Category: Azer News

SOCAR President Rovshan Najaf has met with Hussein Lutah, Board Member and Chief Executive Officer of ENOC Group, according to a statement released by SOCAR, Azernews reports.

During the meeting, the parties reviewed current and prospective areas of cooperation between the two companies. Special emphasis was placed on the Memorandum of Understanding signed in November this year between SOCAR and Dragon Oil, highlighting its importance in expanding bilateral ties.

The discussions also included an exchange of views on cooperation across various segments of the energy sector, including exploration, production, digitalization, trading, marketing, as well as other areas of mutual interest.

Humanitarian aid rarely exists in a political vacuum. When assistance is extended selectively, prolonged indefinitely, and accompanied by the quiet collection of personal data, it ceases to be a purely charitable act. Which brings us to our main topic: Moscow’s decision to extend its ‘humanitarian’ program for Armenians who voluntarily left Garabagh is not simply about food parcels or solidarity. It is about preserving leverage, influence, and relevance in a region where Russia’s role has visibly eroded.

The project aimed at supporting Armenians who left Garabagh, implemented in Armenia by Rossotrudnichestvo in cooperation with the non-profit organisation Eurasia and the Russian Humanitarian Mission, has now been extended until at least 2026. Officially, the extension is explained by the ‘continued flow of applications.’ In practice, however, it reflects Russia’s determination to keep the Garabagh issue alive as a political and informational instrument, long after the conflict itself has been resolved.

Deputy Head of Rossotrudnichestvo Igor Chayka openly stated that the project was planned as a long-term initiative and that its purpose is to demonstrate ‘Russia’s solidarity with the Garabagh Armenians.’ This wording is revealing. Solidarity here is not framed in universal humanitarian terms, but through a specific political and identity-based lens, one that deliberately preserves a narrative of grievance and dependency.

More troubling are reports that Rossotrudnichestvo has been collecting personal data from Armenians who left Garabagh. According to sources close to the Armenian government, beneficiaries are asked to submit copies of passports, birth certificates, and other sensitive documents, ostensibly as part of the aid process. While data collection can be standard in humanitarian work, the scale, depth, and lack of transparency surrounding this effort raise legitimate concerns, especially given Russia’s long record of instrumentalising diaspora communities for political leverage.

This brings the discussion to the central question: what is Moscow really seeking to achieve?

One explanation is reputational repair. Russia’s standing in Armenian society has deteriorated sharply in recent years, particularly after failing to meet Yerevan’s expectations during critical moments. Food packages and aid programs may serve as a low-cost attempt to restore a sense of relevance and benevolence among a disillusioned population. Another explanation is electoral. With parliamentary elections scheduled in Armenia in June, humanitarian activity that targets a politically sensitive group could indirectly bolster pro-Kremlin forces that openly advocate a return to the old Yerevan-Moscow alignment.

The intense interest in the personal data of Armenians who left Garabagh is hardly accidental in this context. For decades, this community has functioned as a political asset for Moscow, a group that can be mobilised rhetorically, socially, and, when needed, politically. Today, some of the most vocal figures associated with this group openly declare that their ultimate objective is the removal of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. Against this backdrop, Russia’s sustained engagement looks less like charity and more like strategic positioning.

What is perhaps most striking is the restrained reaction from the Armenian authorities. This is the same government whose own attempt to send humanitarian aid to the Garabagh Armenians in the past was blocked by Azerbaijan because no such assistance had been requested. Today, despite technical expressions of concern, Yerevan has largely avoided confrontation on this issue. The reason appears pragmatic. Pashinyan has recently made it clear that removing the Garabagh issue from Armenia’s political agenda is essential for advancing the peace process. Openly challenging Moscow’s actions could complicate that goal.

For Russia, however, keeping the Garabagh topic alive is strategically convenient. It weakens Pashinyan’s position domestically, fuels dissatisfaction among segments of Armenian society, and helps mobilise the Armenian diaspora in Russia against the current political course in Yerevan. In the event of a power shift, this very issue could once again be activated as leverage.

