Category: Azer News

President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev has approved the law on amendments to the law “On aviation”, AzerNEWS reports.

The text of the document has been published on the official website of the President of Azerbaijan.

According to the amendment, the rules for the use of airspace and flights of very light aircraft will be determined by the body (organization) designated by the relevant executive authority.

President Ilham Aliyev also signed a decree on the application of the law and the regulation of some related issues.

According to the document, the Cabinet of Ministers of Azerbaijan must prepare proposals on determining liability for violation of requirements for the use of airspace and flights of very light aircraft within four months and submit them to the President of Azerbaijan.

In addition, in accordance with Article 56.5 of the law of Azerbaijan “On aviation”, the rules for the use of airspace and flights of very light aircraft must be approved within three months, taking into account the proposals of the State Protection Service of Azerbaijan, the Ministry of Digital Development and Transport of Azerbaijan, the Ministry of Justice of Azerbaijan, the Ministry of Youth and Sports of Azerbaijan, the State Agency for the Protection of Strategic Facilities of Azerbaijan and the Tourism Agency of Azerbaijan.

The rules must reflect:

requirements for the technical characteristics of aircraft;

registration of aircraft and their operators, as well as cases of exemption from registration;

requirements for age, training, medical fitness, and professional training for persons operating aircraft, as well as the mechanism for providing them with a document granting the right to operate aircraft;

criteria for clearly defining areas where flights are permitted, restricted, and prohibited, including regulation of flights over the state border, military facilities, strategic infrastructure facilities, airports, and other special regime zones;

features of the use of aircraft for commercial or non-commercial, including personal, sports, and tourism purposes;

safety requirements, including procedures for prior approval and notification of flights for the purpose of safe flight operations;

requirements for the technical suitability, operation, and periodic inspection of aircraft;

rights and obligations of aircraft operators and persons participating in flights.

Reza Pahlavi, the son of Iran’s last Shah, has claimed that he is receiving private messages from serving members of Iran’s security forces, including personnel from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Basij, who say they oppose the country’s ruling establishment, AzerNEWS reports.

Speaking about the communications, Pahlavi said the number of security officials seeking to distance themselves from the Iranian government is growing.

According to Pahlavi, active members of Iran’s security apparatus have been contacting him through social media to express dissatisfaction with the current leadership and to explore ways of leaving the system.

“I began receiving some direct messages on my social media from people saying, ‘I’m a Basiji in Mashhad,’ or ‘I’m a member of the IRGC in such-and-such a country. We hate this regime. We’re not with them. We’re looking for an opportunity to break away,'” Pahlavi said.

He clarified that these contacts do not involve senior commanders within Iran’s security establishment.

“When I said to the media that I’m in touch with elements like that, it was in that context. It’s not like I’m talking to the IRGC command, not at all,” he said.

Pahlavi added that the messages have come from individual members of the Basij, the IRGC, and Iran’s regular military.

“There were elements of the Basij, of the Sepah, of course, the military as well, that would communicate with me discreetly, as a sign that this is where they stand,” he said.

Pahlavi, who has lived in exile since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, has repeatedly called for political change in Iran and has sought to position himself as a figure capable of uniting opposition groups. Iranian authorities have consistently dismissed his statements and continue to regard him as an opponent of the Islamic Republic.

The U.S. Department of Energy announced a signed Section 123 civil nuclear cooperation agreement between Washington and Saudi Arabia. The 30-year agreement aims to open multibillion-dollar commercial opportunities for U.S. nuclear firms (such as Westinghouse) and help Saudi Arabia transition its domestic grid toward nuclear energy.

The pact has sparked intense debate for several reasons, of course.

Congress has not yet approved the arrangement, and few details about it have been made public. But former officials and members of the nuclear community said it is a major shift in U.S. policy and risks accelerating a nuclear arms race in an already volatile region.

The agreement may allow U.S. companies to build uranium enrichment facilities in Saudi Arabia to supply its nuclear reactors. U.S. companies would also provide additional technical expertise. The deal could mean Saudi Arabia would not have to import its nuclear fuel, and it could provide a pathway for it to enrich uranium on its own at a later date.

