Category: Azer News

For a body that the U.S. President Donald Trump spent much of his UN address deriding as useless, the General Assembly gave him an unusually receptive stage for boasting. Eight conflicts resolved since taking office, he told the chamber, several of them running for decades. Cambodia and Thailand, Kosovo and Serbia, Congo and Rwanda, Pakistan and India, Israel and Iran, Egypt and Ethiopia, and Armenia and Azerbaijan, a rivalry he noted had run for 31 years. “I did it in just seven months,” he said. “It is a great honour for me to do this.” He then quoted, approvingly, Ilham Aliyev’s assessment of his own diplomacy, that Donald Trump had performed a miracle in six months that nobody thought possible.

It was an effective speech and a truly remarkable one for Baku. The relations between Azerbaijan and the United States have been a story of friction instead of praise for most of the last three decades, through Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act of 1992 that banned any assistance from the US government to Baku during its occupation by Armenian troops (Joseph Biden was one of the authors of the amendment), and years of chairing the Minsk Group, which resulted in four Security Council resolutions on Armenian withdrawal but no withdrawal. Trump’s recent memo regarding the 907 waiver, added now to his UN statements, sounds in Baku like a much-needed rectification of a century-old wrong.

On August 8th 2025, in Washington, President Ilham Aliyev and Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan initialed a draft peace deal in the presence of Trump, along with an additional deal between the US and Armenia on the Zangezur corridor, renamed, fittingly enough, ‘Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity.’

Fuel products, grains, and building materials have since been transferred from Azerbaijan into Armenia; meetings of representatives of both parties on one another’s territories have become frequent, something that would have been unheard of just five years ago; last September an Armenian delegation, led by the director of the country’s National Security Service, took part in a Baku security conference. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan also used his speech at the UN to give his blessing to the process and remark on progress in Armenian-Turkish normalisation. In terms of a war that had been going on for three decades and the displacement of a million people, six months of advancement seems plausible.

Then came the postponement

Which makes the week’s other headline out of Baku worth reading carefully. Azerbaijani side have decided to postpone talks at an expert level that were meant to take place between Azerbaijan and Armenia as part of their ‘Bridge of Peace’ project, owing to what they refer to as a growing campaign of information against Azerbaijan in Armenia. Irrespective of whether or not that is the case, it comes across as rather awkward in the context of the celebratory tone that occurred in New York. The signing of the peace treaty is now being tied to constitutional reforms within Armenia, while any comments concerning the Gandzasar monastery have been met with hostility.

There is a valid argument, put forth by Baku, behind each of these stances when considered in isolation. The constitution of Armenia, for example, does make mention of the 1990 Declaration of Independence, which makes mention of territorial claims to unification decisions made with Karabakh back in 1989, a real legal loophole, rather than a fabricated pretext. There have been times when rhetoric from elements of both the diaspora and Armenian political elites did indeed take a more revanchist tone than a reconciliatory one. Yet, a peaceful process founded on trust does not need to litigate each of these irritations as something so serious as to be able to halt negotiations between the two states. By doing so time and again, especially in the very weeks during which Baku was proudly declaring its recent great diplomatic achievement on the international stage, the inevitable question must be raised of which storyline better fits the strategy of Azerbaijan?

The real underlying danger is one shared by Baku, rather than Yerevan, with Washington: this whole system hangs precariously upon the personal commitment of just one U.S. president within just one election period. The obvious disdain of DonaldTrump towards both the UN and the OSCE Minsk Group, where he complained of ‘not receiving a single phone call from the UN to help us make some agreements,’ has actually been productive in avoiding the institutional bodies that had failed for decades to achieve anything. However, personal diplomacy is, by definition, institutional diplomacy, and peace negotiations that hinge upon one leader’s desire to perform ribbon-cutting ceremonies tend not to endure very long after the leader is out of office. Neither Baku nor Yerevan seems to have put up much concrete treaty-level infrastructure beneath the goodwill of Donald Trump, which means that all the corridor diplomacy, all the working groups, and all the security conferences remain, for now, little more than confidence-building exercises.

