Category: Azer News

Russia is once again talking about building the maritime infrastructure it needs to exploit the Northern Sea Route, but the scale of the task and the weakness of its domestic shipbuilding industry may leave Moscow with little choice but to turn to China for assistance, says Paul Goble, former Special Advisor to the Secretary of State and a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia, in his recent commentary on WindoonEurasia.

He says that would be an ironic outcome for the Kremlin. Moscow presents the Northern Sea Route as a strategic national asset and a critical component of Russia’s future economic and geopolitical position in the Arctic. Yet the effort to keep the route navigable may ultimately increase rather than reduce Russia’s dependence on Beijing.

The former US diplomat writes that Yury Trutnev, the Russian presidential plenipotentiary for the Far Eastern Federal District and one of Moscow’s leading officials responsible for Northern Sea Route policy, has said that Russia intends to establish a national ‘dredging fleet’ to deepen waterways and maintain access to ports along the route.

According to Trutnev, President Vladimir Putin is expected to approve the plans.

On paper, the proposal is straightforward. In practice, it presents Russia with a formidable engineering and financial challenge.

The Northern Sea Route is not simply a maritime highway that becomes available when Arctic ice retreats. Its effective operation requires a substantial supporting infrastructure, including ports, navigation systems, icebreakers and vessels capable of maintaining adequate depths in increasingly busy waterways.

Dredging is one of the less visible but essential parts of that infrastructure.

The scale of the challenge was highlighted by Rosatom earlier this year. The state corporation estimated that around 60 million cubic metres of sediment would have to be dredged and removed along the Northern Sea Route over the next five years.

Russia does not currently possess the domestic dredging capacity required to undertake a project of that magnitude.

That admission is particularly significant because Moscow has already encountered a similar problem elsewhere.

Global warming, changing water conditions and growing economic activity have increased the need to maintain navigable waterways in Russia. On the Caspian and along major Russian rivers, Moscow has increasingly had to look beyond its own borders for dredging capabilities, including to China and Iran.

The Northern Sea Route could therefore become the next area in which Russia’s ambitions run ahead of its capabilities.

There is an additional complication. Dredging in the Arctic is not equivalent to ordinary dredging in warmer waters. Vessels operating in or near the Northern Sea Route would need to function in extremely difficult conditions. Some would have to be ice-capable, while others could require protection and assistance from Russia’s already heavily utilised icebreaker fleet.

That makes the construction of a Russian dredging fleet a much more expensive and technically demanding undertaking than simply ordering conventional vessels.

And Russia’s shipbuilding industry is already under pressure.

The Kremlin has made repeated efforts to revive domestic shipbuilding and reduce dependence on foreign technology and equipment. But sanctions, technological constraints, financing problems and the broader difficulties facing the Russian industrial sector have complicated those ambitions.

The question, therefore, is not whether Moscow wants to build a national dredging fleet. It clearly does.

The more important question is whether Russia can build one quickly enough, cheaply enough and at the necessary technical level to meet the demands of the Northern Sea Route.

If it cannot, China is likely to emerge as the obvious alternative.

That would not be without precedent. Russia has increasingly turned to China when it has needed equipment, technology or industrial capacity that it cannot readily produce itself. The same pattern has already appeared in the management and development of waterways outside the Arctic.

Beijing would consequently have another opportunity to translate Russia’s infrastructural weaknesses into political leverage.

This is particularly important in the Arctic because the Northern Sea Route is not simply an economic project. Moscow regards it as a strategic corridor connecting Russia’s European and Asian territories and as a means of increasing the country’s role in global shipping.

The Kremlin also sees the route as a symbol of Russian sovereignty and technological capability in the Arctic.

Dependence on Chinese dredging vessels would complicate that narrative.

It could also create a relationship in which Russia depends on China not only for trade and investment, but for maintaining one of the most strategically important transport corridors under Moscow’s control.

The more the Arctic warms and the more heavily the Northern Sea Route is used, the greater the need for regular maintenance is likely to become. Sedimentation does not respect geopolitical boundaries, and commercial vessels cannot operate efficiently on a route whose channels are inadequately maintained.

That creates a potentially long-term structural dependence.