Unlike the landmark 2009 U.S. – UAE agreement, which explicitly barred domestic uranium enrichment (the “gold standard” of non-proliferation), the framework with Saudi Arabia includes a joint feasibility study on building a uranium enrichment facility in the kingdom. Enrichment technology can generate fuel for peaceful power plants, but if refined to higher purity levels, it can be used to produce weapons-grade material.

Speaking to AzerNEWS, geopolitical risk analyst Victor Bruno argued that the agreement reflects a much broader transformation in global politics rather than simply a shift in U.S.-Saudi relations. According to him, the Middle East is entering a new era of strategic autonomy and nuclear proliferation, and that the decline of US dominance is pushing regional powers to seek their own means of deterrence.

“Very probably, but it is increasingly evident that we are walking down a path of increased national self-determination. Surprisingly, countries that are economically dominant in the region have not tried to develop their own nuclear arsenal. But on the other hand, this goes to show how much power and leverage the U.S. had over the region. One should not be deceived that this apparent act of mutual respect between the Kingdom and America is, deep down, Washington washing its hands. The fact of the matter is that Western Asia is increasingly a region with bigger and bigger Great Powers, and such actions are bound to happen. It hardly can under these provisions. And with everything that has transpired over the last 12 to 18 months in Iran, any power with hegemonic aspirations should learn the lesson and try to develop its nuclear arsenal.”

Lebanon-based analyst Hazem Al-Tawil, on the other hand, noted that Saudi Arabia’s pursuit of nuclear technology should be viewed within the broader context of its changing security environment rather than as an isolated energy project.

“Saudi Arabia has long argued that nuclear energy is part of its economic diversification strategy under Vision 2030. That objective is legitimate in itself. The question is whether domestic uranium enrichment becomes merely an energy capability or gradually evolves into a strategic hedge. Unlike purchasing nuclear fuel abroad, domestic uranium enrichment creates indigenous technical expertise, industrial infrastructure and trained personnel. While enrichment for civilian reactors typically requires uranium enriched to around 3-5 percent, the same centrifuge technology can, if political decisions change, eventually be used to produce weapons-grade uranium above 90 percent.”

The expert firmly believes that this does not trigger any regional arms race, as this is more of a ‘muscle show’ over Tehran:

“Now, this [referring to his prior quote] is what nuclear experts commonly describe as a “latent” or “breakout capability.” It does not mean a country intends to build nuclear weapons, but rather that it possesses much of the technological foundation necessary to do so within a relatively short timeframe if circumstances dramatically change. Countries such as Trkiye, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates have all expressed varying degrees of interest in expanding civilian nuclear energy over the past decade. In a 2018 interview with CBS News, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman declared that “without a doubt, if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible.” That statement has remained one of the most frequently cited arguments among arms control experts questioning whether Saudi enrichment should receive the same safeguards applied elsewhere. So, as a reference, we can surely say that Trump is making sure to help build ‘muscle’ near Iran that it can flex over its ambitions.”

However, he also thinks it certainly changes strategic calculations:

“Now, as much as I believe that Saudi Arabia does not intend to trigger any arms race or confrontation in the region, this also adds a bigger complexity to the latter. In a Middle East already balancing Iranian nuclear advances, Israel’s undeclared deterrent and growing geopolitical uncertainty, perception often shapes security calculations as much as capability itself. From my observation, the Israeli side does not directly welcome the initiative. The opinions are rather mixed or quite hostile, at least from a public perspective.

The US president cast doubt on the Saudi deal just hours after announcing that it hinged on Riyadh’s recognition of Israel. While this recognition had always been a precondition for an agreement, the ongoing conflict in Gaza has strengthened Saudi Arabia’s position, asserting that such recognition can only occur alongside the establishment of a Palestinian state. Even if no nuclear reactors are constructed, the mere announcement legitimizes and encourages other nations’ ambitions for nuclear capabilities. Previous negotiations led to an Obama-era nuclear agreement that Tehran adhered to until Mr. Trump abandoned it. His actions seem to have resulted in a more aggressive and risk-taking Tehran, as anticipated; further military interventions are likely to exacerbate rather than resolve the nuclear threat. The possibility of Riyadh seeking a nuclear bomb still could serve as additional motivation – at least in a longer perspective.”