Distributing food is, in itself, a commendable act. But in geopolitics, context matters more than packaging. When humanitarian assistance is prolonged indefinitely, accompanied by sensitive data collection, and aligned with political timelines, it ceases to be just about helping people. In this case, the real story is not about aid deliveries, but about how humanitarian language is being used to preserve influence, shape narratives, and prepare for political contingencies.

In the case of Russia, though, it is quite handy to have this issue of Garabagh lingering in the background. It shakes the position of Pashinyan, fuels dissatisfaction with some layers of Armenian society, and helps to energise the Armenian diaspora in Russia against the current political trajectory in Yerevan. In the case of a change of power, this issue might again come to the foreground as leverage.

In such a scenario, the story is actually about using the vocabulary of humanitarian assistance. The question, then, is not whether there is a distribution of food, but why it is being distributed in such a way, for such a long period, by whom.

Members of the Independent Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association (MUSIAD Azerbaijan) have invested ?93 million in Azerbaijan’s economy so far this year, Azernews reports, citing Rashad Jabirli, Chairman of the Board of Directors of MUSIAD Azerbaijan.

Jabirli noted that total investments made by the association’s members over the past four years have reached ?167 million, highlighting MUSIAD’s growing contribution to the country’s economic development.

According to him, MUSIAD Azerbaijan members generate annual exports worth around ?10 million. Strengthening investment activity and expanding trade, particularly among association members, remain key strategic priorities. In this context, intra-member trade totaled ?4.6 million this year, bringing the cumulative figure for the past four years to nearly ?11 million.

Jabirli also emphasized the association’s role in job creation, stating that 100 MUSIAD Azerbaijan members currently provide employment for approximately 8,500 people.

Established in 2017, MUSIAD Azerbaijan operates eight permanent commissions and a subsidiary organization, Young MUSIAD. The association is part of the global MUSIAD network, which includes around 4,000 members across 40 countries. Jabirli added that MUSIAD is currently active in Azerbaijan’s Garabagh region as well.

Senior Iranian diplomat Ali Akbar Velayati’s repeated warnings against the opening of the Zangazur Corridor and its association with what he describes as a Trump plan for the Caucasus reveal more about Iran’s strategic anxieties than about the actual mechanics or intent of the corridor itself. His remarks to the Armenian ambassador, framed as a defence of regional security, sit uneasily alongside Armenia’s own readiness to cooperate with Washington and Azerbaijan on opening the route under the (Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity) or literally Transport and Regional Infrastructure Peace Platform proposal. This disconnect exposes a widening gap between Iran’s threat perception and the evolving interests of its northern neighbours.

For Armenia, the opening of the Zangazur Corridor represents an obvious opportunity to escape structural isolation rather than a concession of sovereignty. After decades of closed borders with Trkiye and Azerbaijan, and limited connectivity beyond Georgia and Iran, Yerevan increasingly understands that economic resilience depends on integration rather than obstruction. In addition, although Yerevan and Tehran are neighbouring states bound by historical ties and overlapping geopolitical interests, Armenia’s growing orientation towards the West exerts a far stronger pull, almost magnetically. For a country seeking, even if only partially, to exit Russia’s strategic orbit, drifting beyond the contours of Western engagement would place Armenia in a precarious position. It is for this reason that Yerevan, even if this sits uncomfortably with Tehran, does not reject the oversight of the historic route by a US company, and indeed views this arrangement as a form of security umbrella. Armenia is also fully aware that Western control over a strategic transport corridor in the region is more pragmatic and aligns more closely with the shared interests of Azerbaijan and Trkiye. Besides, Armenia is not endorsing foreign military presence, but rather international management standards that can guarantee predictability, insurance coverage, and investor confidence.