Moscow may therefore be right to seek a national dredging fleet. From the standpoint of Russian sovereignty and strategic planning, it would make sense.

But announcing such a fleet and possessing one are two very different things.

The 60 million cubic metres of sediment that Rosatom says must be removed over the next five years offer a useful measure of the gap between Russia’s Arctic ambitions and its existing capabilities.

If Russian shipyards can close that gap, Moscow will have strengthened its ability to control and develop the Northern Sea Route on its own terms.

If they cannot, Russia may once again turn to China.

And if that happens, the Northern Sea Route could become another example of a broader transformation already under way: Russia seeking greater strategic independence while, in practice, becoming increasingly dependent on Chinese economic and technological capacity.

That may prove to be one of the most consequential unintended consequences of Moscow’s Arctic strategy.

The number of Palestinians who have died in Israeli prisons since 1967 has risen to 328 following the confirmed death of a detainee from the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian Commission of Detainees and Ex-Detainees Affairs said on Sunday.

As reported by AzerNEWS, citing ThePeninsular, the commission said Israeli prison authorities had confirmed the death of Ihab Mohammad Abdul Qader Diab, 36, who had been detained since 12 December 2023.

According to the commission, the Israeli Prison Service attributed Diab’s death to a health condition. His family rejected the explanation, saying he had been in good health and had no known illnesses when he was detained.

The commission said Diab is believed to have died on 18 September 2024.

His death brings the number of Palestinians who have died in Israeli prisons since 1967 to 328, including 91 since 7 October 2023. Of those 91 deaths, 53 involved detainees from the Gaza Strip, according to the commission.

The commission called for urgent international intervention to end what it described as torture and ill-treatment in Israeli prisons and detention centres.

It said it had collected numerous testimonies concerning detainees who allegedly died under torture, while claiming that Israeli authorities had not acknowledged many of those deaths.

The commission also accused Israeli authorities of maintaining a policy of enforced disappearance and withholding information about detainees.

The figures and allegations were issued by the Palestinian Commission of Detainees and Ex-Detainees Affairs and have not been independently verified.

Civilian facilities at Yemen’s Mocha port were targeted by drones on Sunday in an attack attributed to the Houthi group, according to the port’s director, as tensions continue to rise along Yemen’s western coast and in the Red Sea region, AzerNEWS reports via Voiceofemirates.

The port director said civilian infrastructure within the port had come under attack, according to remarks carried by Al-Araby TV.

The extent of the damage remains unclear, while there is no confirmed information on possible casualties.

The attack marks the latest reported strike on the port, which is located on Yemen’s western coast and has become an important point of concern amid heightened tensions affecting maritime security in the Red Sea.

In a later development, media reports indicated that another attack had occurred in the vicinity of Mocha.

Details surrounding the reported second incident, including the target, method of attack and possible damage, were still being verified.

Local authorities were monitoring the situation, while the Houthi group had not issued a detailed statement clarifying the circumstances surrounding the reported attacks or identifying the targets it claimed to have struck.

The latest incidents come amid continued security concerns along Yemen’s western coastline and growing uncertainty over maritime traffic through the wider Red Sea area.

The European Union has welcomed what it described as positive and constructive steps by Armenia and Azerbaijan to advance the peace process, one year after the historic Washington summit involving the leaders of Armenia, Azerbaijan and the United States.

Magdalena Grono, the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia, made the remarks in a post on X marking the anniversary of the summit.

‘Today marks one year since the historic Washington summit of Armenia, Azerbaijan and the United States and the leaders’ meeting on 8 August 2025,’ Grono said.

She added that the EU welcomed a series of ‘positive and constructive steps’ taken by the parties over the past year to further institutionalise and advance the peace process.

The Washington summit, held on 8 August 2025, marked a significant milestone in efforts to establish lasting peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Grono’s remarks come as the two countries continue efforts to consolidate the progress made in the peace process and move towards the institutionalisation of their peace agenda.

8 August 2025 was widely seen as a turning point in the political history of the South Caucasus. Its significance, however, reaches beyond the region. The meeting in Washington between Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev, US President Donald Trump and Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, and the Joint Declaration that followed, formally marked a new stage in relations between Baku and Yerevan.

