Category: Azer News

On January 27, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev participated in the inauguration of the cardboard and box packaging production facility of ‘Baku Cardboard and Box Factory’ LLC in the Sumgayit Industrial Park, Azernews reports.

Kamran Salmanli, head of ‘Baku Cardboard and Box Factory’ LLC, briefed the head of state on the enterprise’s operations.

It was reported that ‘Baku Cardboard and Box Factory’ LLC, which was granted resident status in the Sumgayit Industrial Park in 2023, established the cardboard and box packaging production facility on nearly three hectares of the Park’s territory. Utilizing Turkish and Chinese technologies, the facility will produce 55 million square meters of cardboard and box packaging annually. The project is planned in two phases: the first phase involves the production of cardboard and boxes, while the second phase will focus on recycling local raw materials required for cardboard production. In addition to meeting domestic market demand, the products are intended for export. The investment value of the facility amounts to 20 million manats. The Azerbaijan Business Development Fund under the Ministry of Economy allocated a preferential loan of 2 million manats for the establishment of the enterprise. The facility has created 64 permanent jobs. Benefiting from all incentives provided to industrial park residents, the enterprise has enjoyed tax and customs exemptions totaling approximately 1.3 million manats.

Broad incentive and stimulation mechanisms are applied for residents of industrial zones to promote the development of entrepreneurship. Residents are provided with ready-made infrastructure created at the state’s expense, including gas, electricity, water, wastewater disposal systems, internal roads and railways, as well as fiber-optic internet lines. At the same time, residents are exempt for 10 years from property, land, and profit taxes, as well as from value-added tax and customs duties on imported machinery, technological equipment, and devices intended for production purposes.

When Donald Trump returned to the White House for a second presidential term in 2025, many international analysts predicted that his foreign policy would avoid costly new wars. Having left office in 2021 amid controversy over his first-term Middle East record, including heightened tension with Iran, Trump’s re-election prompted expectations that he would lean less on kinetic force and more on ‘economic tools’ to confront adversaries such as Tehran and Beijing. For China, this has largely held true: tariffs, export controls and technology bans have become Washington’s preferred levers of competition. But with Iran, the record so far tells a more complex and contradictory story. It is the one that blends intense economic pressure with the very real possibility of military escalation, especially in the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz.

Within weeks of his inauguration, Trump revived a more aggressive version of his 2018-2020 ‘maximum pressure’ policy against Iran. A National Security Presidential Memorandum signed in February 2025 directed U.S. agencies to intensify sanctions with clear strategic goals: reduce Iranian oil exports to zero, dismantle Tehran’s nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities, and constrain its regional influence. This campaign combined traditional sanctions with stricter enforcement and targeted financial measures aimed at isolating Iran economically, while also warning foreign firms and insurers away from doing business with Tehran.

In theory, this approach signalled Trump’s preference to starve Iran of economic lifelines, forcing it to negotiate or capitulate without resorting to direct combat. The economic strategy certainly deepened Tehran’s domestic struggles and eroded confidence in its political and financial institutions. But the policy’s implementation quickly intersected with larger regional dynamics in ways that fuelled military escalation rather than suppressing it.

By mid-2025, the tensions that had been simmering between Israel and Iran over alleged nuclear activity and proxy conflicts escalated into direct conflict. U.S. forces conducted strikes on key Iranian nuclear facilities, a dramatic departure from pure economic pressure. Tehran responded with increased military rhetoric and threats against U.S. interests and allies in the region.

One flashpoint in this escalation has been the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow waterway linking the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman. Roughly 20% of the world’s crude oil and liquefied natural gas pass through this chokepoint. Iran has periodically threatened to close or mine the strait in retaliation for U.S. or Israeli strikes – a move that would have immediate and severe global economic implications.

Washington, for its part, has responded with warnings that any attempt to close Hormuz would be ‘economic suicide’ for Tehran’s economy, given its own dependence on oil exports. Yet despite these warnings, Iran’s parliament even voted on non-binding plans to close the strait – a political signal of rising hostility.

