Category: Business Daily

Tax base expansion plays a dual role: improving tax equity by raising revenue while reducing the overall burden. Kenya’s tax policy borrows from the OECD’s minimum rate benchmarks, including Significant Economic Presence rules. The OECD further identifies three pathways that support business sustainability-strong institutions, direct support, and hybrid policy designs.

In Kenya, KRA and the Business Registration Service (BRS) anchor taxation and licensing. The adoption of the UK Companies Act in 2015 marked a major step in deregulation, boosting the formation and visibility of local start-ups across supply chains.

Direct support involves building ecosystems that help businesses move from incubation to industrial stability through financing, training, mentorship and access to market information.

Without timely information, however, incentives can deepen market asymmetry, allowing large firms to dominate. Tax rebates such as Industrial Deduction Allowances, though powerful, tend to benefit large investors with access to high-level advisory services and the capacity to recover tax credits tied to heavy capital expenditure.

Financial institutions remain essential to enterprise growth.

Banks like KCB and Ecobank have intervened in dairy value chains, clean energy for schools and cottage industries, and gender-responsive credit programmes. Yet a closer look at Ecobank’s operations shows stronger investment footprints in West Africa than in Kenya-an indication that local banks must scale up support for home-grown projects.

Comparatively, the BRS Registry holds millions of dormant firms created mainly to access state tenders, only to be derailed by policy inconsistencies.

Botswana offers a contrast, with a successful hybrid model of part-grant, part-loan financing, predictable tax bands and the kgotla culture of public consensus-building. Corruption does not stifle start-ups at infancy.

Kenya, by contrast, frequently alters tax policies. From January 2026, all individual tax-deductible expenses must be validated on iTax-a shift that will increase audit and filing costs for SMEs. Even so, Kenya retains stronger market frontiers than Botswana.

To borrow from Barack Obama, the climb may be steep, but it leads to a better place. KRA must find the right policy mix to turn Kenya’s diversity into a stronger, expanded tax base.

NCBA Investment Bank has launched two offshore special funds for investors seeking exposure to international markets, joining other wealth managers that have introduced similar products that are popular with high-net-worth investors.

The company has joined other firms offering international market exposure including Standard Investment Bank (SIB) with MansaX and Faida Investment Bank with its OAK special fund.

The NCBA Global Equity and Fixed Income Special Funds will enable savers seeking long-term diversification to access international markets through a regulated, dollar-denominated structure.

The funds offer access to a wide range of global assets, allowing for diversification beyond traditional Kenyan unit trusts.

‘These [funds] invest in assets around the world and nothing to do with Kenya, and the genesis of them was to help our clients diversify and have exposure to the global markets in a way that is safe. We are not trying to take risks but manage their money in a diligent and trustworthy way in order to earn a good return,’ said Muathi Kilonzo, the managing director at NCBA Investment Bank.

The firm is looking to tap about 6,800 high net worth individuals, its diaspora clients and corporate customers engaging in international trade, with a minimum entry of $1,000 (Sh129,500) for each of the funds.

The funds rely on Exchange-Traded Fund portfolios that draw exposure from the United States, Europe, Asia and emerging markets.

‘We’re utilising our global presence, market knowledge and expertise to create a solid offshore investment setup.

Our goal is to ensure it meets all regulatory standards in various markets and truly connects with our clients’ needs, helping them invest their capital safely while aiming for reliable returns,’ Mr Kilonzo said.

‘It was client demand. Our clients were asking us to start giving them a diverse bouquet of solutions, people wanted to invest outside Kenya and diversify, we are doing so elsewhere but they wanted a brand like NCBA to give them a solution.’

Fund managers have been keen to introduce and grow special investment schemes that typically charge higher fees, compared to traditional investment assets as more Kenyans seek to diversify their portfolios beyond the local equities and fixed income assets.

A special fund is a type of a collective investment scheme that invests based on a fund manager’s strategy, and largely covers non-traditional assets such as real estate, private equity, offshore stocks and commodities.

