Nagoya 2026: Defining challenge for Sevens Rugby as medal dream hangs in balance

With just three weeks remaining for the 2026 Asian Games in Nagoya, Japan, Sri Lanka’s men’s rugby sevens team faces one of its biggest tests in recent years as it looks to revive its fortunes after a disappointing showing in the opening leg of the Asia Rugby Sevens Series in China.

The rugby sevens competition at the Asian Games will be worked off from 1 to 3 October at the Paloma Mizuho Rugby Stadium in Nagoya, with 12 of Asia’s top teams battling for medals. Sri Lanka, once ranked among Asia’s top three sevens nations, has slipped to seventh in the regional rankings after a string of inconsistent performances in Suzhou, China, at the recently concluded first leg of the Asia Rugby Sevens Series.

The opening tournament in China exposed several weaknesses in the Sri Lankan outfit. The team began impressively with a commanding victory over Kazakhstan but failed to maintain momentum, suffering defeats to South Korea and hosts China in the pool stage. Those losses pushed Sri Lanka into the Cup quarter-finals as one of the best third-placed teams, where they were outclassed 17-0 by Japan. Sri Lanka eventually finished seventh after defeating Thailand in the placement play-off, a result well below expectations.

That campaign highlighted concerns over ball retention, discipline, decision-making, defensive structure and selfish play, areas New Zealand head coach Peter Woods will be desperate to address before Nagoya.

Sri Lanka has been drawn in Group C alongside the United Arab Emirates, Singapore and the Philippines. On paper, it is a group Sri Lanka is capable of topping, but recent performances suggest there is little room for complacency. The UAE has made significant progress in recent seasons, while the Philippines continue to improve with a physically strong squad.

The format offers some hope, with the top two teams from each group and the two best third-placed teams advancing to the quarter-finals. However, if Sri Lanka hopes to stand on the podium, merely reaching the knockout stage will not be enough.

A potential medal run is likely to require victories over stronger opponents such as China, South Korea and the UAE. Hong Kong China and Japan enter the Games as favourites after months of uninterrupted preparation and impressive performances on the Asian Sevens circuit.

Captain Soori and his teammates will need to rediscover the fearless brand of rugby that made Sri Lanka one of Asia’s most exciting sevens teams. The squad possesses pace and attacking flair, but consistency over three demanding days will determine whether they can challenge for a historic medal.

For Peter Woods, the countdown has begun. Turning around Sri Lanka’s fortunes in a fortnight will be a massive task, but a bronze medal at the Asian Games remains an achievable target if the Tuskers can produce their best rugby when it matters most. With the President of Sri Lanka Rugby putting in a lot of effort and even signing contracts with the players, a better performance is expected from the players. A few changes are also expected to be made to the final touring squad of 13, with Janidu Dilshan and a few more likely to come into the squad.

Group A comprises Hong Kong China, China, Malaysia and Uzbekistan, while Group B features Japan, Thailand, South Korea and Kazakhstan. Sri Lanka has been drawn in Group C alongside the United Arab Emirates, Singapore and the Philippines.

Sri Lanka will open its campaign on 1 October with matches against the Philippines and Singapore. The team will then face the United Arab Emirates on 2 October in its final group-stage fixture.

The knockout stage will take place on 3 October, featuring the quarter-finals and semi-finals, followed by the fifth/sixth and seventh/eighth place play-offs, the bronze medal match and the gold medal match.

Cyprus Department of Meteorology – Forecast for the Sea Area of Cyprus (A)

Atmospheric pressure at the time of issue: 1007hPa (hectopascal)

Seasonal low pressure is affecting the area. The weather over the coastal areas will be mainly fine with locally increased low cloud coverage, overnight and during the morning. Local mist and/or fog patches are expected during night and around dawn.

