantages of incumbency and political organisation, while a divided opposition may struggle to convert economic dissatisfaction into a coherent alternative. But political structure cannot substitute indefinitely for delivery. Voters can tolerate difficult reforms when they believe sacrifice is temporary, necessary and produces results. The danger comes when sacrifice becomes permanent while official statistics describe an economy citizens cannot recognise. The administration’s strongest defence in 2027 will therefore be evidence that reforms are improving household welfare.

That evidence should be visible before the election. The Federal Government should publish a quarterly household-welfare dashboard covering real income, food affordability, employment, poverty and access to essential services alongside GDP, inflation, reserves and revenue. States should publish equivalent scorecards, with 12- to 18-month targets for food affordability, job creation and basic-service delivery. Ministries and states should publicly explain missed targets.

Nigeria does not need to pretend its reforms have failed, nor should critics pretend nothing has changed. Progress is clearly real. But stabilisation is valuable only if it improves people’s lives. Nigerians experience the economy through food prices, transport costs, salaries after rent and school fees, jobs, hospitals and education.

Nigeria has begun the difficult work of stabilisation. It must now complete the more important work of delivery. The real measure of reform is not whether the economy is bigger on paper, but whether growth becomes income, income becomes purchasing power and public revenue becomes services citizens can see, use and trust. That is the economic dividend Nigerians are waiting for and the dividend that will matter most in 2027.

It is the latest sign of how difficult it has become to build a sustainable ride-hailing business in Africa, where demand for affordable mobility is growing but the economics of providing it are becoming increasingly challenging.

The US-based company announced on Wednesday that it would wind down its operations in Nigeria and Uganda effective September 2, following a review of its business priorities and investment focus across the continent.

‘After careful consideration, we have made the difficult decision to discontinue operations in Nigeria and Uganda as part of evolving business priorities and investment focus across the continent,’ Uber said in a statement.

The exits come less than a year after it withdrew from Côte d’Ivoire in September 2025 and months after it left Tanzania in January 2026.

The latest decisions mean Uber has exited four African markets in roughly a year, leaving it operating in South Africa, Kenya, Ghana, Egypt and Morocco.

Uber, however, is not abandoning Africa.

The company said it remains committed to sub-Saharan Africa and is focusing its investments on markets where it believes it can create the most value for drivers through scale while providing riders with seamless transportation.

The question, therefore, is not simply why Uber is leaving Nigeria and Uganda.

It is why some African ride-hailing markets have become so difficult to make profitable.

Africa has the demand, but the economics are difficult

On the surface, the continent appears to offer an attractive market for ride-hailing.

Rapid urbanisation, growing smartphone adoption, youthful populations, inadequate public transportation in many cities and rising demand for convenient mobility should provide fertile ground for platforms connecting passengers with drivers.

But demand for rides does not necessarily translate into sustainable returns.

At the heart of the problem is a mismatch between what passengers can afford to pay and what drivers need to earn.

Fuel, vehicle maintenance, insurance and other operating costs have risen across several African markets, while inflation and currency depreciation have reduced consumers’ purchasing power.

In Nigeria, the removal of the petrol subsidy sharply increased transportation costs, while the naira’s depreciation has made vehicles, spare parts and other inputs more expensive.

That pressure runs through the entire ride-hailing chain.

Passengers want cheaper fares. Drivers need higher earnings. Platforms need enough passengers and drivers to keep their networks functioning while remaining price competitive.

Ibrahim Ayoade, general secretary of the Amalgamated Union of App-Based Transporters of Nigeria (AUATON), said rising operating costs have made the business increasingly difficult for drivers.

‘Rising fuel prices, inflation, vehicle maintenance costs and the depreciation of the naira have all increased the cost of operating a ride-hailing vehicle,’ Ayoade said.

He said many drivers also struggle to maintain or replace their vehicles. ‘Many of the vehicles operating on these platforms are old. A lot of drivers do not have the financial capacity to repair or replace them.’

That creates a structural problem for platforms built around independent drivers.

Although the platforms do not own most of the vehicles, the quality, availability and reliability of those vehicles ultimately determine the quality of the service they can offer.

A graveyard of ride-hailing apps

Uber’s retreat comes against the backdrop of a long list of ride-hailing platforms that have struggled to survive in Africa’s most populous nation.

More than 2,500 ride-hailing apps have attempted to enter the Nigerian market since Uber arrived in 2014, according to AUATON.

Many did not survive.

Among the platforms that have disappeared or become inactive are Oga Taxi, Smart Ride, Alpha1, GLT, RideMe, Tripz, Go247, T-Cab, Taxigo, MotionPlus, Gidicab, Soole, Easy Taxi and Afro Cab.

Their failures signals that Uber’s difficulties are not simply the result of being a foreign company operating in a difficult market.

They point to a deeper challenge with the economics of ride-hailing itself.

A platform needs large numbers of drivers and passengers before its network becomes efficient. More drivers reduce waiting times, while more passengers create greater earning opportunities for drivers.

That network effect makes scale critical – and makes the market particularly difficult for new entrants.

Developing a ride-hailing app is relatively straightforward.

Building a network of thousands of reliable drivers and enough passengers to keep those drivers busy is considerably harder.

Competition can become a race to the bottom

The economics become even more challenging when several platforms compete for the same passengers and drivers.

Nigeria’s market has been dominated by Uber, Bolt and inDrive, each using different strategies to attract users.

inDrive, for instance, allows passengers and drivers to negotiate fares, putting additional pressure on conventional pricing models.

Ayoade said intense competition has pushed prices lower as platforms fight to attract passengers.

‘Competition drives down prices because platforms have to lower fares to attract passengers,’ he said.

But cheaper rides do not necessarily translate into a healthier industry.

The cost of providing the service does not fall at the same pace as fares.

