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The Founder of the New Nigeria Peoples Party (NNPP), Dr. Boniface Aniebonam, has expressed support for President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s appointment of Prof. Joash Amupitan as the chairman of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC).

Aniebonam spoke yesterday in Lagos against the background of controversies surrounding Amupitan’s appointment.

The News Agency of Nigeria (NAN) recalls that the National Council of States on October 7 approved the appointment of Amupitan to take over from Prof. Mahmoud Yakubu as INEC chairman.

The appointment is awaiting the Senate’s confirmation.

The NNPP founder noted that Amupitan already has his work cut out for him and should hit the ground running as soon as his appointment is confirmed.

‘The first task for Amupitan is to change the battered image of INEC and restore the trust of Nigerians in the umpire.

‘INEC’s image has been so eroded over the years that the first task before Amupitan is righting the wrongs of the commission and re-creating confidence in it.

‘Amupitan needs to study the commission thoroughly and correct issues currently before it that Mahmoud ignored,’ he said.

According to him, President Tinubu and the Federal Executive Council (FEC) members must have seen Amupitan’s capacity before nominating him.

Aniebonam said the President is truly committed to righting the wrongs in Nigeria, and may be starting from INEC.

‘What we need in Nigeria at the moment should be leaders who can take informed and hard decisions, if we must reinvent the Nigeria of our dreams

‘Our experience with INEC over the internal leadership crisis in NNPP has given us an insight into the ills of the commission and how the body worked sometimes.

‘For the immediate past leadership of INEC to ignore subsisting court orders and directives to upload the NNPP’s new national executives was a shocker and very shameful to constitutional democracy

‘What could have stopped the former INEC boss from obeying the court orders should be looked into. These and many more are part of issues that can erode a people’s confidence in an institution.

‘Amupitan has the choice to either follow the path of past INEC chairmen or write his name in Diamond,’ he said.

Aniebonam said unattended matters, especially disobedience to court judgments, should be cleared forthwith by the new INEC boss, once confirmed.

‘It is still like a daydream to us that some bad eggs in INEC connived and changed the logo and colour of NNPP symbols without the consent of its founding members and holder of the original certificate of registration.

‘INEC did the conversion without asking or sighting the original certificate of registration of the NNPP.

‘This simply means that anyone can approach INEC and change the logo and colour symbols of APC, PDP, Labour Party (LP), and others just like that,’ Aniebonam said.

He stressed that the NNPP remained committed to joining President Tinubu to give the new INEC leadership maximum support and prayed that Amupitan would not be distracted from carrying out his duties.

Was former president, Goodluck Jonathan wrong to expect his successor, late Muhammadu Buhari to have defeated Boko Haram insurgency soon after assuming office? That is the question brought to the fore by Jonathan’s reservations last week, on Buhari’s inability to expeditiously bring the war to an end, despite being once named by the insurgent group as their negotiator.

This question still needs answers irrespective of the clarification by Jonathan that his statement should not be misconstrued as an indictment on Buhari or suggestive of his complicity in the Boko Haram saga. Perhaps, interrogating the observation, may well get the country closer to comprehending the complexities posed by the festering Boko Haram challenge.

Jonathan had during a book launch in Abuja said, ‘One of the committees we set up then, the Boko Haram nominated Buhari to lead their team to negotiate with the government.

‘So, I was feeling that, oh, if they nominated Buhari to represent them and have a discussion with the government committee, then when Buhari took over, it could have been an easier way to negotiate with them and they would have handed over their guns. But it is still there till today’.

The statement quickly drew the ire of Buhari’s former spokesman, Garba Shehu. He described it as misleading since neither Boko Haram’s founding leader, Muhammed Yusuf, nor his successor, Abubakar Shekau, ever nominated Buhari for mediation. Shehu claimed that Shekau consistently denounced and threatened Buhari while recalling that Buhari escaped a Boko Haram bomb attack in Kaduna in 2014.

Shehu however, claimed confusion over the nomination of Buhari arose after a Boko Haram faction, allegedly sponsored by his (Buhari’s) political opponents staged a press conference in Maiduguri, through one Abu Mohammed Ibn Abdulaziz claiming that the sect preferred Buhari and other northern elders.

Even then, he said Buhari dismissed the report at the time as ‘just speculation’ since nobody had contacted him directly.

