From the perspective of an exiled Ugandan who witnessed them firsthand, this account revisits the 1985 Nairobi peace talks and explains why mistrust, political manoeuvring and the reality of war ensured their failure.
I was one of the exiled Ugandans who witnessed the Nairobi peace talks. Most of us who attended were sceptical from the word go. The talks, later dubbed by some pessimists as the Nairobi Peace ‘Jokes’, began on August 26, 1985, with President Daniel Arap Moi as chair, and ended on December 17.
Before that, the initial meeting with Museveni was held at the home of Mathew Rukikaire, chairman of the NRM External Wing, where he briefed us about the progress of the war. He said the NRA was confident of victory and that it was only a matter of time.
Museveni explained that Okello could neither win nor surrender, which was why he had earlier appealed to President Moi to persuade the NRA to surrender.
Museveni had already held discussions with those in the bush and now wanted to hear the views of exiles in Nairobi.
Background
On July 27, 1985, a section of the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA), commanded by Brigadier Bazilio Olara-Okello, staged a coup d’état against Milton Obote’s government. The National Assembly was dissolved, and a Military Council was established to rule the country, first with Olara Okello and later with Gen Tito Okello as chairman.
Meanwhile, Museveni’s National Resistance Army (NRA) rebels were gaining ground, taking advantage of the chaotic situation caused by a power struggle within the government and a demoralised, disintegrating UNLA.
Tito Okello openly invited all parties involved in Uganda’s violence to join in national reconciliation and nation-building. All the major armed groups accepted, except the National Resistance Movement (NRM), the political wing of the NRA.
Okello approached President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania to facilitate a negotiated agreement between the NRM/A and the Military Council. Museveni and the NRM failed to attend the first round of talks in Dar es Salaam, possibly suspicious of Nyerere’s friendship with the ousted Milton Obote.
Alternative arrangements were made for discussions presided over by a mutually acceptable Kenyan delegation, headed by President Daniel Arap Moi.
Negotiations
On realising Museveni’s strength in the bush, Okello asked President Moi to persuade him to cease fire and negotiate an agreement with the Military Council. The gruelling negotiations continued from August 26 to December 17.
Museveni and the NRM/A were angered that the revolution they had fought for four years had been ‘hijacked’ by the UNLA, which they viewed as discredited by gross human rights violations during Obote II.
The talks occasionally degenerated into slanging matches. Museveni denounced previous Ugandan regimes as ‘primitives’ and ‘backward,’ initially refusing to negotiate with the ‘criminal’ Military Council.
Museveni and the NRM adopted a mercurial negotiating position, changing demands and reintroducing supposedly resolved issues. Okello’s team accused the NRM of unnecessarily prolonging the discussions. On one occasion, Museveni disappeared for three days, only to return with new demands. Both sides accused each other of maintaining links with soldiers loyal to former president Idi Amin. These details are drawn from eyewitness accounts and memoirs of those present.
Talks fall apart
Article 17(c) of the agreement called for a commission of inquiry into human rights violations in Uganda since independence. This created a disincentive for the UNLA to implement the plan, as many of its leaders were likely to be implicated in abuses under Obote II.
The prospects of a lasting agreement were further weakened by the context of the negotiations. The Kenyan team lacked in-depth knowledge of Uganda’s situation, the key personalities involved, and their views, failing to build meaningful relationships with the parties to the conflict.
When Museveni asked those in exile if the NRA could cease fire while the talks continued, the general consensus was ‘NO’, to continue fighting. Quoting from the late Besweri Mulondo’s book Semusota GuliMuntamu, he wrote: ‘Let us have the peace talks, but fighting should go on.’
During the meeting, Besweri Mulondo informed Museveni that he had stopped referring to him as vice-chairman of the NRM and instead recognised him as chairman, following Yusuf Lule’s death. Mulondo’s proposal was not challenged.
The Nairobi accord collapsed just weeks after it was signed. The NRM accused the Military Council of not honouring its terms, though memoirs provide much of the detail about what the parties were thinking and feeling.
‘The peace talks did not amount to much. Each side was trying to deceive the other. Museveni went knowing he was close to victory. He knew his fighters were making good progress, closing in on Kampala,’ Rukikaire recalled.
Tito Okello, on the other hand, despised the fighters, seeing them as young boys with no military skills. He suggested incorporating them into the government army, which Museveni deemed impossible.
‘So, the peace talks were just on the surface, but underneath, they were peace jokes,’ Rukikaire said. Accusations flew from both sides of working with Amin’s former soldiers, seen as architects of dictatorship and torture.
Uganda had gone to the dogs, a situation both sides wanted to change, and neither wanted association with the discredited army. ‘We are here to talk, we are going to talk, but I must tell you that if you continue to kill people, this peace cannot hold. You must stop killing people,’ said Museveni, naming those killed by the Okellos.
The talks were notoriously acrimonious. The resultant ceasefire broke down almost immediately. The final agreement, signed in Nairobi, had called for a ceasefire, demilitarisation of Kampala, integration of the NRA and government forces, and absorption of NRA leadership into the Military Council. None of these conditions were met.
Museveni takes power
The economy was in total shambles. When the NRM struggle began, Obote had turned into a vicious dictator, prepared to abrogate the Constitution with impunity. Most Ugandans could not see a good future, and many of us joined the NRM on that basis.
The war intensified, and it was not long before it ended, with Tito Okello going into exile. The war had lasted five years and two months. Museveni was sworn in as President of Uganda on January 26, 1986, amid cheers from the people. These events are widely documented in historical records.