There is often a temptation in geopolitics to interpret every telephone call between leaders as a dramatic signal of friendship or hostility. But Vladimir Putin’s latest call to Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev is interesting precisely because it points to something more durable than the diplomatic arena: Azerbaijan’s ability to maintain working relationships with competing powers without becoming politically subordinate to any of them.

On 28 July, the Russian president called his Azerbaijani counterpart to discuss bilateral and international issues. According to the Azerbaijani presidency, both sides described relations as constructive, noted active dialogue between governments and institutions, and confirmed a mutual interest in expanding co-operation.

The significance lies not just in the call itself, but in what it says about the direction of relations after a period of considerable friction.

At the Shusha Global Media Forum earlier this month, President Aliyev said that Azerbaijan-Russia relations had been fully normalised, despite the difficulties of the recent past. He pointed to continuing contacts between the two governments, foreign ministries and presidential administrations, while stressing the importance of the relationship for both bilateral co-operation and the wider region.

That is a distinctly Azerbaijani approach to diplomacy: disagreements may be serious, but they do not necessarily have to become permanent ruptures.

If viewed from a wider perspective, this is particularly important in the South Caucasus, where outside powers have long sought influence and where smaller states are often pressured to define themselves according to someone else’s geopolitical map. Azerbaijan has generally resisted that logic. Its foreign policy has been based less on choosing a camp than on preserving room for manoeuvre.

That does not mean neutrality in the strict legal or ideological sense. Azerbaijan has its own strategic partnerships and alliances. It has deep ties with Trkiye, a strategic partnership with the European Union, close energy relations with European markets and extensive economic and political engagement with the United States. At the same time, it has maintained a strategic partnership and allied relationship with Russia and continued dialogue with Iran, despite periods of tension with both.

The point is not that Azerbaijan treats all relationships equally. It absolutely does not. The point is that it does not allow one relationship automatically to determine all the others.

That distinction is increasingly valuable in a region where geopolitical competition has intensified.

Azerbaijan’s relations with Russia offer perhaps the clearest example. The two countries have experienced serious disagreements, and there have been moments when public rhetoric on both sides became noticeably sharper. Those tensions created opportunities for commentators, political actors and media figures seeking to portray the relationship as irreparably damaged. Nonetheless, Baku largely resisted the temptation to turn temporary disputes into a permanent foreign-policy realignment, and that restraint matters.

Diplomacy is rarely about responding to every provocation with an equal and opposite reaction. It is about understanding which disputes are temporary, which interests are permanent and which relationships remain strategically necessary after the immediate crisis has passed.

The Kremlin’s latest engagement with Baku suggests that this calculation has not been lost on Moscow either.

The contrast with Armenia is instructive, although the two countries occupy very different geopolitical positions. Yerevan has increasingly sought closer ties with the European Union and the United States while simultaneously attempting to preserve important economic links with Russia. This is a difficult balancing act in its own right. Putin has publicly warned that Armenia cannot simultaneously belong to the EU and the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union because of incompatible regulatory frameworks.

Armenia’s turn towards Europe is understandable in the context of its security concerns and its political transformation. But it also demonstrates the limits of a foreign policy in which strategic realignment can become the central organising principle.

Azerbaijan’s model is different. It is less ideological and more transactional, more focused on national interests and long-term strategic autonomy. It does not require Baku to become part of anyone’s sphere of influence in order to maintain productive relations with that power.

This is also visible in its dealings with Iran. Relations with Tehran have periodically been strained by security concerns, political disagreements and competing regional interests. However, Azerbaijan has continued to engage Iran as a neighbour whose geography cannot be changed and whose interests must be managed. The same principle applies to Russia.

That may sound obvious, but it is not always how international politics works.

For Azerbaijan, neighbours are not temporary geopolitical partners who become irrelevant when a new alliance emerges. They are permanent facts of geography. Governments change, conflicts end, international blocs shift and global powers come and go. Borders remain.

This helps explain why Azerbaijan has been able to develop increasingly close relations with the West without turning those relations into an anti-Russian or anti-Iranian project. Its energy partnership with Europe has expanded dramatically, while Baku has simultaneously maintained channels with Moscow and Tehran. Azerbaijan has positioned itself as a major energy supplier to Europe and an increasingly important transport hub connecting Central Asia, the Caspian and European markets. That gives it strategic value to the West. But it has not treated that value as a licence to abandon its relationships with its neighbours.

