Category: Azer News

Polish state-controlled energy group Orlen lost $230 million in an attempt to purchase around 6 million barrels of Venezuelan crude using cryptocurrency,

According to an investigation by the Financial Times, the money was transferred through intermediaries and converted into USDT, but the planned oil delivery ultimately failed.

It was noted that in November 2023, Orlen’s Swiss trading subsidiary, Orlen Trading Switzerland (OTS), signed a $345 million contract with Dubai-based Hannon International to purchase Merey 16 crude oil from Venezuela.

OTS expected to earn around $25-30 million from the transaction and paid Hannon a $230 million advance.

Venezuela was reportedly willing to accept payment only in cryptocurrency, specifically USDT. Hannon therefore transferred the funds to intermediaries in Dubai for conversion into the digital currency.

One intermediary received $135 million, but according to Hannon, only $85 million in USDT was ultimately passed on to the Venezuelan seller. Another $30 million was transferred to a different company but never reached Venezuela.

Both were supposed to facilitate deliveries of Venezuelan crude during a narrow window in late 2023 and early 2024, when the US temporarily eased sanctions on Venezuela’s oil sector. The window closed. The oil never came. The money didn’t come back either.

Azerbaijan has successfully participated in the International Tasanno Festival of National Cuisines and Cultures held in Tashkent. The country took second place in the “Best Cuisine” category.

The Heydar Aliyev Azerbaijan Cultural Center, operating under the Azerbaijani Embassy in Uzbekistan, represented Azerbaijan at the festival with presentations reflecting the country’s rich national cuisine, cultural heritage and arts.

More than 15 countries, including Azerbaijan, were represented by their diplomatic missions at this year’s festival. The participating countries presented their national dishes, table traditions, customs, music and dances, as well as distinctive elements of their cultural heritage.

As part of the festival’s artistic programme, the center’s “Karabakh Victory” Dance Ensemble performed Azerbaijani national dances, presenting the richness of the country’s dance tradition and the distinctive features of its cultural heritage to festival participants.

As part of the competition, national dishes presented by the participating countries, their preparation methods, table arrangements and presentation were evaluated by a jury in several categories.

According to the final results, Azerbaijan secured second place in the “Best Cuisine” category.

Held annually since 2004, the International Tasanno Festival of National Cuisines and Cultures aims to strengthen friendship and mutual understanding among peoples, promote cultural dialogue and expand opportunities for people-to-people diplomacy.

The Tasanno Festival brings together the national cuisines, arts and cultural traditions of different peoples, contributing to the development of cultural and humanitarian ties between countries, greater mutual recognition and stronger friendly relations.

The presentation of Azerbaijani culture continues with an extensive programme at Switzerland’s 80th Septembre Musical Montreux-Vevey Festival.

Azerbaijan’s participation as an honorary guest at the landmark anniversary festival holds particular significance for promoting the country’s national arts internationally.

A gala concert featuring Azerbaijani artists was held on September 14 at the renowned Auditorium Stravinski in Montreux.

The two-part programme opened with the Overture from Uzeyir Hajibayli’s opera “Koroglu,” performed by the Azerbaijan State Symphony Orchestra under the baton of Fuad Ibrahimov.

The orchestra then performed the “Waltz” from Gara Garayev’s ballet “Seven Beauties,” “Jangi” by Agshin Alizade, Fikrat Amirov’s “Azerbaijan Capriccio,” Niyazi’s “Concert Waltz”, and the “Dance of Turkish Girls” from Arif Malikov’s ballet “The Legend of Love.”

The evening also featured People’s Artist Alim Gasimov performing “Garagila,” while Fagan Alasgarov on balaban and Madina Shahgaldieva on kamancha performed the Azerbaijani folk song “Sari Gelin.” The Azerbaijan State Dance Ensemble presented Eldar Mansurov’s “Land of Fire” and “Uzundara.”