Much of the substantive work here was Baku’s and Yerevan’s own, years of quiet, painstaking negotiation that predates any American involvement. If the corridor traffic, the working-group meetings and the security-forum invitations are genuinely underwritten by treaty-level commitments the two governments built themselves, they should outlast whoever currently sits in the Oval Office. If they turn out to have depended more on the optics of a Washington signing ceremony than on institutions either side actually built, that is a different and more fragile story, and one Baku and Yerevan, not Washington, will be the ones to answer for.

A test yet to come

All of this shouldn’t overshadow how much ground has actually been covered. Thirty years of stalemate do not generally result in signed draft agreements, viable transit routes, and reciprocal diplomatic attendance all in the course of one year, and despite the selfish nature of Trump’s praise at the UN General Assembly, he wasn’t entirely wrong about the reality of the situation. However, an applause line is not the same thing as a solid deal, and a peace process that puts a stop to expert-level discussions of information warfare complaints one month after it has been celebrated around the world as a model for success is still unproven in its ability to weather criticism without retreating into the maximalist policies of the past three decades. The true challenge for Baku and Yerevan’s diplomats lies not in what is said on the floor of the UN.

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, responding to a question from a journalist with the Rossiya TV channel on the sidelines of the 81st session of the UN General Assembly in New York, said Yerevan intends to continue pursuing a balanced foreign policy.

“We plan to continue our balanced foreign policy, as we have stated,” Pashinyan noted.

Asked about Armenia’s further rapprochement with the European Union, he responded to the phrase frequently used in media about attempts to “sit on two chairs.”

“Why two chairs? We are sitting on one Armenian chair, so we do not need two,” the Armenian prime minister added.

Asked whether he was concerned that European countries might fail to keep their promise to ensure that 99% of Armenian agricultural products have access to the European market, Pashinyan expressed surprise.

“Why should they deceive us? We try to be honest and open with all our partners and hope for reciprocity,” the prime minister emphasized.

Earlier, Armenian opposition MP Sevak Khachatryan of the Armenia bloc said that Europe’s interest in Armenia was driven exclusively by pragmatic considerations.

Racing Bulls driver Arvid Lindblad crashed during the second free practice session in Baku, bringing out the red flags.

The incident occurred when Lindblad’s car hit the safety barrier. The damaged car was subsequently removed from the track, allowing the session to resume.

The 2026 Azerbaijan Grand Prix is taking place at the Baku City Circuit from September 24 to 26. It is the 15th round of the Formula 1 World Championship, with the main race scheduled for Saturday, September 26.

The Baku City Circuit is 6.003 kilometers long and features 20 corners.

The street circuit is known for its long straights, heavy braking zones and the narrow section around Icherisheher, making car setup and straight-line speed important factors throughout the weekend.

Azerbaijan is seeking to strengthen institutional engagement with the US Congress as part of efforts to advance long-term regional security, peace and stability.

Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov discussed the issue with US Congressman Joe Wilson on the sidelines of the 81st session of the UN General Assembly in New York, Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry said in a post on X.

The sides exchanged views on Azerbaijan-US strategic relations, with particular attention to the importance of institutional engagement with the US Congress in supporting regional security, peace and stability.

The meeting also highlighted Azerbaijan’s role in regional processes.

The talks come as Baku continues to develop its engagement with Washington across strategic and regional issues, including security, connectivity and economic cooperation.

The meeting was held on the sidelines of UNGA81, where Azerbaijan is conducting a series of diplomatic engagements with international partners and officials.

The first day of the Formula 1 Azerbaijan Grand Prix begins with a busy programme at the Baku City Circuit. From the morning hours, Formula 2 and Formula 1 drivers take to the track for the first practice sessions of the race weekend.

The day’s first session starts at 10:00 with Formula 2 practice. During the 45-minute session, drivers complete their first laps of the Baku City Circuit, check their car setups and prepare for the two qualifying sessions later in the day.