In late January 2026, President Trump openly described a U.S. naval ‘armada’ positioned near Iran as both a deterrent and a means to reinforce U.S. capacity for defence though he stated he hoped military conflict could still be avoided. Iran, however, responded that any U.S. attack would be treated as a declaration of all-out war. The deployment of the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln and accompanying destroyers signals that the administration is willing to back economic pressure with credible military deterrence, a combination that blurs the line between diplomacy and confrontation.

Trump’s Iran policy in his second term is therefore not easily reduced to a single strategy of ‘economic pressure instead of war.’ The reality is more nuanced: his administration has sought to integrate economic sanctions with force projection, punitive strikes, and high-stakes deterrence in an attempt to check Iran’s nuclear ambitions and regional influence. This hybrid approach reflects Washington’s belief that economic tools alone may not compel Tehran to capitulate, especially given Iran’s historical record of resisting external pressure.

It also reveals the inherent tension in U.S. strategy: heavy economic sanctions squeeze Iran’s economy, but they can also incentivise Tehran to respond with asymmetric military measures, including threats to the maritime routes that underpin global energy markets. The Strait of Hormuz remains the ultimate geopolitical lever in this confrontation, capable of turning economic sanctions into a broader strategic crisis with worldwide repercussions.

The Azerbaijan Judo Federation (AJF) continues to advance the professional development of judo coaches across the country, aiming to align their knowledge and skills with contemporary standards, Azernews reports.

As part of this ongoing initiative, the “Coach Certification Program” has entered a new phase, with 30 coaches who have completed the “Level III training” now undergoing practical skills assessments.

The evaluation process focuses not only on theoretical knowledge but also on how coaches apply their methodologies, technical and tactical expertise, and management skills in real training scenarios.

The assessment is overseen by Richard Trautman, the performance director of Azerbaijan’s national judo teams.

The process follows a global best-practice methodology, ensuring that the evaluation of coaches’ proficiency is both thorough and objective.

The primary goal of the certification program is to strengthen the coaching infrastructure within Azerbaijan, create greater incentives for professional development, and, ultimately, ensure the long-term success of Azerbaijani judo on the international stage.

Furthermore, this initiative will open up additional opportunities for specialists in various regions of the country, contributing to the development of a unified coaching methodology and offering a significant boost to the growth of judo in Azerbaijan.

Founded in 1972, the Azerbaijan Judo Federation actively promotes this martial art worldwide. Since 2015, the Federation has been led by Rovnag Abdullayev.

The country’s modern judo history was laid by Mehman Azizov, who won a silver medal at the Old World Championship in 1998.

A year later, the winner of the World Youth Games in Moscow, Rasul Salimov, grabbed the bronze medal at the European Championship in Slovakia. Another national judoka, Elchin Ismayilov, became the European champion in 2000 in Wroclaw.

However, the achievements of Azerbaijani judo fighters did not stop there. Elnur Mammadli was named the best at the 2008 Beijing Olympics in the 73 kg division.

The list of the country’s top judo fighters includes Rustam Orujov, Irina Kindzerskaya, Mammadali Mehdiyev, Elmar Gasimov, Hidayat Heydarov, Zelim Kotsoev, Ushangi Kokauri, and Nijat Shikhalizada.

Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova on Monday criticized the European Union’s decision to ban all imports of Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) to the bloc, claiming that the Europeans have “given up their freedom”, Azernews reports.

“It’s hard to say for sure yet: whether they are happy vassals or unhappy slaves – time will tell. But either way, they gave up their freedom,” the diplomat told Zvezda TV.

Earlier today, the European Council announced the official approval of the ban on Russian LNG imports. The full ban will take effect from the beginning of 2027, while Russian pipeline gas will be fully banned from autumn 2027.

Under the agreement, the ban on LNG imports will take effect in early 2027, while the ban on pipeline gas imports will begin in the fall of 2027.

In addition, the European Commission plans to propose legislation for a gradual phase-out of Russian oil imports by the end of 2027, signaling a broader strategy to reduce the EU’s reliance on Russian energy.

