Category: Business Daily

Kenya’s plan to sell data collected via eCitizen and other State agencies is opening a new debate about the value of information in the digital economy and the limits to what public institutions can do with it.

At the centre of the proposal is a planned data marketplace where businesses, researchers, investors and innovators would be able to access datasets generated by government agencies.

The proposal comes at a time when countries around the world are increasingly treating data as an economic asset. Yet that information is unlike other government resources because much of it originates from citizens.

This raises questions about privacy, ownership and whether information collected for public service delivery can later be commercialised.

Kenya’s data protection laws draw clear boundaries around what can and cannot be sold. While some government datasets may be commercially valuable, others are legally protected because they contain information that could identify individuals.

Understanding these distinctions is key to understanding how the proposed marketplace would operate and the safeguards it would require.

Why does the State want to sell data?

Officials argue that vast amounts of information collected by the State remain under-utilised despite having significant economic value. By making some of this data available at a fee, the government hopes to generate revenue while supporting innovation and evidence-based decision-making.

What is the difference between personal and non-personal data?

Personal data refers to information that can identify a living individual either directly or indirectly. This includes names, identity card numbers, phone numbers, email addresses, biometric records, photographs, location information and financial details. Even where a person’s name is removed, data may still be considered personal if it can reasonably be linked back to a specific individual.

For example, information showing that a particular person owns a vehicle, received government benefits, paid taxes or visited a health facility would generally fall within the category of personal data.

Non-personal data, on the other hand, is information that does not identify any individual. It is usually aggregated, anonymous or statistical in nature. Examples include county-level agricultural production figures, average household income trends, road traffic volumes, electricity consumption patterns, rainfall statistics and sectoral economic performance data.

Why can’t the government sell personal data?

Kenya’s Data Protection Act places strict limits on how personal information can be collected, processed, shared and transferred.

Government agencies typically collect personal information for specific purposes such as issuing identity cards, processing taxes, delivering healthcare, providing education services or administering social programmes. The law generally requires that personal data be used only for the purpose for which it was collected unless another lawful basis exists.

Selling citizens’ personal information would likely violate several core principles of data protection, including purpose limitation, fairness and lawful processing.

The Kenyan Constitution also guarantees the right to privacy, including the right not to have information relating to one’s private affairs unnecessarily revealed.

Allowing the commercial sale of personal information could expose citizens to profiling, discrimination, financial fraud, identity theft and unwanted surveillance. It could also undermine public trust in government systems, making people less willing to share information needed for service delivery.

For these reasons, personal data is generally treated as a protected asset belonging to the individual rather than a commodity that can be freely traded by the State.

Why can’t some economic data be sold?

Not all non-personal data can be commercialised.

Under Kenya’s Access to Information Act, public bodies are required to provide citizens with access to information held by the State, subject to specific exemptions.

Information relating to public finances, government programmes, public contracts, environmental matters and economic performance is often expected to be publicly accessible because it supports transparency and accountability.

How will people’s privacy be protected?

The government’s plans are expected to rely heavily on anonymisation and aggregation.

Anonymisation involves removing or altering information that could identify a specific person. Aggregation involves combining data into broader categories so that only trends and patterns are visible.

The Office of the Data Protection Commissioner would be expected to oversee compliance with the Data Protection Act and ensure that any datasets released through the marketplace meet legal requirements.

The participants in the data market will also be heavily supervised to ensure proper use of the data obtained from the marketplace and that only anonymised data is obtained.

Who owns government-held data?

One of the emerging questions is whether data collected from citizens belongs to the government, the individual or both.

Current data protection laws recognise that individuals retain rights over their personal data even when it is held by public institutions. Governments act as data controllers or custodians rather than outright owners of personal information.

Non-personal data, however, is not well-defined legally. Governments often argue that aggregated datasets generated through public administration are public assets that can be used to support economic development. But there’s no clarity on whether citizens should claim ownership to the data and whether they should be paid for it.

What are the benefits and risks of a government data marketplace?

Proponents argue that selling non-personal data could unlock economic value from information that currently sits unused in government databases. Businesses could make better investment decisions, researchers could generate new insights and technology companies could develop innovative services.

Critics, however, warn that weak safeguards could create privacy risks, encourage excessive data collection or blur the line between public service delivery and commercial exploitation.

The success of the plan will need a clear demonstration by the government that personal information will remain protected, citizens’ rights respected and commercially valuable datasets shared without compromising privacy or public trust.

Has this happened in other countries?

Yes, governments like the United Kingdom, the United States, and Singapore have long recognised that public-sector data has economic value. In these countries, the trend has been making more government data freely available as open data while charging for specialised products, real-time access or value-added services.

The Ministry of Agriculture projects to collect Sh1.38 billion from the newly tea export levy annually, raising the total taxes from the beverage to more than Sh1.4 billion.