Drivers still have to buy fuel, maintain their vehicles, pay for repairs and absorb depreciation regardless of how much a passenger pays.

The result can be a race to the bottom in which platforms compete for market share while drivers absorb much of the pressure through lower earnings.

This is particularly problematic in markets where vehicle ownership is expensive and access to affordable financing is limited.

Regulation adds another layer of pressure

Regulation has also shaped the fortunes of ride-hailing platforms across Africa.

Uber’s experience in Tanzania provides one of the clearest examples.

The company spent years dealing with regulatory disagreements over fares and commissions. The east African nation introduced regulated fares, including minimum prices per kilometre and minute, while regulators capped the commission ride-hailing platforms could charge drivers at 15 percent.

Uber had previously suspended its Tanzanian operations in 2022 before returning in 2023. It eventually withdrew again in January 2026.

The experience illustrates the difficult balance governments face.

Authorities want to protect passengers and drivers from unfair pricing and working conditions, but regulations that materially change the economics of a platform can affect whether international operators consider a market commercially viable.

Nigeria has its own regulatory pressures.

Ayoade pointed to commission structures, vehicle standards and restrictions affecting e-hailing operations at airports as challenges facing the sector.

However, Uber has said its Nigerian exit was not related to the recent Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria directive concerning e-hailing operations at airports.

Instead, the company attributed the decision to its evolving business priorities and investment focus across the continent.

That shows that Uber’s Nigerian withdrawal is broader than any single regulatory dispute.

Why Uber is staying in some African markets

Uber’s remaining African markets offer an important clue about the strategy behind its retreat.

The company is not leaving the continent altogether. It is becoming more selective about where it deploys capital.

Uber continues to operate in South Africa, Kenya, Ghana, Egypt and Morocco – markets that offer different combinations of urban scale, consumer demand, purchasing power, regulatory environments and growth opportunities.

Charles Robertson, London-based chief economist at Renaissance Capital, noted the apparent concentration of Uber’s remaining African operations in some of the continent’s more developed or industrialised markets.

‘Interesting. So Uber is still operating in SA, which hit the @TTTEconomist metrics for industrialisation in the 20th century, and Egypt, Kenya and Ghana, which are the only African countries to hit the metrics between 2019 and 2034,’ Robertson said in social media platform X.

A global restructuring is changing Uber’s priorities

The African exits also coincide with a broader restructuring at Uber.

The company announced plans on Wednesday to cut about 3,300 jobs, representing roughly 10 percent of its workforce, as it simplifies its organisational structure and reduces management layers.

Dara Khosrowshahi, CEO of Uber, said the company’s rapid growth had created additional layers of management, coordination and fragmented ownership that it no longer needs at its current scale.

The savings are expected to be redirected towards the company’s core products, payments to drivers and couriers and emerging areas such as autonomous mobility.

That means Uber is making choices not only about where it operates, but where its capital can generate the strongest returns. Its decision to remain in five African markets while withdrawing from four others therefore looks less like a complete retreat from the continent and more like a rationalisation of its footprint.

Will Uber’s exit make rides more expensive?

For Nigerian consumers, one immediate question is whether Uber’s departure will lead to higher ride-hailing fares.

Ayoade believes it could.

‘I expect prices could increase, because pricing has always been a major issue in the ride-hailing industry,’ he said.

But higher prices are not guaranteed.

Bolt, inDrive and other operators still have an incentive to keep fares competitive as they compete for the customers Uber leaves behind.

The bigger question is whether the remaining platforms can maintain affordable fares while giving drivers enough income to keep their vehicles on the road.

That is the fundamental tension in Nigeria’s ride-hailing market.

The co-founder of AUATON argues that regulation could help create a more sustainable pricing framework by ensuring fares reflect the actual cost of providing transportation.

‘There has to be a price that makes it viable for drivers to operate,’ he said, arguing that fares should account for fuel, vehicle wear and tear, maintenance and other operating costs.

The bigger lesson from Uber’s retreat

Uber’s African retreat does not mean the continent lacks demand for ride-hailing.

If anything, the opposite is true.

The demand is clear. The challenge is converting that demand into a business model that works simultaneously for passengers, drivers and platforms.

Nigeria’s experience is particularly revealing.

Thousands of platforms have attempted to enter the market, but only a handful have achieved meaningful scale. Uber itself survived 12 years in Africa’s third biggest economy, built a recognisable brand and established a substantial driver and customer network, yet has now concluded that its investment priorities lie elsewhere.

Its departure leaves fewer major players competing for passengers and drivers and raises a broader question for the companies that remain:

Can Africa’s ride-hailing platforms offer affordable transportation while generating enough returns to keep drivers, vehicles and investors in the business?

For Uber, the answer appears to depend increasingly on choosing markets where that equation works.

For Africa’s ride-hailing industry, finding that balance may be the real test of whether the sector can move from rapid expansion to sustainable growth.

The Kano State Centre for Disease Control (KNCDC) has turned to traditional institutions to drive community acceptance of vaccination and curb the spread of diphtheria following a recent outbreak in Rano Local Government Area.

The move reflects growing concern that low immunisation coverage, delayed presentation at health facilities and reliance on informal treatment could undermine efforts to contain the infectious disease and expose more communities to transmission.

Muhammad Adamu-Abbas, director-general of KNCDC, made the appeal during a meeting with district heads under the Kano Emirate Council in Kano, where he urged traditional leaders to use their networks to promote vaccination and ensure early reporting of suspected cases.

Adamu-Abbas said increased vaccine uptake remained critical to preventing further transmission, particularly among children who are more vulnerable to the consequences of inadequate routine immunisation.

He said many of the diphtheria cases recorded in the state involved children who had either missed routine vaccinations, received treatment from patent medicine vendors or traditional healers, or arrived at health facilities after the disease had progressed.

The KNCDC director-general urged district heads to intensify sensitisation at the grassroots, stressing that residents should seek medical attention immediately when symptoms associated with the disease emerge.

