As the world watches the fragile ceasefire in Gaza, the spotlight is turning to an unusual coalition of Muslim-majority nations – Indonesia, Azerbaijan, and Pakistan, as potential contributors to a U.S.-proposed international stabilization force.
While the concept remains in its early stages, the idea signals a new approach to peacekeeping in the Middle East: one where regional actors, rather than Western troops, could play a central role in maintaining order, supporting local police forces, and paving the way for Gaza’s reconstruction. The move also highlights Washington’s reliance on politically and culturally diverse partners to lend legitimacy to its controversial 20-point plan for Gaza.
Muhammad Asif Noor, a political analyst and Director of the Center for Central Asia and Eurasian Studies at the Institute of Peace and Diplomatic Studies, spoke to Azernews about the emerging international stabilization force for Gaza. He noted that the involvement of countries like Pakistan, Azerbaijan, and Indonesia could bring a combination of peacekeeping experience, regional legitimacy, and cultural understanding to the mission:
– Could this force actually operate effectively in Gaza’s complex urban terrain?
– Operating effectively in Gaza’s terrain would be one of the greatest tests any multinational stabilization force has ever faced. Gaza is not merely an urban zone-it is a compressed battlespace where geography, demography, and trauma intersect. The Strip’s dense high-rises, narrow alleyways, and sprawling 500-kilometer tunnel network make it an environment that consumes conventional military logic. As of mid-2025, nearly three-quarters of Gaza’s land has been marked by demolitions and buffer zones, creating vast no-go areas where both insurgents and civilians coexist in fragile proximity. Visibility is limited, and each street corner holds the potential for an ambush. In such conditions, armored mobility loses its advantage, and technology alone cannot distinguish between a militant and a man fleeing rubble with his family. To be effective, a stabilization mission would require more than superior firepower; it would demand cultural fluency, intelligence coordination, and moral legitimacy. Gaza’s population is not merely war-weary but deeply skeptical of external actors. Western-led interventions have often been viewed as extensions of occupation, eroding trust even before the first patrol begins.
By contrast, Muslim-majority countries like Indonesia, Azerbaijan, and Pakistan possess an inherent advantage and that is shared faith and cultural affinity. This can translate into local acceptance, critical for intelligence gathering, humanitarian coordination, and conflict de-escalation. When troops are seen not as occupiers but as protectors, local cooperation can replace resistance, enabling smoother operations even in the Strip’s most volatile quarters.
However, effectiveness will also depend on how clearly the mission’s mandate is defined. Without robust rules of engagement, an agreed command structure, and credible international oversight, whether through the UN, OIC, or a hybrid coalition, the force risks being trapped between insurgency and accusation. Coordination with Israel and Palestinian authorities will be necessary but politically sensitive; one misstep could turn a peacekeeping effort into a geopolitical flashpoint. Moreover, Gaza’s tunnels, improvised explosives, and sniper positions mean that traditional static deployments are untenable. Instead, mobile units trained in counter-insurgency, equipped with drone reconnaissance, and supported by humanitarian corridors will be essential to prevent escalation while ensuring aid flows to civilians.
A stabilization force can succeed in Gaza, but only if it operates as more than a military presence. Its strength must lie in restraint, legitimacy, and partnership with local communities. The terrain will test discipline, but it will also reward empathy. If the participating nations can fuse tactical professionalism with cultural understanding, they may achieve what repeated military campaigns could not: a measure of peace sustained not by fear, but by trust.
– What message would Azerbaijan’s participation send about its global standing and neutrality?
– Azerbaijan’s participation in a Gaza stabilization force would send a powerful message about its evolving global identity, one that bridges faith, pragmatism, and responsible leadership. For years, Baku has cultivated a reputation as a state that balances Islamic solidarity with secular governance and strategic independence. Its willingness to contribute troops to such a politically charged mission would highlight Azerbaijan’s emergence as a confident middle power capable of engaging in complex peace operations beyond its immediate region. Rather than being confined to the South Caucasus, Azerbaijan would project itself as a country ready to share the burden of global responsibility, particularly in the Muslim world, where credibility often stems from both moral and material commitment. At the same time, participation would reaffirm Baku’s delicate brand of principled neutrality, a posture that has defined its foreign policy since independence. Azerbaijan’s diplomatic dexterity has allowed it to maintain strong partnerships with Israel, while simultaneously championing Palestine’s right to self-determination at the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the United Nations. By sending forces to Gaza, Baku would demonstrate that neutrality does not mean passivity. Instead, it signals an ability to act impartially, driven by humanitarian purpose rather than ideological alignment. It would reinforce the notion that Azerbaijan is a state guided by balance, one that seeks stability, not confrontation, and understands that moral leadership can coexist with strategic pragmatism.