At 12:30, attention turns to Formula 1. During the one-hour first practice session, teams test the technical characteristics of their cars on the circuit’s challenging corners and assess the performance of the Pirelli tyres. The data collected during the session will play an important role in preparing race strategies.

Formula 2 drivers return to the track at 14:00 and 14:30 for two consecutive qualifying sessions. The results will determine the starting positions for the sprint and main races.

Formula 1’s second practice session gets underway at 16:00. Teams continue the work started in the first session, looking to improve their cars and find more pace around the Baku circuit.

Formula 2 is the only support series competing alongside Formula 1 at this year’s Azerbaijan Grand Prix, resulting in an expanded programme for the Baku round. The Formula 2 weekend includes one practice session, two qualifying sessions, one sprint race and two feature races.

The racing action will be followed by an evening music programme for fans. Scottish DJ and producer Calvin Harris will perform at Baku Crystal Hall as part of the 2026 Formula 1 Qatar Airways Azerbaijan Grand Prix. Known for global hits including “We Found Love”, “Summer” and “One Kiss”, Harris is among Britain’s most successful dance music artists.

Formula 1 fans in Baku will have a change of pace tonight as Scottish DJ and producer Calvin Harris takes the stage at Baku Crystal Hall.

The internationally acclaimed artist, known for hits such as “We Found Love”, “Summer” and “One Kiss”, will headline the evening entertainment programme during the 10th anniversary of the Azerbaijan Grand Prix.

Following a full day of action at the Baku City Circuit, the focus will shift from the track to live music, with Harris performing for fans at the Crystal Hall.

The concert programme will continue on September 25, when pop star Katy Perry is scheduled to perform at the same venue.

The 2026 Azerbaijan Grand Prix is underway in Baku, with Formula 1 and Formula 2 drivers taking on the Baku City Circuit from September 24 to 26. The event marks the 10th Formula 1 weekend in Baku and is the 15th round of the 2026 championship.

The first on-track action of the weekend saw ART Grand Prix’s Kush Maini set the fastest time in Formula 2 practice, with the Indian driver posting a 1:56.532 on his final lap.

Maini had been among the front-runners throughout the 45-minute session and improved his time at the end to take first place. Rodin Motorsport’s Alexander Dunne finished second, 0.2 seconds behind, while Campos Racing’s Nikola Tsolov moved up the order late in the session to take third.

Colton Herta was fourth, with Gabriele Minì completing the top five. Rafael, Laurens van Hoepen, Martinius Stenshorne, Ritomo Miyata and Mari Boya rounded out the top 10.

The Formula 2 drivers return to the circuit later on Thursday for two qualifying sessions. The first takes place at 14:00 and sets the grid for the Sprint Race and Feature Race 1, while the second starts at 14:30 and determines the grid for Feature Race 2.

Formula 1’s first practice session follows at 12:30, with a second session scheduled for 16:00. The 6.003-kilometre Baku City Circuit features 20 corners and combines long, fast sections with the narrow streets of the Old City.

The Azerbaijan Grand Prix itself takes place on Saturday, September 26, with the 51-lap race starting at 15:00 local time.

Azerbaijan’s Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov has met with his Cypriot counterpart Constantinos Kombos on the sidelines of the 81st session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in New York.

The meeting focused on the importance of maintaining political dialogue between the two countries.

The sides also exchanged views on the Azerbaijan-EU cooperation agenda, regional developments and ongoing efforts to establish peace and stability in the South Caucasus.

The meeting was announced by Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry in a post on X.

The ministry said the discussions covered continued political engagement as well as issues concerning regional and international cooperation.

Mercedes driver George Russell set the fastest time in the opening Formula 1 practice session of the Azerbaijan Grand Prix in Baku.

Russell led a closely contested session, finishing ahead of Red Bull’s Max Verstappen. Ferrari’s Charles Leclerc took third place.

The Azerbaijan Grand Prix programme continues today with Formula 2 qualifying at 14:00 local time, followed by Formula 1’s second free practice session at 16:00.