The government expects to collect Sh40 million in tea import levy, raising the total revenue from tea taxes to Sh1.42 billion a year.

The Tea Levy Regulations, 2026 reintroduces a levy, payable only by tea exporters at 0.8 percent of the auction value or customs value for direct sales, and by tea importers at 100 percent of the import value per consignment of made tea.

The collection of Sh1.42 billion is based on 2023 export data, where 522.92 million kilos of tea was exported, generating Sh180.57 billion.

‘Based on 2023 export data, the levy is projected to generate approximately Sh1.38 billion from export levy and Sh40 million from import levy, totaling Sh1.42 billion per annum,’ the Ministry said in a report.

‘Under the regulation, the funds would be invested into the tea sector. Sh710 million will go to the Farmer Price Stabilisation Fund, Sh284 million to research, Sh213 million to Tea Board of Kenya (TBK) operations and Sh213 million to county governments for infrastructure.’

The Tea Levy Regulations, 2026 reintroduced a statutory levy of 0.8 percent on exports and imports under the authority of Section 53 of the Tea Act, 2020.

The levy was previously in place as an ad valorem until 2016, when it was scrapped. Its abolition left the TBK and the Tea Research Institute without sustainable funding, causing a sharp decline in research, quality surveillance and market promotion.

‘The levy is being restored to build a sustainable, industry-funded mechanism to invest in research, marketing, infrastructure and farmer price protection,” the ministry said.

‘It is imposed on exporters and importers of tea, not farmers or factories. The 100 percent import levy is a protective mechanism, not a general revenue measure.’

The Ministry says the purpose of the 100 percent import levy is to shield Kenyan tea producers from the influx of cheap, low-quality imported tea from neighbouring countries.

‘The fund framework ensures farmers are not wholly exposed to the volatility of the international commodity market, a protection they have lacked since the levy was abolished in 2026,’ the ministry report said.

‘The Price Stabilisation Fund (receiving 50 percent of levy revenue) is designed to act as a cushion when global tea auction prices drop below sustainable levels, provide supplementary payments to smallholder farmers to bridge the gap between market prices and target earnings and respond to climate events such as floods and drought that damage crop output and reduce farmer income.’

Under regulation 5 of the Tea Levy Regulations, 2026, some teas are exempted, including value-added tea packed in containers of 10kg or less, tea extracts and tea aroma products, and Kenyan teas processed for value addition in an Export Processing Zone.

President William Ruto’s ambition to make Kenya the ‘Singapore of Africa’ has dominated development discourse, but history suggests that replicating Singapore’s model is far harder than policymakers assume.

Dr Christie Agawa’s research shows the rapid rise of Germany, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan cannot be separated from Cold War geopolitics. Their transformation was not just superior policy or governance. It was also strategic backing from Western powers who needed capitalist success stories against Soviet influence.

West Germany received massive grants and debt relief in the 1950s. South Korea industrialised through state-backed chaebols (large, family-owned industrial conglomerates ) that became global export engines.

Singapore’s rise follows the same logic. Located at the entrance to the Strait of Malacca, it controls one of the world’s most vital maritime chokepoints. Lee Kuan Yew became a staunch anti-communist ally when containing communism in Asia was a core Western objective.

That stance secured US security guarantees, preferential access to Western markets, and disproportionate foreign direct investments (FDI) inflows for a country its size.

Singapore did not industrialise in a neutral global environment. It was a strategic asset in a bipolar world. Taiwan and South Korea reinforce the point: State-led development was deeply intertwined with patronage.

Planning was centralised, credit was directed by the State, and infant industries were shielded. But success depended on tight coordination between political elites and connected business groups. Access to finance, licences, and export quotas was politically managed. Crony capitalism was not a deviation from their takeoff. It was embedded in the model.

Contrast that with Africa’s structural reality. The Democratic Republic of Congo holds some of the world’s richest cobalt, copper, gold, and uranium deposits, yet remains trapped in poverty, weak infrastructure, and recurring conflict.

In Ghana, rural women harvest shea nuts for the global cosmetics industry, but European firms capture the bulk of the value through processing, branding, and retail. The core trap is structural.

In global value chains, power sits with firms that control technology, branding, and market access. Raw material exporters like Kenya compete on price and volume. Singapore escaped because Cold War geopolitics let it host, not just supply, the high-value nodes: finance, logistics, and manufacturing for Western multinationals.

Dr Agawa asserts that Western policy in Africa is fundamentally about control of resources, not growth. Liberalisation, austerity, and open markets keep African States as suppliers of cheap inputs while foreclosing the State-led upgrading that Asia used.