The initialling of the peace agreement and the understandings reached on opening regional communication routes were more than diplomatic gestures. They laid the foundations for a different political and economic future for the South Caucasus.

For Azerbaijan, the pursuit of that future has long been presented as part of a wider commitment to international security. After nearly three decades of negotiations failed to resolve the conflict, Azerbaijan argued that the relevant UN Security Council resolutions adopted in 2020 had to be implemented. The Second Karabakh War, followed by the restoration of Azerbaijan’s sovereignty in 2023, fundamentally altered the political landscape of the South Caucasus and the calculations of outside powers.

The military phase of the conflict had already been brought to an end on 10 November 2020, following Armenia’s appeal to Russia and an agreement between the leaders of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia. The resulting declaration established a new framework for relations and ended the immediate phase of hostilities.

But ending a war and building a peace are not the same thing.

In the years that followed, Azerbaijan repeatedly argued at bilateral and multilateral meetings that the region had reached a point where the politics of conflict should give way to reconstruction, development and cooperation. The United States, the European Union and Russia all assumed mediating roles at different stages of the process, while Azerbaijan sought to position itself not simply as a party to the conflict but as a country with a broader interest in regional stability.

That process eventually produced the seven-point Joint Declaration signed in Washington on 8 August 2025.

A year later, the significance of that moment can be judged less by the symbolism of the summit than by what has happened since.

The tangible effects are increasingly visible. Economic and trade relations have developed, transit opportunities have expanded, and the restoration of transport and communication links has moved closer to becoming a practical reality. These developments matter because sustainable peace is ultimately tested not only in presidential meetings or diplomatic documents, but in whether it changes the economic incentives facing the countries of the region.

The first anniversary itself offered a revealing sign of how far the relationship has moved. Pashinyan called Aliyev on 8 August, a gesture that would have been difficult to imagine during the years when the conflict dominated relations between the two countries.

The conversation also highlighted the continuing role of the United States and the Trump administration in advancing the peace process. But its significance went beyond diplomacy. The leaders discussed practical questions of economic cooperation, including the export of Azerbaijani petroleum products to Armenia, transit freight and the implementation of the TRIPP route.

That is perhaps where the real significance of the Washington process lies.

A peace agreement matters, but connectivity can make peace durable. Roads, railways, energy links, freight routes and trade create interests that are harder to reverse than political declarations. If the region can turn the commitments made in Washington into functioning economic links, the benefits could extend well beyond Azerbaijan and Armenia.

The South Caucasus has spent decades being defined by closed borders, competing geopolitical interests and unresolved conflict. Its future could instead be shaped by connectivity.

Azerbaijan has consistently argued for a regional order based on peace, security and stability. Its efforts now extend into transport, energy, trade and investment – areas that could help create a more interconnected regional economy.

The challenge is that none of this is automatic. Political agreements can falter, infrastructure projects can be delayed and old mistrust can return. The task after Washington is therefore harder than signing a declaration: it is to turn political commitments into institutions, infrastructure and economic realities.

One year on, however, there are signs that this process has begun.

The Washington Declaration did not erase the South Caucasus’s difficult history. Nor can one summit guarantee a lasting peace. But it helped create the political space for a different future – one in which the region’s countries can increasingly measure their interests not through the logic of conflict, but through the opportunities created by cooperation.

For Azerbaijan, that means continuing to push for lasting peace while expanding the region’s potential as a hub for transport, energy and trade.

For Armenia, it means the possibility of deeper economic integration with its neighbours.

And for the wider South Caucasus, it offers something that has been missing for far too long: the prospect that peace might become not merely an agreement between governments, but the foundation for shared economic opportunity.

The real test of Washington, then, is not what was signed on 8 August 2025. It is whether, years from now, the roads, railways, energy networks and trading relationships that followed can make a return to conflict increasingly unthinkable.

Iran is preparing to release new images of Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei in public, state media reported, as speculation continues over his health and prolonged absence from public view, AzerNEWS reports, citing GulfNews.

Iran’s state-run Mizan news agency, citing Basij Organisation deputy Qasem Qoraishi, reported that images showing Khamenei ‘among the people and out in the streets’, as well as meeting commanders of the armed forces, would be released in the coming days.