He also appealed to traditional medicine practitioners and barbers, known locally as Wanzamai, to refrain from attempting to treat suspected diphtheria cases or carrying out interventions that could delay access to appropriate medical care.

‘Suspected cases should be referred immediately to health facilities,’ Adamu-Abbas told the traditional leaders, stressing the importance of early detection and treatment in controlling the outbreak.

The engagement with the traditional institution comes amid concerns over casualties associated with the recent outbreak in Rano and the potential for the disease to spread to neighbouring communities.

Traditional leaders, according to the KNCDC, occupy a critical position in Kano’s community mobilisation structure because of their influence over village and ward-level leadership.

Responding to the appeal, Bashir Dankadai, Dankadai of Kano, assured the disease control agency that the traditional institution would support the vaccination campaign and community response to diphtheria.

Dankadai said district heads would mobilise village heads, known as Dagatai, who would subsequently engage ward heads, or Masu Unguwanni, to take the vaccination and disease-awareness campaign to residents.

He said the traditional institution would also caution traditional healers and barbers against interfering with the treatment of suspected diphtheria cases.

According to him, the traditional leadership structure would work with KNCDC to encourage residents to present suspected cases at health facilities promptly rather than relying on unverified treatment methods.

The collaboration is expected to strengthen surveillance at the community level, allowing suspected cases to be identified and reported more quickly while improving public understanding of the importance of vaccination.

The latest mobilisation drive also comes against the backdrop of a request by KNCDC for the urgent supply of nine million doses of vaccines to strengthen the state’s capacity to contain diphtheria.

The request underscores the scale of the public health challenge facing Kano, one of Nigeria’s most populous states and a major commercial centre with densely populated urban and rural communities.

In response to the outbreak and concerns about its possible spread, the Federal Ministry of Health deployed 500,000 doses of vaccines to Kano and Katsina states, alongside a special task force to coordinate surveillance and rapid response activities.

The deployment is aimed at supporting state-level efforts to identify cases, vaccinate vulnerable populations and prevent further transmission.

Diphtheria is a vaccine-preventable bacterial infection that can spread through respiratory droplets and close contact. Its prevention depends heavily on high vaccination coverage, while early diagnosis and appropriate treatment are important once infection is suspected.

For Kano, health officials are now relying not only on medical facilities and emergency response teams but also on the state’s traditional leadership network to close gaps between public health interventions and communities.

The involvement of district, village and ward heads could prove particularly important in communities where residents may be more responsive to messages delivered through trusted local authorities.

Health authorities are therefore expected to sustain surveillance and vaccination activities while encouraging families to ensure that children receive routine immunisation and that suspected infections are reported without delay.

The KNCDC’s engagement with the traditional institution signals a shift towards a broader community-led response, with officials seeking to address both the availability of vaccines and the behavioural factors that can delay treatment and facilitate the spread of preventable diseases.

The Nasiru Yusuf Gawuna campaign organisation has dismissed reports that a group described as ‘Gawuna’s bigwigs’ has defected from the Nigeria Democratic Congress (NDC) to the All Progressives Congress (APC), insisting that the individuals had severed ties with the former Kano State governorship candidate months ago.

The clarification comes amid renewed political realignments in Kano ahead of the 2027 general elections, with politicians and political groups repositioning themselves as alliances that shaped the 2023 election continue to undergo major changes.

The Gawuna campaign team said the individuals currently being portrayed as members of his political camp were no longer part of his official structure and should not be presented as representatives of his political organisation.

The clarification followed reports linking the group to a recent solidarity visit to Governor Abba Kabir Yusuf, with suggestions that their movement from the NDC towards the APC represented a significant political setback for Gawuna and his allies.

However, Saleh Adamu Kwaru, Director-General and Chairman of the Gawuna Campaign Coordinating Team, said the affected individuals had left the structure in June after their personal demands were rejected by Gawuna.

According to Kwaru, the separation was not triggered by the recent political developments in Kano but followed disagreements over what he described as personal political interests.

The campaign team further alleged that members of the group had independently initiated discussions with the African Democratic Congress (ADC), seeking to persuade Gawuna to accept the party’s governorship ticket for the 2027 election.

The alleged discussions, according to the statement, were conducted without Gawuna’s prior knowledge, consent or authorisation.

The group was also accused of attempting to secure political concessions for itself as part of the proposed arrangement.

Kwaru alleged that the individuals presented the ADC as a platform that would finance Gawuna’s governorship campaign, while legislative positions and other political opportunities would be made available to members of the group.

The negotiations reportedly failed after Gawuna declined to participate in the arrangement.

The campaign team said the development subsequently led members of the group to explore alternative political platforms, including efforts to return to the APC.

‘While three members of their circle chose to remain within the NDC structure, the rest continued their political shopping spree,’ the statement said.

The Gawuna camp maintained that the political movement of the individuals should therefore not be interpreted as a defection by Gawuna’s political structure or as an indication that his support base was collapsing.

It said its campaign organisation for the 2027 election had been developed independently of the individuals in question and remained operational.

‘Our operational strategies, campaign structures, and internal systems were fully established independent of these defecting individuals,’ the statement said.

The campaign team also sought to allay concerns that the departure of the individuals could expose sensitive information about Gawuna’s political operations or compromise preparations for the next election.

It said the political organisation had continued to strengthen its grassroots structures and attract politicians, community leaders and mobilisers from across Kano State.

According to the campaign team, new political figures and grassroots supporters were joining the Gawuna political family across the state’s 44 local government areas.

It argued that the continued expansion of the political network had more than compensated for the departure of the individuals now associated with the latest realignment.

Kano’s shifting political landscape

The development is unfolding against the backdrop of one of the most significant political realignments in Kano since the 2023 governorship election.