The creation of the special funds has allowed fund managers to not only earn higher returns for clients from non-traditional assets such as offshore instruments but also helped them raise their fee income.

Total special funds’ assets under management touched Sh113.3 billion at the end of June this year, according to the Capital Markets Authority.

The dramatic weakening of the shilling to record lows seen in January 2024, is among the reasons that have drawn investor interest in assets denominated in hard currencies.

If you work in infrastructure, finance, or the wide grey zone between the two, you already know that big ambitions die quietly without the right partnerships.

In markets like ours, capital doesn’t move just because a project or an idea is brilliant, it moves because risk is understood, shared, mitigated, and sometimes nudged along by those brave (or stubborn) enough to insist that African markets can, and should, finance their own growth. Period.

That is the work Dhamana was built to do. And on November 18th, we proved it.

Dhamana announced its first guarantee-backed transaction: a KES 2.5 billion (~ USD 20 million) financing arrangement to solarise and hybridise Safaricom’s base transceiver stations across Kenya. This multi-party deal brought together Ofgen (the project developer), Safaricom (the off-taker), Middle East Bank (initial lender), Absa (takeout financier), and Dhamana as the guarantor enabling the entire structure to happen in local currency.

It’s one of the largest telecom modernisation and solar-hybridisation efforts in East Africa, and it isn’t just a clean-energy win, it’s proof of concept that local capital can support climate-resilient infrastructure when risk is intelligently mitigated and aligned.

In the words of our CEO Christopher Olobo, ‘Guarantees serve as an essential link between aspiration and investment. transforming a technical solution into a viable local-currency project that domestic capital providers can support confidently.’

He’s right. And this confidence shift is exactly why Dhamana exists.

So, why partnerships matter and why Dhamana is built on them? Infrastructure takes a village. A very technical, capital-heavy, risk-sensitive village. Partnerships are not mono, they are the operating system.

When people ask, ‘What’s the right time to pursue partnerships?’ the real answer is, before you think you need them. Partnerships work best when they’re not a last-minute fix, but part of the design.

At Dhamana, partnerships are foundational. Our shareholders are themselves evidence of what strategic alignment looks like. PIDG’s project development arm – Africa (InfraCo) have helped set up InfraZamin in Pakistan, InfraCredit in Nigeria, and supported GuarantCo across multiple frontier markets, institutions that have unlocked billions for infrastructure and proven the viability of guarantee models in tough environments. Our establishment for the East African market was the logical next step.

CPF Group, a local county pension fund and one of Kenya’s strongest advocates for local-currency investment, has been instrumental in pushing the conversation on domestic capital mobilisation.

And that conversation matters. Pension funds in Kenya, Uganda, and Rwanda collectively hold roughly USD 30 billion. Yet less than 10% is allocated to infrastructure, and even that is often untapped. We like to talk about ‘mobilising domestic capital,’ but let’s be honest, it’s hard to mobilise money that is allergic to risk. And pension funds are risk-averse for good reason, they hold you and I’s money, the life savings of millions.

But sometimes the biggest risk is the perception of risk. On the 18th November at Dhamana’s LC Investments event, CPF Group’s CEO Dr Hosea Kili accurately described it, our markets suffer from ‘risk inertia’, a reluctance to change our assumptions even when conditions evolve. Partnerships help break this inertia. Guarantees help break it faster.

As East Africa’s local-currency infrastructure guarantor, Dhamana sits precisely in that uncomfortable space between opportunity and hesitation. Our job is to create enough confidence for domestic capital to enter sectors it traditionally tiptoes around.

In this transaction, our guarantee de-risked a complex, multi-stage financing structure. By absorbing specific takeout and credit risks, Dhamana unlocked participation from Absa and Middle East Bank, both deploying local currency and both reducing exposure to FX volatility, which has quietly killed many well-meaning projects across the continent.

More importantly, this is replicable. As Absa’s Vice President Andrew Awilly put it, this model has ‘potential for replication across Africa’ and replication is where transformation happens.