Visibility: Good

Sea surface temperature: 29°C

Warnings: NIL

AREA

PERIOD

WIND

STATE OF SEA

West Coast

Morning

Southwest 3

Smooth to Slight

Afternoon

Southwest to Northwest 3 to 4, at times locally 4

Smooth to Slight

Night

Northwest to North 3, later North to Northeast

Smooth to Slight

South Coast

Morning

East to Southeast 3, gradually South to Southwest

Smooth to Slight

Afternoon

Southwest to West 3 to 4, offshore 4

Smooth to Slight

Night

Southwest to Northwest 3, initially 3 to 4

Smooth to Slight

East Coast

Morning

Northeast to Southeast 3, later Southeast to Southwest

Smooth to Slight

Afternoon

South to Southwest 3 to 4, locally 4

Smooth to Slight

Night

Southwest to Northwest 3, initially 3 to 4

Smooth to Slight

North Coast

Morning

South to Southwest 3

Smooth to Slight

Afternoon

Southwest to Northwest 3 to 4, locally 4

Smooth to Slight

Night

Southwest to Northwest 3, later Variable

Smooth to Slight

Why Uber is retreating from Africa’s ride-hailing market

It is the latest sign of how difficult it has become to build a sustainable ride-hailing business in Africa, where demand for affordable mobility is growing but the economics of providing it are becoming increasingly challenging.

The US-based company announced on Wednesday that it would wind down its operations in Nigeria and Uganda effective September 2, following a review of its business priorities and investment focus across the continent.

‘After careful consideration, we have made the difficult decision to discontinue operations in Nigeria and Uganda as part of evolving business priorities and investment focus across the continent,’ Uber said in a statement.

The exits come less than a year after it withdrew from Côte d’Ivoire in September 2025 and months after it left Tanzania in January 2026.

The latest decisions mean Uber has exited four African markets in roughly a year, leaving it operating in South Africa, Kenya, Ghana, Egypt and Morocco.

Uber, however, is not abandoning Africa.

The company said it remains committed to sub-Saharan Africa and is focusing its investments on markets where it believes it can create the most value for drivers through scale while providing riders with seamless transportation.

The question, therefore, is not simply why Uber is leaving Nigeria and Uganda.

It is why some African ride-hailing markets have become so difficult to make profitable.

Africa has the demand, but the economics are difficult

On the surface, the continent appears to offer an attractive market for ride-hailing.

Rapid urbanisation, growing smartphone adoption, youthful populations, inadequate public transportation in many cities and rising demand for convenient mobility should provide fertile ground for platforms connecting passengers with drivers.

But demand for rides does not necessarily translate into sustainable returns.

At the heart of the problem is a mismatch between what passengers can afford to pay and what drivers need to earn.

Fuel, vehicle maintenance, insurance and other operating costs have risen across several African markets, while inflation and currency depreciation have reduced consumers’ purchasing power.

In Nigeria, the removal of the petrol subsidy sharply increased transportation costs, while the naira’s depreciation has made vehicles, spare parts and other inputs more expensive.

That pressure runs through the entire ride-hailing chain.

Passengers want cheaper fares. Drivers need higher earnings. Platforms need enough passengers and drivers to keep their networks functioning while remaining price competitive.

Ibrahim Ayoade, general secretary of the Amalgamated Union of App-Based Transporters of Nigeria (AUATON), said rising operating costs have made the business increasingly difficult for drivers.

‘Rising fuel prices, inflation, vehicle maintenance costs and the depreciation of the naira have all increased the cost of operating a ride-hailing vehicle,’ Ayoade said.

He said many drivers also struggle to maintain or replace their vehicles. ‘Many of the vehicles operating on these platforms are old. A lot of drivers do not have the financial capacity to repair or replace them.’

That creates a structural problem for platforms built around independent drivers.

Although the platforms do not own most of the vehicles, the quality, availability and reliability of those vehicles ultimately determine the quality of the service they can offer.

A graveyard of ride-hailing apps

Uber’s retreat comes against the backdrop of a long list of ride-hailing platforms that have struggled to survive in Africa’s most populous nation.

More than 2,500 ride-hailing apps have attempted to enter the Nigerian market since Uber arrived in 2014, according to AUATON.

Many did not survive.

Among the platforms that have disappeared or become inactive are Oga Taxi, Smart Ride, Alpha1, GLT, RideMe, Tripz, Go247, T-Cab, Taxigo, MotionPlus, Gidicab, Soole, Easy Taxi and Afro Cab.

Their failures signals that Uber’s difficulties are not simply the result of being a foreign company operating in a difficult market.

They point to a deeper challenge with the economics of ride-hailing itself.

A platform needs large numbers of drivers and passengers before its network becomes efficient. More drivers reduce waiting times, while more passengers create greater earning opportunities for drivers.

That network effect makes scale critical – and makes the market particularly difficult for new entrants.

Developing a ride-hailing app is relatively straightforward.

Building a network of thousands of reliable drivers and enough passengers to keep those drivers busy is considerably harder.

