Category: Business Daily

US tech giant Meta has begun rolling out advertising on WhatsApp in Kenya, marking a major shift for the messaging service that could open new revenue streams and marketing tools for local businesses.

The company said users will start seeing ads within WhatsApp’s ‘Updates’ tab, specifically in Status and Channels. Personal chats, calls and private messages will remain end-to-end encrypted and free of advertising.

‘You’ll start seeing relevant ads in Status and Channels,’ Meta said in a message to WhatsApp users in Kenya.

The rollout follows a global announcement made last June, with early deployments in markets such as India, where WhatsApp plays a central role in daily communication.

Sponsored content will now appear between users’ contacts’ organic Status updates, similar to Stories ads on Instagram, and as promoted Channels within the Updates tab, WhatsApp said.

For businesses, the change introduces a new avenue to reach customers directly within the app. Advertisers can run campaigns in the Status feed to promote products and services, with ads designed to initiate instant conversations.

When a user taps a Status ad, it opens a direct chat with the business. Industry players say this could offer a more conversational, high-engagement alternative to traditional digital advertising on platforms such as Facebook and Instagram, where ads typically redirect users to external websites.

Unlike conventional e-commerce funnels (the customer journey from first interaction to final purchase), WhatsApp allows businesses to complete the entire transaction within the app, reducing drop-off rates associated with external links.

Meta has not disclosed pricing for WhatsApp ads in Kenya, but advertising on its other platforms typically varies by market. In Kenya, Instagram and Facebook Stories ads cost between Sh500 and Sh2,000 per day for small and medium-sized businesses.

Pricing models

The tech giant runs two models: cost-per-click (CPC), where the advertiser pays only when a user clicks the ad, and cost-per-thousand impressions, abbreviated as CPM (cost per mille), which means paying for every 1,000 times an ad is viewed, regardless of interaction.

CPC rates range from Sh10 to Sh50, while CPM ranges between Sh200 and Sh1,000.

WhatsApp has more than 3 billion monthly active users globally and is one of the most widely used social platforms in Kenya, reaching about 54.4 percent of the population, according to data from the Communications Authority of Kenya (CA).

The introduction of ads marks a significant shift for WhatsApp, which has largely operated without traditional advertising since its acquisition by Meta, then Facebook, in 2014. Until then, WhatsApp users were required to pay an annual fee of $1 for an ad-free experience. Meta scrapped the fee shortly after the $19 billion (Sh2.4 trillion at current exchange rates) acquisition.

Since 2018, businesses have relied on WhatsApp Business, a standalone application designed for small business owners to connect with customers. The platform offers free features such as product catalogues, automated replies and broadcast messaging.

It also has paid API (application programming interface) services for larger enterprises, which allow high-volume messaging and integration with customer relationship management (CRM) systems.

The API’s costs range from Sh3,000 to Sh7,000 per month, plus per-message charges depending on message type. Marketing messages are costlier than utility messages, such as those providing order updates and payment alerts, and service messages such as customer care responses.

The introduction of ads is also likely to reignite privacy concerns surrounding Meta’s data practices. The company has faced scrutiny globally over data collection and targeted advertising, particularly in jurisdictions such as the European Union.

Meta maintains that WhatsApp’s core privacy protections remain intact. In the announcement to Kenyans this week, the firm said personal messages, calls, Status updates, shared locations, contacts and group memberships are not used to target ads.

The company said ad personalisation will rely on data such as a user’s country code, age, device information, general location, content engagement and ads interacted with.

Users will be able to manage their ad experience, including viewing recent advertisers, hiding or reporting ads, and controlling which advertisers they see.

Meta also said it is developing a subscription option that would allow users to remove ads from the Status and Channels sections, although the feature has not yet been launched.

Joseph Waweru is preparing to open another Bata depot in Molo, betting on a town that many investors once avoided.

Just a decade ago, its past was enough to keep capital away. Today, rising land prices, a growing population and renewed business activity are turning it into one of Nakuru County’s most closely watched growth centres.

That shift is perhaps most visible in the land market. In 2015, an eighth-acre plot in Molo sold for about Sh350,000. Today, similar parcels fetch between Sh2 million and Sh2.5 million.