The announcement came a day after Iran’s semi-official Mehr News Agency released a 12-second video showing Khamenei speaking with several officials and advisers.

The footage showed the Supreme Leader seated on a carpet and delivering a religious lesson. Mehr did not specify when or where the video was recorded.

The timing of the footage, and whether it reflects Khamenei’s current condition, could not be independently verified.

The planned release of further images would provide additional footage of Khamenei in public following his extended absence from view.

OpenAI has announced a major update for free ChatGPT users, saying it is preparing to remove usage limits on text-based conversations, AzerNEWS reports.

Under the planned changes, Free and Go users will be able to have unlimited text-based conversations with ChatGPT. According to the company, the default model for Free and Go users will be the new GPT-5.6 Luna, which will replace the currently available GPT-5.5.

Users will also receive a new ‘Think’ button, allowing them to activate the model’s more advanced reasoning capabilities when dealing with complex questions and tasks.

However, the unlimited access will apply only to text-based conversations. Separate usage limits will remain in place for file uploads and processing, image and voice features, as well as AI-powered image generation.

OpenAI has also introduced updates for its paid Plus and Pro subscribers. These users will have access to the upgraded GPT-5.6 Sol model.

According to OpenAI, GPT-5.6 Sol delivers improved performance across a range of everyday tasks, including answering questions, conducting web research, providing advice, planning, writing and decision-making.

The company also highlighted the model’s ability to provide more concise and reliable responses as one of the key improvements in the new version.

The ‘Modern Cities and Technology’ camp, the fourth camp of the Yay Fest 2026 youth festival, has concluded in Azerbaijan’s Shamakhi district with a five-day programme focused on smart cities, artificial intelligence, innovation and sustainable development.

Supported by the Youth Foundation of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the camp aimed to strengthen young people’s knowledge and skills in modern urban planning, architecture, digital transformation, artificial intelligence, innovation and sustainable development, while fostering creative thinking, leadership and teamwork.

At the start of the camp, participants visited the monument to National Leader Heydar Aliyev in Shamakhi and laid flowers in his memory before heading to the camp site to begin the programme.

According to AzerNEWS, the five-day programme brought together representatives of government institutions and the private sector for discussions on urban development, reconstruction, security, artificial intelligence and emerging technologies.

Sessions included ‘A New Vision for Urban Planning: Experience, Innovation and Inclusivity’, ‘From Return to the Future: Security and Sustainable Development’, ‘AI for Digital City’ and ‘Smart Robots, Smart Future’.

Participants were briefed on reconstruction and redevelopment projects in Karabakh and East Zangezur, modern urban planning practices, mine risks and safe return, as well as the role of artificial intelligence in planning and managing the cities of the future.

The programme also explored smart city solutions, robotics and emerging professions, giving young participants an insight into how technology could reshape urban life and the future labour market.

An interactive session organised by IDEA Public Union focused on environmental challenges and innovative solutions amid rapid urbanisation. Participants also met Azerbaijani statesman, diplomat, scholar and Doctor of Historical Sciences Hasan Hasanov to discuss Azerbaijan’s rich history and statehood traditions.

The educational programme was complemented by a range of practical and recreational activities, including the ‘Your Idea: The City of the Future!’ ideathon, the ‘KOD Karabakh’ intellectual game, the ‘Revival’ Urban Art workshop, an airsoft tactical game, an excursion to the Observatory Museum, sports competitions and team-building activities.

Evenings at the festival featured music, dancing and informal conversations around a campfire, adding a social dimension to the programme.

Organisers said the ‘Modern Cities and Technology’ camp helped participants develop skills suited to contemporary challenges, build innovative perspectives on the cities of the future and expand their networks with other young people.

Yay Fest 2026, described by organisers as Azerbaijan’s largest youth festival in terms of participant numbers and duration, will continue until September 4 with five further camps focusing on ‘Science, Ethics and the Future’, ‘Engineering and Coding’, ‘Start-ups and Entrepreneurship’, and ‘AI – Sport and Health’.