So, there is a lesson here about reliability. In international affairs, reliability does not necessarily mean agreeing with everyone. Nor does it mean avoiding disagreements. It means that partners can reasonably expect a country to pursue its interests consistently, to honour its commitments and to keep communication channels open even when relations become difficult.

That is perhaps the most important message behind Vladimir Putin’s call to President Aliyev.

For those in Russia who have sought to turn bilateral disagreements into a broader rupture, the renewed high-level contact is a reminder that relations between states cannot be reduced to the loudest television commentary, the most provocative social media post, or the most sensational political statement. Governments have interests that outlast the news cycle.

The same message applies to Azerbaijani critics of engagement with Moscow. Maintaining dialogue with Russia does not mean accepting Russian influence. Just as closer ties with Europe do not require Azerbaijan to become an extension of European foreign policy.

This is where Azerbaijan’s regional policy has demonstrated a degree of strategic maturity. Baku has sought to avoid being trapped in the binary logic of geopolitical competition. It can work with the West on energy and transport, with Russia on trade and regional security, with Trkiye on strategic partnership and with Iran on issues arising from shared geography.

The strategy is not without risks. Balancing competing powers requires constant adjustment. It can be criticised by all sides and tested whenever regional tensions intensify. But the alternative, such as placing all strategic bets on one external centre of power, can be even more dangerous for a country situated at the crossroads of competing geopolitical interests.

Azerbaijan’s experience suggests that strategic autonomy is not the same as isolation. A country can be deeply connected to multiple centres of power while remaining politically independent of each.

The South Caucasus has increasingly been shaped by competing alliances and shifting external pressures. Azerbaijan’s most valuable asset in this region may therefore be neither its energy resources nor its geography alone. It may be the credibility of a foreign policy that refuses to confuse partnership with dependence.

Azerbaijan Culture Minister Adil Karimli has discussed prospects of cooperation with Pakistan’s Ambassador to Azerbaijan Qasim Mohiuddin, AzerNEWS reports.

The meeting highlighted the strong relations between Azerbaijan and Pakistan, with Karimli noting that the partnership is based on the friendship and mutual trust between the leaders of both nations.

The minister pointed out that there are broad opportunities to further strengthen cooperation in the cultural field and expand joint projects between Azerbaijan and Pakistan.

Ambassador Qasim Mohiuddin expressed gratitude for the warm reception and said Pakistan is interested in further developing cultural relations with Azerbaijan.

During the meeting, the sides exchanged views on cooperation in various areas of culture and discussed ways to deepen cultural ties between the two countries.

Azerbaijan and Pakistan continue to develop cultural ties as part of their broader strategic partnership, with cooperation between the two countries growing in areas such as heritage, arts, literature, and cultural exchange.

The Azerbaijan Culture Ministry has been involved in strengthening these relations through meetings with Pakistani officials, participation in cultural events, and discussions on new joint projects. Both sides have emphasized the importance of increasing contacts between cultural institutions, artists, and creative communities.

The two countries have also worked to increase cooperation between museums, cultural organizations, and institutions responsible for preserving historical heritage. Future collaboration is expected to focus on joint cultural programs, creative projects, and greater participation in each other’s cultural events.

Through continued cooperation, Baku and Islamabad aim to use culture as a bridge to strengthen friendship and deepen relations between Azerbaijan and Pakistan.

The Moldovan government has declared a 30-day high-alert regime in the energy sector in response to diesel fuel shortages affecting parts of the country, AzerNEWS reports.

Prime Minister Vasily Tofan said the measure is intended as a precaution to ensure stable fuel supplies rather than to cause public concern.

‘We are implementing the high-alert regime not to create panic, but to take preventive measures. Such situations have happened before. Today’s measures are aimed at minimizing disruptions in fuel supplies during the agricultural season,’ Tofan said.

According to the Moldovan authorities, around 50 filling stations, accounting for approximately 10% of the country’s fuel stations, have run out of diesel.

Officials attributed the shortages to logistical disruptions caused by low water levels on the Danube River, which have complicated waterborne fuel transportation, as well as the impact of the ongoing situation in the Middle East on fuel supply chains.