The 2023 election produced one of the closest political contests in the state in recent years, with Gawuna, who contested on the APC platform, challenging Abba Kabir Yusuf of the NNPP.

Yusuf emerged as the declared winner of the election, defeating Gawuna in a contest that subsequently generated prolonged legal battles over the result.

The dispute eventually reached the Supreme Court, which affirmed Yusuf’s victory, bringing an end to the major judicial challenge surrounding the governorship election.

The political landscape that emerged after the election, however, did not remain static.

Yusuf’s political movement away from the NNPP and his subsequent alignment with the APC fundamentally altered the configuration of Kano politics.

His move to the APC in January 2026 brought him into the same political platform on which Gawuna had contested the 2023 governorship election.

The development has created new political calculations within the state, particularly among politicians who were previously divided along NNPP and APC lines.

For the APC, the movement has potentially brought together political interests that were on opposite sides of the 2023 election, while simultaneously creating fresh questions over the future of politicians and support groups previously aligned with either camp.

The latest controversy involving individuals associated with the Gawuna political family is therefore taking place within a broader period of political repositioning.

With the 2027 elections approaching, political actors in Kano are expected to continue reassessing their alliances, platforms and electoral strategies.

The emergence and strengthening of alternative political platforms, including the ADC, has also added another layer to the political competition.

For Gawuna’s camp, however, the latest movement does not represent a weakening of its political machinery.

Kwaru said the campaign organisation remained focused on expanding its support base and consolidating its structures ahead of 2027.

The campaign team urged residents, political observers and media organisations to distinguish between individuals who had previously worked within Gawuna’s political network and those who currently constitute his official campaign structure.

It also warned against associating the individuals involved in the latest political movement with Gawuna without verification.

The campaign organisation said its focus remained on building a broad political movement capable of competing effectively in 2027 rather than being distracted by the movement of individual politicians.

The dispute also highlights the growing importance of political structures and grassroots networks as parties prepare for the next election.

In Kano, where political contests are often heavily influenced by local networks, community leaders and ward-level mobilisation, the ability of political actors to retain and expand grassroots support could become crucial as the 2027 election approaches.

While the Gawuna campaign team insists that the latest exit has no significant effect on its political strength, the competing movements among politicians indicate that Kano’s political alliances remain fluid.

The next electoral contest is likely to be shaped not only by party platforms but also by the ability of political camps to attract influential figures, maintain grassroots structures and navigate the changing alliances created by the state’s evolving political landscape.

For now, the Gawuna campaign organisation says it remains firmly committed to its preparations for 2027 and has rejected suggestions that the reported movement of former associates constitutes a setback to its political ambitions.

At dawn in Kano, a truck loaded with shea kernels begins another long journey.

The kernels will cross borders, pass through ports and eventually reach factories far from the women who harvested them. Somewhere else, they will become cosmetics, food ingredients or industrial inputs. The finished product will return to consumers at a price many times higher.

The same story repeats across Africa.

Cocoa leaves Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire as beans. Cashew leaves West Africa for processing in Asia. Cotton leaves the continent before becoming fabric. Hides and skins leave as raw materials while African designers import finished leather. Coffee is exported as green beans while cafés elsewhere capture the premium attached to roasting, branding and retail.

The uncomfortable question is not why Africa exports commodities. It should ask why so much of the economic chain remains elsewhere.

United Nations Trade and Development estimates that commodities accounted for 32.7% of international trade between 2021 and 2023. Across Africa, the problem is particularly acute: the continent’s top 10 export products account for almost half of total exports, with basic commodities dominating the list.

This is the central opportunity behind Africa’s next industrial chapter. The prize is not simply producing more. It is building the businesses, factories, logistics networks, brands and distribution systems around what Africa already produces.

The factory is only the beginning

For too long, industrialisation has been reduced to the image of a large factory with smokestacks. But a functioning local value chain is much bigger.

It begins with the farmer, miner, fisher or artisan. It moves through aggregation, storage, processing, packaging, finance, logistics and quality control. Then come wholesalers, distributors, retailers, digital marketplaces, brands and consumers.

Every link creates an economic transaction. Every transaction creates an opportunity for another African business. This is where the Go Local proposition becomes more interesting than the familiar argument for ‘value addition’.

Take agriculture.

A farmer growing tomatoes is not operating an industrial value chain. A network that aggregates tomatoes, grades them, stores them, processes them into paste, packages the paste, distributes it through supermarkets and neighbourhood shops, and sells it to restaurants and institutional buyers is.

The difference is enormous. The first produces a crop. The second produces an economy. The same logic applies to cassava, cocoa, pineapple, hibiscus, egusi, ginger, shea, cotton, leather and dozens of other African commodities.

Africa already has the market

The common objection is that African markets are too fragmented. That is precisely why the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) matters.

AfCFTA creates a framework for a continental market in goods and services and is intended to facilitate regional value chains, investment and the movement of capital. There is already evidence that African businesses trade more manufactured products with one another than the continent exports to the wider world.

Between 2019 and 2023, manufactured goods represented 46% of intra-African exports, compared with 21% for food, 20% for fuels and 7% for ores and metals, according to the UN Economic Commission for Africa.

That number deserves more attention. It suggests that when Africans trade with Africans, the continent is already moving further up the value chain. The opportunity is to expand it.

A textile producer in Ghana does not need to sell only to Europe. Its market could include Nigeria, Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire and Kenya.

A Nigerian food processor does not need to think only about Nigeria’s 200-million-plus consumers. It should be thinking about supermarkets, hotels, restaurants and distributors across West Africa.

A Kenyan manufacturer should be asking what can be supplied into Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and the wider East African market. The African market is not merely an export destination. It is the industrial laboratory.

The missing middle

Yet there is a reason the opportunity remains largely unrealised. Africa has farms without processors, processors without reliable suppliers, manufacturers without distributors and producers without dependable markets. The missing ingredient is often not entrepreneurship. It is coordination.