A 50 by 100 plot in the outskirts now goes for about Sh1.3 million, up from Sh600,000, while plots near the main tarmac linking the town to Kuresoi, Elburgon and Njoro are selling for between Sh1.4 million and Sh1.5 million.

The surge reflects renewed investor confidence in a town still rebuilding its economic identity. Molo’s population has grown to about 270,000, according to the 2019 census, driven by rising demand for housing and business space.

Several factors are underpinning the town’s revival. Its location along the Nakuru-Eldoret highway provides a strategic link to major markets, while the agriculturally rich areas of Njoro and Kuresoi continue to anchor trade in the region.

Devolution has also played a role. In July 2022, Molo, alongside Gilgil, was elevated to municipality status, unlocking funding from county and national governments as well as development partners. The town now receives at least Sh50 million annually for urban infrastructure development.

A difficult past

Yet Molo’s resurgence comes against the backdrop of a difficult past. The town was among the hardest hit during the 2007-2008 post-election violence, which disrupted businesses, displaced residents and stalled development.

It had experienced similar unrest in 1992, leaving a lasting imprint on investor sentiment. For residents, the turnaround has been gradual but visible.

‘I came here in 2005 when people were moving to Molo in search of jobs and business opportunities. Construction of commercial buildings had picked up, but everything stalled during the violence,’ says Peter Onduso, a long-time resident.

Recovery began to take shape after 2013, following the onset of devolution.

‘Since then, the town has bounced back and is now one of the busiest commercial centres in Nakuru County,’ he says.

As confidence returned, stalled construction projects resumed and new ones emerged. Investors who once avoided the town are now competing for space, drawn by its growing commercial potential.

Expanding business footprint

Banks, telecommunications firms and small businesses have steadily expanded their footprint. Financial institutions such as Co-operative Bank, Equity Bank and KCB have strengthened their presence, while businesses ranging from hotels and restaurants to M-Pesa shops, salons and mini-supermarkets have proliferated.

The influx has in turn driven demand for housing, prompting private developers to put up residential and commercial buildings. However, the growing population has also led to a housing shortage, pushing rents higher over the past five years.

Despite the upward pressure, Molo remains relatively affordable compared to larger urban centres.

‘Food is affordable and readily available compared to major towns in the region. Rent is also relatively low, you can get a single room for about Sh2,500, while a one-bedroom house can cost as little as Sh5,000,’ says Milka Kemunto, a local teacher.

An economist’s take

Economic analysts attribute the town’s growth to a combination of available land, improved security and its proximity to key transport corridors.

‘Molo’s expansion is anchored on its strong agricultural base, supported by surrounding areas such as Njoro and Kuresoi,’ says analyst John Kimani, adding that more businesses may increasingly relocate from larger towns in search of lower costs.

Data from the Nakuru County Department of Finance and Economic Planning shows that annual revenue collection from Molo has risen to between Sh50 million and Sh60 million, up from about Sh20 million before devolution.

Lingering challenges

Still, challenges remain. Residents cite poor road networks, unreliable water supply and frequent power outages as constraints to faster growth.

‘If roads like the Molo-Njoro route are improved, it will boost business and reduce transport costs,’ says Jimson Ndung’u, who runs an M-Pesa outlet in the town.

Others believe infrastructure upgrades could position Molo to compete with larger regional centres such as Nakuru, Kericho and Naivasha.

Railway boost

The town’s prospects may also receive a boost from the ongoing revamp of the Nakuru-Kisumu metre-gauge railway line, which passes through Molo. Improved rail connectivity is expected to enhance the movement of goods and people, further strengthening its appeal to investors.

For entrepreneurs like Waweru, as well as Jimson Ndung’u, who runs an M-Pesa shop, the shift is already clear. A town once defined by uncertainty is now attracting fresh capital, with investors from different communities moving in and expanding their footprint.

The Ministry of Health plans to include haemophilia, a bleeding disorder, into the Social Health Authority (SHA) benefits package, hoping to cut treatment costs for some patients in Kenya who currently pay up to Sh130,000 for a single treatment dose.