All that Shehu strove to prove is that Buhari was not nominated by the known leaders of the Boko Haram insurgency. But he admitted there was a nomination by Ibn Abdulaziz, a factional leader of the insurgency group who he claimed was a political agent. Shehu also sought to establish that Buhari has no known links with Boko Haram as they demonised and even attacked him in Kaduna. All that could as well be.

Does Jonathan’s observation collapse just because Buhari’s nomination was not made by either Mohammed or Shekau presented by Shehu as the known leaders of the insurgent group? Or, how correct is it to presume that the nomination by Ibn Abdulaziz did not exist coming from the quarters it did, especially since the insurgency group demonised and attacked Buhari?

Shehu’s answers to the two questions will likely be in the affirmative. In order words, having seemingly faulted the premise on which Jonathan based his expectation of Buhari to have won the war soon after assuming office, his statement should be seen as lacking in merit. That would however, amount to an oversimplification of the larger issues thrown up by Jonathan.

If Jonathan was wrong to expect Buhari to have won Boko Haram based on the factional leader that made the nomination and Buhari’s rejection of the same, what do we make of copious evidence where Buhari made claims of his uncommon capacities to tame the insurgency group? Did Buhari leave anyone in doubt that he had the capacity to handle the raging insurgency in the country better? At any rate, was the fight against insecurity not one of the cardinal campaign programmes with which he sought the votes of the electorate?

Buhari unarguably, was one of the greatest critics of the handling of the Boko Haram insurgency by the Jonathan administration. He not only accused Jonathan of ‘looking the other way’ when the Chibok girls were abducted but was reported to have said in 2013 that the ‘military offensive against Boko Haram is anti-north’. Many northern leaders had at the budding stages of the insurgency faulted it and read political motives into it. Elite dissonance was one of the key reasons Boko Haram got entrenched.

During his famous speech at Chatham House London, Buhari did not leave his audience in doubt that he had solutions to the Boko Haram insurgency. He did not only fault the prosecution of the war but promised to lead the war from the front.

Hear him, ‘We will always act on time and not allow problems to irresponsibly fester, and I Muhammadu Buhari, will always lead from the front and return Nigeria to its leadership role in regional and international efforts to combat terrorism’.

He also promised to pay special attention to the welfare of soldiers in and out of service: ‘we will give them adequate and modern arms and ammunitions to work with. to choke Boko Haram’s financial and equipment channels, we will be tough on terrorism and tough on its root causes’. Buhari received thunderous ovation from his audience for speaking so confidently on his plans to eliminate Boko Haram.

Buhari was also reported to have assigned himself a timeline of six months to win the war against the insurgents after he won the 2015 general election.

It is therefore not in doubt that Buhari’s statements and body language gave the impression that he had all it takes to tame the Boko Haram monster. So, Jonathan’s expectation of him to have won the war against insurgency soon after assuming office is based on solid foundation. In that also, he is with many.

Irrespective of the quarters from which the mediation nomination came, Buhari left nobody in doubt that he had the magic wand to win the war against Boko Haram. Many believed him and he owes his electoral victory largely to that expectation. His profile as an Army General and former military head of state counted as added advantages.

Jonathan may not have gone this length, but the issues were obviously at the back of his mind when he spoke the way he did at the book launch. It serves no useful purpose misconstruing his statement as suggestive of Buhari’s link with Boko Haram. Buhari made such claims and there is nothing wrong holding him accountable to his words.

Buhari was conscious of the promises he made on the matter. It was in apparent bid to fulfil them, that he gleefully declared in December 2015, barely six months after assuming office that ‘Nigeria has technically won the war’ against Islamist Boko Haram insurgents. He had predicated his claims on the grounds that the militant group could no longer mount ‘conventional attacks’ against security forces or population centres.

For him, Boko Haram had been reduced to fighting with Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and remained a force only in its heartland of Borno State. His claims were seen as hasty and received with mixed feelings by those versed in asymmetrical warfare.

But all these claims were soon to collapse like a pack of cards. The insurgents quickly to put a lie to them as they resumed onslaughts against military formations and population centres. These took enormous toll on the military both in human and material capital despite efforts to contain the insurgents.

It is an irony of sorts that Buhari failed to win the war against the Boko Haram insurgency until he left office. What has rather been witnessed has been the emergence of more splinter groups with some attacking population centres in parts of the country they were not able to access when Jonathan held sway.