Analysts note that this decision marks a significant step in the EU’s energy transition, pushing member states to accelerate investments in alternative energy sources and diversify suppliers. It also reflects the ongoing geopolitical tensions, demonstrating how energy policy and international relations are increasingly intertwined in Europe’s strategic planning.

Few bilateral relationships in today’s geopolitically fractured landscape are as quietly effective as that between Azerbaijan and Israel. Built on mutual trust, strategic alignment and pragmatic cooperation, the partnership has evolved well beyond diplomacy into a model of how political confidence can translate into economic dynamism. The recent meeting between Azerbaijan’s Minister of Economy, Mikayil Jabbarov, and Israel’s Foreign Minister, Gideon Sa’ar, followed by the Azerbaijan-Israel Business Forum, offered a timely illustration of how this relationship is entering a more mature, investment-driven phase.

The discussions in Baku, reinforced by the presidents’ meeting on the margins of the World Economic Forum in Davos, underline a simple reality: Azerbaijan and Israel no longer view each other merely as partners of convenience, but as long-term economic allies. The Business Forum, which gathered companies and institutions across sectors ranging from agriculture and pharmaceuticals to cybersecurity, logistics and water management, was not a ceremonial exercise. It was a practical step towards deepening a partnership that is already delivering tangible results.

Looking from this perspective, Israel’s contribution to Azerbaijan’s economic modernisation is often understated. For example, Azerbaijan’s oil exports to Israel to date and SOCAR’s recent participation in the TAMAR project in the Eastern Mediterranean can be noted as one of Azerbaijan’s important successes. Here, Azeraijan’s growing export volumes of oil in 2024 are significant. Looking through the figures for January-September 2024, it shows that Azerbaijan exported 2.37 million tons of crude oil to Israel. The value of these exports was over $1.46 billion, and this represented about 13.5 % of Azerbaijan’s total crude exports in the period. Besides, Azerbaijan’s investment in Israel’s Tamar gas field, which means also about 10 % stake in Tamar, opens new horizons for long-term revenue potential as well as giving access to the Eastern Mediterranean. Reports estimate significant returns from the Tamar stake, with around $715 million in revenue in 2024 and projections exceeding $1.2 billion for 2025-2026. So, this move shifts Azerbaijan’s energy engagement with Israel from pure commodity supply to asset ownership and joint development, laying the foundations for deeper long-term relations. In short, the Tamar stake represents a qualitative shift from selling resources to owning production shares, which can yield long-term dividends and geopolitical leverage. In simple terms, Azerbaijan expanded its oil export footprint to Israel, with Israel consistently among the key destinations for crude supply through 2024.

While energy cooperation has historically dominated headlines, Israel’s real impact lies in knowledge transfer, technology and innovation-driven sectors. Israeli expertise in high-value agriculture, advanced irrigation systems, water management and agrotechnology aligns closely with Azerbaijan’s ambition to boost productivity, sustainability and export potential in its non-oil economy.

In pharmaceuticals and healthcare, Israel’s globally competitive ecosystem, which is built on research, innovation and efficient regulation, offers Azerbaijan a blueprint for scaling domestic production, improving supply chains and reducing external dependency. As Azerbaijan works to strengthen its pharmaceutical manufacturing base and health security, Israeli know-how provides both credibility and acceleration.

Equally important is Israel’s experience in cybersecurity, fintech and high technologies. As Azerbaijan positions itself as a regional logistics, digital and financial hub connecting Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East, cooperation with Israel adds sophistication and resilience to this ambition. Israeli firms bring not only technology, but also global networks, compliance standards and an innovation mindset that strengthens Azerbaijan’s overall investment profile.