UNCTAD’s recent work on regional value chains identifies high transport costs and poor connectivity as major constraints. In one firm-level example, transport costs increased the price of inputs from roughly $4 per tonne to $42, enough to undermine the commercial viability of regional sourcing.

This is why simply telling African entrepreneurs to ‘add value’ is inadequate. A farmer cannot build a cold chain alone. A small processor cannot finance a multimillion-dollar industrial park.

A fashion designer cannot create a competitive textile industry alone. A manufacturer cannot solve an unreliable electricity supply, border bureaucracy and expensive logistics simultaneously. The industrial opportunity lies in building systems around entrepreneurs.

Shared processing facilities. Industrial clusters. Aggregation centres. Cold storage. Testing laboratories. Warehouses. Reliable power. Packaging plants. Digital marketplaces. Regional logistics. Trade finance.

These are not peripheral infrastructure. They are the businesses of industrialisation. The commodity opportunity is bigger than the commodity Consider Africa’s critical minerals.

UNCTAD estimates that Africa exported about $176bn of critical minerals in 2024. Globally, critical-mineral exports were worth roughly $2.25tn.

The question is no longer whether Africa possesses valuable minerals. It does. The question is how much of the battery, electronics, energy and industrial ecosystem those minerals can support. The same principle applies to agriculture.

Cocoa should not end with cocoa beans. Cashew should not end with kernels. Cotton should not end with lint. Milk should not end with raw milk.

Pineapple should not end with fruit. Hibiscus should not end with dried flowers. Each commodity is a platform for an ecosystem. That ecosystem can include processors, equipment manufacturers, packaging companies, laboratories, transporters, software providers, financial institutions, retailers and exporters. This is how a commodity becomes an economy.

The retailers are already telling us something

There is another opportunity hiding in plain sight: the African shelf.

Across Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, Rwanda and South Africa, supermarkets, specialist retailers, pharmacies, restaurants and digital commerce platforms are increasingly carrying locally produced food, beauty, fashion and household brands.

That matters because production without distribution is not industrialisation. The final mile is where economic value becomes visible.

A Nigerian processor that turns hibiscus into a branded beverage has created more than a factory. It has created demand for farmers, packaging companies, transporters, marketers, distributors, retailers and digital payment providers.

The shelf becomes the meeting point between industrial policy and household consumption. And this is where local manufacturing becomes sustainable.

Factories need customers. Customers need products. Products need distribution. Distribution needs reliable suppliers. Suppliers need markets. The chain feeds itself.

The African industrial strategy should therefore be different

Africa does not need to reproduce every industry in every country. It needs to identify where each economy has a genuine advantage and then connect those advantages across borders.

Zambia can deepen copper processing. The Democratic Republic Congo can move further into mineral refining and battery-related industries.

Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire can deepen cocoa processing. Nigeria can build larger agricultural, petrochemical, pharmaceutical and consumer-manufacturing ecosystems.

Kenya can deepen horticulture, textiles and digital services. Ethiopia can expand leather and apparel. Morocco has already demonstrated how deliberate industrial policy can integrate domestic production into European automotive supply chains.

The lesson is not to copy Morocco. It is to recognise the principle: industrial capability is built deliberately.

UNCTAD’s recent work on value addition reaches a similar conclusion. Domestic processing can increase revenues, employment, technological capability and resilience, but requires coherent policy, infrastructure, skills, finance and market access.

The opportunity Africa keeps overlooking

The next African industrial champions might not begin by building giant factories. They might begin by solving one missing link. A cold-storage company preventing vegetables from spoiling. A packaging manufacturer replacing imported containers. A logistics platform connecting farmers to processors. A local bank financing inventory. A company turning agricultural waste into industrial inputs. A regional distributor moving Nigerian products into Ghana. A fashion manufacturer connecting cotton farmers to textile mills and designers. A retailer deciding that its shelves should become a launchpad for African brands.

These businesses look small when viewed individually. Together, they constitute an industrial system. And that is the deeper Go Local opportunity.

Africa does not lack raw materials. It does not lack entrepreneurs. It does not lack consumers. It does not even lack examples of companies proving what is possible.

What it lacks is enough connected local chains. The task now is to build them. Because the greatest economic prize is not the commodity beneath African soil, nor the crop growing on African farms.

It is the chain of value between the farm and the final customer. And for too long, Africa has been leaving that chain for someone else to build. The next phase of Go Local is therefore not simply ‘make it here.’

It is: Grow it here. Process it here. Finance it here. Move it here. Brand it here. Sell it here. And, when the product is ready, export the finished value to the world. That is how local production becomes a local economy. And eventually, an African industrial economy.

Nigeria’s housing shortage has long been a headline number, but for the first time in years, the country has something close to a reliable figure to work with.

A federal technical committee set up under the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development and working with the World Bank on methodology put the national deficit at 14.9 million housing units for 2025, replacing decades of estimates that swung anywhere from 17 million to 28 million units.

A separate assessment using an ‘Adequate Housing Index’ found a further 15.2 million existing homes fall short of basic standards for water, sanitation, electricity or safety.

Osun State sits inside that national picture, and recent activity suggests it is becoming one of the more closely watched markets in the South-West.

The Federal Housing Authority broke ground this year on a 241-unit estate in Osogbo, developed on 33.3 hectares along the East Bypass through a public-private partnership with Summit Group Limited one of several such federal housing pushes launched across the country in 2026 alongside similar projects in Ogun, Abia, Akwa Ibom and Kaduna states. The project is designed as a mixed-use development, combining residential units with commercial space and recreational facilities.

For private developers, the appeal of a state like Osun is straightforward: land is more available and comparatively affordable next to Lagos and Ibadan, the state sits on a major South-West corridor, and government-backed projects are already testing the market and building supporting infrastructure.

