PHL’s COC push: 80 percent there, but still adrift

The 49th Asean Summit has opened with a diplomatic milestone: Asean and China say they have provisionally agreed on roughly 80 percent of the draft South China Sea Code of Conduct. That is meaningful progress, especially after years in which the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties offered little more than broad pledges of restraint. But ‘substantial completion’ must not be mistaken for a finished agreement, much less a safer seaManila deserves credit for pushing the process forward. Nine rounds of talks and two senior officials’ meetings in a year gave negotiators regular opportunities to narrow differences, and resolving the relationship between the old declaration and the future code is a useful foundation. The agreement that the COC should build on the DOC, guide practical cooperation, manage differences, and uphold the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea gives the negotiations a clearer destination.

Yet the remaining 20 percent may determine whether this is a consequential pact or another carefully worded promise. Geographic coverage, terms of reference and legal status are not technical footnotes. They define where the rules apply, who is bound and what happens when a party disregards them. A code without a clear scope or credible obligations risks repeating the DOC’s weakness: commitments that can be interpreted narrowly and enforced nowhere.

Most urgent is whether the COC will be legally binding. Domestic ratification may make agreement harder, but political discomfort is not a reason to settle for a document with no practical force. Nor should broad language on self-restraint leave room for competing claims about reclamation, construction or upgrading outposts. The point of a code is to reduce ambiguity before an encounter at sea or in the air becomes a crisis-not to supply ambiguity afterward.

A credible agreement must also protect the rights of third parties, as Asean says it intends, and preserve the role of international law, including UNCLOS. The South China Sea is not simply a venue for bilateral disputes; it is a route for trade and energy, and its stability affects countries well beyond the claimants. Practical incident-management channels, transparency and cooperation could make the text matter in daily conduct.

Singapore now inherits both a substantial draft and the hardest choices. It should preserve the momentum without treating the 80-percent figure as a mandate to rush or a substitute for scrutiny. Asean’s consensus is valuable, but consensus that drains a code of precision would be a hollow achievement. China, too, must show that it accepts rules capable of constraining conduct, not merely a diplomatic statement of shared aspirations.

The Philippines can call the advance an achievement, not a conclusion. The next phase should focus on enforceable commitments, clear geographic and operational definitions, and procedures for addressing violations and incidents. If negotiators resolve those questions, the COC can become more than a long-promised symbol: a practical guardrail against miscalculation. If they cannot, the unfinished fifth of the text may matter more than the completed four-fifths. The region needs rules that work.

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