On October 25, 2025, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. signed Executive Order No. 100, prescribing a floor price for palay (unmilled rice) and mandating the full implementation of the Sagip Saka Act.
The EO was framed as a landmark intervention to protect Filipino rice farmers from volatile farmgate prices, which had plunged to as low as ?8/kg in some regions during the wet season harvest.
However, the timing, fiscal feasibility, and institutional capacity surrounding EO 100 raise serious questions about its actual impact.
Critically, EO 100 was issued after most rice fields had already been harvested, particularly in Luzon and Visayas, where the wet season harvest typically peaks between September and October.
This means the EO’s implementation will only take effect in the next cropping cycle, targeting the March-April 2026 dry season harvest.
As of early November 2025, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) have not yet been released, further delaying operational clarity.
The EO’s effectiveness hinges on government procurement volume. Economists warn that unless the government buys at least 20% of total palay production, the floor price will remain symbolic, with private traders continuing to dictate market rates.
At a procurement price of ?20-?25/kg, this would require a budget of ?80-?100 billion. Yet, the National Food Authority’s (NFA) proposed 2026 budget remains unclear, with no public indication that it approaches this scale
Historically, NFA’s budget has hovered below ?10 billion, mostly allocated for buffer stocking and logistics-not direct procurement under the Rice Tarrification Act.
Three interpretations of EO 100 emerge:
Symbolic Propaganda: Without budgetary muscle or IRR, EO 100 risks being a performative gesture-an ‘inutil’ policy that offers political optics but no real protection for farmers.
Trader-Dominated Continuity: In the absence of substantial government buying, private traders will continue to dominate the palay market, using the floor price as a reference only when convenient.
LGU Burden-Shifting: The EO hints at devolving procurement to Local Government Units (LGUs), but most LGUs lack the fiscal space or institutional capacity to buy palay at scale. This risks deepening regional inequalities and placing undue pressure on local governments.
Beyond Symbolism
While EO 100 signals a political commitment to shield farmers from exploitative farmgate prices, its actual impact depends on fiscal capacity, institutional readiness, and strategic procurement design.
Modeling fiscal scenarios reveals that for EO 100 to meaningfully influence market behavior, the government must procure at least 20% of national palay output.
With total production estimated at 20 million metric tons annually, this translates to 4 million metric tons of procurement.
At a price range of ?20-?25 per kilogram, the required budget would fall between ?80 billion and ?150 billion as shown in the Table below.
This figure dwarfs historical allocations to the National Food Authority (NFA), which have typically remained below ?10 billion, primarily for buffer stocking and logistics. Without a dramatic budget increase, EO 100 risks becoming a symbolic gesture rather than a structural intervention.
Three modeled scenarios based on government purchase volumes:
Assumptions:
National palay production: ~20 million metric tons (wet + dry season combined)Procurement price includes logistics, drying, and warehousing costsBudget excludes administrative overhead and LGU subsidies
Comparative procurement systems in Thailand and India offer valuable lessons.
Thailand’s Rice Pledging Scheme, though controversial, involved direct government purchase of rice at above-market prices, backed by central bank guarantees and a budget exceeding $10 billion annually.
While it temporarily boosted farmer incomes, it also led to fiscal strain and warehousing inefficiencies.
India’s Minimum Support Price (MSP) system, on the other hand, is more institutionalized and sustainable.
The Food Corporation of India (FCI) procures rice and other staples at fixed support prices, with a budget exceeding ?2 trillion annually (approximately ?1.4 trillion).
This system stabilizes farm incomes, supports national food security, and buffers inflation-backed by robust logistics and federal-state coordination.
For Philippine coalition advocacy, several actionable insights emerge.
First, demand transparency on the NFA’s 2026 budget and procurement targets, pushing for a minimum ?100 billion allocation to make EO 100 credible.
Second, advocate matching grants to empower Local Government Units (LGUs) to participate in palay procurement, especially in rice-producing provinces.
Third, simulate region-specific floor prices based on actual production costs to expose disparities and inform policy adjustments.
Fourth, develop SDG-tagged youth education modules comparing procurement systems in the Philippines, Thailand, and India to build civic literacy and coalition capacity.
Finally, use exposés to highlight how trader dominance persists when government procurement is weak or delayed, reinforcing the need for structural reform.
EO 100 can be a turning point-but only if backed by fiscal realism, institutional muscle, and coalition vigilance. Without these, it risks becoming another ‘inutil’ policy, offering political optics but no real protection for Filipino rice farmers.