But the sector’s obstacles are also well known. Mortgage penetration in Nigeria remains below 1 percent of GDP compared to roughly 31 percent in South Africa and 77 percent in the United States which means most housing in the country is still financed out of pocket rather than through structured lending. Land titling is another persistent constraint: as of a few years ago, over 60 percent of Nigeria’s land area lacked formal title, and a majority of landlords nationally do not hold documented title to their property.

Adekunle Ibraheem, chairman of the Real Estate Developers Association of Nigeria (REDAN) Osun State Chapter and CEO of Evermark Homes, says these are the two issues developers in the state raise most often.

‘Access to structured financing and clarity around land titling are what determine whether a project gets built or stays on paper,’ he said.

‘We’re seeing genuine interest in Osun, but developers need policy support that matches that interest faster approvals, clearer title processes, and financing instruments that don’t rely entirely on personal capital.’

He argues that the state’s relatively lower entry costs, compared to Lagos, make it an attractive testing ground for mid-income housing models rather than only luxury developments.

‘The opportunity in Osun isn’t in replicating Lagos-style luxury estates. It’s in building housing stock that middle-income earners and young families can actually afford, at scale,’ he said.

Analysts tracking the broader market expect Nigeria’s real estate sector to keep growing one recent estimate put the market at roughly $32 billion in 2025, rising toward $40 billion by 2030 but note that growth will be uneven across states, shaped by which local governments move fastest on land reform and infrastructure. For now, Osun’s combination of federal pilot projects, available land, and an active REDAN chapter pushing for policy engagement puts it on the list of states worth watching as Nigeria works through its housing shortfall.

A political controversy has erupted over an alleged $3 million offer reportedly made to Von Batten in an apparent attempt to halt a campaign concerning allegations involving President Bola Tinubu.

In a statement attributed to him, Von Batten alleged that he received unsolicited offers amounting to $3 million, alongside an invitation to a confidential meeting in London, from what he described as a ‘highly placed individual’ whom he had been informed was connected to President Tinubu.

According to the statement, Von Batten claimed the approach was believed to be an attempt to persuade him to discontinue his campaign relating to what he described as President Tinubu’s alleged heroin-trafficking records.

Von Batten further alleged that he rejected the offer and preserved copies of the communications.

He stated that he subsequently contacted members of former Vice President Atiku Abubakar’s campaign to establish the nature of the alleged intermediary’s relationship with the Nigerian president.

He also alleged that a smear campaign against him began shortly after he rejected the proposal.

The allegations, however, have not been independently verified. The identity of the individual said to have made the offer was not disclosed in the statement, and there was no publicly presented evidence establishing that the alleged approach was authorised by President Tinubu or his administration.

Von Batten said he intends to provide the alleged $3 million offer and related communications to the US Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation for review.

The development could add another layer to the continuing political disputes surrounding allegations concerning President Tinubu, particularly as the claims intersect with Nigeria’s domestic political contest and scrutiny from actors in the United States.

Von Batten concluded his statement by addressing Tinubu, the All Progressives Congress and their associates, saying: ‘Thank you for the offer, but no thanks.’

The allegations are likely to attract further attention if the purported communications are formally submitted to US authorities or independently authenticated.

Pivot Integrated Energy Services Limited has completed its first commercial paper issuance, raising N100.08 billion after its N100 billion Series 1 offer under a N300 billion Commercial Paper Programme was oversubscribed by investors.

The transaction marks Pivot’s entry into Nigeria’s debt capital market and provides the company with additional funding for its downstream energy operations.

The proceeds will support the company’s activities in the trading, storage, distribution and supply of refined petroleum products across Nigeria and selected African markets.

The response from institutional and sophisticated investors also points to demand for opportunities in Nigeria’s energy sector, particularly as companies seek funding to expand their operations.

Babajide Babatope, Managing Director of Pivot Integrated Energy Services, said the transaction marked a new stage in the company’s development.

‘Today marks a defining chapter in Pivot’s growth story. Entering Nigeria’s debt capital market for the first time and achieving an oversubscription is an extraordinary milestone for the Company. It validates the strength of the platform we have built, the confidence investors have in our business and the opportunities ahead of us.’

He said the funds would help Pivot execute its growth plans and expand its operations.

‘We are proud and humbled by the confidence demonstrated by our investors. This successful issuance provides us with additional funding capacity to execute our growth strategy, strengthen our operations and scale our business across Nigeria and selected African markets. We remain firmly focused on building a leading, resilient and sustainable downstream energy business.’

Pathway Advisors Limited served as the Transaction Sponsor, Financial Adviser, Lead Issuing House and Lead Arranger for the issuance.

The advisory firm said the transaction demonstrated investor confidence in Pivot’s business model, management team and financial position.

Adekunle Alade, Founder and Chief Executive Officer of Pathway Advisors, said the outcome showed the level of confidence investors had placed in the company.

‘Debut issuances are always the ultimate test of market confidence. Pivot passed that test emphatically. The level of demand recorded for this maiden N100 billion Commercial Paper issuance is a powerful endorsement of the Company’s fundamentals, its management team and the strength of the investment proposition presented to the market.’

Alade said Pathway Advisors would continue to support Pivot as it accesses the remaining capacity under its N300 billion Commercial Paper Programme.

‘This is a landmark achievement for Pivot and a significant milestone for Nigeria’s commercial paper market. We are particularly proud to have played a central role in bringing Pivot successfully into the debt capital market, and we look forward to supporting the Company through the subsequent phases of its N300 billion Commercial Paper Programme.’

The transaction involved a group of financial institutions across the Nigerian capital market.

The Joint Arrangers were Coronation Merchant Bank, Quantum Zenith Capital and Investments Limited, FCMB Capital Markets Limited, AIICO Capital Limited, FSDH Capital Limited, FSL Capital Limited, Greenwich Capital Markets Limited, United Capital Limited, Mainstreet Capital Limited, Rand Merchant Bank and First Ally Advisory Limited.