The programme continued with a series of performances representing different traditions of Azerbaijani classical and contemporary music. Samir Jafarov performed Uzeyir Hajibayli’s “Sevgili Canan,” Murad Huseynov played “The Joy of Shahrazad” from Fikrat Amirov’s ballet “One Thousand and One Nights,” and Yusif Eyvazov performed Balash’s Aria from Fikrat Amirov’s opera “Sevil.”

Afag Abbasova performed Niyazi’s “Arzu,” while Jeyla Seyidova and Elvin Hoxha Ganiyev performed Niyazi’s symphonic mugham “Rast.” Elmina Hasanova presented Dilbar’s Aria from “Sevil,” and Ahad Aghayev performed the mugham “Bayati-Shiraz.”

Jazz was also represented, with Sevda Alakbarzadeh performing a jazz composition accompanied by Isfar Sarabski and Shahriyar Imanov. Elmina Hasanova and Samir Jafarov performed a duet from Hajibayli’s operetta “Arshin Mal Alan,” while Shahriyar Imanov performed Haji Rzayev’s “Chahargah Rhapsody.”

The concert also featured Yusif Eyvazov and Afag Abbasova performing Tofig Guliyev’s “Song About Baku.”

The gala concluded with all the soloists performing Muslim Magomayev’s “Azerbaijan.”

The evening, dedicated to Azerbaijani culture and national art, made a strong impression on the international audience and was met with prolonged applause.

The United States has deployed weapons in space capable of defending American forces against hostile actions, US Air Force Secretary Troy Meink said, marking the first public acknowledgement of such capabilities in orbit.

Speaking Monday at the Air, Space and Cyber Conference in National Harbor, Maryland, Meink said the United States was continuing to prepare for evolving threats across the space domain.

‘This is why the United States now has on-orbit space control weapons capable of defending the joint force against hostile adversary action,’ Meink said.

He did not provide details about the weapons, including their type, capabilities or when they were deployed. Meink also declined to elaborate when asked about the systems.

The announcement represents a significant public disclosure as Washington faces growing concerns over the development of offensive and counterspace capabilities by China and Russia.

US President Donald Trump has repeatedly promoted the US Space Force, which was established in 2019 as part of the Air Force, as a key element of Washington’s efforts to maintain American military capabilities amid an increasingly competitive space environment.

The US Space Force says China is developing and operating space and counterspace capabilities as part of its broader military modernization efforts, while Russia regards space as a potential warfighting domain and considers control of the space environment important to future conflicts.

US military officials have repeatedly warned that both countries are developing and testing capabilities that could potentially be used in a conflict in space.

Washington has pointed to Russian satellite activities as evidence of the development of capabilities that could support both offensive and defensive operations. US officials have also highlighted China’s development of advanced hypersonic weapons, including a reported nuclear-capable fractional orbital bombardment system.

Meink’s statement did not identify a specific adversary or indicate that the newly disclosed US weapons had been deployed in response to any particular foreign system.

The disclosure nevertheless signals that the United States views the ability to conduct military operations and defend forces in orbit as an increasingly important component of its broader national security strategy.

Trkiye is preparing a sweeping overhaul of its tobacco policy that would gradually tighten restrictions on smoking before phasing out tobacco sales nationwide by 2040.

The draft legislation, coordinated by the ruling party and the Health Ministry, is expected to be submitted to Parliament for consideration. If approved, the measures would be introduced in stages, culminating in a nationwide ban on tobacco sales from January 1, 2040.

The proposed legislation would prohibit smoking in outdoor sections of cafes and restaurants, as well as on beaches, in sports facilities, places of worship, healthcare institutions and educational establishments.

Restaurants and cafes would be allowed to maintain designated smoking areas only if they are physically separated from other sections and do not serve food or beverages.

On public beaches, smoking would be restricted to designated cabins, which would have to be positioned at least 200 meters apart.

The legislation would also require tobacco transactions to be conducted electronically through a centralized tracking system aimed at monitoring distribution and combating illegal trade.