Medical Services Principal Secretary Ouma Oluga said that the government is working to expand access to care and ensure that haemophilia patients are not excluded due to cost or delayed diagnosis. However, the ministry has not yet revealed the budget allocation or the implementation timeline.

Haemophilia is a rare inherited disorder with no cure that affects the blood’s ability to clot. This exposes patients to prolonged bleeding, internal haemorrhages, joint damage, and, in severe cases, death.

‘We are strengthening hemophilia care by expanding access, integrating it into the SHA, and ensuring that no patient is left behind due to cost or delayed diagnosis,’ said Dr Oluga.

A single child’s dose of clotting factor, the medicine used to control bleeding, costs between Sh50,000 and Sh130,000, depending on severity, while adult doses can be more than double that amount.

Patients requiring preventive treatment, involving regular infusions to avoid bleeding episodes, face lifetime costs running into millions of shillings annually.

According to the Kenya Haemophilia Association (KHA), around 5,000 people in Kenya are living with haemophilia, but only around 1,200 have received a formal diagnosis, a disparity attributed to limited diagnostic capacity and the absence of a national patient registry.

Meanwhile, the KHA, through its treasurer, James Kago, has presented a public petition to the National Assembly, calling for urgent intervention to improve access to diagnosis, treatment, and funding.

The petition proposes the classification of clotting factor concentrates as essential medicines, the establishment of additional treatment centres, and the recognition of haemophilia as a disability, which would enable patients to access support through the National Council for Persons with Disabilities.

‘It’s unfortunate haemophilia is not catered for under the Social Health Authority, and we appeal to the government to factor the condition under SHA,’ said Mr Kago.

Without comprehensive public funding, patients largely depend on donations, which currently only meet around 30 percent of the clotting factor needs of those diagnosed. Consequently, many are forced to rely on blood-derived treatments that require hospitalisation and carry a higher risk.

Treatment options for haemophilia include on-demand clotting factor infusions to manage bleeding episodes and prophylactic regimens, which are administered several times a week to prevent complications such as joint damage.

Currently, however, no clotting factor concentrate is registered with the Pharmacy and Poisons Board, and most public health facilities lack the capacity to diagnose and manage haemophilia.

Newer therapies, including extended half-life products and non-factor treatments such as emicizumab, which is administered via subcutaneous injection, remain largely inaccessible in Kenya.

For the better part of most mornings in March, movement across Nairobi came at a cost. Flooded roads turned highways into parking lots. Deliveries got stuck. Shopkeepers couldn’t open on time. For a farmer in the Rift Valley, similar rains meant a destroyed harvest and further added to concerns on food security.

For all of us, it meant a sharper reminder – Kenya’s economy is already paying the price of climate risk, every day, in lost productivity, destroyed harvests, and emergency response costs. The question is no longer whether Kenya can afford climate action. It’s whether we can afford to delay it.

However, the debate around Kenya’s climate response still leans heavily on policy targets, donor commitments, and long-term ambitions. What is slowing capital is who carries the risk of financing the transition.

For commercial banks, lending to renewable energy, clean transport, or sustainable agriculture is not constrained by awareness but by structure.

These projects take longer to break even and their returns are unpredictable, having uncertain cash flows, often lack the collateral on which traditional credit models are built and treated the same as traditional business loans, even though they’re different.

From a balance sheet perspective, they are difficult assets. Consequently, banks often hesitate not because they oppose green investment, but because the risk does not get priced appropriately. This is where the enablement through risk-sharing guarantees becomes important.

By absorbing part of the perceived risk, guarantees change how banks can assess climate-aligned lending. These do not make projects less risky. They make them lendable within existing financial frameworks, hence the difference between announcing climate commitments and actually moving money.

Encouragingly, Kenya’s financial system is already moving in this direction. The introduction of the Kenya Green Finance Taxonomy has created a baseline for what qualifies as green, reducing ambiguity and limiting the scope for misallocation.

At the same time, frameworks linked to the Central Bank of Kenya are pushing lenders to account for climate exposure in their portfolios.

Flood damage to collateral, disrupted supply chains, and declining agricultural yields are no longer externalities. They are already showing up in loan performance and asset quality, ensuring that climate risk is internalised into credit decisions.

