US President Donald J. Trump has reignited global debate after announcing on TruthSocial that he has instructed the Department of War to begin nuclear weapons testing, marking a major shift in US defense policy.
In his post, Trump stated that during his first term, the United States not only expanded but also fully modernized its nuclear arsenal, making it the strongest in the world. Although he claimed he ‘hated to do it,’ the president said he had no choice given the ongoing nuclear activities of Russia and China.
In parallel, President Trump approved a new agreement to purchase agricultural products from China, a move viewed as both a gesture of balance toward US farmers and a signal that he intends to manage US-China relations through ‘controlled interdependence’ rather than direct confrontation. Yet, his decision to resume nuclear testing has raised alarms among global security experts, who warn that it could pave the way for Russia and China to legitimize similar tests and potentially trigger a new arms race.
This development also coincides with Russia’s successful test of the Poseidon unmanned underwater vehicle powered by a nuclear reactor, which President Vladimir Putin hailed as a ‘great success.’ As the world’s major powers test both their weapons and their influence, analysts suggest that the global order is entering a new ‘cold peace’, an era without open conflict but defined by strategic rivalry, technological competition, and military deterrence.
But, what message is President Trump trying to send by resuming U.S. nuclear testing at this stage of global competition? What implications does this hold for U.S. alliances, particularly NATO and Indo-Pacific partners like Japan and South Korea? How might the resumption of US nuclear testing affect the global arms control framework, particularly the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)?
Azernews asked experts to weigh in on these questions:
Ukrainian military expert Vadim Tryukhan believes Trump’s statement is not surprising and indicates his frustration.
‘Nothing surprising. Donald Trump needs to show strength. Apparently, he’s fed up with all these ostentatious performances with the so-called Oreshnikov, Burevestnik, and Poseidon tests, and he’s decided to slam his fist on the table. When and in what form the tests will take place – a nuclear explosion, an atomic bomb, or a launch vehicle – is still completely unclear. We only know some general intentions on the American side.
But the fact remains that Donald Trump is thus demonstrating to the world, especially Putin and Xi Jinping, that he has been, is, and intends to remain the most powerful player on the international stage and that his nuclear weapons – his nuclear arsenal – are in good shape. Putin has threatened, threatened, and threatened – that’s how one can characterize the current moment.
What are the implications for US alliances? Well, I believe they will strengthen both in NATO and in the Indo-Pacific region. US allies will breathe a sigh of relief, perceiving this situation as Washington’s return – the US’s return – to the grand geopolitical game.
Now, as we’ve seen, Donald Trump has conducted a rather successful Indo-Pacific tour, so to speak, concluded lucrative agreements with Japan and South Korea, and held a rather successful meeting with Xi Jinping, where it’s clear that not all issues were resolved, but nevertheless, it was clear that both sides intend to treat each other with respect, and a relationship of constructive competition is gradually developing between them.
But, on the other hand, this could be called a kind of unwritten non-aggression pact. That is, they don’t want to interfere with the relationship between Washington and Beijing. So, the world is bracing itself for an escalating confrontation, primarily between Washington and Moscow, while China is currently determining its position. In any case, knowing the traditions of Eastern diplomacy, it will slowly, like that Eastern dragon, watch as its rivals wear each other down.’
British political analyst Neil Watson, however, argues that if Washington moves forward with real nuclear tests, it could undermine the long-standing taboo and provide Russia, China, and emerging nuclear powers with a pretext to justify their own tests in the name of strategic balance:
‘President Trump’s announcement to resume US nuclear testing is both a strategic and symbolic act that projects strength when Washington perceives itself to be in a tightening great-power competition.
By reviving nuclear testing, Trump is signalling three key messages: the United States intends to reclaim technological dominance in deterrence; that it will not be constrained by international norms that its rivals openly disregard; and that US defense posturing under his administration will be driven by capability demonstration rather than treaty-based restraint. It will also appeal to the right wing of the US electorate.
From a geopolitical perspective, this move is as much about perception as policy. Trump’s rhetoric – that he ‘hates to do it’ but has ‘no choice’ – is calculated to frame the decision as reluctant realism in the face of apparent Russian and Chinese assertiveness, although the real connections between Trump and both of those powers are muddied and possibly stronger than the rhetoric leads us to believe.
It fits a broader pattern of alleged deterrence, appearing to show resolve through decisive, even controversial, actions. However, the decision fundamentally challenges the global arms control framework. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), although never ratified by the US, has functioned as a de-facto moratorium on testing since the late 1990s.
If Washington proceeds with actual tests, it risks eroding that taboo, potentially giving Russia, China, and emerging nuclear states political cover to conduct their own tests under the guise of ‘strategic parity.’ Such a chain reaction could mark the effective end of the post-Cold War arms control era and possibly a return to MAD (mutually assured destruction).
For US alliances, the implications are complex. Within NATO, allies may publicly express concern but privately welcome the renewed deterrence signal amid growing insecurity in Europe. However, it could also strain transatlantic unity by reviving anti-nuclear movements and complicating European disarmament diplomacy.
In the Indo-Pacific, partners such as Japan and South Korea will face sharper dilemmas: both rely on the US nuclear umbrella but also have strong domestic anti-nuclear sentiments and proximity to potential fallout zones. Washington’s move may push Tokyo and Seoul to seek stronger strategic assurances – or, in the longer term, reconsider their own deterrence capabilities.
This is particularly the case for Seoul, which sees a more confident Pyongyang in light of a possible Russian semi-victory in Ukraine. The resumption of nuclear testing would not simply mark a shift in US defense posture; it would signify a psychological and diplomatic turning point. The world may be entering what some analysts call a ‘cold peace’, an era where deterrence replaces dialogue, and power projection and sabre rattling become the language of stability.’