The festival is supported by the Youth Foundation of the Republic of Azerbaijan, with IDEA Public Union as a partner, and is jointly organised by the National Council of Youth Organisations of Azerbaijan, Azerbaijan Student Youth Organisations Union, Azerbaijan Volunteer Organisations Union, Azerbaijani Students and Alumni Platform, ‘CAVAN’ Youth Movement Public Union, ‘Great Return’ Youth Organisation and ‘Young Volunteers’ Public Union.

The Youth Foundation has invited young people to register through the Yay Fest website and take part in interviews for the upcoming camps. Applicants aged 18 to 25 who demonstrate active civic engagement will be given preference. Each participant may attend only one camp.

The International Day of the World’s Indigenous Peoples is observed annually on 9 August.

According to AzerNEWS, the day was established in 1994 by UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/49/214. The date marks the first meeting of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, held on 9 August 1992.

The International Day was first observed in 1995, helping to raise awareness of the rights and challenges facing indigenous peoples and to give greater visibility to their voices around the world.

In 2007, the UN General Assembly adopted the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The declaration recognises the fundamental rights and freedoms of indigenous peoples, including the rights to self-determination, cultural preservation, education, participation in decision-making, and ownership of and access to their lands, territories and resources.

There are currently around 476 million indigenous people living in 90 countries worldwide. Although they account for about 6% of the global population, they make up around 15% of the world’s poorest people.

Indigenous communities continue to face challenges including poverty, discrimination, disease, displacement from their lands, exclusion from political and economic life, and the loss of languages and cultural heritage.

In 2019, the UN General Assembly declared the year the International Year of Indigenous Languages, highlighting the urgent need to preserve, revitalise and promote indigenous languages.

The International Decade of Indigenous Languages began in 2022, with the aim of strengthening efforts to protect indigenous languages and empowering their speakers.

The International Day of the World’s Indigenous Peoples seeks to raise global awareness of indigenous peoples’ rights, cultures and languages and to mobilise international efforts to address the social and economic challenges they continue to face.

When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, most analysts expected the conflict to end within days or, at most, a few weeks. Few imagined that it would enter its fifth year and evolve into one of the defining geopolitical confrontations of the 21st century.

With the benefit of hindsight, it has become increasingly clear that the war is no longer solely about Ukraine or even about the Donbas. It has developed into a broader contest between two competing geopolitical blocs. On one side stands the United States and its Western allies. On the other are Russia and Iran, whose strategic partnership has deepened as the conflict has expanded.

What initially appeared to be a regional war has gradually transformed into a global competition for influence. Its consequences are now visible far beyond Eastern Europe, stretching from Mali to Armenia, from Venezuela to Pakistan. Countries that were once considered peripheral to the conflict are increasingly becoming part of a wider geopolitical struggle.

Ironically, although the confrontation began largely on terms favorable to Moscow, the strategic momentum today appears to be shifting in the opposite direction.

Meanwhile, Russia entered the war with ambitious political and military objectives. The initial expectation in Moscow was that Kyiv would fall quickly, allowing Ukraine to be brought back into Russia’s sphere of influence. Instead, the campaign evolved into a prolonged war of attrition.

Within months, Russian forces withdrew from northern Ukraine and abandoned their attempt to seize the Ukrainian capital. Moscow subsequently concentrated its military resources on consolidating positions in southern and eastern Ukraine, later formalizing control over occupied territories through annexation.

Whether described as a ‘sign of goodwill’ or a necessary military recalibration, the shift reflected a significant change in Russia’s original objectives. The conflict, in the meantime, gradually expanded beyond the battlefield itself.

While front lines in Ukraine often remained relatively static for extended periods, Russia’s broader geopolitical position faced mounting pressure elsewhere. Syria’s long-standing Assad government collapsed after years of Russian military support. Hezbollah-long regarded as one of Iran’s and Russia’s most important regional partners-suffered devastating setbacks. Armenia accelerated efforts to reduce its dependence on Moscow and diversify its foreign policy toward Western institutions.

These developments suggest that the real contest increasingly extends beyond the trenches of eastern Ukraine.

Nevertheless, Donald Trump’s return to the White House marked another turning point. Before his inauguration, many observers predicted that Washington and Moscow would pursue a geopolitical accommodation. Russian state media actively promoted this narrative, portraying Trump as a leader willing to normalize relations with the Kremlin.