That explains why guarantees are becoming central. They represent a move away from a grant-driven model, where climate finance sits outside the market, to a structure where public or development capital is used to unlock private lending. In practical terms, this allows banks to extend credit into sectors they would otherwise shy from, while still protecting their capital base.

The problem, however, is not funding, but execution, with few projects being structured to be financed. Despite stronger frameworks, many businesses, particularly SMEs, cannot meet the technical, reporting, and structuring requirements that green financing demands.

This has created a persistent gap between available capital and actual disbursement, risking stalling the transition.

Without investment in project preparation, technical support, reporting capability and standardisation, guarantees risk becoming underutilised instruments, available, but not fully deployed.

Climate finance, in this sense, is as much an execution problem as it is a funding problem.

In addition, most green investments in Kenya today do not yet stand on purely market terms. They still rely on some level of de-risking through guarantees, concessional funding or policy incentives.

That does not invalidate the model. It defines its current phase. Guarantees are not a permanent solution, but a bridge to a market where climate-aligned investments can compete without support.

Kenya has made progress. Regulatory clarity is improving. Financial institutions are adapting. New instruments are entering the market. But the pace of climate shocks is outstripping the pace of capital deployment.

Each flood event, each disrupted supply chain, each lost harvest reinforces the same pressure point: the economy is already paying for climate risk.

If guarantees are the mechanism that allows banks to price and absorb that risk, then their role is not peripheral but foundational at this stage of the journey. They are what convert climate exposure into investable opportunities.

For policymakers, the priority is scale and standardisation. For financial institutions, it is integration into core lending strategy, not side portfolios. For businesses, it is readiness by structuring projects that can meet the threshold for financing.

The transition will not be funded by policy intent or donor goodwill alone. It will be funded by financial structures that make risk acceptable, and capital deployable.

Executives in the manufacturing sector are the most pessimistic about economic growth over the next 12 months, put off by the consequences of the US-Israel war against Iran.

Findings of a latest survey by the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) in March 2026, show that the CEOs of companies in manufacturing had the lowest growth prospects when contrasted to their counterparts in agriculture and services.

Only 37.5 percent of manufacturing firms expected higher growth over the next year, compared to 87.5 percent and 45.7 percent for agriculture and services respectively.

The pessimism in growth prospects among manufacturers came amid mixed expectations on business activity for the second quarter of 2026, where the outlook highlighted a rising cost of doing business driven by higher input costs, elevated energy prices, expected import inflation and supply chain disruptions.

‘The balance of opinion shows a continued pickup in purchase prices/import costs, driven by heightened geopolitical tensions, uncertainty in global energy markets on the impact of US tariffs and policy changes,’ CBK said in the survey.

‘On the other hand, sales prices are expected to register only a marginal increase, as firms cautiously adjust to rising production costs.’

This suggests that manufacturers will largely seek to absorb additional costs resulting from the Iran war shock, as opposed to passing them on to customers through higher prices for goods.

Kenya is battling renewed inflationary pressure amid disruption in the importation of key items, including petroleum products.

The ongoing Middle East war, which first started on February 28, has disrupted activities on the Strait of Hormuz, a global chokepoint serving as an artery for 20 percent of the world’s total oil supply and 30 percent of the world’s maritime trade.

The hit from the fresh wave of geopolitical tensions will compound headwinds on the sector, which is already feeling the heat from US trade tariffs and policy changes that began in April last year.

Manufacturing was among the most impacted sectors from the last wave of external shocks represented by the US trade tariffs alongside tourism and hospitality, financial services, professional services and agriculture.

‘These effects are largely transmitted through elevated cost of imported inputs, which have raised domestic production costs, as well as weakened demand in key export destinations, thereby dampening export performance,’ CBK added.

Manufacturers have cited the business environment as the leading factor constraining firms’ expansion. Other identified constraints include reduced consumer demand, the economic environment, increased taxation and supply chain disruptions.

CBK expects the manufacturing sector to face a significant hit from the ongoing war although the economic segment is still expected to grow faster in 2026 than last year at 3 percent from an estimated 2.2 percent last year.