This move would also elevate Azerbaijan’s profile within both the Islamic and Western diplomatic arenas. In the Muslim world, participation would be viewed as a gesture of solidarity with a cause that resonates deeply across societies, from Jakarta to Rabat-strengthening Baku’s standing as a trusted and empathetic actor. Among Western and regional partners, including the United States, Turkey, and the European Union, it would enhance Azerbaijan’s image as a constructive stakeholder in peacebuilding, capable of contributing to international stability rather than merely regional interests. Ultimately, Azerbaijan’s decision to join such a mission would showcase a nation confident enough to mediate rather than take sides. It would send the message that Baku’s foreign policy, rooted in respect, dialogue, and balance, is not merely reactive but visionary. In a fractured global order, Azerbaijan’s participation in Gaza could symbolize what modern neutrality looks like: engagement without bias, faith without fanaticism, and diplomacy anchored in the pursuit of shared peace.
– Could this enhance Baku’s diplomatic influence in the Islamic world?
– Yes – Azerbaijan’s participation in a Gaza stabilization force could significantly enhance its diplomatic influence across the Islamic world. For decades, Baku has carefully cultivated a reputation as a modern, secular, yet deeply respectful Muslim-majority nation, one that aligns itself with the principles of unity and solidarity within the Ummah, without succumbing to divisive politics. A visible and constructive role in Gaza, a cause that lies at the moral core of the Muslim world, would project Azerbaijan as not only a bridge between East and West, but also as a moral and mediating power within the Islamic community. Azerbaijan’s steadfast backing of Palestinian resolutions at every OIC summit, including the extraordinary November 2023 gathering that decried Gaza’s plight, has already burnished its credentials despite Ramallah’s historical snubs during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
Such participation would strengthen Azerbaijan’s voice in institutions like the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and enhance its moral authority on issues of justice and humanitarian intervention. Gaza has long been a litmus test for credibility in the Muslim world; by contributing not rhetoric but tangible commitment, troops, aid, and coordination, Baku would stand out among states that have often been paralyzed by internal rivalries or cautious diplomacy. This would align with President Ilham Aliyev’s broader vision of presenting Azerbaijan as a responsible global Muslim actor , one that combines modern governance, interfaith tolerance, and strategic agility. In forums like the Arab-Islamic Contact Group, where Azerbaijan has advocated for ceasefires since October 2023, this move could unlock endorsements from heavyweights like Saudi Arabia and Turkey, funneling investments into the Southern Gas Corridor and beyond.
Moreover, involvement in Gaza would deepen Azerbaijan’s ties with influential Muslim nations like Indonesia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Trkiye, and Qatar, creating a new axis of cooperative credibility. It would place Baku in closer coordination with countries that shape the Muslim world’s political discourse and development agenda, giving it leverage in both regional and multilateral platforms. The symbolism of Shia-majority Azerbaijan working alongside Sunni-majority partners in a peacekeeping mission would also underscore the cross-sectarian unity that many Muslim states aspire to but rarely achieve in practice. By volunteering peacekeepers alongside Indonesia and Pakistan, Azerbaijan signals maturity, distancing itself from accusations of blind allegiance to Israel while leveraging its role as Tel Aviv’s foremost Muslim partner for discreet backchanneling.
Beyond immediate politics, this engagement would humanize Azerbaijan’s global image, transforming it from an energy-driven state into a humanitarian and peace-oriented one. By standing for Gaza’s reconstruction and security, Baku would strengthen its soft power across the Middle East, Central Asia, and Africa, reinforcing its long-standing narrative of being a bridge of peace, not confrontation. Participation in Gaza would elevate Azerbaijan’s role from a regional actor to a symbol of Muslim consensus-building, a rare voice of moderation and action in a fractured Islamic world.
– What are the risks if the mission stalls or fails? (e.g, army personnel’s life guarantee)
– First and foremost is the safety of troops, for whom there can be no absolute ‘life guarantee’ in Gaza’s lethal terrain. The Strip is a maze of narrow streets, shattered buildings, and a vast 500-kilometer tunnel network that conceals militants, weapons, and booby traps. Even Israel’s advanced military, operating with full intelligence capabilities, has suffered heavy losses in this environment. A multinational force would face even greater danger from ambushes or a misdirected Israeli strike, and accidental crossfire amid densely packed civilians. Without heavily armored vehicles, continuous aerial surveillance, and rapid medical evacuation systems, peacekeepers could find themselves exposed with little hope of rescue.