Colonial history sharpens the contradiction. Early European industrialisation drew heavily on colonial extraction. France’s industrial expansion was supported by African raw materials, captive markets, and forced trade systems. The scale remains debated, but the link between colonial extraction and European capital formation is well documented.

The pattern is clear: countries that industrialised often did so under strategic protection, external subsidies, colonial extraction, or tightly managed state capitalism. Yet late-developing countries are now required by the IMF, World Bank, and donor consensus to industrialise through liberalisation, austerity, fiscal compression, and fully open markets.

This raises an uncomfortable question: were the Asian miracles purely good governance, or also beneficiaries of geopolitical favoritism that no longer exists? South Korea and Taiwan expanded rapidly while embedded in patronage networks and politically connected business systems. Corruption existed, but it coexisted with industrial deepening.

History also shows few nations industrialised under mature democracy. Britain’s industrial revolution restricted political participation to a property-owning elite. The US built early economic power while slavery remained a central institution. East Asian states explicitly prioritised economic transformation over liberal democratic ideals during takeoff.

None of this celebrates corruption, authoritarianism, or exclusion. It means development is shaped by historical timing, geopolitics, State capacity, and access to patient capital. Importing policy templates while ignoring those conditions produces fantasy, not strategy.

Kenya is not Singapore, and the differences are structural, not cultural. Singapore is 728 sq km with 5.9 million people, a single tier of government, and a deep-water port on the busiest shipping lane on earth. Nairobi County alone is 694 sq km.

Kenya covers 580,000 sq km with 55 million people, 44 ethnic groups, and a devolved system of 47 counties with distinct political economies. The scale, diversity, and institutional complexity are incomparable.

Singapore also industrialised in a unique Cold War moment with US security guarantees and capital inflows tied to its anti-communist stance. Kenya faces a multipolar world, no security patron, and a debt-driven global financial system that penalises State-led industrial policy. The lesson is not to become Singapore.

The lesson is to study the structural conditions that made Singapore possible, then design a strategy rooted in Kenya’s own realities: leverage agriculture and agro-processing where Kenya has comparative advantage, deepen regional trade under AfCFTA to build economies of scale, and rebuild state capacity to direct credit toward productive sectors instead of consumption. Chasing Singapore is a distraction.

Building Kenya is the task.

The growing reliance on artificial intelligence (AI) in legal work is increasingly dividing opinion between skeptics and believers. Skeptics warn of inaccuracy, ethical compromise and declining service quality. Believers, on the other hand, maintain that AI is not only inevitable but indispensable to modern legal practice.

The truth, however, lies somewhere in between. AI is neither a panacea nor a threat to be resisted. It presents a shift in how legal services are being delivered to businesses.

What distinguishes the current wave of AI from earlier legal technologies is the rise of generative AI and large language models. These systems are capable of understanding and producing human language with remarkable fluency.

This efficiency dividend is already visible in dispute resolution. AI tools are now routinely used to sift through vast volumes of documents, extract relevant facts and organise evidence in a manner that allows lawyers to focus on strategy rather than process.

More advanced applications go further, using predictive analytics to assess likely outcomes based on historical data.

At the far end of this spectrum lies automated dispute resolution, where entire claims can be processed through online platforms that guide parties from filing to resolution with minimal human intervention.

For businesses, this evolution presents a compelling proposition. Disputes can be resolved more quickly, at lower cost and without the procedural complexity that has at times defined traditional modes such as litigation and arbitration. Indeed, global platforms already resolve low-value disputes through automated systems, with human oversight reserved for more complex matters.

Yet it is precisely at this point that the skeptics’ concerns become more persuasive. Dispute resolution is not simply a mechanical exercise in applying legal rules to data. It involves context, judgment and, often, an appreciation of human behaviour and motive.

AI, for all its capabilities, operates on patterns and probabilities. It does not understand nuance in the way a human decision-maker does.

This limitation becomes significant in complex commercial disputes, where outcomes often turn on qualitative factors that cannot easily be reduced to data. These concerns also bring to the fore issues surrounding the unauthorised practice of law, particularly where AI tools are used to generate court documents which, should only be prepared by qualified Advocates.

Recent decisions from Kenyan courts illustrate this tension. In one instance, court documents were struck out on the basis that they were generated using AI and failed to meet substantive and procedural requirements for court documents. In another case, the use of AI was viewed as conferring an undue advantage on one party.

Similarly, in the US, courts have increasingly sanctioned and fined lawyers for using AI to prepare court documents containing fabricated case citations and quotations.

These decisions, though still emerging, signal a judicial unease with how AI is being deployed indiscriminately without regard to substantive safeguards. Together, they reflect a system grappling with a new technology increasingly being deployed without sufficient restraint.