Competition can become a race to the bottom

The economics become even more challenging when several platforms compete for the same passengers and drivers.

Nigeria’s market has been dominated by Uber, Bolt and inDrive, each using different strategies to attract users.

inDrive, for instance, allows passengers and drivers to negotiate fares, putting additional pressure on conventional pricing models.

Ayoade said intense competition has pushed prices lower as platforms fight to attract passengers.

‘Competition drives down prices because platforms have to lower fares to attract passengers,’ he said.

But cheaper rides do not necessarily translate into a healthier industry.

The cost of providing the service does not fall at the same pace as fares.

Drivers still have to buy fuel, maintain their vehicles, pay for repairs and absorb depreciation regardless of how much a passenger pays.

The result can be a race to the bottom in which platforms compete for market share while drivers absorb much of the pressure through lower earnings.

This is particularly problematic in markets where vehicle ownership is expensive and access to affordable financing is limited.

Regulation adds another layer of pressure

Regulation has also shaped the fortunes of ride-hailing platforms across Africa.

Uber’s experience in Tanzania provides one of the clearest examples.

The company spent years dealing with regulatory disagreements over fares and commissions. The east African nation introduced regulated fares, including minimum prices per kilometre and minute, while regulators capped the commission ride-hailing platforms could charge drivers at 15 percent.

Uber had previously suspended its Tanzanian operations in 2022 before returning in 2023. It eventually withdrew again in January 2026.

The experience illustrates the difficult balance governments face.

Authorities want to protect passengers and drivers from unfair pricing and working conditions, but regulations that materially change the economics of a platform can affect whether international operators consider a market commercially viable.

Nigeria has its own regulatory pressures.

Ayoade pointed to commission structures, vehicle standards and restrictions affecting e-hailing operations at airports as challenges facing the sector.

However, Uber has said its Nigerian exit was not related to the recent Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria directive concerning e-hailing operations at airports.

Instead, the company attributed the decision to its evolving business priorities and investment focus across the continent.

That shows that Uber’s Nigerian withdrawal is broader than any single regulatory dispute.

Why Uber is staying in some African markets

Uber’s remaining African markets offer an important clue about the strategy behind its retreat.

The company is not leaving the continent altogether. It is becoming more selective about where it deploys capital.

Uber continues to operate in South Africa, Kenya, Ghana, Egypt and Morocco – markets that offer different combinations of urban scale, consumer demand, purchasing power, regulatory environments and growth opportunities.

Charles Robertson, London-based chief economist at Renaissance Capital, noted the apparent concentration of Uber’s remaining African operations in some of the continent’s more developed or industrialised markets.

‘Interesting. So Uber is still operating in SA, which hit the @TTTEconomist metrics for industrialisation in the 20th century, and Egypt, Kenya and Ghana, which are the only African countries to hit the metrics between 2019 and 2034,’ Robertson said in social media platform X.

A global restructuring is changing Uber’s priorities

The African exits also coincide with a broader restructuring at Uber.

The company announced plans on Wednesday to cut about 3,300 jobs, representing roughly 10 percent of its workforce, as it simplifies its organisational structure and reduces management layers.

Dara Khosrowshahi, CEO of Uber, said the company’s rapid growth had created additional layers of management, coordination and fragmented ownership that it no longer needs at its current scale.

The savings are expected to be redirected towards the company’s core products, payments to drivers and couriers and emerging areas such as autonomous mobility.

That means Uber is making choices not only about where it operates, but where its capital can generate the strongest returns. Its decision to remain in five African markets while withdrawing from four others therefore looks less like a complete retreat from the continent and more like a rationalisation of its footprint.

Will Uber’s exit make rides more expensive?

For Nigerian consumers, one immediate question is whether Uber’s departure will lead to higher ride-hailing fares.

Ayoade believes it could.

‘I expect prices could increase, because pricing has always been a major issue in the ride-hailing industry,’ he said.

But higher prices are not guaranteed.

Bolt, inDrive and other operators still have an incentive to keep fares competitive as they compete for the customers Uber leaves behind.

The bigger question is whether the remaining platforms can maintain affordable fares while giving drivers enough income to keep their vehicles on the road.

That is the fundamental tension in Nigeria’s ride-hailing market.

The co-founder of AUATON argues that regulation could help create a more sustainable pricing framework by ensuring fares reflect the actual cost of providing transportation.

‘There has to be a price that makes it viable for drivers to operate,’ he said, arguing that fares should account for fuel, vehicle wear and tear, maintenance and other operating costs.

