City Hall pledges quick reopening of two children’s museums in Bangkok

The Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA) has promised to quickly find a new team to operate and reopen two childen’s museums being forced to close next week by financial red tape.

The city’s culture, sports and tourism department has announced that the Children’s Discovery Museum in Chatuchak district and the Children’s Discovery Museum in Thung Khru district will be closed from Oct 1, 2026.

The agency said it was still searching for a new contractor to operate and maintain the two depositories.

“If the procurement process completes and a new winning bidder is selected, the museums will be opened as normal, and the public will be informed,” it said.

The announced closure comes at an unfortunate time for children. The two museums are popular, and most schools will take an annual mid-year break in October.

Bangkok deputy governor Sanon Wangsrangboon on Tuesday acknowledged the negative consequences for children, saying the museums were one of their favourite places to visit during school holidays. He also pledged a quick solution to the problem.

Mr Sanon also said the transitional period from one fiscal year to the next was affecting the budgetary process and the funding of museums.

“The BMA realises the vast impact of the museum closures, especially during the school break,” he said. “The most urgent issue now is to quickly find a new operator so that the closure period will be short.”

The new fiscal year starts on Oct 1.

City Hall’s current administration is promoting Bangkok as a city of learning, on the same level as other world-class capitals.

Qualcomm may tap Samsung to co-produce 2nm chips with TSMC

Qualcomm is in talks with Samsung Electronics to help manufacture its next-generation 2-nanometre Snapdragon chips, opening up the possibility of a dual-sourcing strategy alongside Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co (TSMC).

The shift could mark a return to form for the two technology giants. Samsung previously manufactured Qualcomm’s Snapdragon 8 Gen 1 processor on its 4nm process in 2021.

The chipset faced widespread criticism regarding thermal management and efficiency issues and Qualcomm subsequently switched orders for the Snapdragon 8+ Gen 1 and subsequent flagship chips to TSMC.

According to a report by South Korean news outlet ChosunBiz, Qualcomm and Samsung Foundry are currently negotiating the details of a partnership for 2nm chip production. The collaboration could involve the coming Snapdragon 8 Elite Gen 6 series, with Qualcomm looking to split production capacity between Samsung and TSMC rather than relying on a single foundry.

Yield rates remain a crucial factor in the negotiations. Current industry data suggests Samsung’s 2nm yield rate is around 50 to 60 percent, while TSMC yields are slightly higher at 60 to 70 percent. However, Qualcomm is reportedly targeting a minimum combined yield rate of 70 percent or higher. Dual-sourcing would allow the US chip designer to mitigate production risks at a time when global demand for smartphone processors and key components remains high.

Supply constraints at TSMC are also driving Qualcomm’s decision. Although TSMC has ramped up its 2nm production capacity to approximately 60,000 wafers per month, the vast majority of its initial output has reportedly been secured by Apple for its A20 Pro chip, which is expected to power the coming iPhone 18 Pro and iPhone 18 Pro Max. Relying solely on TSMC could leave Qualcomm vulnerable to supply shortages and unable to meet its production targets.

The news comes ahead of Qualcomm’s annual Snapdragon Summit 2026, scheduled for Sept 22-24, 2026. The company is widely expected to unveil its next-generation Snapdragon 8 Elite Gen 6 series at the event, with previous reports indicating clock speeds could reach up to 5GHz.

Whether Samsung will ultimately secure the contract to manufacture Snapdragon chips again remains to be seen, as final agreements will depend on contract pricing, production volume commitments, and stabilised yield figures.

Why Central Luzon and Metro Manila are sinking into deeper flood risk

Massive flooding in several towns and cities in Central Luzon and Metro Manila has subsided.

Many are asking why it happened and whether it will happen again.

Flooding arises from a complex interplay of geomorphic, climatic and human-induced factors. But recent evidence indicates that the worsening flood crisis is not simply a product of climate change. It is increasingly driven by land subsidence.

While global sea levels are rising by an average of 1 to 3 millimeters annually because of climate change, parts of Central Luzon are subsiding at rates exceeding 100 millimeters per year. This subsidence, driven primarily by decades of unsustainable groundwater extraction, has created a situation in which the land is sinking much faster than the sea level is rising.

The result is widespread flooding, even in areas historically unaffected by inundation, threatening millions of lives, livelihoods and ecosystems.