For Azerbaijan, Indonesia, and Pakistan, the loss of soldiers in a foreign warzone would trigger serious domestic repercussions. Azerbaijan, in particular, risks damaging its post-Karabakh military confidence; even minor casualties could provoke national mourning, public anger, and political criticism of what many would perceive as an unnecessary overseas gamble.
A stalled mission, whether due to disagreements over Hamas’s disarmament, funding shortfalls, or renewed Israeli-Palestinian clashes, would multiply these dangers. Troops could become targets for multiple factions seeking to exploit the chaos. History offers sobering precedents: UN peacekeepers in Lebanon and Mali found themselves stranded under rocket fire and IED attacks once international attention faded. A similar breakdown in Gaza could force premature withdrawal, leaving behind not stability but humiliation and distrust.
The diplomatic and reputational costs would also be severe. For Azerbaijan, a failed mission might fracture its delicate balance between neutrality and solidarity, alienating partners across the Islamic world while providing adversaries grounds to question its strategic judgment. The perception of complicity in a failed or biased operation could undo years of patient bridge-building within the OIC and with Gulf investors.
– How does Pakistan’s extensive peacekeeping experience position it as a credible participant? And would its involvement signal a bid to reset ties with Washington under Trump?
Pakistan’s long and distinguished record in United Nations peacekeeping makes it one of the most credible candidates to participate in a Gaza stabilization mission. Few countries possess the combination of operational experience, discipline, and cultural sensitivity that Pakistan’s armed forces have demonstrated across decades of international service. Since joining UN peacekeeping in 1960, Pakistan has deployed more than 200,000 troops to 46 missions across 23 countries-often in some of the world’s most volatile conflict zones, including Somalia, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Liberia. In each of these theaters, Pakistani contingents earned a reputation for professionalism, restraint, and community engagement, frequently being the first to enter high-risk areas and the last to withdraw.
This experience matters immensely in Gaza, where the challenge is not just to maintain a fragile ceasefire, but to navigate a complex human and political landscape. Pakistani peacekeepers have repeatedly shown they can operate effectively in densely populated, sectarian, and post-insurgency environments, conditions that mirror Gaza’s. In Somalia’s Mogadishu, for instance, Pakistani battalions brokered truces between warring clans by mediating through mosque elders rather than force, an approach that transformed hostility into cooperation. In Congo, their community-embedded outposts helped reduce violence by building trust with civilians who initially viewed outsiders with suspicion. Such culturally attuned methods, blending tactical readiness with empathy, would be invaluable in Gaza, where every interaction can determine the success or failure of the mission.
Pakistan’s credibility also stems from its Islamic identity and historic solidarity with Palestine. From Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s early advocacy for Arab unity at the UN to Pakistan’s consistent calls for an end to Israeli occupation, the country’s stance has been morally and diplomatically consistent. Pakistani troops-many of whom regard their service as both professional duty and moral responsibility would likely be viewed by Gazans as protectors rather than occupiers. This religious and cultural proximity could foster local cooperation, improve intelligence flows, and mitigate the mistrust that plagued previous Western-led missions.
Beyond the humanitarian and operational dimension, Pakistan’s participation would also carry strategic and diplomatic significance, particularly in the context of its evolving relationship with the United States under President Trump. For Islamabad, joining a U.S.-backed stabilization mission in Gaza could signal a measured reset in bilateral ties that have long oscillated between cooperation and mistrust. Since 2023, both sides have cautiously explored limited intelligence sharing on counterterrorism, especially against ISIS-K, but deep political divergences have persisted. Contributing to a peacekeeping mission aligned with a U.S. initiative would demonstrate Pakistan’s willingness to shoulder global responsibilities and project itself as a partner in stabilizing, not destabilizing, the broader region.
Such engagement could offer Islamabad indirect dividends that may include renewed access to military training programs, eased financial restrictions, and possibly a thaw in trade relations. For Washington, involving Pakistan provides a Muslim-majority counterbalance within a mission that might otherwise be seen as Western-dominated. Still, Pakistan will tread carefully, it will frame its involvement not as alignment with U.S. policy but as service to the Palestinian cause and international peace.