The apex bank revised Kenya’s growth projection for 2026, earlier this month, from 5.5 percent to 5.3 percent to reflect the emerging risks of the conflict in the Middle East on the performance of some key economic sectors.

‘Higher energy prices attributed to the war in Iran are expected to affect key sectors such as manufacturing, transport and storage, accommodation and food services, and wholesale and retail trade,’ CBK said.

Other global institutions have also cut expectations on Kenya’s growth in 2026 including ratings agency Fitch, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The IMF, which cut its forecast from 4.9 percent to 4.5 percent last week, cited rising energy costs, risks to remittances and export disruptions linked to the war in the Middle East.

Lately, I have noticed a pattern in meetings with clients and colleagues. At some point, the conversation always turns to artificial intelligence (AI). The concern is usually the same: are we heading toward a point where AI replaces communications teams?

It’s a fair question, especially given how quickly these tools have become part of our daily work.

For instance, findings from the 2025 Global AI Survey by McKinsey and Company show that 88 percent of businesses report regular AI use in at least one business function, with generative AI adoption continuing to rise sharply. This is compared with 78 percent a year ago.

In communications, that shift is already visible in day-to-day work. Most AI Tools are now routinely used to draft everything from internal memos to full campaign messaging.

According to the 2026 State of PR, 81.5 percent of senior professionals are very familiar with and actively using AI tools like ChatGPT and Gemini in ideating, drafting, and producing messaging.

There’s no denying the benefits. Work that used to take hours can now be done in minutes, and the output is often clean, structured, and easy to work with. But having spent years in this field, I don’t think job replacement is the real issue we should be worried about.

What concerns me more is something less obvious, but more damaging over time: the rise of what I would call fake authenticity. AI is very good at producing language that sounds right.

It can create content that feels polished, thoughtful, and balanced. The challenge is that many of these tools are trained on similar datasets, so they tend to produce similar outputs.

Over time, you begin to notice that messages across different brands and organisations start to sound alike. Everything is well-written, but very little feels distinctive.

As communications professionals, we know that effectiveness is not just about how something is written. It’s about the thinking behind it, the clarity of the message, and the audience’s understanding.

AI can support the writing process, but it cannot replace the judgment and context that give communication its meaning. While audiences may not always be able to explain why something doesn’t resonate, they can almost always feel it.

When a message is too generic or lacks a clear point of view, people disengage, and it fails to leave a lasting impression.

This becomes even more important in a context where trust is already fragile.

According to Edelman Trust Barometer 2025, trust in institutions remains under pressure globally, and audiences are becoming more selective about what they choose to believe. Therefore, in that kind of environment, sounding polished is not enough; one must ensure that the message feels credible, authentic, and grounded for them to communicate effectively.

We are all witnesses to this on digital platforms. Content that connects tends to be direct, clear, and human, even if it is not perfectly refined. On the other hand, overly polished messaging often struggles to gain traction because it feels distant or overly manufactured. In African markets, for instance, this challenge is even more pronounced.

Communication here is deeply shaped by culture, language, and lived experience. Tone matters. Context matters. Nuance matters. Yet many AI tools are trained primarily on Western data, which means that without careful adaptation, the output can feel generic or slightly out of place.

That is where the real risk lies. Not that AI replaces communicators, but that it gradually erodes the distinctiveness of how we communicate. It also creates a temptation to take shortcuts.

It becomes easier to generate content quickly rather than think through what really needs to be said. It becomes easier to rely on familiar patterns instead of developing original ideas. Over time, that can weaken the quality of communication, even if the output appears strong on the surface.

The way forward is not to avoid AI, but to use it more deliberately. It works best as a support tool, helping to structure ideas and improve efficiency, while leaving the core thinking to the communicator. It should help sharpen your message, not define it.

There is a need for a stronger focus on the point of view. In a space where anyone can generate content, the real differentiator is clarity of perspective. Audiences respond to messages that feel intentional and specific, not ones that try to say everything without saying anything clearly.

In the end, the role of communication has not changed. It is still about building trust and creating meaningful connections. AI can help us do that more efficiently, but it cannot do it for us. And in a world where so much content sounds human, the real advantage will belong to those who remain genuinely so.

