Kenya’s big debt problem is at home, not China

Kenya’s public debt is no longer a single story captured by one alarming figure. At Sh13.01 trillion, or 68.5 percent of GDP as of June 2026, the headline figure raises concern without explaining where the risks lie.

Kenya does not have one debt. It has three distinct debt relationships, involving different creditors, terms, costs and risks. Until these distinctions are understood, we will continue prescribing the wrong solutions.

The first external relationship is with multilateral lenders, including the World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA), the African Development Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

Together, they account for Sh3.07 trillion, about 54 percent of external debt. This is Kenya’s most concessional debt: long-term, often extending 30 to 50 years, with interest rates below 1.5 percent and grace periods of five to 10 years. IDA alone holds more than Sh1.5 trillion.

Between January and April 2026, Treasury contracted Sh416 billion in new borrowing. Two significant concessional facilities were multilateral: Sh45.3 billion from IDA and Sh16.2 billion from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, both signed on April 22 to support affordable housing. Yet concessional financing is not cost-free.

It often carries policy conditions relating to governance, land registration, taxation and procurement. Kenya has therefore exchanged some policy autonomy for cheaper capital.

That may be reasonable, but its price should be acknowledged. The second relationship is bilateral debt – loans from foreign governments – at approximately Sh974 billion, or 17 percent of external debt. Yet it has dominated Kenya’s political debate, particularly through the focus on China. In September 2022, Kenya owed China Sh785 billion.

By February 2026, that exposure had declined to Sh611 billion, a reduction of more than 21 percent. France, Japan, Germany and Italy have become relatively more prominent as Chinese exposure has declined through SGR loan amortisation and reduced new borrowing from Beijing.

The narrative that China owns Kenya is therefore difficult to substantiate. Multilateral institutions hold considerably more external debt.

The greater bilateral risk is currency exposure. These obligations include yen, euro and yuan liabilities. In January 2026 alone, a 1.7 percent depreciation of the shilling reportedly added Sh65 billion to the debt stock. Kenya borrowed nothing to create that increase; the liability grew because the currency weakened.

The third and most consequential relationship is the debt Kenya owes itself: domestic debt. At more than Sh7 trillion, it is the largest component of public debt. Domestic debt is overwhelmingly securities-based, with Treasury bonds accounting for roughly four-fifths and Treasury bills most of the remainder.

Banks, pension funds, insurers, corporates and individuals are major investors. This creates a domestic financial loop in which government borrowing absorbs savings that could otherwise finance private investment. That is the real crowding-out problem.

Lengthening maturities may reduce refinancing risk, but it does not necessarily reduce borrowing costs. When banks and institutional investors can earn attractive returns by holding government securities, businesses, particularly small and medium enterprises, face a smaller pool of affordable credit for investment and expansion.

In FY2024/25, Kenya spent approximately Sh1.72 trillion servicing public debt, equivalent to about 69 percent of ordinary revenue. For every Sh100 collected by Kenya Revenue Authority, roughly Sh69 went to debt service, leaving Sh31 for other government obligations.

In FY2025/26, debt service was budgeted at about Sh1.90 trillion. Meanwhile, Sh1.06 trillion was expected to mature, including Sh648 billion domestic and Sh412 billion external debt. Rolling over these obligations means issuing new debt to retire old debt. That is refinancing, not deleveraging.

The Medium-Term Debt Management Strategy’s plan to source approximately 78 percent of net borrowing domestically and 22 percent externally therefore warrants reconsideration.

If concessional external financing is available at very low interest rates and long maturities, Kenya should not reject it simply because it is external. The objective should be to minimise the portfolio’s cost and risk, not pursue an ideological preference for domestic borrowing.

Kenya should maximise long-term concessional IDA financing for productive projects while reducing expensive domestic borrowing that crowds out private investment. Commercial borrowing should be used sparingly, primarily for liability management.

The $2.25 billion sovereign bond issued in February 2026 – $900 million at 7.9 percent maturing in 2034 and $1.35 billion at 8.7 percent maturing in 2039 – should therefore mainly smooth maturities and reduce rollover pressure.

Debt itself is not immoral. Sh416 billion borrowed for housing, education, climate resilience or productive infrastructure can be good debt if it generates returns above its cost.

The question is not simply how much Kenya owes, but whom it owes, in what currency, at what cost, for how long and what the money has built. Kenya does not have one debt problem; it has a debt-portfolio problem. The solution is not to fear debt, but to manage it intelligently.

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