Just a few weeks ago, Borno State governor, Babagana Zulum raised an alarm on the regrouping of the insurgents around the Tumbus areas of Lake Chad and Mandara Hills within the Sambisa Forest in the state. This is in addition to several attacks, killings and abductions by the insurgent group.

But the more troubling arising from the book launch, is the seeming lack of clarity among leaders on what Boko Haram really stands for, its sponsors and the best strategy to eradicate the scourge.

Jonathan believes the issue of Boko Haram is far more complex than it is often presented. He sees their motivation beyond the hunger-narrative even as he fingered external sponsorship given their sophistication in arms and ammunitions.

The Chief of Defence Staff, Christopher Musa wants the underlying factors that incubate insecurity; poverty, lack of education and unemployment to be addressed. For former president, Olusegun Obasanjo, the country must ask itself hard questions about how it has handled the crisis over the past 15 years. If by now there is no consensus on some of these issues, is it surprising Boko Haram appears to be defying solutions?

A coalition of over 130 pan-Yoruba groups has thrown its weight behind the Lagos State Government’s decision to license two new electricity distribution companies, describing the move as a breakthrough in the state’s long struggle with poor power supply.

The coalition, under the umbrella of the Alliance for Yoruba Democratic Movements (AYDM), praised Governor Babajide Sanwo-Olu and his deputy, Dr Obafemi Hamzat, for it called ‘the most important public-interest decision in Lagos since 1999’.

In a statement issued after its Executive Council meeting, the AYDM said the registration of Excel Distribution Company and IE Energy Lagos Limited marks a ‘radical departure from years of corporate irresponsibility’ by existing electricity distributors, Eko Electricity Distribution Plc and Ikeja Electric Plc.

‘Governor Sanwo-Olu and his team have written their names in history,’ the group declared, calling the move a new chapter in the quest for stable electricity in Lagos and the Southwest.

The AYDM urged both the state and federal governments to investigate the operators of the current electricity distribution companies for alleged ‘crimes against the people,’ accusing them of negligence, extortion, and disregard for human life.

The group alleged that many Lagos residents had lost their lives and properties due to abrupt disconnections, power surges, and unsafe distribution practices.

‘Many have died as a result of the recklessness of the existing DISCOs. Their record is worse than that of their predecessors, NEPA,’ the statement read.

‘These companies lack human conscience and are driven only by greed and cruelty.’

The coalition said it was documenting the alleged abuses of the electricity firms and would seek international sanctions against their management.

The AYDM commended the Lagos State Government for ‘standing with the people’, saying the decision would rescue businesses and industries from the brink of collapse.

‘When electricity is inefficient, businesses fail, hospitals suffer, and the social economy crumbles. Millions of Lagosians have endured the arrogance and exploitation of operators who see citizens as commodities for profit,’ said AYDM Secretary Popoola Ajayi and Mobilisation Director Chief Kunle Oshodi.

The coalition said it is ready to work with the newly licensed distributors to rebuild public trust in the power sector. It also encouraged the state government to invest in cleaner energy sources, including converting Lagos’ massive daily waste output into power.

The 130-member coalition includes the Oodua Nationalist Coalition (ONAC), Agbekoya, Yoruba Artisan and Traders Association (YATA), Nigerian Automobile Technicians Association (NATA – South West), Oodua Peoples Congress (OPC – New Era), South West Professional Forum (SOWPROF), Covenant Group (CG), Oodua Hunters Union (OHUN), and the South West Women Congress (SWECO), among others.

The AYDM described the outgoing DISCOs as ‘economic saboteurs’ and warned the new licensees against repeating their mistakes.

‘The Lagos people have suffered enough. The era of exploitation must end,’ the statement concluded.

On March 18, President Bola Ahmed Tinubu declared a six-month state of emergency in Rivers State under Section 305 of the 1999 Constitution, suspending the governor, deputy governor, and the state legislature, and appointing Vice Admiral Ibok-Ete Ekwe Ibas (retd.) as sole administrator to take charge of state affairs. The proclamation and the swearing-in of the sole administrator were performed by the federal government as part of the constitutional procedure invoked to restore order in the face of both political paralysis and security threats.

The emergency was formally lifted by President Tinubu on September 17, with democratic governance scheduled to resume the following day. The revocation marked the end of the six-month federal intervention and the reinstatement of the suspended governor and other elected officials.

