Russia’s influence over Armenia is increasingly being tested by Yerevan’s efforts to diversify its security, transport and energy ties. At the center of this debate is the TRIPP project, which is intended to establish a new transport link through southern Armenia connecting Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan. While Moscow has argued that the project cannot realistically move forward without Russian involvement, Armenian analysts have pointed to the country’s dependence on Russian border forces, energy supplies, and financial flows as potential pressure points.
The TRIPP project could technically be implemented without Russia’s participation, political scientist Sergey Melkonyan, a researcher at the APRI Armenia think tank, told NEWS.am.
According to the expert, there are currently enough companies capable of building all the necessary infrastructure, possessing both the experience and expertise required for the task.
As Melkonyan noted, when the Russian side speaks of the project’s impossibility without its involvement, it is likely referring to potential obstacles and difficulties that could arise.
“What kind of obstacles are we talking about here? Let me recall that, under the 1992 agreement, Russian border guards are stationed on our territory. Yes, they have left the checkpoint on the Iranian border, but border guards remain along the border itself. According to Article 4 of the aforementioned agreement, we can assume control of the Armenian-Iranian border only when our own border guards are ready to do so. However, this process could drag on. Russia might refuse to withdraw its border troops from this section of the border anytime soon,” Melkonyan explained.
According to him, this could create certain problems for the implementation of the TRIPP project.
Furthermore, political scientist Armen Badalyan told the same outlet that Russia holds several significant levers of pressure over Armenia. He made the remarks while commenting on the recent meeting between President Vladimir Putin and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in the Kyrgyz capital, Bishkek. He first addressed the issue of remittances, noting that the Kremlin could, for instance, block money transfers from Russia to Armenia, a matter involving $1-1.5 billion.
He continued:
“Alongside all this, there is the issue of gas. Do you want to join the European Union? Then the price of gas for Armenia will be the same as it is for EU member states.”
“While the current border price for gas is $170.5 per 1,000 cubic meters, the figure in Europe is around $750. This means the end consumer will pay $800-850 per 1,000 cubic meters of gas,” the expert added.
Speaking to AzerNEWS, Armenian activist and public figure Ishkhan Verdyan argued that, despite increasing public debate, the legal and political realities make such a scenario highly improbable.
“It is not customary to discuss this, but sooner or later, we will have to face it. There is a principle stating that a railway is built from an existing railway. In other words, there must already be a track from which construction of a new section can proceed. Geographically, the TRIPP project serves as an intermediate link for the transport line connecting Azerbaijan to its exclave, Nakhchivan. Consequently, Azerbaijan will inevitably play a direct role in constructing the TRIPP railway section: Azerbaijan Railways will operate at both the beginning and the end of the route, meaning the section will essentially have to be built extending from existing Azerbaijani railway infrastructure. Thus, Azerbaijan is poised to become a pivotal participant in the project’s construction. For the Armenian side, this may sound somewhat unusual today. Nevertheless, if this is indeed the case, Azerbaijan possesses its own channels to engage whatever components, companies, contractors, or even states are required to complete this railway section. In this scenario, a physical Russian presence is not strictly necessary. Russia’s involvement in the project would depend entirely on whether Azerbaijan itself chooses to bring them on board.”
The question of Russian border guards presents a considerably more complicated challenge, Verdyan said, stressing that decisions on their withdrawal ultimately rest with the Armenian government rather than political analysts.
“The question of withdrawing Russian border troops from the Armenian-Iranian and Armenian-Turkish borders lies beyond the purview of political analysts; even the most seasoned expert could not provide a precise or concrete timeline. This is, in fact, a matter of state importance. It is regulated by the state and rooted in interstate relations-arrangements that likely cannot be undone by mere desire or the stroke of a pen. Success here depends on the Armenian government’s foreign policy acumen, as the issue falls entirely within its jurisdiction.
At the same time, it remains entirely unclear how these border troops could influence the implementation of the TRIPP project, let alone hinder it or render its realization impossible. As far as can be judged, no serious issues regarding this have arisen so far, nor have any been voiced publicly. Therefore, the speculation by political analysts remains strictly within the realm of a thought experiment.”
Verdyan challenged the argument that Moscow could maintain decisive influence over Armenia through gas supplies, pointing instead to diversification and alternative suppliers.
“The issue of gas pricing might appear problematic at first glance, but that is only on the surface. A natural question arises here: if Armenia can purchase one type of energy resource, say, gasoline, from Azerbaijan, what prevents it from buying another, namely gas, at a price significantly lower than what Russia charges, for instance, the European Union?
Not to mention the potential for cooperation with Iran, which already supplies gas to Armenia, albeit in small quantities. However, the very logic of the Armenia-Iran relationship and the declared level of strategic cooperation could imply an increase in these volumes. Be that as it may, the government has announced a policy of diversification, including within Armenia’s energy sector. Consequently, it seems to me that Armenia will not ultimately remain entirely dependent on a single source of gas: Russia. In that scenario, threats of price hikes could simply lead Armenia to purchase gas much more cheaply from other suppliers, while Russia, in turn, would simply lose its market in Armenia.”
He also downplayed the potential impact of restrictions on remittances from Russia, arguing that Armenia’s economy has become more resilient and less dependent on such transfers.
“The issue of remittances from Russia to Armenia is likely not the most critical one today, as the Armenian economy has recently undergone a transformation and is now far less dependent on transfers from abroad, specifically the funds sent home to families by citizens working overseas. I do not believe the situation is dire; Armenia’s financial system is quite capable of absorbing the shortfall threatened by Russia, a deficit that would arise if Russia were to cut off financial channels to Armenia. And, of course, this would inevitably impact bilateral relations. If Armenia suffers losses, Russia, too, will face risks, including business losses within Armenia itself. At first glance, such drastic scare tactics certainly appear to amount to an ultimatum. However, closer analysis reveals that these losses can actually be offset, and the threats themselves no longer carry the critical nature they did a few years ago.”