The bigger lesson from Uber’s retreat

Uber’s African retreat does not mean the continent lacks demand for ride-hailing.

If anything, the opposite is true.

The demand is clear. The challenge is converting that demand into a business model that works simultaneously for passengers, drivers and platforms.

Nigeria’s experience is particularly revealing.

Thousands of platforms have attempted to enter the market, but only a handful have achieved meaningful scale. Uber itself survived 12 years in Africa’s third biggest economy, built a recognisable brand and established a substantial driver and customer network, yet has now concluded that its investment priorities lie elsewhere.

Its departure leaves fewer major players competing for passengers and drivers and raises a broader question for the companies that remain:

Can Africa’s ride-hailing platforms offer affordable transportation while generating enough returns to keep drivers, vehicles and investors in the business?

For Uber, the answer appears to depend increasingly on choosing markets where that equation works.

For Africa’s ride-hailing industry, finding that balance may be the real test of whether the sector can move from rapid expansion to sustainable growth.

China urges ‘equal consultation’ after G20 finance meeting ends without joint statement

China has called on the United States and other G20 members to uphold ‘equal consultation’ after a meeting of the group’s finance ministers and central bank governors ended without a joint communiqué.

Beijing expressed ‘deep regret’ over the failure to reach consensus following the two-day meeting in Asheville, North Carolina, hosted by the United States, which holds the G20 presidency for 2026.

‘China had actively and constructively participated in discussions across all G20 tracks since the US assumed the group’s rotating presidency for 2026, working to promote practical outcomes,’ Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun told reporters in Beijing, according to the state-run Global Times.

Guo said the G20, as a major platform for international economic cooperation, should coordinate on global economic issues ‘in an objective, fair and balanced manner, based on consultations and equal participation.’

‘China hopes the US, as the presidency, and all members will follow these principles, respect the legitimate concerns of all parties and work toward positive outcomes’ at the G20 Leaders’ Summit in Miami, he added.

The United States issued a chair’s statement at the conclusion of the meeting instead of a consensus-backed communiqué. According to the US Treasury, China objected to several elements of the statement.

The document said the global economy ‘has remained resilient in the face of multiple shocks, including ongoing wars and conflicts,’ while also calling on countries to address ‘non-market policies and practices that exacerbate imbalances.’

According to the Financial Times, Beijing objected to references to ‘imbalances’ and ‘non-market policies,’ reflecting broader differences between Washington and Beijing over trade and economic policy.

The disagreement highlights the difficulty of reaching consensus within the G20 as major economies pursue different approaches to trade, industrial policy and global economic governance.

US President Donald Trump, meanwhile, described the discussions in Asheville as involving ‘very productive and positive conversations.’

The meeting also marked the return of Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov to a G20 finance gathering, in what was reported to be his first attendance at such a meeting since Russia launched its full-scale war against Ukraine in 2022.

The latest disagreement comes ahead of the G20 Leaders’ Summit in Miami, where Washington is expected to seek agreement among member states on a broader range of global economic issues.

The absence of a joint communiqué from the finance meeting underscores the challenge facing the US presidency as it seeks to build consensus among the world’s major economies amid persistent trade and geopolitical tensions.

Textbook ‘breakthrough’ that exposes a decade of educational neglect

The Department of Education’s recent announcement that it has finally-finally-secured all 105 required textbook titles for public schools should be cause for quiet satisfaction. Instead, it serves as a damning indictment of just how far the country has allowed its educational infrastructure to crumble. When the procurement of basic learning materials becomes headline news, we must confront an uncomfortable truth: we have normalized failure to such a degree that competence now looks like revolution. Let us be clear about what Education Secretary Juan Edgardo Angara has accomplished. In a single year, the DepEd procured nearly four times the total number of textbook titles secured across the entire preceding decade. Between 2014 and 2023, the agency managed to deliver only 27 out of 88 required titles-a pathetic 31 percent completion rate that left generations of students sharing tattered, outdated books or learning from photocopied pages. The new policy framework, anchored by DepEd Order No. 008, has compressed a three-year procurement nightmare into a streamlined process with strict timelines and transparent evaluation.

This is undeniably progress. But we must resist the urge to celebrate.