The African Development Bank’s participation in our establishment was, frankly, obvious. They’ve spent decades championing development finance, resource mobilisation, and the very mechanisms (like blended finance and partial guarantees) that we are now applying in East Africa.

Their approach has always been consistent: Reduce barriers, derisk markets, and crowd in capital.

With the AfDB, the conversation has never been about charity, it’s about scale. It’s about getting African institutions to trust African opportunities. And for a guarantor like Dhamana, that alignment is invaluable.

The hurdles are real. But so is the opportunity. East Africa has the capital, the appetite, and the ambition. Dhamana’s work sits directly in that gap, helping shift markets from ‘risk inertia’ to informed confidence.

As Partnerships and Communications Officer, I see every day how partnerships reshape mandates. They enable, they contribute, they amplify. They move us from talking about potential to structuring it, financing it, and delivering it.

And if this first deal is any indication, East Africa’s infrastructure future will not be defined by hesitation…it will be defined by collaboration, boldness, and the insistence that local solutions deserve local capital.

Because when partnerships are intentional, aligned, and built on actual needs, they don’t just support a mandate…they move it forward.

Kenya is expected to establish a dedicated national e-commerce regulation unit as part of sweeping new regional rules, aimed at harmonising digital trade across eastern and southern Africa and improving consumer welfare in fast-growing digital markets.

The Model E-Commerce Policy for the eastern and southern Africa and Indian Ocean regions recommends that every member state creates a National E-Commerce Unit to coordinate regulation, oversee digital marketplaces and streamline policy implementation.

The proposal marks a shift from the current trajectory in Kenya, where legislation is underway to place the entire industry under the Competition Authority of Kenya (CAK), the country’s main consumer protection agency.

Experts from 29 countries under Comesa, the East African Community, Southern African Development Community , Inter-Governmental Authority on Development and the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) endorsed the new proposals at a meeting in Nairobi on Monday.

Currently, most countries, including Kenya, rely on multiple regulators such as communications authorities, competition agencies and data protection offices to police online commerce. The policy argues that this fragmentation weakens enforcement, slows cross-border trade and creates uncertainty for businesses.

‘Findings show fragmented governance, overlapping mandates, weak enforcement, and limited coordination with private sector and civil society,’ reads the proposed policy.

‘Recommendations include establishing national e-commerce units, developing harmonized laws, enhancing coordination, strengthening consumer protection, and ensuring policy alignment across regional economic communities.’

If adopted, the reforms could reshape how Kenya regulates online marketplaces, digital payments, advertising, refunds, complaints and platform dominance – areas that have expanded rapidly but lack a unified oversight mechanism.

CAK is currently seeking amendments to the Competition Act to give it sole authority over e-commerce and digital markets, a move local experts warn could stifle innovation.

Comesa, which coordinated the development of the regional policy, says countries will be free to choose where the new units are housed – within communications regulators, competition watchdogs or State ministries.

‘At the national level, there are a lot of dynamics, so we can only recommend, but the choice and the decision is ultimately that of the member States,’ said Benard Dzwanda, Comesa’s director of infrastructure and logistics.

CAK could therefore create an additional department to handle e-commerce and digital trade, drawing expertise from data protection and communications agencies, or a fully separate entity could be established.

Kenya is currently consulting on its draft National E-Commerce Policy, which does not explicitly provide for a national e-commerce unit.

The new regional framework increases pressure on Nairobi to revisit its approach as it advances the next phase of digital-economy reforms.

If the government adopts the recommendation, Kenya would join other member states expected to reconfigure their regulatory systems to meet the standards set out in the model policy.

The State-owned Pyrethrum Processing Company of Kenya (PPCK) remains trapped by a Sh3.5 billion debt after a failed asset sale derailed the restructuring plan meant to clear long-standing financial obligations.

The aborted disposal was intended to unlock part of the firm’s Sh6 billion asset base, but delays during the transition from the defunct Pyrethrum Board halted the process before any assets could be sold.

At a Senate session last week, Agriculture Cabinet Secretary Mutahi Kagwe said that the liabilities include supplier arrears and staff pensions accumulated over several years of institutional decline.