AI systems are known to produce inaccurate outputs, sometimes referred to as hallucinations, where responses are plausible but incorrect. There are also concerns around bias in training data, confidentiality of client information and the question of liability when AI-generated content proves erroneous.

In a profession built on precision, confidentiality and accountability, these concerns go to the heart of legal practice, with direct implications on the businesses they advise and represent.

However, these risks are not without mitigation. Techniques such as requiring AI systems to cite sources, grounding outputs in verified data and maintaining strict human oversight can significantly reduce error. Nevertheless, the responsibility for the final product remains with the lawyer.

Perhaps the skeptics are correct in stating that AI use needs to be minimised and disputes resolved by human beings, however, the believers are not wrong in stating that the increased use of AI is inevitable.

Administrative and preparatory functions such as document review, legal research and case organisation are increasingly accepted and pose minimal threat to the integrity of proceedings. But tasks such as drafting legal documents or analysing evidence should not be substituted by AI use.

The future of dispute resolution therefore lies not in replacing lawyers or judges with AI, but in redefining its role. AI will handle the repetitive administrative tasks allowing practitioners to focus on strategy, advocacy and judgment. In this sense, the most effective model is not substitution but collaboration in a system where human expertise and machine efficiency complement each other.

This shift is already influencing client expectations. Businesses are no longer asking whether AI can be used, but how it can be used to enhance efficiency and reduce cost without compromising quality.

Law firms that fail to respond to this expectation risk falling behind, not because AI will replace them, but because others will use it more effectively.

At the same time, regulation is beginning to take shape globally, with jurisdictions adopting risk-based approaches to ensure that AI systems are used responsibly. Kenya’s AI legislation should follow a similar path.

The challenge for policymakers will be to strike a balance between encouraging innovation and safeguarding the fundamental principles of fairness, transparency and accountability.

Ultimately, the debate on AI in legal practice is not a binary one.

The skeptics are right to caution against its unrestricted adoption. The believers are equally right to recognise that AI is here to stay. The important question is how to integrate it in a manner that enhances, rather than undermines, the administration of justice.

Stanbic Bank says it is ready and able to make a start-up operation in Ethiopia as it explores ways of circumventing a rule that caps foreign ownership at 49 percent when a lender enters that market through an acquisition.

This makes Stanbic Bank the first major African bank to consider the possibility of venturing into the Horn of African market without going through the acquisition route, which has been touted by many interested banks as optimal.

Stanbic, a subsidiary of Standard Bank – the continent’s largest bank by asset base – says gaining entry into Ethiopia by building from the ground is a card on the table, given its vast experience across 20 African countries, including Kenya.

In March last year, Ethiopia’s Central Bank – the National Bank of Ethiopia – issued Business Proclamation 136 ushering in the liberalisation of the country’s banking sector through allowing foreign institutional and foreign national investments into Ethiopia.

The liberalisation, however, comes with a rule that requires local investors to retain a minimum controlling interest of 51 percent, leaving the foreign buyer with a maximum minority stake.

‘We generally go to new markets as a large and significant owner, and so a minority position is always going to be a difficult point to start with,” Stanbic Bank Regional Chief Executive Joshua Oigara told the Business Daily in Johannesburg on the sidelines of President William Ruto’s state visit.

“It is also important to note that Ethiopia does not stop financial institutions from setting up from scratch if you want to own 100 percent of the entity. We have seen Kenyan enterprises setting up green field Ethiopia and we are confident.”

Whereas many banks, including KCB Group and Equity Group, have signalled intent to venture into the Ethiopian market, the prospect of being a minority shareholder has been widely cited as a matter most find to be challenging.

Stanbic Bank says Safaricom Plc’s experience in entering Ethiopia through greenfield operations is a testament that whereas this route may be fraught with challenges, it is likely to yield dividends when perceived through a long-term horizon.

‘One of our greatest clients is the telco business that went into Ethiopia a few years ago. It was an absolutely difficult environment, I agree. Does it tick the right boxes now? May be not yet. Are we seeing progress so far? Absolutely,” Mr Oigara said.

“Sometimes we take a short-term view and look at things from a one-year, two-year or three-year lens, yet when you look at things from a 10-year perspective, you are likely to end up wishing you had even done more investment.’

In the just concluded financial year, Safaricom Ethiopia trimmed its loss position to Sh21.2 billion compared to a loss of Sh36 billion reported in the previous year, with the subsidiary’s service revenue having grown 58.3 percent to Sh14.1 billion.

Standard Bank has had a representative office in Ethiopia since 2015 and will be looking to build on this with the market entry that is under consideration.

Banks and market analysts have differed on the CBK benchmark interest rate decision as calls to raise and hold the key rate emerge amid a jump in domestic inflation.

The Kenya Bankers Association (KBA) sees an increase in the benchmark rate as a decisive move to anchor inflation expectations while analysts mostly see a raise in the Central Bank Rate (CBR) as premature.