Land subsidence must be considered within broader climate resilience and governance frameworks and alongside the hydrological, socioeconomic and institutional dimensions of the crisis. The interaction of land subsidence with urbanization, reclamation and climate variability in contributing to massive flooding must also be examined, along with possible governance failures.

This underscores the urgency of integrated resilience strategies combining engineering solutions, governance reform and community relocation planning. Implementable recommendations are provided to guide policymakers, communities and institutions toward sustainable adaptation.

Emerging subsidence crisis

Flooding has long been a defining feature of the Philippine landscape, shaped by monsoon rains, typhoons and the country’s archipelagic geography. Yet recent evidence indicates that the worsening flood crisis is not simply a product of climate change but is increasingly driven by land subsidence (Siringan and Rodolfo, 2003).

Subsidence occurs when the ground sinks because of the removal of underground water or other geological processes. In the Philippines, it has been accelerated by decades of groundwater extraction for domestic, industrial and agricultural use (Lasco et al., 2006).

In Central Luzon, subsidence rates exceed 100 millimeters per year, a figure that dwarfs the global average rate of sea-level rise (Rodolfo and Siringan, 2006). This disparity means subsidence is not just a contributing factor but the dominant driver of flooding in many areas.

Land subsidence in Central Luzon is largely anthropogenic, or caused by human activities, particularly unsustainable groundwater extraction (Lasco et al., 2006).

Aquifers, once abundant, have been depleted by decades of pumping to meet the demands of urban expansion, industrial growth and agricultural irrigation. As aquifers collapse, the land above them sinks, creating a situation in which subsidence rates exceed 100 millimeters per year (Siringan and Rodolfo, 2003).

Compared with the 1 to 3 millimeters of annual sea-level rise (IPCC, 2021), subsidence is 30 to 100 times more significant in shaping flood risk (Table 1).

Multi-causal flood regime

Flooding in Central Luzon is not the result of a single failure. It reflects the interaction of geography, extreme rainfall, altered waterways, land subsidence, reclamation, dam operations and decades of fragmented development.

The 2026 Habagat floods showed the limits of responding project by project and disaster by disaster.

Riverbed siltation and erosion have drastically reduced the capacity of major waterways such as the Pampanga River, whose depth has declined from roughly 6.5 meters to less than 3 meters because of sediment deposition from deforested upland watersheds and kaingin farming (Lasco et al., 2006).

Urbanization and subdivision growth have replaced permeable agricultural land with concrete surfaces, accelerating runoff and overwhelming drainage systems (Mendoza, 2026).

In Bulacan and Pampanga, the proliferation of gated communities and industrial estates has fragmented natural floodplains, preventing water from dispersing laterally during heavy rains.

Fishpond conversion and dike construction have compounded these effects. Roughly 15,000 hectares of aquaculture ponds now occupy what were once interconnected wetlands, impeding natural water flow and hydraulic connectivity between the Candaba Swamp and Manila Bay (Lagmay et al., 2026; Mendoza, 2026a).

Continuous water pumping for aquaculture contributes to groundwater depletion and land subsidence, further lowering terrain elevation and worsening flood exposure.

Land reclamation adds another layer of complexity. Projects such as the Bulacan airport reduce water-storage capacity and alter tidal flows.

Along Laguna Lake, reclamation has already reached 80 hectares, encroaching on natural buffer zones that once absorbed excess rainfall (Asian Development Bank, 2026). The narrowing of littoral zones and the construction of embankments for housing and industrial parks have disrupted the lake’s ability to regulate water levels during monsoon events.

Rising sea levels, averaging 3 millimeters per year (IPCC, 2021), further hinder drainage into Manila Bay, while subsidence rates exceeding 100 millimeters per year tilt the floodplain toward the coast (Rodolfo and Siringan, 2006).

Governance failures

The subsidence crisis is not merely environmental but institutional.

Weak governance is evident in fragmented water management agencies, poor enforcement of groundwater extraction limits, inadequate urban planning and infrastructure projects that ignore hydrological impacts.

Short-term economic gains, such as airport reclamation or subdivision development, override long-term resilience. The crisis reflects a broader governance deficit in the Philippines, where institutional fragmentation and weak enforcement undermine resilience.

Socioeconomic impacts

Flooding linked to subsidence affects millions of Filipinos (Table 1).

Agriculture is particularly vulnerable, with rice fields permanently waterlogged and yields reduced. This threatens food security in a country where rice is a staple.