‘The debt portfolio is some Sh3.5 billion, and this debt is essentially owed to suppliers and staff pension.. The organisation has an asset portfolio of about Sh6 billion, so it is possible for us to cover the debt once we sell (the assets),’ said Mr Kagwe.

‘The process of doing so hit a problem at some point. The movement from the original company to this organisation, the transition period, the valuation of those assets and so on and so forth, delayed everything about the sale of the assets.’

CS Kagwe said that payments to farmer remain outstanding to the tune of about Sh10 million for flowers delivered between August and October this year, highlighting the processor’s fragile cash position.

Historical delays in payments remain a major cause of farmer quitting, with the Mr Kagwe observing that people stopped farming pyrethrum because they were not being paid on time, weakening production across key counties.

The halted assets sale prevented the company from cleaning its balance sheet, making it unattractive to investors and preventing it from rebuilding a consistent working capital for processing and farmer advances.

The debt crisis has intensified strain within the pyrethrum value chain, undermining confidence in a crop that was once central to Kenya’s position in the global natural insecticide market.

Overall output remains well below potential, limiting Kenya’s ability to supply markets that demand natural insecticides in the wake of restrictions on synthetic pesticides in multiple jurisdictions.

The CS revealed that he has drafted a memo to be presented to the Cabinet, proposing that the handover of the company to private management once the debts have been cleared and valuations updated.

To this end, a fresh valuation will be conducted to reactivate the disposal plan. Mr Kagwe noted that the previous valuation no longer reflects current asset values.

‘The only way, in our view, in terms of policy structure that we can have a future within the pyrethrum sector is to involve the private sector,’ Mr Kagwe told senators.

‘There’s a Cabinet memo at the moment, which I have done, and we’re working with the Treasury to see whether we can go into leasing of the Pyrethrum Processing Company of Kenya. Once Cabinet agrees that we lease the organisation, we will need to go through the entire valuation of the assets again.’

A few years ago, I was walking by the poolside at the Muthaiga Country Club to my table, when I spotted my dear friend Bob Munro, (now deceased). He was there with his family and with his friend Michael Hopkins, to whom he introduced me.

Since then, Prof Hopkins and I became close friends as well, but equally sadly he too passed away recently- a few weeks before his eightieth birthday.

For the last few years, Prof Hopkins had been living part of his time in Malindi, part in Nairobi and part in France near the Swiss border, in each location continuing to pursue his passion for corporate social responsibility (CSR), where he had been a pioneer in developing sustainable frameworks.

He authored numerous books on the subject, including periodic updates, and he was also a visiting professor at many universities, including Management University Africa here in Nairobi.

He also published a series of blogs, condemning the awfulness of Brexit, which he later collected into a book called Brrrexit!.

Prof Hopkins was greatly in demand for interacting with students on the highly topical subject of sustainability, as well as with corporates around Europe, in India, Mauritius and elsewhere. He was also in demand with me, as he became my guide on CSR and sustainability, plus the closely related ESG issues – on Environment, Social and Governance.

I particularly admired him for his ‘systems thinking’, urging those with whom he interacted to integrate their ESG strategies with their overall ones. And another point he liked to make was not to confine CSR activity to the for-profit private sector but also to not-for-profits and to the public sector. Great thoughts! Plus to have sufficient but not excessive regulations for it.

I quoted him in a couple of my articles on such subjects in this column, and we participated in a joint book launch at the Westgate bookshop, he-with his CSR volume, ‘From the Margins to the Mainstream’ and I-with a collection of my articles on ESG.

Prof Hopkins and I linked up in several other related ways. He introduced me to Prof Mike Saks, his UK colleague who also specialised in such fields, and the three of us co-founded the UK-centred International Responsible Leadership organisation, which promotes such kind of leadership around the world.

Prof Hopkins may have been a much-respected academic in his field, but I don’t think I’ve ever come across such a jolly fellow, whose laughter so often filled the room.

He was a joker, not least about himself, and he and I would always have such a happy time together, whether just on the phone or in person.

