Recent events around the world, particularly the ongoing crisis in Venezuela, have once again drawn the attention of political analysts and commentators to what many perceive as the fragility of international law. Some romanticised observers lamented, in grandiose language, that Washington disregards the norms of international law to serve its own interests, and that the law exists merely as a set of empty formalities on paper. Yet this is by no means a new phenomenon. Throughout history, the factor of power has consistently trumped law.
For instance, the ancient Greek philosopher Solon famously compared the law to a spider’s web. In his view, the strong could easily tear through this web, while the weak became entangled, suffering inevitable destruction. This metaphor has retained its relevance over centuries because, in practice, law often proves powerless in the face of entrenched interests.
Today, the events unfolding across the globe reflect the enduring truth of this metaphor. The modern world is dominated by two primary hegemons: the United States and Russia. The comparatively weaker Russia has been waging a bloody war for three years to seize the territory of its neighbour. Meanwhile, the more powerful United States recently detained the leader of another nation within a matter of hours and prepared to subject him to its judicial system.
On the other hand, European states have expressed solidarity against the aggression of the weaker hegemon, Russia, yet remain largely silent in the face of the actions of the stronger hegemon, the United States. This represents one of the clearest forms of hypocrisy. The double standards inherent in international law cast doubt on its universality and highlight how easily power can override legal principles. The global reality demonstrates that, in international relations, strength often equates to legitimacy or at least de facto authority. Even when moral or legal justification is lacking, power remains the decisive factor. This has always been the case, and current events suggest it will continue to be so.
Some nations have recognised this reality and adapted accordingly. Azerbaijan, for example, has long prioritised the factor of power, striving to strengthen itself across economic, political, and military dimensions. By contrast, post-Soviet states, such as Georgia and Moldova, have yet to fully grasp these dynamics. As a result, even as Azerbaijan restored its sovereignty after thirty years, similar countries continue to struggle to restore their territorial integrity.
President Ilham Aliyev explicitly articulated this principle during a meeting with military leadership on the occasion of Armed Forces Day in June 2021:
‘I have repeatedly said that the norms of international law do not work. I have repeatedly said that the great powers implement the decisions that meet their own interests and do not implement those that don’t. Otherwise, the resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council and demanding an immediate withdrawal of the Armenian armed forces from our lands would not have remained on paper for 30 years. We have seen that the norms of international law are almost designed for small, medium-sized and not very strong countries. Large countries may ignore them, and there is no enforcement mechanism. Of course, the power factor came to the fore. A few years before the war, I made it clear in my speeches: we must gather strength, and this issue will be resolved by force.’
These words resonate even more profoundly in the context of the recent Venezuelan crisis. In an environment where international law fails to operate effectively and major powers dictate their interests, small and medium-sized states have little recourse other than to strengthen themselves. This strength cannot be limited to military capacity alone; it must also manifest in economic resilience, political stability, and strategic diplomacy.
President Aliyev’s emphasis on power in his recent New Year’s address was no coincidence. In recent years, Azerbaijan has steadily enhanced its military and economic capabilities, asserting itself on the international stage. The liberation of Garabagh stands as the most concrete illustration of this principle. Without the factor of power, the legal frameworks of international law would have offered little practical recourse for reclaiming Azerbaijani territory.
The pattern of powerful states exerting influence over international affairs is far from new. However, the crises in Venezuela and Ukraine have laid bare the realities of global power dynamics. Governments whose interests do not align with those of the world’s leading powers find themselves subjected to immediate pressure, with international law serving only as a formal, symbolic framework. For smaller states, this represents a stark lesson: without strength, the rights granted by law offer no guarantees.
Criticism of the weaknesses of international law is easy; altering the underlying realities of global power is far more difficult. Consequently, the factor of power remains paramount and is likely to continue doing so. Azerbaijan’s experience demonstrates that strength is essential not only for self-preservation but also for asserting influence and defending national interests on the international stage. The events in Venezuela once again confirm this unyielding truth.
In essence, the contemporary global landscape underscores a historical axiom: in international relations, power often defines legitimacy. Countries that fail to recognise and cultivate strength risk marginalisation, regardless of the legal or moral justifications they may claim. Azerbaijan’s steady rise as a regional and increasingly global actor exemplifies the strategic foresight required for small and medium-sized nations navigating a world dominated by superpowers.