Urban settlements, particularly informal housing in low-lying areas, face chronic inundation. Infrastructure damage, displacement and health costs escalate, undermining economic stability.

Poor communities bear disproportionate burdens because they lack resources for relocation or adaptation. The crisis thus exacerbates social inequities, with vulnerable populations facing the greatest risks.

Table 1. Projected subsidence vs. rainfall impacts in Central Luzon, 2026-2035

Scenario Subsidence rate (mm/year) Rainfall increase (%) Projected flood depth (cm) Affected population (millions)

Baseline 50 +5 30 2.5

Moderate 75 +10 60 4.0

Severe 100 +15 90 6.5

Extreme 120 +20 120 8.0

Source: Data adapted from Lasco, Pulhin, and Cruz (2006); IPCC (2021); World Bank (2020).

Other Asian cities face subsidence, including Jakarta, Bangkok and Ho Chi Minh City. Yet the Philippine case is distinctive because of higher subsidence rates, weaker governance capacity, greater exposure to typhoons and monsoons, and agricultural dependence.

Comparative benchmarking underscores the urgency of reforms. Jakarta, for example, has implemented groundwater extraction limits and relocation programs, while Bangkok has invested in flood barriers.

The Philippines must learn from these experiences while tailoring solutions to its unique context (Table 2).

Table 2. Comparative ASEAN benchmarks on subsidence and adaptation

Country Subsidence rate (mm/year) Key adaptation strategy Governance capacity Effectiveness

Philippines 100+ Weak regulation, fragmented planning Low Poor

Jakarta, Indonesia 80-100 Groundwater limits, relocation programs Moderate Improving

Bangkok, Thailand 30-50 Flood barriers, zoning enforcement High Strong

Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam 40-60 Infrastructure investment, aquifer recharge Moderate Moderate

Source: Data adapted from Asian Development Bank (2026); World Bank (2020).

The projections of cumulative flooding depth in Central Luzon and Metro Manila

The projections reveal a stark trajectory: By 2035, cumulative flooding depth in Central Luzon and Metro Manila could exceed half a meter, affecting more than 115 towns combined.

By 2060, subsidence compounded by sea-level rise could generate flood depths exceeding 3 meters in low-lying areas, with nearly 200 towns experiencing chronic inundation (Table 3).

Flood duration also lengthens significantly. While current floods last weeks to months, by 2050 many towns will experience six to seven months of flooding annually, effectively rendering them uninhabitable.

By 2060, eight to nine months of inundation per year would mean permanent displacement for millions.

Central Luzon, with its extensive agricultural base, faces the greatest risk. Rice fields will be permanently waterlogged, undermining national food security.

Metro Manila, as the economic hub, will suffer infrastructure paralysis, housing crises and escalating health costs. Informal settlements along esteros and rivers will be the first displaced, but even middle-class subdivisions will face chronic inundation.

The projections underscore that subsidence is not a marginal issue but the dominant driver of flood risk. Sea-level rise contributes incrementally, but the collapse of aquifers from groundwater extraction accelerates land sinking at rates far beyond climate-driven changes.

This means policy interventions targeting subsidence – such as groundwater regulation, aquifer recharge and alternative water sourcing – are more urgent than coastal defenses alone.

Table 3. Projected flooding depth and towns affected in Central Luzon and Metro Manila, 2025-2060

Year Subsidence (mm/year) Sea-level rise (mm/year) Combined (mm/year) Cumulative flood depth (cm) Towns flooded, Central Luzon Towns flooded, Metro Manila Avg. flood duration (months/year)

2026 50 3 53 26.5 55 22 1-2

2030 75 3 78 39.0 70 28 2-3

2035 100 3 103 51.5 85 32 3-4

2040 100 3 103 103.0 95 35 4-5

2045 120 3 123 153.8 110 38 5-6

2050 120 3 123 215.3 125 40 6-7

2055 120 3 123 276.8 135 42 7-8

2060 120 3 123 338.3 150 45 8-9

Source: Data adapted from IPCC (2021); Siringan and Rodolfo (2003); Rodolfo and Siringan (2006); Asian Development Bank (2026).

Assumptions: Subsidence rates vary between 50 and 120 millimeters per year depending on extraction intensity. Sea-level rise averages 3 millimeters per year (IPCC baseline). Flooding depth = (subsidence + sea-level rise) × years elapsed. Towns affected are estimated from historical flood mapping, with a baseline of about 50 towns in Central Luzon and about 20 in Metro Manila already considered flood-prone. Flood duration is expressed in months per year of inundation.