His jolliness, his very firm values and his areas of interest also led me to introduce him to my Rotary Club of Nairobi, where he would nudge us into building sustainability into our community projects. Not surprisingly, his commonest phrases were to ‘treat others the way you want them to treat you,’ and to ‘treat all key stakeholders responsibly’, very aligned with Rotary thinking.

Prof Hopkins became a very popular member, often staying behind after our weekly lunch meetings to chat further, with a few members. And when he passed away, a great sense of sadness swept over the club.

Just recently Rosemary Wahome, herself in the sustainability business, asked me if I’ve thought about how to honour Prof Hopkins contributions to sustainability, and it immediately occurred to me to propose a sustainability award in his memory to our Rotary Club. Discussions on this are under way.

On November 16 – Prof Hopkins’ 80th birthday – a memorial service was held in Malindi to celebrate his life, with his son William and daughter Eve present.

And following this, his cremated remains were carried out on a boat and sprinkled into the Indian Ocean. Unfortunately I couldn’t be there to eulogise my buddy, but happily I have this opportunity to write about him.

We will continue learning from Prof Hopkins about CSR and sustainability through his writing and remembering what he taught us, and it will keep reminding us of his permanently on-display sense of humour and his jolly laughter.

The battlefields of 2020s and beyond are currency corridors, energy chokepoints and strategic resource chains. The economy is not a parallel theatre; it is the theatre.

The most serious threats to Kenya today do not just wear boots, suicide vests or carry rocket-propelled grenades, cross borders, or announce themselves on intelligence advisories.

They arrive quietly – through markets, cables, grids and pin-stripe suits wielding contracts and commercial agreements we clap for without reading the fine print.

Modern power doesn’t storm the gates; it buys the land around the fortress until the fortress is an island. It builds a moat around the resource, not to protect but to exploit it. We have already been warned by reality, more than once.

When our Eurobond yields shot up and rolled us into an expensive corner, it wasn’t simply a ‘market reaction.’ It was a lesson: sovereignty can be squeezed through interest rates and access to capital. Financial pressure is a form of state pressure.

We negotiated, refinanced, extended, repackaged – but beneath the financial engineering was a truth we didn’t say out loud: our economic flank is exposed, and exposure is a security issue, not just a fiscal one.

It doesn’t help that Kenya is still lurking in the dark corridors of anti-money laundering and counter terrorism financing grey list globally; the implication isn’t just enhanced scrutiny on financial transactions and increased cost of compliance – it is a strainer on inbound capital itself.

A potential reason for capital flight.

Then the lights went out – repeatedly – and not in remote corners of the republic, but at the nerve centres of our economy. Nairobi went dark. Jomo Kenyatta International Airport fell silent, runways dead, terminals lit by backup systems not designed to carry a nation’s reputation.

The grapevine on internet platforms like X (formerly Twitter) about the reasons for such wide-sweeping blackouts has not helped Kenya’s reputation either. No foreign adversary needed to test our airspace; the country demonstrated, unprovoked, how to bring itself to its knees.

Multiple times. It should never take more than one airport blackout for a serious state to update its doctrine on energy as a national security asset. It is an opinion that having Kenya Power Company as the only national utility scale power distributer is a national security concern in itself.

Our mineral story – or more accurately, our mineral habit – is another window into how casually we treat the assets that the world considers strategic. In a century defined by rare earths, lithium, cobalt, niobium and graphite, we still sign mining licences as if they are real estate leases.

Other nations treat those resources as bargaining chips for their future industrial capacity. We treat them as ribbon-cutting opportunities. The difference is philosophical, not administrative.

It is the difference between seeing minerals as revenue and seeing them as leverage. It is now out there, global powers like China and the US showing a keen interest in our rare earth reserves, estimated to be worth about two thirds of our current debt stock, about $62 billion.

Minerals licences are not merely commercial instruments; the world treats them as geopolitical assets. Mrima Hills is certainly atop US Vice President JD Vance’s agenda when he visits. We will concede ground, given the president’s blunder in foreign relations with former Us President Joe Biden. But what will we get in return for the conceded ground? Or perhaps, forgone revenue?