The government said the high-alert regime will allow authorities to monitor the situation more closely and take additional steps to prevent further supply disruptions.

Earlier this year, in March, Moldova declared a 60-day state of emergency in the energy sector after a power transmission line passing through Ukraine was damaged. That emergency regime was lifted before its scheduled expiration.

Saudi Arabia is lobbying among G20 countries to secure support for its bid to host the group’s summit in 2030 in order to promote the kingdom internationally, Semafor reported on Tuesday, citing people with knowledge of the matter, AzerNEWS reports.

In a joint statement issued by Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman and Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney following their meeting in Jeddah in July, it was stated that Ottawa supported the kingdom’s goal of hosting the 2030 summit. According to the report, Saudi officials have held talks with diplomats from other countries to seek support for their initiative.

The 2020 G20 summit was scheduled to take place in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia’s capital, but it was cancelled due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

In just a few days, it will be one year since Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, and U.S. President Donald Trump signed the Washington Joint Declaration, a document intended to lay the foundation for a lasting peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The declaration was widely regarded as a historic diplomatic breakthrough, raising hopes that decades of conflict in the South Caucasus could finally give way to a new era of regional stability and cooperation.

However, diplomatic signatures alone do not guarantee lasting peace. History has repeatedly demonstrated that peace agreements succeed only when accompanied by political will. Nearly one year after the declaration, optimism has been tempered by a series of unresolved political, legal, and geopolitical challenges that continue to complicate the normalization process between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The obstacle is not, at this stage, the battlefield. It is a tangle of constitutional disputes, domestic political polarization in Armenia, diaspora activism, and the residue of geopolitical ambitions that resist the logic of the post-war settlement.

Just recently, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced that the draft of the country’s new constitution will be made public by the end of the year. Speaking about the timeline for releasing the text of the proposed fundamental law, Pashinyan said that a specific date could not yet be provided but confirmed that the draft would be published before the year’s end. Despite these commitments, no draft has been released yet, and there has been little visible progress in completing this politically sensitive process.

Besides, constitutional change in Armenia is not a simple executive act. It requires broad parliamentary support, public backing, and navigation through a polity that remains deeply divided.

From Azerbaijan’s perspective, as long as these constitutional references remain in force, they create legal and political uncertainty that contradicts the spirit of a future peace treaty and could serve as grounds for renewed disputes in the future. For this reason, Azerbaijan insists that the constitutional issue must be fully resolved before the final peace agreement is signed.

Following the parliamentary elections held on June 7, Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party retained a parliamentary majority with 64 seats. Nevertheless, this falls short of the two-thirds majority (70 seats) required to amend the Constitution. As a result, the government cannot implement constitutional changes unilaterally and must seek support from other political forces, many of which remain sceptical or openly opposed to constitutional reform. So, domestic political resistance remains one of the principal challenges facing the Armenian leadership.

Under Armenian law, any peace agreement must receive approval from the Constitutional Court before it can be ratified. Pashinyan has previously stated that if the Court concludes that the peace treaty contradicts the existing Constitution, he would personally initiate constitutional amendments. This creates an unusual legal and political dilemma.

Without constitutional reform, the Constitutional Court could potentially find incompatibilities between the peace treaty and the current Constitution. In such a scenario, the implementation of the agreement would become legally impossible despite the successful completion of negotiations.

A government of peace, an opposition of war?

Inside Armenia, the peace-versus-war divide has become the central cleavage of national politics. This framing has been articulated most clearly by Alen Simonyan, the former parliament speaker and a close Pashinyan ally, who has argued that the 2026 elections will present voters with a stark choice “between peace and possible war”.

Opposition parties and various political movements continue to criticize many aspects of the government’s approach toward Azerbaijan.

Armenia’s political opposition remains firmly opposed to the current framework of the peace process with Azerbaijan. Opposition parties have repeatedly accused Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan of pursuing a policy of capitulation, making unilateral concessions, and undermining Armenia’s national security. These accusations have fueled domestic political polarization and complicated the government’s efforts to advance normalization with Azerbaijan.

Another factor frequently discussed by regional policymakers is the influence of Armenian diaspora organizations.