Triggers of the emergency

Political and institutional breakdown in Rivers State predated the emergency and centred on an intensely personal and intra-party rivalry. The conflict pitted the state’s incumbent governor, Siminalayi Fubara, against powerful political actors aligned with his predecessor and senior party figure, Nyesom Wike. The dispute encompassed control over appointments, the composition of the state House of Assembly, the presentation and approval of budget documents, and the general direction of state patronage. Escalatory moves – including impeachment efforts by lawmakers aligned with Wike and reciprocal measures by supporters of Fubara – produced legislative paralysis and administrative stoppages.

Concurrently, Rivers State experienced an upswing in security incidents afflicting oil infrastructure: pipeline vandalism, illegal refining and bunkering, and at least one serious fire on the Trans-Niger pipeline. Given the state’s outsized contribution to national oil revenues, the federal government framed these developments not merely as local law-and-order problems but as threats to national fiscal stability and public order. The federal narrative coupled the security incidents with the political impasse to justify invoking Section 305.

Constitutional basis and legal considerations

Section 305 of the 1999 Constitution vests the president with the power to declare a state of emergency where he is satisfied that security, public safety or public order is threatened in any part of Nigeria. The Rivers declaration followed the formal sequence: proclamation by the president, the nomination and swearing-in of a sole administrator, and subsequent legislative ratification at the national level.

Critics – including legal scholars, bar bodies and civil society actors – questioned whether the situation in Rivers met the constitutional standard for suspending democratically elected institutions. They argued that the constitution’s emergency provisions were designed for extreme circumstances (e.g., insurrection, invasion, wide-scale civil disorder) and should not be used primarily to resolve political disputes or intra-party power struggles. These objections highlighted the tension between constitutional text, executive discretion, and democratic safeguards.

Appointment and role of the sole administrator

Vice Admiral Ibas (retd.) – a former Chief of the Naval Staff – was sworn in as sole administrator in mid-March to exercise executive authority in Rivers State for the duration of the emergency. The administrator’s immediate tasks were to restore governance functions, secure critical infrastructure, approve and implement a releasable state budget, and coordinate security responses with federal agencies. As a retired senior naval officer with national security experience, Ibas’s selection underscored the security-first thrust of the intervention.

Short-term security indicators showed modest improvements in the immediate months following the deployment of federal security assets and the administrator’s coordination role. Large-scale acts of pipeline vandalism reportedly fell relative to the period immediately preceding the emergency and the federal presence allowed for rapid response to new incidents. The administrator also facilitated the passage of a delayed state budget, restored payment of certain civil service obligations, and reactivated stalled public projects.

Limitations and persistence of structural drivers

Despite these operational gains, the emergency did not resolve structural drivers of instability. Chronic economic marginalization, environmental degradation from oil operations, youth unemployment, and entrenched patronage politics remained largely unaddressed. The federal intervention, by design temporary and focused on restoring immediate order, lacked the fiscal and programmatic depth to implement long-term development or remediation schemes. Consequently, many of the underlying grievances that fuel pipeline vandalism and local militancy were left intact.

Democratic costs and institutional integrity

The suspension of the governor, deputy governor and the entire state House of Assembly for six months produced a significant democratic deficit. Citizens of Rivers were denied state-level electoral representation and the usual channels of accountability. Legislative oversight of the executive was absent, and political debate shifted from electoral competition and parliamentary contestation to federal administrative fiat. Even where courts and civil society continued to operate, their capacity to substitute for representative institutions was limited. The re-imposition of elected governance upon revocation therefore presented both the practical challenge of transition and the normative problem of repairing citizens’ trust in democratic institutions.

The roles of Wike and Fubara

Wike’s position in this drama was twofold: as a former governor of Rivers State, he retained a substantial political machine and as a senior national figure (serving at the time as a federal minister and party powerbroker), he was positioned to influence intra-state dynamics. Wike’s network of loyalists in the state assembly and local politics used legislative manoeuvres to challenge Governor Fubara’s authority. Observers interpreted some moves as an attempt to check or even remove Fubara from office.

Fubara, who rose to power with the backing of the same political structure, sought to assert autonomy after taking office. His attempts to reorganize local political arrangements and resist certain assembly pressures triggered counter-moves from Wike’s camp. The mutual escalation – impeachment threats by lawmakers and executive countermeasures by the governor – produced a governance vacuum that both exacerbated security vulnerabilities and provided the federal government with a rationale for intervention.