There will be national security consequences to this – but econnomic in nature and may fly over the heads of the current state bureaucrats.

Instead of allowing a non-exploitation concession on the rare earth elemsnts, we could get into a mutually beneficial relationship into building a rare earth refinery – setting us up for major defence, space and global electronics supply chain race.

The economic multiplier around that would be able to inject over $240 billion into the Kenyan gross doemstic product over the next 10-15 years and creating thousands of jobs in the process. That is a strategic national security imperative.

When you look beyond us, the Nord Stream sabotage in Europe didn’t just destroyed two pipelines; it rewired the continent’s entire thinking about energy, alliances and vulnerability.

China’s export controls on rare earths, gallium, germanium and advanced battery technology weren’t mere trade decisions – they were strategic manoeuvres, to remind the world that controlling supply chains can be more decisive than controlling armies. Energy and minerals are now geopolitical instruments. This is not theory. It is the operating system of modern power.

In Kenya, we have structured our national security imagination as if the only legitimate threats are those that can be confronted in uniform. Defence, intelligence and policing remain vital pillars – but power has migrated, and our thinking has not caught the flight. As it stands, we have perfected exceptional talent in mastering structure instead of leverage.

So what would a state that actually intended to keep its future look like?

A serious republic would not design a national security architecture that excludes the custodians of its currency, its energy lifelines and its economic bargaining chips from the core of strategic decision-making. You cannot defend a country’s sovereignty if the stewards of the economy and the stewards of the energy system sit outside the room, where security strategy is defined.

Imagine a small, concentrated office: an advisor who is not ornamental but obligatory, whose job is not to whisper in corridors but to convene the minds that can translate risk into plan, and plan into executed contingency.

Imagine Treasury on the core panel of security decisions because finance is where coercion often begins.

Imagine Energy at the table because when the lights go out, the social contract frays faster than the printed slogans in our press conferences. Imagine a requirement – not a suggestion – that any strategic concession, infrastructure contract, or cross-border asset transfer arrive with a security-impact assessment and a mitigation plan.

You manage risk by naming it, by assigning authority, and by making failure expensive and public. The alternative is improvisation in the teeth of catastrophe, and improvisation is the luxury of those whose options have not yet been exhausted by miscalculation.

A state that confuses the comfort of ceremony, with the rigor of preparedness is a state that will discover its limits in messy, irreversible ways. Put Treasury and Energy into the National Security Council by law. Institutionalise a National Security Advisor to integrate defence, intelligence, finance, energy, cyber and minerals.

This is not bureaucratic cosmetics. It is how sovereign states survive the century. National security is no longer a uniformed domain – it is a whole-of-state discipline. It requires a mind at the centre that integrates defence, intelligence, economic resilience, energy stability, technological sovereignty and resource strategy into a single national posture. Many countries call that role a National Security Advisor.

We treat it as optional decor. A third-rate aide to the president, when this is the individual that ought to consolidate military, civilian, economic and energy intelligence into a presidential daily advisory brief.

The state must stand tall at all times as an organ of resilience. Regimes fail; the state must always endure. There is dignity in admitting that the world has changed, and Kenya must change with it or perish.

As Europeans started getting comfortable living in Kenya in the early 1900s, they gradually established private member clubs, where settlers would gather to enjoy games and to dine as they socialised.

After independence, the clubs shifted from being a whites-only affair, though the elites of the young republic maintained the traditions of their erstwhile colonisers.

Today, as some of the clubs mark a century of existence, there is the burning question of whether they are locking out the youthful populations through their pricing policies and the rules of engagement.

‘There are some clubs where most people are old generation and the young men have not come in,’ says Mr Felix Okatch, one of the directors at the United Kenya Club.

Mr Okatch, who has been a member of one club or another since 1983, says clubs should make it conducive for young people to join as they form the majority of the population.

‘I encourage young men to join, particularly those who have started business,’ Mr Okatch notes.

Private member clubs, which are designed to be a confluence point for the wealthy, exist for various reasons.