The draft would expand the legal definition of tobacco products to include electronic cigarettes, heated tobacco products, hookahs and devices containing organic or synthetic nicotine.

Selling such products to minors would carry a mandatory prison sentence of between six months and one year.

People caught smoking in prohibited public areas would face an immediate administrative fine of 5,000 Turkish liras.

Following the planned 2040 ban, possession or purchase of tobacco products would be subject to fines ranging from 50,000 to 250,000 liras.

Businesses violating the restrictions could face fines of between 5,000 and 10 million liras. Repeated violations could lead to temporary closure or the revocation of operating licenses.

After January 1, 2040, importing, manufacturing, transporting or selling tobacco products would constitute an offense punishable by judicial fines ranging from 1 million to 5 million liras, with the amounts subject to inflation adjustments.

Trkiye is closely following, with satisfaction, the progress made recently toward achieving a final peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia, as well as Azerbaijan’s constructive position in the process, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said.

Speaking at a joint press conference with Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov in Baku, Fidan said the main priority at present is to ensure lasting peace, stability and prosperity in the region.

‘We are pleased to see the progress achieved recently toward a final peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia and Azerbaijan’s constructive position on this issue,’ Fidan said.

He added that Trkiye believes the completion of the peace process would usher in a new era of cooperation in the region.

‘We want the South Caucasus to be remembered not for conflicts, but for peace, transportation, energy, trade and economic development,’ Fidan said.

According to the Turkish foreign minister, the strength of the brotherly ties between Trkiye and Azerbaijan will continue to play a key role in achieving this goal.

Fidan also said that important issues concerning the Turkic world would be on the agenda in the coming period.

He noted that the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of Turkic States will be held in Ankara on October 29, followed by the organization’s 13th Summit on October 30, with the participation of the leaders.

‘We see this summit as a historic step that will strengthen the Turkic world’s common vision for the future,’ Fidan said.

Russia’s 102nd military base in Armenia is costly for Yerevan, but Armenian authorities are ready to discuss both its withdrawal and continued presence, Armenian Parliament Deputy Speaker Vahe Aleksanyan said.

Speaking at a briefing, Aleksanyan said Armenia had not received any notification from Moscow about plans to withdraw the Russian military base from Gyumri.

His comments came after Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister said Moscow had likewise received no request from Armenia to withdraw the base.

‘If they [Russia] want to withdraw the military base, they should state this. If they do not want to withdraw it, that is also a subject for discussion. We are ready to discuss it,’ Aleksanyan said.

The Russian military base in Gyumri is part of Russia’s military presence in Armenia and has long been a key element of the security relationship between the two countries.

Russia’s 102nd military base, headquartered in Gyumri in northern Armenia, traces its origins to the Soviet military presence in the country. It was formally established in 1994 on the basis of the former Soviet 127th Motor Rifle Division, while the legal framework for Russia’s military presence was set by the Russia-Armenia treaty signed in Moscow on 16 March 1995. The treaty entered into force in August 1997.

The original agreement provided for the deployment of Russian forces in Armenia for 25 years, effectively making the arrangement due to expire in 2020. It also established the legal status and operating conditions of the base and its personnel.

A major change came in August 2010, when Russia and Armenia signed Protocol No. 5, extending the agreement from 25 to 49 years from its original 1995 starting date. This pushed the expiry date to 2044. The agreement also provides for automatic five-year extensions unless either side gives written notice of its intention not to extend the arrangement at least six months before expiry.

The 2010 protocol also broadened the base’s stated mission. Whereas the original arrangement focused primarily on protecting Russia’s interests and maintaining regional stability, the revised agreement gave Russian forces a role in jointly ensuring Armenia’s security. Russia also undertook to assist Armenia with modern and compatible weaponry and military equipment.