Armenia’s interest is also driven by changing global logistics. Since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, routes crossing Russian territory have become commercially and politically risky for Western actors. Sanctions regimes and security concerns have reduced the viability of northern Eurasian corridors. At the same time, routes through Iran are equally problematic for Western trade due to the scale of sanctions imposed on Tehran and the compliance risks faced by international firms. This leaves the South Caucasus, and specifically the east-west axis linking Central Asia to Europe via the Caspian, Azerbaijan, and Trkiye, as the most realistic alternative. The Zangazur Corridor is a missing link in this chain, connecting mainland Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan and further to Trkiye, while simultaneously embedding Armenia into a continental transit network.

Iran’s objections, frequently articulated by Velayati, rest on two overlapping fears. The first is geopolitical. Tehran perceives any Western-backed infrastructure near its borders as a potential platform for strategic encroachment. The language of a US foothold reflects a security mindset shaped by decades of containment and rivalry. Yet this concern appears overstated in the context of the corridor’s agreed function. The Zangazur route is designed for transport connectivity, not military deployment. Its mandate is limited to ensuring the secure movement of goods and passengers between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan, and by extension between Asia and Europe. There is no evidence that Armenia or Azerbaijan intends to allow the corridor to be repurposed for security objectives hostile to Iran.

The second Iranian concern is economic and structural. For years, Azerbaijan has relied on Iranian territory as an alternative route to access Nakhchivan, mitigating the effects of the enclave’s blockade. This arrangement gave Iran leverage and transit revenue, as well as a degree of political relevance in Baku-Ankara connectivity. The opening of the Zangazur Corridor would significantly reduce this dependence. In that sense, Tehran’s opposition is less about regional stability and more about losing a transactional advantage. From this perspective, Velayati’s rhetoric appears defensive rather than principled, particularly when framed against Armenia’s explicit consent to the project.

Russia’s position adds another layer of complexity. Moscow views the corridor not as a threat but as an asset it does not wish to lose influence over. Its interest in acting as a stakeholder or guarantor reflects a broader strategy of maintaining leverage in the South Caucasus even as its capacity to project power is constrained elsewhere. Russia’s earlier role as the principal security arbiter after the 2020 war has been eroded by Armenia’s growing engagement with the United States and the European Union. Nevertheless, Moscow still retains tools of influence, ranging from economic ties to security arrangements and political networks within Armenia.

Armenia’s attempt to limit Russian involvement in the corridor must be understood in this context of asymmetry. Yerevan is seeking diversification rather than outright rupture. While it aims to reduce Moscow’s monopoly over its security and infrastructure, it lacks the capacity to exclude Russia entirely in the short term. The question is not whether Armenia can resist Russian influence absolutely, but whether it can dilute it sufficiently by anchoring key projects in multilateral frameworks.

The prospects of the corridor, therefore, extend beyond bilateral reconciliation. Its successful operation would reposition the South Caucasus as a functional transit hub linking East and West at a time of global fragmentation. Unlike contested or militarised corridors elsewhere, Zangazur is emerging as a peaceful route grounded in mutual economic benefit. For Armenia, it offers access, relevance, and growth. For Azerbaijan, it restores territorial continuity and strategic depth. For Western actors, it provides a sanctions-compliant pathway that bypasses Russia and Iran. For Russia, it remains a project worth influencing rather than sabotaging.

Iran stands apart in this equation, clinging to a narrative of exclusion and threat that is increasingly disconnected from regional realities. By framing the corridor as an American plot, Tehran risks marginalising itself from a transformation that is already underway. The South Caucasus is moving from a theatre of frozen conflicts to a zone of logistical competition, and connectivity rather than obstruction will define influence in the years ahead. Velayati’s anti-Zangazur thesis, repeated with growing urgency, may ultimately underline Iran’s strategic isolation more than any genuine danger posed by a railway or highway crossing southern Armenia.

As the corridor moves from concept to implementation, the region faces a clear choice. It can either remain hostage to zero-sum thinking or it can leverage geography for shared prosperity. The trajectory of Armenia suggests that even historically cautious actors are beginning to choose the latter.