Conclusions and recommendations

The Philippines’ flooding crisis is not solely a climate issue but a subsidence-driven governance challenge. Subsidence rates far exceed sea-level rise, making human activity the dominant driver of inundation.

Without urgent reforms, millions will face escalating displacement, economic losses and food insecurity. The crisis exemplifies the Philippine quadruple bind: climate-induced losses, currency depreciation, rising debt service and governance failures.

Addressing subsidence requires integrated resilience strategies that combine engineering solutions, governance reform and community relocation planning.

Addressing the subsidence crisis also requires systemic reforms. Water management must be reformed to enforce groundwater extraction limits, invest in alternative water sources such as rainwater harvesting and water recycling, and establish integrated water governance institutions.

Urban planning and land use must be restructured to restrict subdivisions in flood-prone areas, implement zoning laws that preserve floodplains, and halt reclamation projects that worsen tidal flows.

Engineering interventions must be prioritized, including adaptive flood barriers, elevated housing, river dredging and climate-resilient infrastructure.

Community relocation planning must be developed, with relocation programs for high-risk communities, livelihood support in safer areas and participatory planning.

Climate adaptation must also be integrated by aligning subsidence mitigation with national climate adaptation plans, incorporating subsidence into disaster risk reduction frameworks and benchmarking against ASEAN resilience strategies.

Jackson Wang signs with Jay Z’s Roc Nation, home of Rihanna, Alicia Keys, more

Jackson Wang has marked a new chapter in his career as he signed with Roc Nation, the entertainment company founded by rapper Jay-Z.

Wang’s signing was announced on Monday, Sept. 21, alongside the release of his new single, ‘Thank You,’ his first release since joining the company.

‘We’re excited to have Jackson Wang join our family here at Roc Nation,’ Jay-Z said in a statement. ‘He’s an incredible artist with a very special drive, and we can’t wait to see what he does next.’

Founded in 2008, Roc Nation is a full-service entertainment company co-founded by Jay-Z, Desiree Perez, Jay Brown, Juan Perez and Tyran ‘Ty Ty’ Smith.

Its roster or current clients included some of the biggest names in music, including Rihanna, Alicia Keys, Christina Aguilera, J. Cole, Megan Thee Stallion, John Legend, Big Sean and A$AP Rocky, among others.

Wang, a former member of the K-pop group GOT7, launched his solo career with ‘Papillon’ in 2017, followed by his debut album ‘MIRRORS’ in 2019. The album became the first album by a solo Chinese artist to enter the Billboard 200.

Wang went on to release ‘100 Ways,’ which became the first song by a Chinese singer-songwriter to enter Mediabase’s U.S. Top 40. He has also collaborated with artists including Ciara, Swae Lee, Major Lazer, Galantis, Gucci Mane, Joji and GoldLink.

His second album, ‘MAGIC MAN,’ released in 2022 and was followed by his first solo world tour. He later became the first Chinese solo artist to perform on the main stage at Coachella in 2023.

His third album, ‘MAGICMAN 2,’ was released in 2025 and debuted at No. 13 on the Billboard 200. It also placed Wang in the Top 15 of the Billboard Artist 100, according to his representatives.

Wang is currently continuing his ‘MAGICMAN 2′ World Tour, which included sold-out shows at Los Angeles’ Kia Forum and Brooklyn’s Barclays Center. His Manila stop in November 2025 marked his first solo concert in the Philippines.

FG to empower 200 youths with vocational, start-up tools in Oyo

The Federal Government, through the National Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy (NPRGS), will empower 200 youths in Oyo with practical and marketable skills.

The training, under the auspices of the Office of the Senior Special Assistant to the President on Technical, Vocational and Entrepreneurship Education (OSSAP-TVEE), will run from Sept. 28 to Oct. 9, 2026.

A statement signed by Dr. Abiola Arogundade, Senior Special Assistant (SSA) to the President on Technical, Vocational, and Entrepreneurship Education (TVEE) and made available to State House correspondents on Tuesday disclosed that the initiative, which begins with the Oyo State phase, will be replicated across the six geopolitical zones to expand access to skills training, tools and sustainable livelihood opportunities for more young Nigerians.

‘Beneficiaries will receive training across three tracks: Graphics/Artificial Intelligence (AI), Makeup and Fashion Designing, while each participant will also receive a complete training kit to enable them to commence or expand their chosen enterprise after the programme.