The base remains one of the most important elements of Russia’s military presence in the South Caucasus. Its main facilities are in Gyumri, with an associated Russian air component at Erebuni Airport near Yerevan. Despite the deterioration in Armenia-Russia relations and Yerevan’s moves to reduce reliance on Moscow, the bilateral military-base agreement remains legally linked to the 2044 deadline.

For thirty years, the Azerbaijan-Trkiye energy relationship has meant one thing above all: gas, moving in one direction, through pipe. That relationship has been prodigiously profitable. At the 5th Azerbaijan-Trkiye Energy Forum, held in Baku this month and co-chaired by energy ministers Parviz Shahbazov and Alparslan Bayraktar, officials put a number on three decades of cooperation: 561m tonnes of oil and 196bn cubic metres of gas delivered from Azerbaijan to Trkiye and onward markets through existing infrastructure. Of the 130bn cubic metres of that gas that reached Trkiye specifically, 40bn cubic metres travelled via the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) alone, the backbone of the Southern Gas Corridor and, at 1,850km, more than half its total length. In the first eight months of this year, Trkiye took 6.2bn cubic metres, European buyers received 7.5bn cubic metres via Turkish territory, and Syria, a market that barely registered a decade ago, took 1bn cubic metres.

This is the paragraph that officials enjoy reciting. The far more intriguing one is the one that is hidden further down in the text of the forum’s declaration, and it speaks of what happens next – not a new pipeline, but a wire. The officials are now starting to speak of ‘Electric TANAP,’ a deliberately stolen metaphor and a pretty good one, as it speaks of an interconnected high voltage grid that will tie Azerbaijani, and ultimately Central Asian, energy production to Trkiye and Europe.

According to Parviz Shahbazov, speaking at the forum, digitalization, artificial intelligence and growth of data centers are making electricity “one of the key strategic resources for economic development” – an idea which does not seem exaggerated when considering the upward revision of power-needs projections in Europe and Central Asia due to AI infrastructure. Gas pipelines took many years to reach the necessary political consensus, while the logic in Baku and Ankara now is that the necessary institutions of cooperation and trust have been built already and only need to be shifted from compressor stations and valves to electric grids and storage.

Geography plays into it nicely as well, which is known to everybody. Azerbaijan already has signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement in Bucharest in December 2022 with Georgia, Romania, and Hungary to construct a submarine cable capable of transmitting up to 4 gigawatts of green energy from the coastline of Georgia on the Black Sea to Romania – the so-called Black Sea Green Energy Corridor, whose feasibility study was revealed at COP29 in Baku. Currently, Azerbaijan’s generating capacity amounts to 8.4 gigawatts, of which more than 20% is renewable sources of energy despite the fact that the government has made an ambition to increase the share of renewables in the power sector to 30% by 2030. According to the World Bank, the potential of offshore wind energy in the Caspian Sea alone can reach 157 gigawatts.

Nakhchivan’s new relevance

The place where the narrative of electricity has a very direct connection to politics today is Nakhchivan. The fact that the Igdir-Nakhchivan gas pipeline opened this year has already provided a second route for this isolated enclave to receive energy from Trkiye, and the next stage – that of high-voltage electricity through the Zangezur corridor and turning Jabrayil-Aghband and similar routes into electricity corridors as well – was presented at the forum as the solution that will finally allow Nakhchivan’s renewable energy potential to reach the grid of Trkiye and not remain stranded in the corridor, which even now lacks its section on the territory of Armenia. As analysts tracking the project say, the export potential could be in the region of 1-2 gigawatts from the region, although like many parts of the corridor’s infrastructure, this figure will become clear only after construction of the disputed Armenian part begins.