The rising domestic inflation rate, which topped 6.7 percent in May from 5.6 percent previously on the compounding effects of higher fuel prices is expected to influence the direction taken by the CBK monetary policy committee (MPC) on Tuesday.

KBA says inflationary pressures have re-emerged from the oil supply shock, raising the expectation for general price increases in the economy, necessitating the MPC to provide a cushion.

‘A timely upward adjustment of the CBR will effectively anchor inflation expectations and support price stability in the medium term,’ KBA said in a note.

Overall inflation rose to a 28-month high of 6.7 percent in May, from 5.6 percent in April and 4.4 percent in March.

The higher consumer prices have left inflation on the brink of reaching the 7.5 percent ceiling, which would warrant interventions by the CBK to maintain price stability.

Analysts at the AIB-AXYs Africa say they expect a soft CBR increase, pushing the rate up from 8.75 to nine percent.

‘We expect the committee (MPC) to increase the CBR by 25 basis points, marking a shift towards a more cautious monetary stance following the acceleration in inflation,’ the analysts said in a note.

Proponents against a June 2026 benchmark rate increase say an adjustment would be premature at present.

Contrarians argue that a rise to the benchmark rate may not necessarily arrest inflation, noting the shock has emanated from an external sector.

The proponents note that the inflation rate remains anchored between the target of 2.5 and 7.5 percent while the shilling remains largely unchanged in its trade against the dollar.

I am 29, and my friends say I should start investing. They recommend choosing between stocks, bonds, and unit trusts. Where should a complete beginner start without losing money?

For as long as people have created value, they’ve looked for ways to grow it. One of the earliest documented investment frameworks appears in the Code of Hammurabi, written around 1700 BCE in what is now Iraq. It laid out rules for lending, collateral, interest, and risk sharing, evidence that humans have been trying to protect and multiply their wealth for millennia.

In the 1600s, the rise of global trade reshaped investing. European ships from Britain, the Netherlands, and France embarked on long, dangerous voyages to Asia for spices, silk, and precious goods. These expeditions were expensive and unpredictable, so ship owners invited investors to fund each journey in exchange for a share of the profits if the ship returned safely.

To avoid catastrophic losses, investors spread their money across several voyages. Over time, individual expeditions became structured shipping companies, and ownership evolved into shares-laying the foundation for the modern stock market and the principle of risk diversification.

Today, the mechanics have changed, but the essence remains the same: pooling resources, spreading risk, and building wealth gradually. The choices available, however, can feel overwhelming-especially for a beginner.

Imagine you’re preparing ugali and beef for the people you care about. You walk to the market, select the best cut of meat from the butcher, gather fresh tomatoes, onions, and sukuma wiki, and prepare everything yourself.

Alternatively, you could walk into a restaurant and enjoy the same meal without lifting a finger. Investing mirrors this choice. You can buy the ‘ingredients’ yourself-stocks, bonds, bills, real estate, commodities, or forex-or you can opt for the ‘cooked meal’: professionally managed investment options like unit trusts.

Stocks

Understanding the individual ingredients makes the entire landscape clearer. Stocks, or equities, represent ownership in a registered company, whether private or publicly listed. In Kenya, investors can access shares through the Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE), home to around 66 listed companies. Historically, investing in shares required significant capital and manual processes, but that has changed.

Innovations such as Ziidi M Trader, integrated with M-Pesa, now allow anyone to buy shares starting from as little as one unit, lowering entry barriers and making the market more inclusive. For those who prefer diversification rather than selecting individual companies, there are collective equity based options that mirror broader market indices or sectors.

Bonds

Debt instruments take a different shape. Bonds are long term loans-often issued by governments or large corporations-to fund projects.

The Kenyan government infrastructure bonds have become common funding sources for energy, roads, and water initiatives. They typically run for more than a year and provide interest payments for the duration of the bond, along with the return of principal at maturity.

Short term versions, commonly known as Treasury Bills, help the government manage shorter term financial needs.

Kenyans can access these instruments digitally through platforms such as the DhowCSD app, with a minimum investment amount starting at Sh50,000. For those who prefer the structure of bond like returns without selecting individual instruments, fixed income unit trust funds can provide a managed alternative.

Unit trusts

Unit trusts bring all these ingredients together under professional management. These collective investment schemes pool money from many people and allocate it into diversified portfolios depending on the fund’s objective.

Common options include Money Market Funds, Fixed Income Funds, Equity Funds, and Balanced Funds. They offer ease of entry, liquidity, and expert oversight-features that appeal to beginners who want exposure to the market without analysing individual assets.

Before choosing any unit trust, it’s important to review its long term performance, fee structure, the composition of its underlying investments, and the stability of the provider.