ProvidusUnity Bank and Fidelity Bank Plc acted as Collecting and Paying Agents, while Globus Bank Limited and Polaris Bank Limited also participated in the transaction. Alliance Law Firm served as Solicitor.

The issuance forms part of Pivot’s plans to increase its funding capacity as it continues to operate across the downstream energy value chain.

For Pivot, the N100.08 billion subscription provides a route to further capital-market funding under its N300 billion programme. For investors, the transaction marks another example of institutional capital being deployed to support businesses operating in Nigeria’s energy market.

Pathway Advisors said the investors included Pension Fund Administrators, insurance companies, commercial and merchant banks, asset management companies, investment funds and corporate treasuries.

‘Their strong response represents more than successful subscription; it is a powerful endorsement of Pivot’s business model, management capabilities, growth strategy and credit fundamentals,’ Alade said.

Johnson Kokumo, director-general of the National Centre for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (NCCSALW), has dismissed as false allegations circulating in a viral video that suspects arrested over the seizure of illegal arms at the Tin Can Island Port were allegedly sponsored by Nuhu Ribadu, National Security Adviser (NSA).

Kokumo described the claims as baseless, saying he was personally present when the Nigerian Customs Service (NCS) intercepted and subsequently handed over 399 assorted automatic weapons to the centre for investigation and safe custody.

The NCCSALW director-general spoke on Tuesday in Abuja at the joint security spokespersons briefing, where he provided details of the seizure and ongoing investigation into the alleged illegal importation of the weapons.

‘The story in the video is not correct and cannot be correct,’ Kokumo said.

He explained that he personally accompanied the Comptroller-General of the Nigeria Customs Service to the Tin Can Island Port during the handover of the seized weapons to the centre.

‘I was at the Tin Can Island Port with the Comptroller-General; 399 assorted automatic weapons were intercepted by the Nigerian Customs Service at the port. And this cache of arms, illegal weapons, was handed over to the centre.

‘I was not there in a representative capacity; I was there personally. And the Comptroller-General, of course, was also present personally to do the handing over,’ he said.

According to Kokumo, the seized weapons have since been secured in an armoury, while two suspects arrested in connection with the alleged illegal importation remain in custody.

He said investigations were ongoing to establish the full network behind the arms shipment, including possible links to international criminal groups.

‘As I’m talking to you, the arms are in a secured armoury. Two suspects arrested in connection with the illegal importation are currently in custody.

‘Investigation is ongoing with a view to bringing to book the criminal elements in Nigeria and possibly identifying their international criminal partners outside the shores of Nigeria,’ he said.

Kokumo also raised concerns over the contents of the viral video, saying it went beyond making allegations and allegedly called for violence against the NSA and other individuals.

He therefore urged Nigerians to disregard the claims, insisting that the facts surrounding the seizure and custody of the weapons were verifiable.

‘So, what has gone viral in the video is not correct and cannot be correct,’ he said.

Kokumo further disclosed that the Federal Government had continued to destroy recovered illicit weapons as part of measures to prevent them from being diverted back into criminal circulation.

He said the destruction programme was also consistent with Nigeria’s obligations under international and regional agreements on the control and elimination of illicit small arms and light weapons.

These, he said, included conventions and agreements under the United Nations, African Union and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

Kokumo said destroying recovered weapons was particularly important given the potential consequences of allowing such weapons to re-enter the illicit market.

‘And of course, another reason for destroying them is to also ensure that the weapons so recovered do not find their way back into the hands of non-state actors for use on innocent citizens of Nigeria,’ he said.

He disclosed that the centre’s Second Quarter Arms Destruction Exercise for 2026, held on July 30 at the Muhammadu Buhari Cantonment, Giri, Abuja, resulted in the public destruction of 1,419 illicit weapons.

The latest exercise, he said, increased the cumulative number of illicit weapons destroyed by the centre since 2022 to more than 19,000.

Kokumo further disclosed that the centre received 5,050 illicit, unserviceable, decommissioned and obsolete assorted automatic weapons retrieved from the Nigeria Police Force in June 2026.

He said the weapons were transferred to the centre as part of ongoing efforts to ensure that recovered and obsolete firearms were properly accounted for and prevented from being diverted into criminal hands.

He also disclosed that the 399 automatic guns intercepted by Customs at the Tin Can Island Port were formally handed over to the NCCSALW on August 17, 2026.

The disclosure provides further details on the chain of custody of the weapons amid the controversy generated by the viral video.

Kokumo also clarified that the government’s campaign against illicit firearms was not targeted at legitimate local arms manufacturers or traditional artisans whose skills could potentially be deployed for productive purposes.

He acknowledged that locally manufactured firearms have historically been used by hunters and communities for legitimate purposes, particularly in rural areas.

‘From time immemorial, in villages in Nigeria, we have traditional, well-aligned rights where people even fire for joy; they use Dane guns to do all this. We have local hunters who go into the bushes to hunt for rats and rabbits.

‘All these guns, of course, are manufactured by local artisanal producers. But what we are seeing now is the introduction of sophisticated weapons,’ he said.

According to him, the major concern for the government is the emergence of criminal manufacturers producing increasingly sophisticated weapons capable of being deployed by organised criminal groups.

He said the government was, however, also interested in identifying talented local artisans whose technical abilities could be redirected towards legitimate national development.

‘So, we have those who are criminal manufacturers of these illicit weapons; we are really out for them.

‘And we have equally identified talents among the local manufacturers, the talents, those who are naturally talented, of course, will be absorbed into our plans, and we’ll see how they can be most efficient and most productively used in national service,’ he added.

The NCCSALW chief said the approach was intended to distinguish between criminal arms production and traditional or artisanal skills that could potentially be harnessed for lawful industrial and national-security purposes.