Capital movements paint their own picture of reciprocity. SOCAR, Azerbaijan’s state-owned oil and gas company, is buying up power production facilities in Trkiye, including an 870 megawatt plant, effectively taking decades of upstream profits and turning them into downstream Turkish power generation infrastructure. TPAO, Trkiye’s state oil company, is buying stakes in offshore exploration in Azerbaijan, including the Shafag-Asiman block and the premier Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli blocks, adding to a trend of both countries having physical investments, as opposed to contractually bound obligations, in the energy economies of the other country. This mutual investment, rather than ‘language of unshakable brotherhood’ (Bayraktar’s phrase, spoken without apparent irony), gives the electricity shift a reality beyond aspirations. Both sides have interests in each other’s power grid already; making this connection between gas and oil and power becomes a natural progression.

None of the above should distract from the amount of work yet to be done. Feasibility studies are all that have been completed on the Black Sea cable. The Zangezur Corridor’s Armenian link – the only connection Nakhchivan could make to the network – has not been given any date of beginning construction by mid-2026, despite the signing of an agreement with a contractor. Even Azerbaijan’s own renewable power capabilities, whatever its theoretical maximum of 157 gigawatts of renewable electricity generation in the Caspian, are a small fraction of that, constructed piecemeal through such projects as the $173.5m AZURE loan from the World Bank, which will unlock another $384m in onshore wind power. ‘Electric TANAP’ is a framing concept and a strategic objective more than it is a construction timetable for now. But to be fair, so too was cooperation on gas between Baku and Ankara in the early 1990s, and today that collaboration moves 200bn cubic metres of product and is a cornerstone of southeastern Europe’s energy security. Should the electrons take the same 30-year path as the molecules did, then the 5th Energy Forum might, in retrospect, appear to have been more than a diplomatic nicety.

Armenia could face an ‘apocalyptic scenario’ if Russia raises the price of natural gas supplied to the country, Armenian Central Bank Governor Martin Galstyan has warned.

Speaking to journalists, Galstyan said a significant increase in the cost of Russian gas could have a ‘double effect’ on the Armenian economy, potentially driving up overall inflation or triggering an economic downturn.

‘If the price of Russian gas increases, it will not be Plan A or Plan B, but Plan X,’ Galstyan said, stressing that the Central Bank would need to respond in an unconventional manner.

According to the governor, the impact of higher gas prices would extend beyond the energy sector and could affect broader economic conditions.

A rise in gas costs could put additional pressure on consumer prices, while also increasing costs for businesses and households. At the same time, weaker economic activity could emerge if higher energy costs begin to weigh on demand and production.

Galstyan therefore said that the Central Bank’s response could not simply follow its standard policy framework if such a scenario materialised.

The comments highlight Armenia’s sensitivity to changes in the cost of Russian gas, with energy prices representing an important factor for inflation and economic stability.

The Armenian central bank chief did not provide details of what the proposed ‘Plan X’ would involve, but indicated that the response would have to differ from the institution’s conventional policy measures.

His warning comes as Armenia continues to navigate its economic and energy relationship with Russia while seeking to diversify its wider economic and regional partnerships.

Azerbaijan exported products worth $17.603 million to Armenia in January-August 2026.

According to the Azerbaijani State Customs Committee, the development comes after Azerbaijan lifted all restrictions on cargo transit to Armenia that had been in place since the occupation period. President Ilham Aliyev announced the decision on October 21, 2025, during a joint press statement with Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, noting that the first such transit shipment was Kazakh grain delivered to Armenia.

Since then, Azerbaijan has facilitated a growing number of shipments to Armenia, including fuel, grain, fertilizers and other goods.

On December 18, 2025, the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) sent 1,220 tons of AI-95 gasoline to Armenia.

On January 9, 2026, a total of 2,698 tons of cargo, including 1,742 tons of AI-95 gasoline and 956 tons of diesel fuel, was sent to Armenia in 48 railcars. On January 11, another train consisting of 18 railcars carrying 979 tons of AI-92 gasoline was dispatched.

Further fuel shipments followed. On February 25, Azerbaijan sent 4,500 tons of diesel fuel to Armenia. On March 5, a shipment consisting of 31 railcars carrying 1,984 tons of diesel fuel and two railcars carrying 135 tons of Russian fertilizer was dispatched.