Therefore, this cooperation is far from one-sided. For Israel, Azerbaijan represents a stable, trustworthy, strategically located and business-friendly partner in a complex region. For this reason, a brief excursion into history is sufficient to show the true reasons for the emergence of strong trust and confidence in cooperation between the two states. It can be particularly noted that Israel has a special role in expanding Azerbaijan’s capabilities in the military field. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the outbreak of the First Karabakh War, Azerbaijan faced a de facto international arms embargo. While there was no single, universal UN ban, several factors combined to restrict Baku’s access to weapons severely. For instance, OSCE-led diplomacy aimed at freezing the conflict, Russia’s dominant role as Armenia’s main arms supplier, Western reluctance to arm a newly independent state in an active conflict zone, export-control regimes and third-party component restrictions, and many such nuances were real but painful obstructions. This meant that even when countries were politically willing, arms sales often failed due to technical or legal issues. Israel’s ability to supply arms – initially modestly, later extensively – rested on three decisive advantages: export autonomy, strategic convergence and quiet, non-politicised cooperation. Generally, these experiences shaped Azerbaijan’s long-term defence and foreign-policy thinking, pushing it toward diversification over dependence, a preference for partners with full export control over their systems, scepticism toward suppliers constrained by third-party approvals, and a gradual emphasis on domestic defence production in later years. In many ways, the constraints of the 1990s explain how Azerbaijan’s later deep defence ties were formed with Israel.

Today, Azerbaijan’s diversified economy, improving legal framework and generous investment incentives – highlighted by Minister Jabbarov at the Forum – make it an attractive destination for Israeli capital seeking new markets and production bases.

Azerbaijan also offers Israel access to broader regional markets, particularly through its transport corridors, logistics infrastructure and growing role in Eurasian connectivity. Israeli companies operating in Azerbaijan are not merely investing in a single market; they are positioning themselves within a wider economic geography.

The signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between the National Confederation of Entrepreneurs (Employers) Organisations of Azerbaijan and the Manufacturers Association of Israel further institutionalises this synergy. It signals an understanding that sustained cooperation requires structured dialogue between business communities, not just government-to-government engagement.

Moreover, what sets the Azerbaijan-Israel Business Forum apart is its focus on implementation. The B2B and B2G meetings reflected a shift from conceptual cooperation to deal-making, project financing and regulatory alignment. As Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar rightly noted, enhancing direct contacts between business circles is essential for turning political goodwill into economic output.

The emphasis on expanding the legal framework, increasing trade turnover and accelerating joint investment projects suggests that both sides recognise the need for predictability and scale. Trust may open doors, but legal certainty and commercial logic keep them open.

The Business Forum was therefore more than an event. It was a statement of intent that Azerbaijan and Israel are ready to elevate their cooperation from successful collaboration to shared prosperity.

Armenia is considering the possibility of importing gas through Azerbaijan as it faces growing difficulties with its traditional supply routes, Azernews reports via Sputnik-Armenia.

According to the report, Yerevan has acknowledged serious logistical challenges linked to supply corridors passing through Iran and Georgia. Internal instability in Iran has disrupted transport and customs operations, while adverse weather conditions have repeatedly forced the closure of the Military-Georgian Highway, a critical route linking Armenia to external markets.

Against this backdrop, Armenian authorities are exploring alternative transit options, including a railway line that passes through the territory of Azerbaijan. After previously launching grain and oil product shipments via this route, Armenia is now also examining the feasibility of importing liquefied natural gas (LNG) through Azerbaijan.

The Armenian Ministry of Economy confirmed that the route through Azerbaijan is being considered as an alternative to existing supply channels via the Upper Lars border crossing on the Georgian-Russian border and Iran.

Armenian experts cited by Sputnik-Armenia argue that economic relations in the South Caucasus should be grounded in cooperation rather than isolation. They note that Armenia’s key priority is the restoration and development of its industrial base, along with deeper integration into the region’s broader economic and production framework. Without this, they warn, Armenia’s economy could become increasingly vulnerable to external shocks and global crises.

Within the framework of the peace agenda, Armenia has already begun using Azerbaijan as a transit route. Since November last year, wheat from Russia and Kazakhstan has been transported to Armenia via Azerbaijani territory, and in December, exports of oil products from Azerbaijan to Armenia were launched.