So, where does a 29 year old beginner actually begin?

Benjamin Graham, the father of value investing, wrote in The Intelligent Investor that most individuals are better off as ‘defensive investors.’ A defensive investor isn’t avoiding the market; they simply prioritise simplicity, patience, and loss avoidance over chasing high returns.

They understand that markets are competitive, that emotions can sabotage decision making, and that consistent research requires time-something many working adults don’t have.

At 29, the most powerful tool you have isn’t expert knowledge; it is time. Money that is saved and invested consistently has years to grow through compounding.

The goal isn’t to master every concept at once or to find perfect opportunities. It is to start small, learn gradually, and stay consistent.

Focus on your savings discipline, understand your comfort with risk, and choose simplicity over complexity.

Wealth rarely arrives with noise or drama. It grows quietly, almost invisibly, as you make steady, thoughtful decisions. Years from now, your future self will thank you for the step you take today.

Customs administrations across the world are under increasing pressure to strike a delicate balance between facilitating trade, safeguarding revenue, and protecting society.

In Kenya, this responsibility rests with the Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA)’s Customs and Border Control Department. As global trade expands and the risks associated with illicit flows grow more sophisticated, the need for transparency, accountability, and operational efficiency has never been greater.

It is within this context that KRA recently launched the Body-Worn Camera system. This initiative marks a critical milestone in KRA’s ongoing journey to modernise customs administration and reinforce integrity in its operations.

The initiative is not simply a technological enhancement, but a deliberate and strategic response to the evolving demands of border management.

At the core of customs operations are daily interactions between officers and the public, travellers, traders, clearing agents, and other stakeholders.

These engagements are pivotal in shaping perceptions of fairness, professionalism, and trust in government institutions. However, they also present potential points of friction, particularly in high-pressure environments such as passenger clearance, cargo verification, and enforcement operations.

Historically, disputes arising from such interactions have often relied on competing narratives, making it difficult to establish the facts. The introduction of body-worn cameras fundamentally changes this dynamic.

By providing real-time and recorded visual evidence of engagements, the system ensures that decisions can be verified objectively and disputes resolved fairly and efficiently.

This is a significant step toward strengthening procedural justice within customs operations.

Equally important is the role of this technology in promoting ethical conduct. Integrity challenges, whether real or perceived, undermine public confidence, distort markets, and result in revenue leakages.

The presence of body-worn cameras introduces a powerful deterrent effect. When officers and members of the public are aware that their actions are being recorded, adherence to established procedures and professional standards improves markedly. In this way, the technology supports a culture of accountability while protecting both officers and citizens.

From an operational perspective, body-worn cameras also enhance efficiency and effectiveness.

The recorded footage provides valuable insights into frontline processes, enabling supervisors to identify bottlenecks, refine procedures, and strengthen training programmes. It allows the Customs officers to move from account assessments to evidence-based decision-making, improving service delivery across the points of entry.

The deployment of this system has been carefully designed to support KRA’s core mandate.

The cameras are utilised across a wide range of operational environments, including passenger clearance at international airports, cargo inspections at seaports and inland container depots, and enforcement activities at land borders.

Equipped with capabilities such as GPS tracking, live streaming, and secure data storage, the system enables real-time monitoring and centralised oversight, enhancing both situational awareness and operational control.

The adoption of body-worn cameras is also aligned with KRA’s digital transformation agenda. Over the years, KRA has invested in advanced technologies such as non-intrusive inspection equipment, integrated customs management systems, and data-driven risk analysis tools.

The Body-Worn Camera system complements these investments, creating a more integrated, responsive, and technology-enabled customs environment.

Importantly, this initiative represents more than the deployment of devices, it signals a shift in institutional culture. It reinforces our commitment to professionalism, transparency, and service excellence.

It affirms that accountability is not optional but integral to effective public service. And it demonstrates the Authority’s resolve to continuously innovate to meet the expectations of a dynamic and interconnected global economy.

By enhancing transparency, deterring misconduct, improving operational efficiency, and strengthening public confidence, this initiative positions KRA at the forefront of modern customs administration.

KRA remains committed to leveraging innovation to secure our borders, facilitate trade, and serve the nation with integrity.

An investment vehicle associated with Bidco Africa Chairman Vimal Shah and former Central Bank of Kenya Governor Nahashon Nyagah is set to lose its stake in Tatu City, bringing to a near end a dramatic decades-long battle for control of the multibillion-shilling real estate project.

This follows the loss by Stephen Mbugua Mwagiru, one of their associates, in his bid to stop the disposal of shares held in two Mauritian-registered special purpose vehicles that ultimately linked them to Tatu City.

