For three decades Africa enjoyed an unusually accommodating financial climate. Donors expanded aid, multilateral lenders supplied concessional funds and China financed infrastructure.
It was no free lunch, but governments could generally look abroad to fill gaps in roads, railways, ports and power.
That climate is changing: deterrence costs money. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and rivalry between America and China have returned defence to the centre of national budgets.
The consequences are fiscal. Advanced economies are trying to rearm while servicing large debts, caring for ageing populations and coping with weak growth.
Something must give and from the look of things, development assistance is a tempting target. Aid will not vanish. Humanitarian crises will still command attention, and multilateral lenders will remain indispensable.
But the era in which development finance could be assumed to become steadily more plentiful is over. Money will now be far tighter, more strategic and more explicitly tied to the geopolitical interests of those who provide it.
Africa feels the squeeze, especially sharply. Its needs are expanding as traditional sources of finance become less generous.
Governments face costly debt-service bills, daunting infrastructure gaps and fast-growing populations.
China, once a powerful alternative to Western lenders, is lending abroad much more cautiously than in the boom years.
Its economic strains, concern about repayment and preference for less risky deals have changed the arithmetic.
The danger is that governments shift the burden indiscriminately on to domestic banks.
Uganda shows it: in 2024/25 domestic debt overtook external debt, and debt service absorbed roughly a third of revenue, as the Monitor Publication reported.
Nor does borrowing in local currency remove the danger. It may avoid an exchange-rate shock, but it concentrates risk in domestic banks and pension funds, binding their fortunes more tightly to an already indebted state.
Local borrowing may spare a difficult foreign negotiation, and deeper domestic capital markets are desirable.
But excessive reliance can crowd out businesses, push up interest rates and create an unhealthy embrace between banks and the state.
The sensible response is not to hunt for the next benevolent lender, but to become less dependent on any lender.
That begins with raising more revenue at home: widening tax bases, reducing exemptions, improving collection and making public spending visible enough that taxpayers see a return. It also requires discipline.
Governments should favour projects that earn or save foreign exchange, resist prestige schemes with opaque contracts and publish their terms.
The African Union has a useful role here. Its institutions can press for common standards on debt disclosure, procurement and project appraisal, reducing the scope for lenders and borrowers alike to hide imprudent bargains.
Continental integration can also make investment more attractive: larger and more predictable markets lower the cost of infrastructure and create opportunities that national borders alone cannot.
None of this means Africa should retreat from external engagement. African governments should welcome the competition, but negotiate with clearer priorities and fewer illusions.
Strategic partnerships are useful only if they advance domestic productivity rather than merely rearrange creditors.
The old development model relied too heavily on the assumption that outsiders would repeatedly finance the next gap. The new geopolitical order makes that assumption dangerous.
The countries best placed to prosper will not be those that secure the largest headlines or the biggest loans.
They will be those that build institutions strong enough to tax fairly, borrow prudently, attract long-term investment and turn external capital into exports, jobs and resilience.
In a world where rich countries increasingly choose between guns and butter, Africa should plan as though neither will be supplied in reliable abundance.