The fact that we are celebrating the procurement of textbooks-the absolute baseline of educational infrastructure-reveals how catastrophically low we have set our expectations. Textbooks are not innovation. They are not reform. They are the floor, not the ceiling, of what a functional education system provides. In any developed nation, this would be routine administrative work, worthy of a line item in a quarterly report, not a press conference with triumphant rhetoric about ‘restoration of service.’

The cost of this decade of dysfunction cannot be calculated merely in pesos or procurement statistics. It is measured in the millions of students who sat in classrooms without proper materials, in the teachers who improvised lessons from memory or photocopies, and in the country’s persistent humiliation at the bottom of international assessments like PISA. While other nations debated pedagogical innovations and digital integration, the Philippines was still struggling to put paper books into children’s hands.

Secretary Angara’s acknowledgment that ’27 titles in a decade is your baseline’ is refreshingly candid, but it should also infuriate citizens. How did we accept this for so long? How did three-year procurement cycles for single titles become standard operating procedure? The EDCOM II findings exposed systemic bottlenecks that were obvious to anyone who cared to look-redundant review cycles, opaque evaluation processes, and a bureaucracy more concerned with procedure than outcomes. That these obstacles required a complete policy overhaul in 2025, rather than incremental fixes years ago, speaks to a failure of political will across multiple administrations.

Textbooks alone won’t reverse the country’s educational decline. PISA points to deeper issues-widespread poverty that keeps children out of school, an overloaded curriculum focused on quantity over comprehension, and resource gaps beyond printed materials, including teacher training, classroom infrastructure, and digital connectivity. Textbooks are necessary but insufficient: they’re the starting line, not the finish.

So yes, let us acknowledge that the DepEd has done what should have been done years ago. Let us recognize that political will, when properly directed, can dismantle bureaucratic inertia. But let us not confuse remediation with achievement. The Philippines is not yet an educational success story-we are merely a nation that has stopped sabotaging its own students.

The real test begins now: Can we maintain this momentum? Can we extend this efficiency to other neglected corners of the system? Can we finally build an education sector where the delivery of basic resources is so routine it never makes the news again?

Our students deserve an education system that does not treat textbooks as headline-worthy breakthroughs, but as the bare minimum they are entitled to. After 10 years of failure, we should demand nothing less.

Uncertainty and indecision clouds over Sri Lanka’s economy

Nearly two years into the Anura Kumara Dissanayake Presidency, Sri Lanka’s economic recovery remains shrouded in uncertainty. On the back of indecision and a lack of a cohesive policy, we are facing the possibility of seeing the hard-fought gains post-bankruptcy being reversed.

The recent comments in the media regarding the state of the country’s economy has suggested that neither the Government nor the Opposition have taken the warning signs seriously. Two weeks ago, during a public event, former President Ranil Wickremesinghe highlighted the concerns that adequate measures had not been taken by the Government to prepare the economy to resume its debt repayments in 2028.

Commenting on the situation, the former President drew attention to the fact that the country’s reserves have not been sufficiently expanded to provide the economy with the necessary buffer ahead of the resumption of debt servicing. Finance and Planning Deputy Minister Dr. Anil Jayantha swiftly rejected the assertion, presenting future projections by the Government as an answer to the concerns.

Responding to former President Wickremesinghe’s warning, the Government resorted to defending their economic policies by drawing attention to anticipated foreign earnings from sectors such as tourism, foreign worker remittances and export earnings. However, the figures paint a bleak picture. The tourism sector has seen earnings decline by 11% from January-July in 2026 compared to 2025. While export earnings have recorded an increase of 5% in the first seven months of 2026, the country’s import expenditure rose by nearly 26% during the same period.

While the Government’s rejection was an expected response, it was surprising that Member of the Opposition, and Chairman of the Committee on Public Finance, Dr. Harsha de Silva, chose to downplay the current economic fragility, simply rejecting both statements as ‘incorrect’.

Under the economic recovery strategy designed by former President Wickremesinghe, and his economic team, it was envisaged that the country would obtain a foreign exchange reserve buffer of $ 13 billion by the end of 2027. This target was agreed upon after establishing that the country would pursue a GDP growth rate exceeding 5%. In 2024, during the former President’s tenure, the country recorded a GDP growth rate of 5%, which was a reversal of two consecutive years of economic contraction.

While the country is already servicing institutional debt, by the end of the 2027 Sri Lanka will resume repayments for commercial and sovereign debt.

For the Public Debt Management Office (PMDO) to initiate debt repayments, they would be required to offer rupees on the open market in exchange for dollars. The cost of purchasing the dollars from the open market would be determined by the growth rate of the country, the interest rates and the exchange rate.