Abel Muhatia is a Senior consultant in crisis PR, strategic communications, and reputation management.

Each time oil prices spike in the Gulf, Africa is reminded of an uncomfortable truth: too much of our economic confidence still depends on decisions made far from our shores.

Last week, Brent crude moved back above $100 a barrel after the latest escalation around Iran and the Strait of Hormuz, a corridor that handles about a fifth of global oil trade. For Africa, that is not distant geopolitics. It is a direct tax on transport, food, fertiliser, manufacturing and household budgets.

That is why this moment should not push Africa deeper into anxiety. It should push us into clarity. We have spent too long discussing energy security as if it begins and ends with imported petroleum. It does not.

Real energy sovereignty means building systems that are harder to destabilise from abroad. It means drawing power from what this continent already owns in abundance: sun, wind, water, geothermal heat and the mineral base of the next industrial age.

Africa accounts for just 6.0 percent of global energy use and less than 3.0 percent of global energy-related carbon emissions. Yet we are repeatedly among the first to absorb the economic pain of global fuel shocks.

The hopeful story is not that Africa must discover energy, but that it must value the abundance it already has. The International Energy Agency (IEA) has noted that Africa holds 60 percent of the world’s best solar resources, yet only 1 percent of installed solar photovoltaic (PV) capacity.

This single statistic shows that we are not short of potential. We are short of speed, financing, transmission and political conviction.

Kenya offers proof that a different path is not theoretical. According to the country’s energy regulator, the Energy and Petroleum Regulatory Authority (Epra), renewable sources supplied 78.79 percent of Kenya’s electricity in the second half of 2025, with geothermal alone accounting for 40.06 percent of the energy supplied to the interconnected grid.

This is not a fringe success. It is a serious national asset. It means Kenya already has a stronger foundation for clean industrial growth than many larger economies. The task now is to extend that logic from the grid to the wider economy.

Across the continent, positive trends continue. Ethiopia generated 99.99 percent of its power from renewable sources in 2023, according to the IEA. Morocco approved $32.5 billion in green hydrogen projects in 2025 and aims for 52 percent renewables by 2030.

These advances show clean energy is now a foundation for industrial policy, not just a climate goal.

This is where African ambition must become bolder. Governments should electrify public fleets as policy, not for public relations. Official vehicles, municipal buses and commuter systems should be the guaranteed market for African e-mobility.

Kenya is already moving: its VAT framework retains relief for electric motorcycles, bicycles, solar and lithium-ion batteries and electric buses. Wider charging infrastructure, concessional finance and smarter urban transport policy can turn tax signals into mass adoption.

The market is responding. A 2025 East Africa e-mobility assessment estimated that Kenya had around 9,000 electric vehicles in 2024, more than double the number in 2023, with electric motorcycles making up the bulk of the fleet.

Rwanda had about 500 pure electric four-wheelers and 5,000 electric motorcycles by 2024, supported by incentives and a discounted electricity tariff for public charging.

These are still early numbers, but they show that policy can create momentum long before a market reaches scale. Africa also has no excuse to remain a spectator in the battery economy. The continent already supplies the minerals that make electric mobility possible.

A 2025 factsheet from Agora Verkehrswende notes that the Democratic Republic of Congo produces about 74 percent of current global cobalt output; South Africa and Gabon are major manganese producers; Morocco accounts for around 13 percent of global phosphate output; and countries including Zimbabwe, Namibia, Madagascar, Mozambique and Tanzania are important to lithium and graphite supply.

Yet Africa still exports too much raw value and imports too much finished technology. The World Bank has argued that the EV battery value chain could quadruple the end value of battery minerals mined in Africa. That should be read as a development strategy, not a technical footnote.10,11.

None of this means abandoning the language of biodiversity. On the contrary, it means understanding biodiversity properly. Nature is not only something to protect at the edge of the economy. It is part of the economy’s operating system. Healthy watersheds support hydropower.

Intact landscapes protect rivers, soils and rainfall patterns. Geothermal fields, wind corridors and sun-rich arid lands are all natural infrastructure.