‘Graphics/AI trainees will receive laptops, while Makeup trainees will receive fully equipped makeup kits.

‘Fashion Designing trainees will receive sewing machines and starter kits to support their transition from training to entrepreneurship.’

The statement noted that the programme will culminate in a graduation and grand finale on October 9.

As part of the Federal Government’s digital empowerment drive, 500 tablets will also be distributed to young Nigerians during the grand finale.

Arogundade noted that the initiative underscores the Federal Government’s commitment to equipping young Nigerians with practical skills, tools and opportunities to build sustainable livelihoods.

Through the NPRGS, the government is supporting skills development and entrepreneurship as pathways to greater economic participation and improved livelihoods among Nigerian youths.

Cabinet approves B43bn consumer subsidy extension

The cabinet has approved a 43-billion-baht extension of the government’s Thai Chuay Thai Plus (Thais help Thais plus) co-payment scheme for October and November, along with an additional 700-baht allowance for state welfare cardholders in October, Finance Minister Ekniti Nitithanprapas said on Tuesday.

The extended 60/40 scheme will provide eligible participants with up to 1,000 baht to spend on qualifying food, beverages, goods and services at participating shops through the end of November. The government will subsidise 60% of eligible purchases, subject to a daily limit of 200 baht per person.

The extension is intended to ease the impact of high oil prices linked to the conflict in the Middle East, support household purchasing power and stimulate the grassroots economy, Mr Ekniti, who is also deputy prime minister, said.

The measure will be financed with remaining funds from relief projects under a broader 400-billion-baht borrowing plan designed to address the impact of the energy crisis and support Thailand’s energy transition.

Lavaron Sangsnit, permanent secretary for finance, said about 44 billion baht remained available for measures to ease the people’s financial burden.

Under the welfare top-up, eligible cardholders will receive a total of 1,000 baht in October, up from the regular 300 baht, with the additional 700 baht available for purchases at participating Thong Fah (Blue Flag) low-cost shops and other outlets designated by the Ministry of Commerce.

The government said the measures were necessary because volatile energy prices could weaken household purchasing power and private consumption, key drivers of the economy, while putting further pressure on growth and inflation.

The first phase of Thai Chuay Thai Plus, which began in June and ends this month, covered about 40 million people, with each eligible participant receiving up to 1,000 baht per month.

Eligible participants can confirm their registration through the Pao Tang mobile application from Oct 1 to 15. Businesses already participating in the scheme can confirm their participation in the additional phase through the Tang Rat app from Oct 1 to Nov 30.

The subsidies can be used from Oct 1 to Nov 30 at participating shops between 6am and 11pm. Food and beverages can also be purchased through participating delivery platforms via the Pao Tang app between 6am and 9pm.

Mr Ekniti said he remained confident that the economy would expand by 2.5% this year, in line with the Finance Ministry’s forecast issued in July.

Highlights: Day 28 of Sara Duterte impeachment trial | Sept. 22, 2026

The Senate impeachment court wrapped up Day 28 of Vice President Sara Duterte’s trial on Tuesday with presiding officer Senator-judge Francis Escudero announcing that Wednesday’s session would be devoted to oral arguments on the conviction-vote threshold, with no witness taking the stand.

Each party will be given 15 minutes to argue, after which senator-judges may ask questions before voting on a motion or appeal-cum-motion for reconsideration filed by Senator-judge Erwin Tulfo.

The threshold debate centers on whether the number of votes required to convict Duterte should remain at 16, a question that has divided the court and now demands a formal ruling.

House lead prosecutor Rep. Gerville Luistro of Batangas told the Senate impeachment court that Mamamayang Liberal party-list Rep. Leila de Lima will lead the prosecution panel during Wednesday’s oral arguments, while the defense said it has yet to decide who will lead its team.

Private prosecutor Lorna Kapunan sharpened the prosecution’s case against the vice president following Davao City Mayor Sebastian ‘Baste’ Duterte’s statement that he was unaware that his sister holds an interest in GenCorp Industries Inc.. Kapunan called it a ‘confession’ and a failure to exercise ‘due diligence.’ GenCorp Industries has extensive links to Davao City through multiple local government contracts and is central to allegations of unexplained wealth in the trial.