Background on Azerbaijan-Armenia rapprochement:

Relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia have shifted dramatically from decades of conflict to active cooperation and peacebuilding. After nearly four decades of hostilities, including wars over the Karabakh region, both countries agreed on the text of a peace treaty draft in March 2025, a key step toward ending the conflict, though some legal and constitutional issues remain before final signing.

In August 2025, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan initialled a peace agreement and joint declaration in Washington under US auspices, a milestone widely welcomed by international partners. This was reinforced by the ‘Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity’, a planned transit corridor linking Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave via Armenia, aimed at bolstering connectivity and economic ties.

Concrete signs of improving ties include lifting restrictions on cargo transit to Armenia, allowing shipments like Kazakh grain to travel through Azerbaijan to Armenia for the first time since the Soviet era.

These developments have helped create new economic opportunities between Baku and Yerevan, with fuel exports and renewed trade flows reflecting a broader shift from conflict toward cooperation in the South Caucasus.

Shares of Puma SE surged more than 16% on Tuesday after China’s sportswear giant Anta Sports Products Limited announced plans to acquire a 29.06% stake in the German company from the Pinault family for pound 1.5 billion, Azernews reports, citing foreign media.

Once the deal is completed, Anta Sports will become Puma’s largest shareholder. As part of the transaction, the Chinese firm will purchase 43.01 million shares at pound 35 per share in cash, representing a significant premium to Puma’s previous closing price of pound 21.63. The deal is expected to be finalized by the end of 2026, subject to regulatory approvals.

Following the announcement, Puma shares climbed 16.27% by 9:22 a.m. CET, trading at around pound 25.15 per share.

Market analysts view the move as a strategic expansion by Anta Sports into the European premium sportswear segment, potentially strengthening Puma’s presence in the Asian market, where Anta has extensive retail and distribution networks. The partnership could also open the door to joint product development and deeper supply-chain integration, helping Puma compete more effectively with global rivals such as Nike and Adidas.

Interestingly, the deal highlights a broader trend of Chinese companies increasing their stakes in established European brands, seeking global recognition and technological expertise, while European firms gain access to fast-growing Asian consumer markets.

The Azerbaijan State Orchestra of Folk Instruments has delighted the audience with a fascinating concert at the International Mugham Center, Azernews reports.

The wonderful musical evening pleased the audience with musical compositions that combined the richness of national tradition with a contemporary sound.

Particular attention was drawn to new arrangements created especially for this evening.

The concert was conducted by the orchestra’s artistic director and chief conductor, Mustafa Ashurov, a recipient of the Presidential Award.

The Azerbaijan State Orchestra of Folk Instruments is widely known for its mastery in performing national musical works, and each piece in the program was marked by virtuosity, emotional depth, and a high level of artistic refinement.

The origins of this orchestra trace back to May 1, 1931, when the founder of Azerbaijan’s classical music tradition, Uzeyir Hajibayli, initiated the establishment of a folk instruments orchestra.

This ensemble was notable for being the first orchestra in the East organized on the principles of a symphonic orchestra but using only folk instruments, and it marked a major milestone in the development of national music culture.

The orchestra’s repertoire blends traditional Azerbaijani folk music with works by prominent Azerbaijani and international composers, and it often performs at state ceremonies, major concert halls, and music festivals.

In 2026, the orchestra will celebrate the 95th anniversary of its founding. Concerts held throughout the year will be organized as part of the event plan dedicated to the orchestra’s 95th jubilee.

Azerbaijan is increasingly demonstrating that its economic relevance extends well beyond oil and gas. Historically positioned at the crossroads of East and West, the country has long functioned as a natural transit hub. Today, however, Azerbaijan is transforming this inherited geographic advantage into a strategic economic asset through the development of the Middle Corridor, officially known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR). As global supply chains face prolonged disruptions, geopolitical risks, and congestion along traditional routes, the Middle Corridor is emerging as a competitive alternative – defined not only by geography, but by speed, reliability, and institutional coordination.