Currently the country’s foreign reserves stand at $ 6.5 billion, a simple $ 500 million increase from when the former President handed over the Government in 2024. It does appear unlikely that the Government will be able to achieve the pre-established foreign reserve target of $ 13 billion by the end of next year. However, it has not been suggested that the ability to service debt and avoid a repeat of an economic collapse was simply reliant on the country achieving this foreign reserve target.

Rather it has been stated that the cost of servicing debt would determine whether the country’s economy is adequately prepared to ensure there is no repeat of 2022. The national foreign reserves are simply a buffer that will act as a confidence booster for the open markets, allowing the Government to purchase the necessary dollars to ensure sustainable debt repayment.

The IMF has forecast that the Sri Lanka’s GDP growth rate will drop to 3.1% by the end of 2026. With a slow-down in the growth rate, it has been predicted that Sri Lanka’s economy will face significant hardship when it resumes debt repayment at the end of next year.

However, it is a worrying sign that the Government is continuing to ignore the warnings and are failing to adopt a course correction. There are several signals that have emerged in the recent months pointing towards upcoming economic upheaval.

Inflation is on an upward trend, with it being recorded at 8% for August (up from 7.3% in July). This has a direct impact on the consumers with the cost of living increasing, which will result in a reduction in purchasing that will further impact businesses in the country. As inflation goes up, it is likely that the interest rates will also go up to try and counter the rising cost of living. With a hike in interest rates borrowings will increase which will impact investors, potentially seeing a reduction in investments in the local economy. This will also impact the cost of dollar purchases by the government. In a further shock to the economy, Sri Lanka has seen its cumulative trade deficit expand to $ 6.5 billion during the first seven months of 2026, compared to $ 3.9 billion in the same period last year.

The increased demand for foreign currency, to finance the country’s expanding import bill, will certainly place increased pressure on the exchange rate. No doubt resulting in a further knock-on effect to the country’s overall economic growth.

As the growth performances of the country fluctuates under a shadow of ambiguity, such as stagnation in the foreign reserves, financial sectors will also adopt a more defensive posture. Foreign exchange dealers may either increase the price or withhold their dollar sales in anticipation of potential shortages in the future.

By 2030 Sri Lanka will have to service around $5 billion a year in debt. Taking account of the growing warning signs, the Government must re-evaluate their current approach to economic management.

Former IMF First Deputy Managing Director Gita Gopinath while visiting Sri Lanka in 2025, drew attention to the reform program that had been introduced by the former Government. Speaking at a public event in Colombo, she outlined ‘how essential it is to sustain the reform momentum’, while emphasising that such measures are ‘the foundation of a more resilient future.’

The achievements in turning the economy around in 2022 by the former Government had been considered, at the time, an impossible task. Which explains why many members of the then Opposition chose to remain in the Opposition benches. However, in 2024 US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Donald Lu praised the efforts of the former President’s efforts claiming that ‘there is no greater comeback story than the story of Sri Lanka’.

With international recognition and appreciation of the economic strategy undertaken by the former administration, it would bode well for President Dissanayake to take note of the existing plans in place, such as the Economic Transformation Act. If they choose to continue to reject these roadmaps, then an alternative must be presented to the public. Failure to act in regard the economy will most certainly place the country back on the path towards economic hardship and a potential return to bankruptcy.

Nobody forced this losing position

The Germans have a word for it. Zugzwang is a term describing a situation in chess and other turn-based games (like government policy) where a player must make a move. Yet every available move worsens their position with different degrees of loss.

China’s current economic data reads like a position under zugzwang. Industrial production slowed in July. Retail sales barely grew. Wind Economic Database on the monthly split show retail services sales growth dropping to about 3.2 percent in July from above 6 percent in January.

Goldman Sachs’ early-Q3 estimate of roughly 4 percent would, if sustained, represent China’s weakest quarterly growth rate in the past decade outside the pandemic period. July’s slowdown is more troubling than April’s because it began from a weaker base and struck sectors that had looked resilient. President Xi Jinping arrives at his September meeting with President Trump holding a poor hand.

Beijing was never forced into zugzwang. In July only 17 of 70 major cities recorded new home price increases. China’s property market has fallen since mid-2021, with national new-home prices down year-on-year since April 2022, per National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) data. Meanwhile, Beijing had two paths open to it. One was repair: a large, direct fiscal push to recapitalize developers, backstop household mortgages, and absorb unsold housing.