The impeachment court served a subpoena on Baste Duterte, with two members of the Senate Office of the Sergeant-at-Arms traveling to Davao City to deliver the order personally. The subpoena directs the Davao City Mayor to appear before the Senate from September 28 to 30 at 10 a.m. and to produce certified true copies of relevant documents.

Separately, the prosecution confirmed during Day 28 that Jaime Tan Cruz, identified as an incorporator of businesses in which Sara Duterte declared holding shares, had previously served as special envoy to China for trade and investments under former President Rodrigo Duterte.

The Naga experiment

When Leni Robredo returned to Naga City in 2025-not as a former vice president seeking another national post, but as mayor-some saw it as a retreat from the national stage. After the extraordinary national visibility of the 2022 presidential election, why go back to city hall?

Perhaps we are looking at it backward. Political capital is not simply a stock that one accumulates by holding increasingly high office. It can be diversified, sequenced, converted, and regenerated. And Robredo’s trajectory offers an intriguing case of this process: widowhood and the Jesse Robredo legacy; congressional representation; the vice presidency; a national movement through Angat Buhay; a presidential campaign; and now direct executive governance in Naga. The interesting question is whether Naga represents diminution-or another form of accumulation.

Consider Pasig City Mayor Vico Sotto. His emergence as a potential national leader has been built substantially around what might be called performance capital: the accumulated perception that he can govern. He has been Pasig City mayor since 2019 and is now in his third and final term. His administration has emphasized institutionalizing reforms rather than making government dependent on a single personality. His trajectory is relatively easy to understand: local performance generates national curiosity.

Robredo’s trajectory is different. She already possesses national political capital. What she lacks is not national experience but a fresh demonstration of executive performance under her own direct authority.

That is where Naga becomes interesting. Her administration has deliberately framed the city through the ‘2028 Finish Lines,’ an eight-part development framework covering economic inclusion, environmental sustainability, mobility and order, health and education, heritage, digital governance, good governance innovation, and local government efficiency. The framework aligns plans, budgets, and performance targets and calls for scorecards and a public Governance Impact Dashboard.

That is potentially much more than a mayor’s program. It can become a demonstration laboratory. The basic proposition is simple: the city is the nation writ small. Philippine problems-flooding, poverty, housing, mobility, bureaucratic inefficiency, digital exclusion, environmental degradation, citizen disengagement-appear in Naga at the human scale. If an intervention works there, can it be measured? If it works, can it be replicated? If it fails, can the failure be understood?

This is where I see the possibility of what might be called demonstration capital. Performance becomes political capital only when citizens can see what was attempted, what changed, what it cost, what did not work, and whether the experience can travel beyond the jurisdiction.

Naga’s early steps point in that direction. Robredo ordered a baseline performance review of city departments, explicitly seeking measurable outcomes and an institutional culture of evaluation and continuous improvement. The city has subsequently reported initiatives involving flood management, business processing, social targeting, waste diversion, infrastructure, and participatory planning.

But the deeper opportunity is not simply to publicize accomplishments. It is to document learning. Imagine Naga becoming a living laboratory in which each major intervention follows a simple chain: problem ? baseline ? intervention ? implementation ? evidence ? citizen experience ? lesson ? replicability. That would transform a mayoral accomplishment report into a national governance resource.

It also introduces an intriguing element of appreciative inquiry. Instead of beginning with ‘What is wrong with government?’ begin with ‘What is already working, why is it working, and how can it be made to work better and elsewhere?’ Naga’s existing traditions of participatory governance and its new Finish Lines framework provide fertile ground for such an approach. This may be the most consequential difference between simply being a successful mayor and becoming a credible national executive in the public imagination.

Sotto’s Pasig experience is accumulating from the local upward. Robredo’s Naga experience could potentially accumulate from the national downward and then move upward again: national experience ? local experimentation ? demonstrated results ? transferable lessons ? national relevance. That is not necessarily a step backward. It may be a different sequence of political capital generation.

And perhaps this is the provocation we should take seriously as we approach 2028: instead of asking whether Robredo’s return to Naga diminishes her national stature, ask whether Naga can become her executive laboratory. If the answer eventually becomes visible in the data, in the lived experience of Nagueños, and in the ability of other Philippine cities to learn from Naga, then the political significance of the experiment will not depend on slogans, endorsements, or nostalgia. It will rest on something harder to manufacture: demonstrated capacity to govern.

Anambra Govt dares Obi: Quit 2027 race over debt, unpaid salaries

The Anambra State Government has challenged former governor Peter Obi to withdraw from the 2027 presidential race, citing what it described as inconsistencies between his campaign pledges and allegations over debts and workers’ salary arrears left by his administration.