Recent operational data underline a key trend: reduced transit time is rapidly becoming the corridor’s strongest value proposition. According to Wang Sui Dun, Managing Director of Beijing Cross-Eurasia International Logistics, the average delivery time for cargo transported via the Xi’an-Baku railway route fell to 16 days in January 2026, down from 17 days in December 2025. While a one-day reduction may appear marginal, in logistics terms it represents a meaningful efficiency gain – particularly for time-sensitive and high-value cargo. Faster transit reduces inventory holding costs, improves supply chain predictability, and enhances the overall competitiveness of the route vis-à-vis maritime transport.

The operational intensity of the corridor is also increasing. Eight freight trains were dispatched on the Xi’an-Baku route in January 2026, compared to eleven in December 2025, reflecting both seasonal fluctuations and ongoing optimization of schedules. Since the launch of regular container train services on the Middle Corridor in 2019, traffic has grown steadily, with more than 400 train runs recorded in 2025 alone. The launch of a new service from Beijing on 30 June 2025 further expanded the corridor’s geographic reach, reinforcing Azerbaijan’s role as a pivotal Eurasian logistics node.

Infrastructure investment has been a decisive factor behind these gains. The modernization of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (BTK) railway in 2024 increased annual throughput capacity from 1 million tonnes to 5 million tonnes, significantly reducing bottlenecks along one of the corridor’s most critical segments. Equally important is the growing institutional integration along the route. In August 2024, China Railway and Container Shipping Corporation (CRCT) joined the joint venture ‘Middle Corridor Multimodal Ltd,’ signaling stronger coordination between rail, maritime, and logistics operators. This institutional consolidation has translated into measurable results: in early 2026, the first train of the year arrived in Baku with a reported transit time of just 11 days-approaching levels that position the Middle Corridor as a serious competitor to northern routes.

Yet, the corridor’s future success will depend not only on steel and concrete, but also on regulatory efficiency. According to forecasts by the International Road Transport Union (IRU), freight volumes along the Middle Corridor could triple by 2030. However, without decisive modernization of border-crossing procedures, customs digitalization, and harmonized documentation, actual volumes could fall up to 35% short of their potential. This gap highlights a critical reality: in modern logistics, institutional efficiency is as vital as physical infrastructure. Delays at borders can easily erase gains achieved through faster rail and port operations.

The growing strategic relevance of the Middle Corridor is also reshaping trade patterns. Whereas earlier cargo flows were dominated by raw materials such as oil and minerals, containerized freight is now expanding rapidly. Over the past 12 months, container volumes along the corridor have more than tripled, with over 60% consisting of Chinese exports destined for European markets. This shift reflects deeper integration into global value chains and underscores the corridor’s role not merely as a transit route, but as a facilitator of diversified trade.

In this context, Azerbaijan’s role extends beyond that of a transit country. By reducing transit time, expanding capacity, and strengthening institutional cooperation, the country is positioning itself as a key architect of a more resilient and multipolar Eurasian logistics architecture. As global trade increasingly prioritizes speed, security, and diversification, the Middle Corridor’s evolving efficiency may prove to be its most decisive competitive advantage.

Israel is preparing to open talks with the Trump administration on a new 10-year security agreement, aiming to secure continued US military support while gradually reducing reliance on direct American cash grants, Azernews reports via the Financial Times.

Speaking to the FT ahead of stepping down as chief financial adviser to Israel’s military and Defence Ministry, Dr. Gil Pinchas said Israel plans to prioritise joint military and defence projects over traditional financial assistance in negotiations expected to take place in the coming weeks.

‘The partnership is more important than just the net financial issue in this context. there are a lot of things that are equal to money,’ Pinchas said, stressing that future cooperation should be viewed in broader strategic terms.

According to him, the current level of direct financial support – about $3.3 billion annually, which Israel uses to purchase US-made weapons – is only one element of the existing memorandum of understanding (MOU) and could be gradually reduced.

In 2016, Washington and Tel Aviv signed a 10-year MOU running until September 2028, under which the US committed $38 billion in military aid, including $33 billion in grants for defence procurement and $5 billion for missile defence systems.

Earlier this month, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Israel hoped to ‘taper off’ its dependence on US military assistance over the next decade, signaling a strategic shift toward deeper cooperation and greater self-reliance.