When the African Development Bank says the continent could mobilise an additional $1.43 trillion in domestic resources through deeper reforms and better use of its natural, fiscal, business and human capital, it is pointing to a larger truth: Africa’s real wealth is broader than what comes out of a fuel tanker.12

So the question before us is no longer whether Africa can participate in the energy transition. It already is. Now, will we lead boldly enough to reduce our vulnerability to outside shocks? We can keep importing volatility, or choose to build true sovereignty.

The Technical and Vocational Education and Training Authority (TVETA) has revoked the accreditation of the Kenya Institute of Management (KIM) and ordered the immediate closure of all its campuses, citing violations of training regulations and operations outside its legal mandate.

In a public notice on Monday, the regulator stated that KIM has continued to offer academic and professional programmes without proper accreditation, including the awarding of qualifications that fall outside its approved scope.

TVETA noted that the institution had been offering unapproved programmes and awarding academic qualifications in contravention of the guiding rules, raising concerns over the legitimacy of certificates issued to students.

The authority also flagged the KIM for engaging trainers without valid licences as required by the law, pointing to gaps in compliance with standards governing technical and vocational education in the country.

‘The public is hereby notified that KIM does not have the legal mandate to award qualifications. Consequently, any certificates, diplomas, or other qualifications obtained from the institution beyond 2018 are not recognised for purposes of employment, further education, or professional advancement,’ said the TVETA.

‘All KIM campuses have been closed with immediate effect,’ the notice stated, adding that enforcement action would be taken against institutions found to be operating in breach of regulatory requirements.

The institution states that it was established in 1954 as a nonprofit business school.

It offers seven diploma courses ranging from business management, human resources management, to purchasing and supplies for Sh126,000.

The college also offers eight certificate courses and 15 professional certifications.

The authority did not highlight the courses that are in breach.

KIM on Monday said it was engaging the regulator and would decide its actions later.

‘KAM is currently reviewing the contents of the notice and actively engaging the relevant regulatory authorities to address the issues raised and determine the appropriate course of action in line with the law,’ Dr Muriithi Ndegwa, KIM Chief Executive, said in a social media post.

The development effectively invalidates years of academic output from the institution, placing thousands of current and former students at risk of holding qualifications that may not be accepted in the labour market.

The closure highlights ongoing challenges in Kenya’s technical education sector, where the rapid expansion of private training institutions has at times outpaced regulatory oversight.

Over the past decade, the government has pushed for increased enrolment in technical and vocational education as part of efforts to equip young people with practical skills and reduce unemployment.

The State has identified technical training as a critical pillar in its development agenda, particularly under initiatives aimed at boosting manufacturing, construction and the informal sector. This has led to a proliferation of training centres, some of which have struggled to meet accreditation standards, raising concerns about the quality and credibility of qualifications issued.

A feature in the Business Daily’s March 24 edition captured something real. Young Kenyans are entering forex trading in large numbers, losing money, getting burned, and then-this is the part people avoid-coming back again.

The article calls that resilience. It isn’t. It’s the system doing exactly what it was built to do.

Between 7.6 million and 9.6 million Kenyans aged 18 to 45 have tried trading. That’s not a group of investors. That’s a market.

And inside that market, brokers, signal sellers, course creators, and lifestyle-driven influencers aren’t backing you. They’re running a process. Here’s the number buried beneath everything: up to 94 percent of retail traders lose money.

Most brokers are non-dealing. They earn from activity-spreads, commissions-not your outcome. The moment you open a trade, they get paid. Whether you win or lose doesn’t change their revenue.

You are not the customer. You are the flow. The idea that ‘you learn through pain’ sounds deep, but it’s sloppy thinking. Pain doesn’t make you a better trader. It conditions you to return. And the return is where the money is made.

Not your first deposit-your second, third, fourth. A trader who loses, rethinks, funds again, and repeats is more valuable than someone who tries once and walks away. Everything around you-communities, signals, mentors, content-is built to keep that loop alive.

What you actually learn is this: you were close. The idea worked. The execution just needs fixing. Next time will be different.

That feeling isn’t insight. That’s the hook. The influencer pipeline makes this even clearer.