The 2026 Azerbaijan Grand Prix is being held at the Baku City Circuit from September 24 to 26.

Last week, Russian President Putin’s United Russia party secured its strongest-ever election result and a constitutional majority in parliament. Some experts assume and predict this outcome could be another motivation for the Kremlin to recalibrate its geopolitical strategy.

Amid that occurrence, the Transnistrian dispute is once again producing political signals that could have implications far beyond the narrow strip of territory along the Dniester.

Vadim Krasnoselsky, the head of the internationally unrecognized Transnistrian administration, has said that the region is ready to hold another referendum on self-determination, exactly 20 years after the territory held its previous vote. Krasnoselsky recalled that the 2006 referendum produced a claimed 97.1 percent vote in favour of independence and eventual ‘free reunification’ with Russia, and said Tiraspol would be prepared to repeat the exercise if its outcome were accepted by all international participants.

The proposal comes at a particularly sensitive moment. Moldova is deepening its integration with the European Union, while Russia continues to maintain military and political influence in Transnistria. Moscow has also recently facilitated a simplified route to Russian citizenship for residents of the region. Krasnoselsky says more than 60,000 people have registered for the process since the decree signed by Russian President Vladimir Putin in May, while claiming that more than 220,000 residents already hold Russian citizenship. Russian and Transnistrian sources have confirmed the scale of registrations, although the figures should be treated as claims from the authorities in question rather than independently verified demographic data.

Is Tiraspol preparing the ground for another attempt to alter the political status of the region, or is the referendum rhetoric primarily intended to increase pressure on Chisinau?

Speaking to AzerNEWS, German-based analyst Brendan Ziegler said the referendum proposal should be understood less as an immediate blueprint for annexation than as part of a broader strategy of maintaining controlled pressure on Moldova.

‘The value of Transnistria for Moscow is not necessarily in an immediate escalation or military confrontation. A much more effective method is to keep the region in a state of constant, controlled tension: not to create war, but to create the feeling that a crisis could flare up at any moment,’ Ziegler said.

In his assessment, this approach allows Moscow and Tiraspol to exert pressure on Chisinau without necessarily crossing the threshold into a new armed conflict.

‘Instead of one major clash, the strategy can consist of dozens of smaller conflicts, each of which forces Chisinau to redirect political attention, resources and state capacity toward Transnistria,’ he said.

The referendum issue, therefore, can serve a purpose even if no vote actually takes place.

According to Ziegler, political escalation is one of the most straightforward mechanisms available to Tiraspol. Raising the prospect of a new referendum, demanding a special status and repeatedly stressing the region’s supposed right to determine its own future can reinforce the image of Transnistria as a separate political entity.

‘The referendum discussion is important because it attempts to shift the political framework of the conflict. Tiraspol wants to be treated as an equal negotiating subject rather than as a region of Moldova. For Chisinau, accepting that premise would already represent a major political concession,’ he said.

That argument runs directly against the established international settlement framework. The OSCE continues to define a settlement in terms of Moldova’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders, combined with a special status for Transnistria. Moldova and the EU have reaffirmed the same principle in 2026.

The precedent of the 2006 referendum also matters. Although Tiraspol presented the result as a mandate for independence followed by accession to Russia, the OSCE rejected the vote, arguing that a unilateral referendum challenging Moldova’s territorial integrity could not constitute a legitimate settlement mechanism. The organization said a future status referendum could only be considered after a political settlement and under conditions allowing for a free and fair vote.

Ziegler believes the political pressure could nevertheless take forms beyond the referendum itself.

‘Social and economic problems can also become instruments of political escalation. Tariffs, taxation, customs regulations, energy supplies and social payments can all be presented as evidence of an alleged blockade by Chisinau,’ he said.

‘This is particularly effective because Moldova is attempting to apply common economic and legal rules across the country. Measures taken by Chisinau can therefore easily be reframed by Tiraspol as an attack on Transnistria rather than as part of a broader reintegration policy.’