The state’s New Media Office raised the issue in a post on its official X account on Tuesday, asking: ‘When will Peter Obi quit presidential campaign?’

The government recalled that Obi had pledged to withdraw from the presidential contest if it was established that he left Anambra State in debt.

It also alleged that, while campaigning for governor, he promised to resign if workers were not paid their salaries as and when due.

To support its argument on salary arrears, the government published a letter dated April 25, 2006, purportedly written by Chuks Iloegbunam, who was then Obi’s Chief of Staff.

The letter, titled ‘Gubernatorial Prerogative,’ appealed to Obi to intervene in salary arrears owed to workers of the Anambra State Water Corporation.

It stated that the corporation’s monthly wage bill was about N15 million and that workers had last been paid in February.

Iloegbunam appealed to Obi to include the Water Corporation among government parastatals funded through subventions, arguing that this would prevent workers from repeatedly visiting the Governor’s Office over unpaid salaries.

The letter also referred specifically to Obi’s campaign manifesto, stating that he had pledged to resign if workers were not paid as and when due.

However, the document does not establish how long the arrears lasted, whether they were eventually cleared or whether the issue persisted until the end of Obi’s tenure.

Indeed, the letter was written only about five weeks after Obi assumed office on March 17, 2006. This raises the possibility that some or all of the salary arrears referred to in the document may have originated under the preceding administration.

The latest controversy is part of a broader dispute between Obi and the Anambra State Government over the financial position of the state when he left office in March 2014.

The state government has alleged that outstanding external loans contracted during Obi’s administration amounted to N127.4 billion as of June 30, 2026, while also alleging that salary, pension and gratuity arrears remained outstanding.

Obi has rejected the allegations, maintaining that he left office without unpaid salaries, pensions, gratuities or certified contractor obligations. He has also said his administration cleared more than N35 billion in historical gratuities and arrears.

The former governor has challenged the state government to provide evidence supporting its claims and pledged to stop campaigning for the presidency if it establishes that he left debts or unpaid obligations.

BSP must check more inflation, growth data

EVEN against the backdrop of a weak local currency and the resurgence of global oil prices, the central bank still has to scrutinize more data on inflation, growth, exchange rate and capital flows as it must be sure to maintain ‘sufficient interest-rate support,’ according to a former Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) deputy governor.

‘The challenge for the BSP is to maintain sufficient interest-rate support without making the cost of capital so high that it begins to damage the very growth and investment that the economy needs,’ former BSP Deputy Governor Diwa C. Guinigundo told the BusinessMirror in a Viber message.

Asked if the central bank should continue raising interest rates given the weak local currency and high oil prices, Guinigundo said the BSP ‘should be data-dependent,’ hence the need to gather more data on inflation and growth, exchange rate and capital flows.

This, the former BSP deputy governor stressed, as he weighed the advantages of raising the policy rate further against the risks that would come with further tightening.

Guinigundo explained that a higher rate can strengthen the peso, anchor inflation expectations and support portfolio flows.

However, he pointed out that if the policy rate ‘stays high for too long,’ it can ‘unnecessarily suppress domestic demand, investment and employment.’

‘In short, a relatively high rate can buy monetary and exchange-rate stability, but it comes at a cost,’ added the former central bank deputy governor.

Moving forward, Guinigundo said it is more important to look at the real policy rate and interest-rate differential after adjusting for inflation and exchange-rate expectations rather than the nominal policy rate alone.

‘That distinction is particularly important now because the BSP is already dealing with both inflationary pressures and peso weakness; its recent decision explicitly cited the need to anchor inflation expectations and mitigate broader price pressures,’ he also told this newspaper.

In an earlier commentary, the former central bank deputy governor explained that the issue is not simply whether the BSP should raise, hold or eventually cut its policy rate.

‘The more fundamental question is whether monetary policy is sufficiently restrictive in real terms to bring inflation back to target and keep expectations firmly anchored,’ Guinigundo noted.

The Monetary Board, the highest policy-making body of the BSP, has raised the key interest rate by a total of 75 basis points since the start of the conflict in the Middle East, delivering three separate quarter-point rate hikes at the Monetary Board’s rate-setting meetings held on April 23, June 18, and August 27.

These policy actions brought the Target Reverse Repurchase (RRP) Rate to 5 percent.