The UNAOC Group of Friends High-Level Meeting has taken as part of the 11th Global Forum of the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC) in Riyadh, Azernews reports.

During his speech, Azerbaijani Culture Minister Adil Karimli highlighted Azerbaijan’s long-standing tradition of tolerance and stressed the importance of promoting intercultural dialogue, safeguarding multicultural values, and leveraging cultural diplomacy to strengthen international cooperation.

Praising Saudi Arabia for its outstanding organization of the event, Karimli described UNAOC as a key global platform for fostering dialogue and mutual understanding among nations.

The minister also underscored Azerbaijan’s initiatives in advancing interfaith dialogue in partnership with UNAOC.

The 11th Global Forum of the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC) hosted by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the city of Riyadh on December 14-15 under the theme “UNAOC: Two Decades of Dialogue for Humanity – Advancing a New Era of Mutual Respect and Understanding in a Multipolar World”.

The Forum brought together political leaders, international and regional organizations, religious leaders and faith actors, as well as representatives of the private sector, civil society, academia, youth, arts, sports and media, who came together to reaffirm their collective commitment to the lasting importance of dialogue, mutual respect, and understanding.

Moscow is ready to hold consultations with Yerevan on the parameters of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) and to discuss Russia’s possible participation in the project, Mikhail Kalugin, Director of the 4th Department of CIS Countries at the Russian Foreign Ministry, told RIA Novosti, Azernews reports.

According to Kalugin, the details of the Armenian-American project still require thorough examination. ‘We are ready to consult with our Armenian partners to discuss both the parameters of the initiative and possible Russian participation,’ he said.

He noted that the initiative largely concerns a section of the route previously agreed upon within the framework of the trilateral Armenian-Russian-Azerbaijani working group at the level of deputy prime ministers. Kalugin emphasized that Russian railway infrastructure is used in the region and that the planned route would mostly pass through the area of responsibility of Russian border guards.

The Russian Foreign Ministry official also pointed out that Armenia’s membership in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) should be taken into account. ‘It is clear that our partners cannot do without Russia,’ he added.

It should be recalled that on August 8, 2025, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev, with the mediation of US President Donald Trump, initialed an agreement and signed a joint declaration stressing the importance of continuing efforts toward the signing and final ratification of the document.

One of the key elements of the agreement ??????????????? the construction of a route linking mainland Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic through a section of Armenian territory. While the route will remain part of Armenia and operate under Armenian law, the United States will have exclusive rights to develop the area for 99 years. In recognition of President Donald Trump’s role in brokering the agreement, the project has been named the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP).

The 8th Congress of the Azerbaijan Trade Unions Confederation (ATUC) is being held in Baku, Azernews reports.

The congress will feature delivery of speeches by foreign guests and representatives of the social partners of the ATUC, and reports.

The event also schedules speeches by representatives of the ATUC member organizations, discussion of issues on the agenda, and adoption of decisions.

The event is expected to feature speeches focusing on trade union rights, as well as the protection of members’ labor, social, and economic rights and legal interests. Discussions will also address the development of trade unions in Azerbaijan, efforts to safeguard workers’ labor rights, the creation of safe and decent working conditions in line with established standards, the organization of workers’ leisure time, and the protection of their health.

President Ilham Aliyev has addressed the participants of the 8th Congress of Azerbaijan Trade Unions Confederation, Azernews reports.

President Ilham Aliyev’s address was read by Shahmar Movsumov, Assistant to the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan – Head of the Department of Economic Issues and Innovative Development Policy of the Presidential Administration of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

“Dear Congress participants!

I greet you on the occasion of the 8th Congress of the Azerbaijan Trade Unions Confederation.

The trade unions of Azerbaijan occupy an important place in the public and social life of the republic through their multifaceted activities, their role in the development of labour relations, and their contribution to strengthening civil society.