Rather than reducing pressure on Russia, Washington adopted initiatives aimed at reshaping geopolitical competition across several regions simultaneously.

Rather than relying exclusively on military confrontation, the United States increasingly focused on weakening Russian influence through infrastructure projects, diplomatic engagement, economic partnerships and strategic realignment.

The expansion of connectivity initiatives across the South Caucasus and the Caspian region reflects this broader strategy. Likewise, developments in Latin America-including the removal of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro from power and his subsequent transfer to the United States to face criminal prosecution-demonstrated Washington’s willingness to challenge governments traditionally viewed as part of Moscow’s sphere of influence.

At the same time, pressure on Cuba and renewed American engagement across the Western Hemisphere signalled that geopolitical competition was no longer confined to Europe.

As regards Tehran, if Russia has experienced growing pressure on its western flank, Iran increasingly finds itself under pressure from multiple directions.

The 2026 war involving Iran, Israel and the United States fundamentally altered the regional balance of power. The death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei during Israeli strikes marked an unprecedented moment in the history of the Islamic Republic. Repeated attacks on military facilities, critical infrastructure and strategic assets exposed vulnerabilities that few observers believed possible only a few years earlier.

Among all of Washington’s recent geopolitical successes, its approach toward Iran may ultimately prove to be the most consequential. Some observers continue to argue that the United States has failed in its confrontation with Tehran. However, from the very first days of the 2026 conflict, AzerNEWS outlined three possible scenarios for Iran’s future in an earlier analysis.

The first scenario envisioned a short war in which both sides would quickly declare victory and seek to avoid prolonged escalation. The second anticipated a descent into civil war, leading to the “Syrianization” of Iran through state fragmentation and internal conflict. Today, neither of those scenarios appears to reflect the direction events are taking.

Instead, developments on the ground increasingly resemble what we described as the third scenario: the gradual “Iraqization” of Iran.

In detail, Iran’s demographic weight, vast territory, mountainous geography and strategic depth make a conventional military occupation extraordinarily difficult and politically costly. A more realistic strategy is to steadily weaken the country’s military capabilities, economic resilience and regional influence over an extended period.

Iraq experienced a remarkably similar trajectory after the 1991 Gulf War. For more than a decade, Baghdad was subjected to sanctions, repeated military strikes, restrictions on its military capabilities and constant international pressure before the 2003 invasion. The objective was not an immediate victory but a long-term erosion of the state’s ability to project power.

Current developments suggest that Iran may be entering a comparable phase. Military strikes have become periodic rather than exceptional. Pressure on Tehran rises, temporarily subsides, and then intensifies again. At the same time, Iran faces growing economic constraints, continued attacks on strategic infrastructure and increasing pressure on its regional network of allies. Maritime pressure and disruptions to Iranian logistical routes further reinforce this pattern of sustained strategic attrition rather than decisive confrontation.

Next phase of new cold war

Another defining feature of this emerging confrontation is the transformation of Western defense policy.

For decades, many European NATO members relied heavily on American military guarantees while maintaining comparatively modest defense spending.

The Trump administration challenged this model by demanding that allies increase defense expenditures to around five percent of GDP. Although initially controversial, the proposal has gradually gained momentum across much of Europe.

The long-term implications are potentially enormous.

Combined, the economies of the United States, NATO members and the European Union generate roughly $55-60 trillion in annual GDP. If defense spending approaches five percent across much of this bloc, annual military expenditures could eventually exceed $2 trillion-an amount comparable to Russia’s entire gross domestic product.

Military competition is ultimately sustained by economic capacity. History repeatedly demonstrates that prolonged strategic rivalries are often decided less by battlefield victories than by the ability to finance them over time.

From this perspective, the New Cold War is entering a new phase.

The conflict is no longer defined solely by events in Ukraine. It increasingly encompasses the South Caucasus, the Middle East, Latin America and other regions where competing powers seek to reshape alliances, transport corridors and spheres of influence.

The map of global competition is expanding. The battle is no longer over a single country. It is over the geopolitical architecture that will define the international order for decades to come.