Mr Mwagiru had moved to the Privy Council-the equivalent of Kenya’s Supreme Court in Mauritius-seeking to stop the sale of shares he held in the Mauritian investment holding companies Cedar IV and Cedar V through Manhattan Coffee Investment Holdings.

For nearly two decades, Tatu City’s foreign majority shareholders and Kenyan minority shareholders have been locked in protracted court battles, triggering delays in a row that moved to the London Court of International Arbitration.

Manhattan Coffee Investment got into trouble in Mauritius after it defied an order from the arbitration court to pay $15m (Sh1.94 billion) in damages to the foreign investors over the Tatu City development.

The London court ruled in February 2018 that Mr Shah, Mr Nyagah and Mr Mwagiru should pay for damages, interest and costs to SCF Holdings II after ruling they had defrauded the developer.

The minority investors did not challenge the settlement awarded by the London court within the permitted 28 days, but failed to pay, prompting the foreign partner to begin legal proceedings in Mauritius to enforce the ruling.

Manhattan Mr Shah, Mwagiru and Mr Nyagah’s holding company at the time of the suit is registered in the Indian Ocean tax haven.

Manhattan unsuccessfully fought against the liquidation, triggering the loss of shares it claimed in Tatu City, as the stock was the only asset associated with the investment firm.

The Privy Council dismissed the application, ruling that Mr Mwagiru lacked the legal standing to pursue the claim against the liquidation of Manhattan.

The Privy Council ruled that Mr Mwagiru lacked the legal standing required under Section 174 of the Insolvency Act 2009 to continue litigation on behalf of Manhattan Coffee after the company entered liquidation.

The court also found that a lower court had wrongly allowed him to pursue a derivative claim under Section 170 of the Companies Act 2001 because he was neither a creditor nor a shareholder of the company since the firm was under liquidation.

‘For these reasons, the Board considers that the appellant had no standing to apply for an order under Section 174 of the IA 2009 for authority to continue the Plaint on behalf of and in the name of the Company. The Derivative Order was wrongly made at first instance, whether based on Section 170 of the CA 2001 or Section 174 of the IA 2009,’ the five-judge bench said in its May 16, 2026 judgment.

It is yet another setback for Mr Mwagiru, who for nearly two decades has been embroiled in a bitter dispute with the foreign investor, Stephen Jennings, over control of the Sh240 billion Tatu City project.

Besides Mauritius, the battle has played out in courts across Kenya and London.

The Cedar entities are among the offshore holding companies through which ownership interests in the multibillion-shilling Tatu City development are held.

Mr Jennings is the chief executive of Rendeavour, whose subsidiary, SCF Holdings II, is the other shareholder in the Cedar companies.

The firm is the majority shareholder and developer of Tatu City, the Special Economic Zone situated off Thika Superhighway in Kiambu County.

Tatu City’s ownership structure comprises layers of offshore companies formed as special purpose vehicles for the project, according to court filings.

Cedar IV (Mauritius) Ltd owns 99.9 percent of Tatu City. The Mauritius company is in turn owned by two offshore entities-SCFE II (Cyprus) and Manhattan Coffee Investment Holdings (Mauritius).

Manhattan Coffee Investment Holdings was incorporated in Mauritius by local investors and is owned equally by two companies known as Redline Investments Corporation and Blacknight Holdings.

Former Tatu City director Josphat Kibogo Kinyua told the court that Mr Shah, Mr Nyagah and Mr Mwagiru were among the local investors in the multibillion-shilling project.

Manhattan Coffee Investment Holdings was wound up by the Mauritian courts in 2023 after failing to pay a nearly $15 million (Sh1.94 billion) arbitration award arising from claims that it had defrauded SCF Holdings II.

The London court found that Manhattan Coffee failed to pay a $20 million (Sh2.58 billion) deposit to the sellers of some of the land on which Tatu City is being built, despite repeatedly claiming that it had done so.

It ruled that the ‘false misrepresentation’ affected SCF Holdings II’s investment strategy.

In his 127-page judgment, the arbitrator described part of Mr Shah’s testimony as ‘insufficiently consistent with the documentary evidence’.

In 2018, the London Court of International Arbitration awarded Mr Jennings $15 million (Sh1.94 billion) in damages against Manhattan Coffee Investment Holdings.

The court further ruled that the shareholders should pay interest and costs to SCF Holdings II after finding that they had defrauded the developer.

Mr Shah and Mr Nyagah did not challenge the arbitration award within the required 28 days and subsequently failed to settle the debt.

This prompted Mr Jennings to petition a Mauritian court to wind up Manhattan Coffee Investment Holdings and place its assets, including its shares in the Cedar companies, under liquidation.

Mr Mwagiru’s petition was driven by concerns that, after securing the $15 million arbitration award and forcing Manhattan Coffee into liquidation, SCF Holdings II could acquire the company’s Cedar shares from the liquidators.