Such tensions are already visible in the Security Zone. Moldovan authorities have reported disputes over Transnistrian checkpoints, inspections and restrictions on movement, as well as disagreements within the Joint Control Commission. In June, Chisinau said the presence of what it described as illegal Transnistrian security posts and restrictions on movement were contributing to the deterioration of the situation in the Security Zone.

For Ziegler, these seemingly limited disputes can be politically significant precisely because they do not require a military confrontation.

‘Provocations in the Security Zone are another mechanism for maintaining tension. Illegal posts, restrictions on movement, detentions and disputes over the powers of security structures create a permanent supply of incidents that can be turned into political crises,’ he said.

The same logic, he argued, applies to elections and questions of legitimacy.

‘Every electoral process in Transnistria can become another confrontation. Chisinau may reject the legitimacy of procedures organised by Tiraspol, while Tiraspol can accuse the Moldovan government of interference and of denying the region its supposed right to choose its own future,’ Ziegler said.

‘This creates a cycle in which every political process increases the distance between the two banks of the Dniester.’

The citizenship issue adds another layer.

Putin’s May decree simplified the procedure for certain Transnistrian residents to apply for Russian citizenship, removing several requirements under Russia’s citizenship legislation. By August, Krasnoselsky said more than 60,000 people had registered for the process, while the first Russian passports under the simplified mechanism were subsequently handed out in Tiraspol.

Ziegler said this should be viewed not simply as a bureaucratic development but as a mechanism that strengthens the region’s institutional and human links with Russia.

‘Russian citizenship has both a practical and a political function in Transnistria. It creates a direct legal connection between residents and Russia, while simultaneously reinforcing the narrative that Russia has a special responsibility toward the population of the region,’ he said.

However, he cautioned against interpreting the 60,000 applications as proof that 60,000 people have already become Russian citizens.

‘The figure being discussed is the number of people who have registered or applied under the simplified procedure, not the number of passports already issued. That distinction is important. The scale of interest is nevertheless politically significant,’ Ziegler said.

The latest developments do not necessarily mean that Moscow has decided to trigger a new crisis in Transnistria, either.

‘There is no need to assume that Krasnoselsky received a direct instruction from the Kremlin simply because he raised the referendum issue,’ Ziegler said. ‘The more important point is that the referendum narrative is compatible with Russia’s broader interests in maintaining leverage over Moldova.’

He argued that Moscow’s most useful strategy may be precisely to preserve uncertainty.

‘Russia does not necessarily need to recognise Transnistria or attempt to annex it tomorrow. The region can be more valuable as a permanent strategic pressure point. As long as the conflict remains unresolved, Chisinau has to devote political and institutional resources to it, while Russia retains an additional instrument for influencing Moldova’s strategic choices.’

This is particularly relevant as Moldova advances its European integration while maintaining a stated commitment to a peaceful settlement. The EU has reaffirmed support for Moldova’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and has called on Russia to withdraw its forces and ammunition from the Transnistrian region.

Ziegler therefore sees the current referendum discussion less as evidence that a new war is imminent and more as a warning that the Transnistrian issue could become increasingly politicised as Moldova moves further toward Europe.

‘The greatest danger is not necessarily an immediate military escalation. It is the gradual transformation of every political, economic and security disagreement into another argument over sovereignty and legitimacy,’ he said.

‘Referendum rhetoric, citizenship, elections, economic disputes, incidents in the Security Zone and claims about an alleged Moldovan military threat can all reinforce the same narrative. Each individual issue may appear manageable, but together they can produce a sustained atmosphere of crisis.’

For Moldova, the challenge will therefore be to prevent the conflict from being repeatedly reset around the question of Transnistria’s supposed statehood, while maintaining channels for dialogue and addressing practical problems affecting residents on both banks of the Dniester.

For Russia and Tiraspol, meanwhile, the strategic value may lie precisely in keeping the question unresolved.

‘The objective does not necessarily have to be a dramatic event,’ Ziegler said. ‘Sometimes the most effective form of pressure is simply to ensure that the crisis never completely disappears.’