Rail transit of grain and other agricultural products from Russia to Armenia through Azerbaijan also continued throughout the spring and summer.

On March 9, a seven-car train carrying Russian grain was sent to Armenia, followed by another shipment of grain on March 11 consisting of 11 railcars with a gross weight of 1,023 tons and a net weight of 770 tons.

On March 24, four railcars carrying 271 tons of fertilizer and one railcar carrying 68 tons of buckwheat were sent to Armenia. The following day, five railcars carrying 350 tons of wheat were dispatched.

On April 1, 349 tons of Russian wheat were delivered to Armenia in transit through Azerbaijan.

Further shipments included 974 tons of diesel fuel in 16 railcars on April 21 and 350 tons of grain in five railcars on April 24, transiting from Russia to Armenia through Azerbaijan.

On April 30, four railcars carrying 279 tons of grain and three railcars carrying 203 tons of fertilizer were sent from Russia to Armenia through Azerbaijan. In early May, additional fertilizer shipments followed, including 536 tons in eight railcars on May 3 and 678 tons in 10 railcars on May 4.

On May 6, Russia sent 271 tons of fertilizer and 275 tons of grain to Armenia through Azerbaijan. The following day, two railcars carrying aluminum and nine railcars carrying grain were dispatched.

Azerbaijan also continued direct fuel deliveries to Armenia. On May 9, eight railcars carrying 479 tons of diesel fuel were sent, followed by 16 railcars carrying 986 tons of diesel fuel on May 10.

On May 15, 977 tons of Russian wheat were transported to Armenia in 14 railcars through Azerbaijan. Further shipments included 126 tons of urea and 67 tons of flour on May 28, as well as 280 tons of wheat and 277 tons of fertilizer on May 29.

The flow of agricultural products and fuel continued in June. On June 4, three railcars carrying 210 tons of wheat, two railcars carrying 140 tons of barley and one railcar carrying 69 tons of fertilizer were sent from Russia to Armenia through Azerbaijan. The same day, Azerbaijan dispatched 42 railcars carrying diesel fuel to Armenia, followed by another 17 railcars on June 11.

On June 20, seven railcars carrying 490 tons of Russian wheat were sent to Armenia through Azerbaijan, followed by 10 railcars carrying 700 tons of wheat on June 23.

On June 26, Azerbaijan sent 18 railcars carrying 971 tons of AI-92 gasoline and eight railcars carrying 467 tons of diesel fuel to Armenia.

Further Russian grain shipments followed. On June 28, 11 railcars carrying 770 tons of wheat were sent through Azerbaijan.

In July and August, the volume and frequency of grain shipments increased. On July 3, 14 railcars carrying 976 tons of wheat were dispatched. In August, shipments included 979 tons of wheat in 14 railcars on August 6; 1,049 tons of wheat and 700 tons of coal on August 8; 1,400 tons of wheat in 20 railcars on August 13; and 420 tons of wheat in six railcars on August 14.

On August 15, eight railcars carrying 560 tons of wheat were sent to Armenia. On August 20, another 39 railcars carrying 2,725 tons of wheat were dispatched.

On August 21, 11 railcars carrying 1,108 tons of cargo and four railcars carrying 273 tons of barley were sent. This was followed by seven railcars carrying 242 tons of propane on August 24 and 14 railcars carrying 976 tons of wheat, along with one railcar carrying 65 tons of timber, on August 25.

The shipments continued into September. On September 3, Azerbaijan sent 989 tons of diesel fuel to Armenia in 17 tank cars.

On September 5, Azerbaijan sent approximately 16,000 tons of diesel fuel, as well as around 5,000 tons of AI-92 and AI-95 gasoline, to Armenia. On the same day, Russia sent 355 tons of wheat in five railcars, 180 tons of fertilizer in three railcars and 138 tons of timber in two railcars to Armenia in transit through Azerbaijan.