In such a scenario, SCF Holdings II would be able to offset part of the purchase price against the debt it already owed, potentially increasing its control over the Tatu City investment structure at a discount.

The idea of building an idyllic mixed-use city on more than 5,000 acres was mooted in the late 2000s, fuelled by the Mwai Kibaki administration’s ambitious vision of transforming Kenya into a middle-income economy.

At the time, the newly completed Thika Superhighway had opened up the area to increased investment in residential, commercial and industrial developments, a prospect that attracted the investors behind Tatu City.

However, it did not take long before the project was engulfed in shareholder wrangles that delayed its rollout by several years and triggered a protracted legal battle spanning multiple jurisdictions.

As far back as 2010, Mr Mwagiru and his mother, Rosemary Wanja, filed a petition seeking to dissolve Tatu City Ltd, claiming that directors and other shareholders had excluded them from the affairs of the company.

However, the courts ruled that they could only be compensated for the one share each directly owned in Tatu City and sister company Kofinaf.

Justice Daniel Musinga directed that the value of the shares be determined by an independent valuer, saying that relations between the parties had irretrievably broken down and that disengagement was the only viable remedy.

‘I will not, however, make a winding-up order since there is an alternative remedy available and that is the acquisition of their shares by the majority shareholders at a fair value,’ ruled Justice Musinga.

Mr Mwagiru and Ms Wanja claimed that they owned 14.5 percent of Tatu City and 15.8 percent of Kofinaf, claims disputed by the majority shareholders.

While accepting that the petitioners had demonstrated ownership of some shares in Tatu City through offshore companies, the judge held that Kenyan courts lacked jurisdiction to determine shareholding disputes in those firms because the parties had agreed that such disputes would be resolved under English law.

The Court of Appeal has upheld a decision by security firm Wells Fargo Limited to dismiss a group of cash management officers for abandoning ATM services for contracted banks over alleged welfare grievances.

The court, however, faulted the security services company for conducting a rushed disciplinary process and ordered compensation equivalent to two months’ salary for each worker.

The appellate court overturned a key finding by the Employment and Labour Relations Court, which had ruled that the dismissals were unfair and awarded each employee compensation equivalent to 12 months’ salary.

The dispute dates back to December 2013 when the employees, who were responsible for loading ATMs and handling sensitive access combinations, stopped work while demanding a meeting with senior management over their working conditions.

The workers complained of long hours, late-night shifts and a lack of transport home after working late. They told the court they had repeatedly raised the concerns with management without success.

Court records show that on December 5, 2013, the officers reported to work at 6am but declined to continue with their duties until their grievances were addressed.

The employees later claimed they were detained by police, issued with show-cause letters and dismissed the following day.

Wells Fargo defended the dismissals, arguing that the officers had engaged in an unlawful work stoppage that threatened to cripple ATM operations and expose the company and its banking clients to significant risks.

The company said the workers held sensitive ATM access combinations and refused to hand them over despite requests from management.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the employer’s position, ruling that the company had reasonable grounds to conclude that the officers’ conduct amounted to gross misconduct.

Valid grounds

‘It is not in dispute that the respondents admitted that on the material day they collectively declined to continue working until their grievances were addressed,’ the judges said.

The court added that the officers were entrusted with ATM operations and sensitive access codes and that their refusal to work had ‘immediate operational implications’.

The appellate court found that Wells Fargo had established a valid and fair reason for terminating the employees’ contracts.

However, the judges found that the disciplinary process fell short of the requirements of the Employment Act.

The court noted that although show-cause letters were issued, disciplinary hearings were convened and concluded within a day before dismissal letters were issued.

Wells Fargo moved from issuing show-cause letters on December 5 to hearing the employees and dismissing them by December 6, a timeline the judges said denied the workers a meaningful opportunity to prepare their defence.

‘The compressed timeline between the show-cause letters and the hearing did not afford the respondents a meaningful opportunity to prepare their defence,’ the court said.

The judges stressed that disciplinary proceedings must give employees a realistic opportunity to understand the allegations against them, consult representatives, gather documents and prepare a defence.

‘If an employee receives notice and is heard on the same day or the following morning, especially in misconduct cases involving dismissal, fraud, strike allegations, or multiple employees, such a notice ought to be found to be inadequate unless urgency is clearly justified,’ the court said.

The appellate judges also criticised the trial court for failing to adequately consider the employees’ role in the breakdown of the employment relationship.

‘The evidence demonstrates that they collectively engaged in a work stoppage affecting essential banking operations, which substantially contributed to the breakdown of the employment relationship,’ the court said.

The judges concluded that the award of 12 months’ salary was excessive and substituted it with compensation equivalent to two months’ gross salary for each employee.