Significant steps are being taken in our country to protect workers’ labour and socio-economic rights, create decent working conditions, and improve social partnership mechanisms. In this context, particular importance is attached to flexibly adapting to the challenges of the modern era, establishing close ties with trade union members, digitizing services, expanding the application of artificial intelligence in relevant areas, and enhancing service quality and satisfaction levels. Activities aligned with international labour standards, cooperation with the global trade union movement, and the mutual exchange of experience further contribute to strengthening the prestige of trade unions. Trade unions carry out important work in the development of a strong and healthy civil society and in reinforcing solidarity.

The dynamic socio-economic development of our republic, the just transition to a ‘green economy,’ and the impact of artificial intelligence on the labour market place responsible and strategic tasks before trade unions, encouraging them to take a more active role. As key partners in social dialogue between workers and employers and as guardians of labour values, trade unions must actively participate in strengthening professional associations, educating workers, and enhancing their knowledge and skills in the field of labour rights. All these efforts serve to ensure the proper regulation of labour relations, social justice, and mutual responsibility.

The Azerbaijani state fully guarantees the right of trade unions to independent and free activity within the legislative framework and has created broad opportunities for their unhindered operation.

Particular attention should be paid to deepening effective cooperation between sectoral trade unions and social partners, fostering an environment of mutual trust, and enhancing collective responsibility.

Dear Congress participants!

I am confident that the trade unions of Azerbaijan will continue to resolutely defend the rights and interests of their members, contribute to the regulation of labour relations on modern and civilized foundations, and support the overall socio-economic development of our country.

I believe that this Congress will play an important role in determining the future directions of the trade union movement in line with new challenges and in shaping an improved strategy of activity.

I wish the 8th Congress of the Azerbaijan Trade Unions Confederation every success,” the address reads.

For the first time in its 88-year history, Volkswagen is forced to close one of its factories in Germany. The last car will roll off the assembly line at the Dresden plant on Tuesday, just over 20 years after the facility first opened, Azernews reports.

The plant is set to be leased to the Technical University of Dresden and will be repurposed for artificial intelligence research. In addition, it will become a unique tourist attraction, allowing visitors to explore the history and future of automotive technology.

This closure underscores the challenges facing the German automotive industry, including weak demand in China and ongoing tariff disputes with the United States. Volkswagen is now navigating a complex path to allocate its investment budget of around pound 160 billion over the next five years, while also adapting to a market where gasoline-powered vehicles are expected to have longer service lives. The company’s annual investment budget has been gradually reduced in recent years.

Volkswagen’s CFO, Arnaud Antlitz, suggested in October that the company’s net profit for 2025-previously projected to be near zero-could turn slightly positive. Yet analysts warn that external pressures are likely to persist. Bernstein Center expert Steven Reitman noted that Volkswagen is actively exploring ways to cut costs and boost operating profits. He added that the expected extended lifespan of fossil-fuel engines requires fresh investments: ‘We need to develop new generations of gasoline technologies,’ Reitman explained.

The Dresden plant’s transformation highlights a broader trend: even historic automotive giants are embracing innovation and research to stay competitive in an era of shifting technology and global market pressures.

The Azerbaijan Literature Foundation continues its “Western Azerbaijan in Literature” project with the preparation of a new novel titled “There are no moles left in Iravan” or in its Azerbaijani “Ir?vanda Xal Qalmadi”.

According to Varis Yolchuyev, the Foundation’s director and a noted writer, the novel is dedicated to the early 19th-century occupation of Azerbaijani lands by the Russian Empire. Drawing on important historical archival sources, the work vividly portrays the material and moral hardships inflicted by this occupation. In particular, it depicts, in a highly artistic manner, the process through which the Russian Empire established an Armenian state at the expense of Azerbaijan’s historical territories.

The narrative frames this national tragedy through the poignant story of Ulukhan and Seljan, two young lovers whose lives are marked by the hardships of the era.

The novel is intended for a broad readership and aims to bring this critical period of Azerbaijani history to life. The project is supported by the State Support Agency for Non-Governmental Organisations.