Political effects and public perception

The federal intervention temporarily reasserted central authority in Rivers. For Abuja, the move projected capacity to manage threats in the Niger Delta and to keep oil flows stable – a national priority. For local actors, however, the intervention represented an external imposition that straddled the line between constitutional remedy and political arbitration. The lifting of the emergency on September 17 and the planned resumption of democratic governance on September 18 signalled closure of the immediate episode but left open whether the political reconciliation between Wike and Fubara would endure or merely be a surface calm atop unresolved rivalries.

Proportionality and alternatives

Assessing proportionality requires weighing alternatives that might have been less intrusive of democratic institutions. Possible options included intensive federal mediation between the rival camps, targeted security deployments strictly limited to protecting oil infrastructure, or judicial and constitutional remedies through the courts to settle disputes over assembly composition and impeachment procedures. The choice of a full emergency that suspended elected institutions implied a judgment that less coercive measures had failed or would fail to restore order in time to prevent wider harm – a judgment that remains contestable in legal and normative terms.

Lessons and policy recommendations

Clarify constitutional thresholds: The Rivers case exposes ambiguities in Section 305’s operationalization. Legislative or judicially endorsed guidelines could help define the scope and limits of emergency invocation to reduce risks of misuse.

Institutionalize mediation mechanisms: Where intra-state political conflicts threaten governance, impartial mediation mechanisms should be mandatory precursors to resorting to emergency powers.

Ensure periodic oversight: Any emergency should be subject to clearly defined periodic reviews by the legislature, with statutory time-limits, reporting requirements, and sunset clauses.

Combine security measures with development commitments: Security operations must be paired with concrete, time-bound development and environmental remediation plans.

Protect democratic continuity: Even under emergency administrations, mechanisms should preserve citizen representation and accountability.

The Rivers State emergency of March-September demonstrates the difficult balance between preserving public order and safeguarding democratic governance. The federal intervention, administered by Vice Admiral Ibas (retd.), achieved immediate administrative and security stabilization while imposing heavy democratic costs. The public revocation of the emergency on September 17 allowed for the planned resumption of elected governance, but the deeper political contest between Wike and Fubara – and the structural drivers of insecurity in the Niger Delta – require sustained, non-coercive remedies. For Nigerian federalism to be resilient, emergency powers must remain tightly constrained, transparently used, and coupled with policies that address long-term governance, development, and environmental justice.

Alabi is professor of Political Science, Defence and Security Studies.

Entrepreneur, youth advocate and All Progressives Congress (APC) chieftain, Comrade Isaac Balami, has extolled Seyi Tinubu’s virtues, describing him as a man of humility, compassion who is deep committed to humanity.

In a statement at the weekend, Balami, the founder of Isaac Balami University of Aeronautics and Management (IBUAM), said Seyi Tinubu embodies rare qualities that are often misunderstood by critics, yet his dream of a better Nigeria remains unwavering.

According to him, the President’s son has consistently demonstrated a genuine passion for national development and youth empowerment.

‘My perspective on Seyi Tinubu is that of a man with a large heart, deeply committed to impacting his generation, yet often constrained by the inevitable challenges that come with being the son of the President,’ Balami stated.

He noted that despite distractions from detractors, Seyi Tinubu has remained focused on his mission to reach many parts across Nigeria and leave lasting imprints through his progressives initiatives and peace campaigns.

Balami praised Seyi’s contributions to nation building, saying no son of any politician in Nigeria has matched his record of impactful initiatives at such an age.

He affirmed that Seyi’s sincerity, humility, and unwavering commitment to Nigeria’s unity has distinguished him among young Nigerians.

‘In less than two years of working with him, I have seen a man who has touched countless lives, created opportunities, promoted peace, and consistently championed unity across the country,’ he said.

Balami further described Seyi Tinubu as a detribalised Nigerian whose worldview aligns with progressive thinkers advocating simplicity, service, and the collective good, regardless of background or privilege.

‘The Seyi Tinubu I know does not wish to be seen merely as the President’s son, but as a fellow Nigerian genuinely committed to building the nation of our dreams,’ he added.

While congratulating him on his 40th birthday, Balami urged Nigerians to judge Seyi Tinubu by his actions and positive contributions rather than sentiments or bias.

‘Today, I celebrate a trailblazer, a patriotic Nigerian who believes that Nigeria’s greatness transcends individual ambition or aspiration,’ Balami stated.