African currencies performed stronger in August, with 13 of the 17 currencies tracked gaining against the United States dollar, compared with only seven in July.

The improvement came despite renewed tensions in the Middle East. The United States and Iran had maintained a period of relative calm after an earlier ceasefire. Still, fresh strikes at the end of August revived concerns over oil supplies and pushed Brent crude above $90 a barrel on August 31.

According to data compiled by real-time trading platform African Markets, 13 of the 17 major African currencies tracked appreciated against the dollar between the end of July and the end of August, while four depreciated. The performance marked a notable improvement from July, when only seven currencies recorded gains.

The Ghanaian cedi was the strongest performer in August, appreciating by 3.72 percent against the dollar.

The currency strengthened from 11.69 cedis per dollar at the end of July to 11.27 by the end of August.

The monthly gain marks a sharp turnaround for a currency that had been Africa’s weakest performer for much of the year.

After gaining more than 40 percent against the US dollar in 2025 and emerging as Africa’s best-performing currency, the cedi came under sustained pressure in 2026. By July 28, it had lost 11.6 percent against the dollar year to date.

Botswana pula

The Botswana pula appreciated by 2.77 percent, moving from 14.06 pula per dollar at the end of July to 13.68 at the end of August.

The pula’s performance reflects Botswana’s relatively strong external position and its established system of managing the currency against a basket of currencies. The country’s foreign exchange position is closely linked to its export earnings, particularly diamonds.

Namibian dollar

The Namibian dollar gained 2.54 percent, strengthening from 16.53 per dollar to 16.12.

Its performance was closely linked to the South African rand because the Namibian dollar is pegged one to one to the rand. As a result, movements in the rand are quickly reflected in Namibia’s currency.

The rand received some support from domestic economic indicators during the month, although gains were limited by a stronger dollar and uncertainty over US monetary policy.

South African rand

The rand also appreciated by 2.54 percent, moving from 16.54 per dollar at the end of July to 16.13 at the end of August.

The currency faced competing forces during the month. Lower precious metal prices and a firmer dollar weighed on it, but cooler domestic producer inflation provided some support for investor confidence.

By the end of the month, however, renewed US-Iran tensions and rising oil prices were again putting pressure on the rand.

Nigerian naira

The naira appreciated by 2.03 percent, strengthening from N1,363.95 per dollar at the end of July to N1,336.71 at the end of August.

The improvement came as Nigeria’s foreign exchange position strengthened. Moody’s revised Nigeria’s sovereign outlook to positive in August, citing higher foreign exchange reserves, stronger than expected economic growth and greater resilience to external shocks. The ratings agency also pointed to higher oil revenues and a current account surplus as supporting factors.

Tunisian dinar

The Tunisian dinar appreciated by 1.03 percent, moving from 2.94 per dollar to 2.91.

Tourism and transfers from Tunisians living abroad continued to provide important foreign exchange inflows. By July, Tunisia had welcomed about 5.8 million visitors, generating 4.4 billion dinars in tourism receipts.

Egyptian pound

Egypt’s pound gained 0.82 percent, strengthening from 51.12 pounds per dollar to 50.70.

The currency continued to benefit from the easing of Egypt’s foreign exchange shortages and stronger inflows from tourism, remittances and foreign investment. The IMF has previously linked Egypt’s improved external position to these inflows, alongside tighter monetary and fiscal policies and a more flexible exchange rate.

CFA franc

The CFA franc appreciated by 0.79 percent, moving from 569.52 CFA francs per dollar to 565.05.

The currency’s performance is closely connected to the euro because the CFA franc.

Moroccan dirham

Morocco’s dirham appreciated by 0.75 percent, strengthening from 9.36 per dollar to 9.29.

Tourism remained an important source of foreign exchange. Morocco recorded strong tourist arrivals during the first quarter, while tourism revenues reached 21.4 billion dirhams by the end of February, up 22.2 percent from a year earlier.

The country also maintained a substantial foreign exchange reserve position, with official reserve assets reaching nearly 498 billion dirhams in July.

Malawi kwacha

The Malawian kwacha recorded a modest 0.10 percent appreciation, moving from 1,746.80 per dollar to 1,744.89.

The gain was marginal and points more to relative stability than a major currency rally. Malawi continues to face structural foreign exchange constraints, making small movements in the currency significant in a market where demand for dollars remains strong.

Mauritian rupee

The Mauritian rupee gained 0.06 percent, moving from 47.03 per dollar to 47.00.

The movement was small, but Mauritius continues to benefit from foreign exchange earnings from tourism.

Tanzanian shilling

The Tanzanian shilling appreciated marginally by 0.06 percent, moving from 2,643.21 per dollar to 2,641.53.

The near-flat movement suggests that the currency largely held its ground rather than experiencing a significant rally.

Zimbabwean ZiG

Zimbabwe’s ZiG recorded the smallest gain among the appreciating currencies, rising by 0.03 percent from 26.68 per dollar to 26.67.

The near-unchanged movement reflects the tight range in which the currency traded during the month. Zimbabwe has continued efforts to strengthen regulation of its foreign exchange and financial markets, although confidence in the country’s currency remains a major consideration for businesses and households.

Four currencies weakened

Four of the 17 currencies tracked lost ground against the dollar in August.

Zambia’s kwacha recorded the largest decline, falling by 0.94 percent from 18.85 to 19.03 per dollar. The currency came under pressure around the country’s August 13 election, although strong copper prices provided some support.

Zambia’s copper sector accounts for about 70 percent of export earnings, making copper prices and production critical to the kwacha’s outlook. Uganda’s shilling depreciated by 0.50 percent, while Rwanda’s franc fell by 0.30 percent. Kenya’s shilling was broadly stable, recording only a 0.03 percent decline from 129.37 to 129.42 per dollar.