The erosion of Uganda’s democratisation experiment may be approaching the point of no return. The rulers’ overt contempt for democracy is shared by their subjects. While the rulers employ the state’s instruments of coercion, violence and vote tally manipulation, their subjects are perfect enablers of the anti-democratic abuse that is inflicted on them. This shared dance is exemplified by the trading of votes that is a major symptom and catalyst of Uganda’s failed democratisation experiment. What began as a promising transition from authoritarian rule exactly 40 years ago this week, is now an obscene supermarket for the exchange of money, goods, and services for votes.
Many have correctly emphasised the role of suppression of political opponents through physical violence, incarceration, and restricted access to political campaigns. Others correctly identify the role of regional and international powers as enablers of Uganda’s political crisis. All that is true, of course. However, my focus today is on voter bribery in the hollowing out of democratic institutions, which has created a vicious cycle that perpetuates authoritarian governance while maintaining a democratic façade. Vote buying in Uganda operates through sophisticated and multi-layered systems. At the most visible level, candidates and their agents distribute cash directly to voters, particularly in the days and hours before polling.
These payments typically range from a few thousand to tens of thousands of Ugandan shillings, modest sums that nonetheless hold significant value in a country where many live in poverty. Nearly all candidates, regardless of party, engage in this immoral, anti-democratic behaviour. Beyond direct cash payments, vote buying takes more subtle forms. Politicians distribute so-called essential goods such as sugar, salt, soap, and cooking oil. They pay school fees for voters’ children, provide building materials for homes and churches, and offer agricultural inputs like seeds and fertilisers. Waragi and other potent alcoholic beverages are vote winners in Kigyezi and many other regions.
These material exchanges create networks of obligation and dependency that extend far beyond election day. The ruling party has systematically weaponised state resources for electoral advantage. Government programmes ostensibly designed for poverty alleviation have become vehicles for political patronage. The distribution of funds through schemes like the Parish Development Model or youth livelihood programmes often correlates suspiciously with electoral calendars and favours areas supporting the incumbent. Political culture also plays a role. Many Ugandans have come to view elections as opportunities for extracting resources from politicians rather than mechanisms for holding leaders accountable.
This transactional view of politics reflects rational adaptation to a system where elected officials rarely deliver on campaign promises and where voters have limited means to punish poor performance. If politicians are going to steal once in office anyway, the logic goes, voters might as well get something tangible during campaigns. Widespread poverty creates vulnerability to inducements that would seem trivial in wealthier societies. When families struggle to afford necessities, even small payments can influence voting decisions, particularly when voters perceive little meaningful difference between candidates or doubt that electoral outcomes will substantially improve their lives.
The chairman of a Local Council in Mparo, Kigyezi, told me that he did not expect any service from his newly elected MPs. ‘They gave me money and T-shirts, and I supported them to go and get their riches and fame,’ he said with a smile. I know him to be a very intelligent man. The weakness of democratic institutions enables vote buying to occur with impunity. Uganda’s Electoral Commission is not independent. Despite its claims of neutrality, its track record suggests otherwise.
Law enforcement selectively prosecutes electoral violations, targeting Opposition figures while ignoring similar or worse violations by ruling party candidates. The Judiciary, increasingly packed with ruling party loyalists, rarely delivers meaningful accountability for electoral fraud. The Opposition’s own weaknesses paradoxically enable vote buying to thrive. Fragmented, under-resourced, and frequently repressed, Opposition parties struggle to build sustained grassroots organisations that could compete with ruling party patronage networks.