Creators earn roughly $50-$300 per funded account. Then they earn a share of every trade that account makes-for as long as it trades.

Let that sink in. A creator who sends 500 traders who all lose quickly can earn more than one who sends 50 traders who actually perform well. The model doesn’t reward your success.

It rewards your participation. The cars, the travel, the ‘results’ – none of that proves profitable trading. It proves audience conversion.

They don’t need to understand the market. They need to understand how to pull you in.

The traders in that article are not failing because they’re lazy or undisciplined. They’re failing because they walked into a structure designed to extract capital from retail – repeatedly, gradually, and convincingly.

Small wins keep you engaged. Losses push you to adjust. Adjustments lead to re-entry.

The loop continues. Effort doesn’t break that structure. Understanding it does.

That’s the point behind The House Always Wins. Not to kill ambition. Not to claim nobody succeeds.

But to show – without noise, without hype – what the system actually is. Because once you see it clearly, continuing the same way stops being ignorance.

It becomes a decision. And from there, responsibility shifts to you.

The Treasury has cut the net amount it expects to borrow from external lenders in the current financial year by Sh61.6 billion to Sh225.8 billion, reflecting delays in accessing loans from multilateral lenders and falling interest rates that have made domestic borrowing cheaper.

The external target has been cut despite the budget deficit going up by Sh323.4 billion to Sh1.22 trillion in the Supplementary I 2025/2026 Budget that was passed last week. In response, the Treasury has raised the net domestic borrowing target by Sh385.1 billion to Sh998.6 billion in the mini budget.

In the June 2025 budget, Kenya had pencilled in an expected drawdown of Sh170.5 billion from the World Bank’s Development Policy Operation (DPO) funding framework, before revising the target down to about $750 million (Sh97 billion).

This amount is yet to materialise after the World Bank expressed concerns about delayed reforms in fiscal management, governance and tackling conflict of interest among public officials.

In a presentation to investors on the sidelines of last week’s World Bank and IMF Spring meetings, the Treasury indicated that the revised external target was still inclusive of the DPO loan, adding that it had made progress in implementing the required actions to unlock the funding.

At the same time, Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) Governor Kamau Thugge said that Kenya was pursuing a separate emergency funding package from the World Bank to cushion the economy from shocks related to the Iran war.

However, the exchequer warned that failure to unlock the World Bank funds could result in yet another upward revision of the domestic borrowing target.

‘The revision in the external target points to a financing issue, looking at the DPO reduction, and the fact that we have not seen progress on the $1 billion (Sh129 billion) second tranche of the UAE-backed loan,’ said Churchill Ogutu, an economist at Capital A Investment Bank.

‘The lower domestic interest rates and high liquidity in the market have been a good coincidence therefore for the government, allowing the domestic market to come in and plug the higher budget deficit.’

Domestic interest rates have been on a downward trend since August 2024, coinciding with the CBK cutting its base rate from 13 percent to 8.75 percent in the course of 10 consecutive monetary policy committee meetings.

The latest meeting on April 8, however saw the MPC hold the rate at the current level of 8.75 percent, citing concerns about possible inflationary pressure due to the war in Iran.

At the same time, the interest rates on government bonds have come down to a range of 11 percent to 13 percent, from highs of 18 percent in 2024, while Treasury bill rates are now ranging between 7.4 percent and 8.3 percent, down from 15 percent to 17 percent in mid-2024.

In the 2024/2025 fiscal year, the government also cut the external borrowing target while expanding domestic borrowing, following similar struggles to meet conditions set by multilateral lenders.

The budget statement of June 2024 had set the deficit at Sh597 billion, which was to be financed through domestic borrowing of Sh263.2 billion, and external funding worth Sh333.8 billion.

Three revisions through supplementary budgets followed, with the deficit expanding to Sh997.5 billion in the mini budget of June 2025 and net domestic borrowing set at Sh815.6 billion-three times the original projection.

The government ended up breaching this target in its final budget outcome where the total deficit settled at Sh1.034 trillion, financed through domestic borrowing of Sh854.5 billion and external borrowing of Sh179.7 billion.