History teaches is that the Armenian lobby and its supporters in Western institutions have long served as obstacles to peace. Back in 1992, the infamous Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act denied aid to Azerbaijan, emboldening Armenia’s occupation of Azerbaijani lands and prolonging a bloody war. Now, decades later, the same forces are at play, desperate to reverse the irreversible: Azerbaijan’s restoration of its territorial integrity.

Armenian diaspora organizations, flush with funds and steeped in revisionist fantasies, continue to drive Yerevan into confrontational policies. Rather than building bridges or investing in Armenia’s development, the diaspora has consistently pushed for militarization and intransigence.

The reality is that diaspora organizations, like many transnational advocacy networks worldwide, are capable of influencing public debate and foreign policy discussions. Their impact on the peace process therefore remains a subject of continuing political debate rather than settled consensus.

This matters for the peace document because a treaty is only as durable as the political consensus behind it. If a signed agreement is perceived by nearly half the Armenian electorate as a capitulation imposed under duress, it will be vulnerable to revision the moment the political winds shift. Azerbaijan’s demand for constitutional guarantees is, in this sense, a recognition of the same problem from the other side. Without a domestic Armenian consensus in favor of peace, ink on paper may not be enough.

A peace document cannot be divorced from the regional geometry in which it sits. One of the sharpest points of contention remains Azerbaijan’s push for the so-called Zangezur Corridor – an extraterritorial transport link through Armenian territory connecting Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan.

Despite political disagreements, economics provides one of the strongest arguments in favor of lasting peace. Improved regional connectivity could create new transportation routes linking the South Caucasus with Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East. Expanded trade, infrastructure investment, and cross-border commerce could generate significant economic benefits for both Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Business communities generally favor predictability over instability. Investors are considerably more likely to commit long-term capital when regional security risks decline. For this reason, a peace agreement could reshape not only bilateral relations but also the broader economic architecture of the South Caucasus.

Nearly one year after the Washington Joint Declaration, the foundations for peace undoubtedly appear stronger than they did only a few years ago. Nevertheless, important obstacles remain.

Questions surrounding constitutional reform in Armenia or domestic political polarization continue to influence the pace of normalization.

The success or failure of this peace process will ultimately depend not on the symbolism of diplomatic ceremonies, but on the consistent fulfillment of commitments and Armenia’s recognition of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity.

United Nations Special Rapporteur on the occupied Palestinian territories Francesca Albanese on Tuesday criticized Italy, France and Greece for allowing Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s aircraft to use their airspace during his trip to the United States, arguing the three countries failed to meet their obligations under the International Criminal Court (ICC), AzerNEWS reports.

“Three Rome Statute parties opened their airspace to fugitive Netanyahu, in breach of their obligation to cooperate with the ICC,” Albanese wrote on X, calling on “competent authorities to investigate possible complicity.” The remarks came after a journalist noted that the three ICC member states had permitted Netanyahu’s flight despite the arrest warrant issued by the ICC in November 2024.

In separate posts, Albanese reiterated calls for an arms embargo and for countries to cut trade with Israel, saying “it is never too late”. She also argued that Israeli soldiers, political leaders and settlers should be investigated and, where warranted, prosecuted over actions in the occupied Palestinian territories.

Baku continues to strengthen its position as a major international sporting venue by hosting a series of high-profile events throughout 2026, AzerNEWS reports.

The U-17 Wrestling World Championships are among the latest competitions to take place in the Azerbaijani capital, bringing together young athletes from around the world.

Speaking at the opening ceremony of the U-17 Wrestling World Championships in Baku, Azerbaijan’s Minister of Youth and Sports, Farid Gayibov, said the National Gymnastics Arena has hosted numerous sporting events throughout 2026 and will continue to stage competitions until the end of the year.

Farid Gayibov highlighted the government’s continued support for sport, noting that Baku was named the World’s Sports Capital for 2026.

“This title was not given to us as a gift. It is the result of the successful sports policy pursued by the head of state,” he said.

The minister also praised the organization of the U-17 Wrestling World Championships, emphasizing that athletes from many countries are competing in the tournament.

“I believe this championship will be successful for Azerbaijan’s representatives. I wish all wrestlers taking part in the World Championships the best of luck,” Gayibov said.

The U-17 Wrestling World Championships, being held at the National Gymnastics Arena, will conclude on August 2.