From the point of view of Azerbaijan’s political elite, not all borders that are potentially dangerous are those which appear on the map. In the era of modern technology, such borders can pass right through screens, media channels, universities and various alternative narratives through which a particular society understands its history. This was one of the key conclusions that could be made from the speech of President Ilham Aliyev at the eighth congress of the New Azerbaijan Party (YAP). But even this paragraph understates the hour-long congress.
The congress was the first held since Azerbaijan restored its occupied territories. The question before Azerbaijan was no longer how the state might eventually recover what it had lost, but what kind of state should emerge after that objective had been achieved.
In President Aliyev’s case, this means that he drew a clear line back to the political groundwork laid down over three decades ago. In his view, both the triumphs of 2020 and 2023 were not merely military victories but rather culminations of a much larger process of state formation which had been started when Azerbaijan itself was politically and economically vulnerable. ‘The date of the start of our victories is the congress of the New Azerbaijan Party,’ he stated, alluding to the founding of the party in Nakhchivan in November 1992.
That historical argument matters because it leads directly into the doctrine Aliyev set out for the period ahead. Whereas the first challenge in gaining independence was the formation of a state and the second one, restoration of its territorial integrity, the challenge posed in Baku now is the preservation of sovereignty in an entirely different sphere. Borders may be secured by means of armed forces and modern technologies. The information space cannot be protected. It was here that Aliyev shifted from the history of victory to what he described as one of the central vulnerabilities of the modern state: ideological security.
This argument goes all the way back to the turbulence of the early days of independence. Azerbaijan began the 1990s in a climate of war, political upheavals, institutional weakness, and struggle over where the new country would be going. Within the story of politics, this was also an era when different outside forces found sympathetic networks within society, media, and the world of ideas. The counter-response represented by Heydar Aliyev was not just bureaucratic reorganization, rather, it was the formation of a political ideology: Azerbaijanism, designed to elevate the values of statehood, national unity, and autonomy from foreign ideological commitments.
‘Naturally, as the years go by, tactical and even strategic goals adapt to a certain extent, but the core course remains unchanged: independence, statehood, economic independence, strong military potential, and the ability to maximize the use of our own capabilities.’ – Ilham Aliyev at the 8th YAP Congress.
That sentence is perhaps the most concise description of the continuity the government wants to project.
The methods have changed, but the underlying idea remains the same. During the 1990s, the pressing requirements were preventing state collapse, encouraging foreign investment, and setting up working institutions. This was followed by efforts at military reform, economic reserves, and re-establishing territorial control. The current stage of this policy has been moved into the world of information.
The President placed ‘ideological security’ alongside physical security, arguing that technological change has made older ideas of borders inadequate. The internet, cyberattacks and artificial intelligence allow influence to travel without territory, armies or formal political representation. In that environment, the state’s concern is not merely hostile messaging but the possibility that external actors can cultivate domestic dependency, shape political language and exploit social divisions from afar.
‘Ideological security is just as important as physical security, because ideological provocation is directed at the interior of the country.’
The suggested first line of defense turned out to be a very traditional one: education. ‘The more educated, knowledgeable, and literate our people are,’ Aliyev said, ‘the less they will succumb to these lies, rumors, and poisonous ideological provocations.’ The second component of this defense line consisted in patriotism. According to the president, the 44-day war confirmed the power of national solidarity: a united society with a single goal would resist any external pressure and strive for the interests of the state.
This is why the same rationale is applied to the very pointed discussion of Azerbaijani-language media working outside the country. Here, Aliyev described these as tools which may be used in attempts to interfere in Azerbaijan from the outside in order to undermine internal cohesion and keep Azerbaijan on an independent path. In the framework of the doctrine developed at the congress, however, the distinction made here is quite clear.
The solution that has been provided by the state is not supposed to be merely propaganda for the sake of propaganda itself. According to Ilham Aliyev, party members should give up clichés and formality and make their claims without any myths or exaggeration of the past. The task is to present their arguments within the context of media which has more sources, more skepticism and shorter attention span than before.
The economic throughline
The speech’s economic sections returned repeatedly to the theme of self-funded independence. “Whatever we acquired, we purchased with money,” Mr Aliyev said of the country’s military buildup. “That includes all weapons, which were bought with money at world prices, down to the last bullet.” He added that foreign suppliers had, in his account, never extended favourable terms: “Not once were we granted a single manat or single dollar discount. In fact, sometimes they sold to us at prices several times higher than the world market rate.”
That same emphasis carried into the broader economic picture he presented to the congress. Foreign exchange reserves, he said, have reached $90bn, “approximately 20 times more than our external debt,” which he noted stands at just 5.6% of GDP, among the lowest ratios globally. Investment contracts signed at the country’s two International Investment Forums now exceed $20bn in total, drawing participation from institutions managing over $30 trillion in combined assets. On foreign policy, he pointed to Azerbaijan’s expanding web of partnerships, strategic declarations with ten EU member states, and, in the past year alone, a comprehensive strategic partnership with China and a Strategic Charter with the United States, as evidence of a country operating independently of any single patron. “We do not join any camp and will not join one,” he said. “We do not need to.”
Now, for the government’s ruling party, the early 1990s disturbances, the rise of Heydar Aliyev, state building, victories in Garabagh, and contemporary geopolitical balancing represent a continuum of history. It asks its citizens to see current controversies about media, education, and foreign influences not as separate policy issues, but as the latest chapter in an earlier conflict over national self-determination.
That is why, more than three decades after independence, the question has shifted from how to build a sovereign state to how to preserve one. In the government’s telling, the challenge is no longer confined to territory or military power. It extends into economics, information, and the ability of a society to withstand pressure from beyond its borders. The battlefield may have evolved, but the fundamental idea remains the same: political sovereignty is viable only when the state feels militarily capable, economically secure, and intellectually empowered enough to say ‘no.’