The other choice was timid restraint: smaller rate cuts and targeted local support, sized to avoid overloading the central government’s balance sheet but not sized to clear the inventory or restore confidence. Beijing chose restraint, and the bill has been coming due in installments ever since.

The clearest sign of that choice shows up in the ‘credit impulse,’ an indicator tracking not how much credit exists but how fast new credit is accelerating relative to the size of the economy. A rising credit impulse means new lending is accelerating and should show up in growth within six to 12 months. China’s has rolled over from a solidly positive reading to a negative one, meaning the fuel that precedes recovery has been cut, not added. China’s 10-year government bond yield has fallen since February while yields in the US, Germany, and Japan have all risen. If Beijing expected a real recovery this fall, yields would be rising in China too.

Every move available to Beijing carried a cost the leadership judged worse than the one it chose. A larger stimulus meant more debt on a balance sheet already strained. A weaker yuan meant capital flight risk. Opening the credit taps further meant repeating the excesses of 2015. Beijing picked the least uncomfortable weakness and walked into it deliberately, selecting a losing position from a menu of choices, all of them survivable but with varying degrees of pain.

China’s problem is that earlier policy choices have reduced the number of painless choices available now.

The Philippines plays a smaller board but makes the same kind of selection. A stock exchange kept thin, with the country’s biggest exporters absent from it, was not a forced move. It is a preference for concentration among a handful of conglomerates over the harder work of building listing pipelines and enforcing free float. The Philippines’ manufacturing base was never developed. Instead it was offset by remittances from citizens who left because the jobs were never built here. It was decades of choosing the path that required less pain today over the one that offered ‘more pain, more gain’ for tomorrow.

China and the Philippines are not facing the same economic problem. They share a deeper one: past policy choices have narrowed what’s left.

Xi Jinping is due in Washington around September 24, his first visit since Trump returned to office. The trade truce the two sides struck in Busan last year expires in November, so whatever gets settled in September carries a deadline behind it.

Tariff levels, export controls on rare earths and semiconductors, and the broader trade relationship remain unresolved despite a May 2026 agreement. The two sides did establish a ‘Board of Trade’ to formalize it.

Xi does not walk into September with a weak economic hand by accident. A government willing to let a property slump run for years rather than repair it in one shot is a government built to accept unfavorable terms at a negotiating table rather than fight hard to reverse them. What Beijing is playing in September is closer to a poker player checking with a weak hand, betting that the other side blinks first.

Trump has spent years in constant trade battles. Xi has been battling with his own economy.

E-mail me at mangun@gmail.com. Follow me on Twitter @mangunonmarkets. PSE stock-market information and technical analysis provided by AAA Southeast Equities Inc.

India replaces SL as host of inaugural ICC Women’s Champions Trophy

Sri Lanka has lost the hosting rights to the first-ever edition of the ICC Women’s Champions Trophy which will instead take place from 14 to 28 February in India next year.

All the matches in the inaugural edition of the six-team event will be played at the Cricket Club of India in Mumbai and the Vadodara International Cricket Stadium in Vadodara.

The event was originally scheduled to take place in Sri Lanka, but has now been moved to India as Sri Lanka Cricket continues to make the requisite reforms outlined at the ICC’s Annual Conference in July, the ICC said. The ICC assessed three candidates to host the tournament – Bangladesh, India and South Africa – against their established host evaluation criteria before recommending India as the replacement host, a decision ratified by the ICC Board on 1 September.

Nicosia expresses condolences to Egypt and Jordan after the accident in Sinai

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has expressed condolences to Egypt and Jordan for the tragic bus accident in Sinai on Wednesday, conveying its deep sadness in a post on X.

The Ministry extended heartfelt condolences to the families who lost their loved ones, and to the government and people of Egypt. “Our thoughts are also with Jordan and the families of its citizens that are among the victims,” the Ministry added.

“In this moment of profound grief, our thoughts and solidarity are with all those affected,” it concluded.

When will Nigeria’s economic growth finally reach the people?

Nigeria is beginning to win the battle over macroeconomic stability but losing the argument at the household level. GDP is growing and government revenues are rising, yet millions still struggle with basic necessities. As 2027 approaches, the test is whether stability is translating into higher purchasing power, better jobs and visible services.

Figures offer hope. Real GDP expanded by 4.43 percent year-on-year in the second quarter of 2026, up from 3.89 percent in the first quarter and the strongest second-quarter performance recently. But growth remains below the administration’s 7 percent ambition. A larger economy does not automatically mean prosperity.

‘The debate should shift from what governments receive to what they deliver. Every state should publish a quarterly revenue-to-results scorecard showing Federation Account receipts, internally generated revenue, major expenditure and measurable outcomes.’

The gap is most visible in the cost of living. Headline inflation fell to 15.43 percent in July, but lower inflation does not mean lower prices; it means prices are rising more slowly. Households do not recover lost purchasing power simply because inflation moderates. The test is whether incomes are rising faster than necessities.

National averages also conceal severe state-level pressures. Adamawa recorded headline inflation of 33 percent and food inflation of 51.4 percent in July, while several other states recorded headline inflation above 20 percent. Nigerians experience the economy where they live, so national improvement can coexist with hardship in particular communities.

Nigeria entered the reform period with a huge poverty burden. The National Bureau of Statistics’ latest Multidimensional Poverty Index, based on 2021/22 data, found that 62.9 percent of Nigerians, or about 133 million people, were multidimensionally poor. Although dated, the figure illustrates the scale of deprivation from which the country is recovering.

Public finances reveal another part of the disconnect. The three tiers of government shared a record N3.007 trillion from the Federation Account in July, taking distributions for the first seven months close to N16 trillion. States alone received N943.35 billion that month. Greater revenues provide space, but allocations are not development. Citizens should see them in better schools, primary healthcare, water, roads, sanitation, transport and local economies.

The debate should shift from what governments receive to what they deliver. Every state should publish a quarterly revenue-to-results scorecard showing Federation Account receipts, internally generated revenue, major expenditure and measurable outcomes. A portion of significant increases in federal transfers should be linked to defined improvements in basic services for public scrutiny.

The government can argue that it has addressed major distortions. Petrol subsidy removal and foreign-exchange reforms have improved fiscal capacity and contributed to macroeconomic stability. But stabilisation was never the destination. It was meant to create conditions for investment, production, employment and higher living standards.

The missing link is transmission. Stronger revenues must reach households through lower production costs, more employment, higher real incomes and better services. Without that transmission, gains remain concentrated in government accounts, financial markets and economic statistics while citizens continue to experience expensive necessities.

Food should be the immediate priority. The government should set measurable targets for reducing post-harvest losses, expanding irrigation and cutting transport and storage costs along major food corridors. Agricultural programmes should publish figures for irrigation, storage capacity, rural roads rehabilitated and produce reaching markets. Security interventions should prioritise food-producing corridors where insecurity constrains supply.

Growth must also become more employment-intensive. Manufacturing, agro-processing, construction, logistics and energy need reliable power, affordable financing, efficient transport and predictable regulation. The government should track jobs created in productive sectors, including wages and retention, rather than relying on aggregate figures. Incentives should increasingly go to businesses demonstrating additional production, investment and decent employment.

The political implications are hard to ignore. Tinubu enters 2027 with the advantages of incumbency and political organisation, while a divided opposition may struggle to convert economic dissatisfaction into a coherent alternative. But political structure cannot substitute indefinitely for delivery. Voters can tolerate difficult reforms when they believe sacrifice is temporary, necessary and produces results. The danger comes when sacrifice becomes permanent while official statistics describe an economy citizens cannot recognise. The administration’s strongest defence in 2027 will therefore be evidence that reforms are improving household welfare.

That evidence should be visible before the election. The Federal Government should publish a quarterly household-welfare dashboard covering real income, food affordability, employment, poverty and access to essential services alongside GDP, inflation, reserves and revenue. States should publish equivalent scorecards, with 12- to 18-month targets for food affordability, job creation and basic-service delivery. Ministries and states should publicly explain missed targets.

Nigeria does not need to pretend its reforms have failed, nor should critics pretend nothing has changed. Progress is clearly real. But stabilisation is valuable only if it improves people’s lives. Nigerians experience the economy through food prices, transport costs, salaries after rent and school fees, jobs, hospitals and education.

Nigeria has begun the difficult work of stabilisation. It must now complete the more important work of delivery. The real measure of reform is not whether the economy is bigger on paper, but whether growth becomes income, income becomes purchasing power and public revenue becomes services citizens can see, use and trust. That is the economic dividend Nigerians are waiting for and the dividend that will matter most in 2027.