‘One benefit is social, where people of a class come together – those who are capable or the top cream,’ says Mr Okatch, who is also an author.

‘Over time, these clubs have developed facilities like golf, squash, cricket, lawn tennis, swimming pool, gym, and many more activities. The clubs also have bars, restaurants, accommodation, and some have apartments.’

The clubs also help businesspeople as they can be used to host crucial meetings.

‘You come with a car, you park, then you secure a deal,’ says Mr Okatch.

Another benefit is that a member of a club in one part of Kenya can travel to another part of the country and enjoy benefits of another club if the two have a reciprocating arrangement.

‘If somebody’s in Eldoret Club, he can go to Nyanza Club, to Nyeri Club, Mombasa Club, Kitale Club, and enjoy like the other [members],’ says Mr Okatch.

The clubs are also known for the strict rules they enforce. There are guidelines on the dress code, conduct within the premises, welcoming guests, among others.

In a number of the clubs, making a phone call in some spaces can earn someone a fine. Some do not permit wearing a cap in some areas while others prohibit donning denim clothing. A collarless T-shirt is hardly allowed in most clubs, as are sandals.

A recently determined court case, pitting lawyer Donald Kipkorir against the Muthaiga Country Club, revealed how stringent some of the requirements can be. Mr Kipkorir was denied entry at the club in August 2024 on various grounds.

Mr Kipkorir later sued the club, saying the manner in which he had been turned away went against his right to dignity as no sufficient explanation was given.

The court heard that the lawyer visited the premises to meet his clients who are members of the club. However, on that day, he was denied entry. The club argued that it reserved the right of admission, noting that even though its more than 6,500 members are free to invite guests, its by-laws prohibit admission of non-members who are not in reciprocating clubs.

The club said an earlier incident in October 2022, where the lawyer was also denied entry but later allowed in, informed their decision.

Mr Kipkorir said he was treated ‘like a stray dog, a homeless hound that had trespassed on the hallowed grounds of the privileged elite’. A Nairobi court agreed with the lawyer’s arguments and awarded him Sh1 million in damages.

With strictly enforced laws and an old guard not willing to depart from the traditional way of doing things, younger Kenyans in the private clubs ecosystem have sometimes been dismissed as lowering the standards. A former chairman of a private club who spoke with Nation Lifestyle held this view, though he did not wish to share his remarks on record.

We spoke to Jessy Ndegwa, the chairman of the Ruiru Sports Club, and asked him: ‘Is your club doing enough to attract younger members?’

He was candid enough to admit that there are no products targeting youth of 35 and below.

‘However, this being a family-oriented club, we have conversions from junior members to single members. And we have a lot of those. When you have a family [package], the club allows your children to transition to single membership after 25 years. So, what we have, we don’t let go of. We encourage them to graduate and take responsibility for their own membership,’ he says.

Graduating junior members to the senior category after the age of 25 is a common phenomenon in private member clubs across the country. The Wadi Degla clubs-Kenya, a recent entrant in the space, also considers 25 as the age when junior membership ends.

‘They will only pay a subscription [upon converting to single members]. They will not pay entry fees,’ says Mr Ndegwa.

To obtain family membership at the Ruiru club, one needs to pay Sh600,000. To become an individual member, on the other hand, one needs to pay Sh450,000. On top of the membership fee, a member of Ruiru Sports Club should pay an annual subscription fee of Sh24,000 for the family package and Sh16,000 for the individual package.

That isn’t too far from what other clubs charge. As per the last published rates online, the Royal Nairobi Golf Club that has been in existence since 1906 charges a joining fee of Sh595,000 and an annual subscription of Sh61,460.

The Parklands Sports Club, which will be 120 years old next year, charges a full member admission fee of Sh775,000.

The United Kenya Club, on the other hand, charges Sh150,000 to admit a member living in the city, with a Sh20,000 annual subscription required.

Asked whether the fees are too high to discourage younger Kenyans, Mr Ndegwa says: ‘True and not true.’

He notes that besides the option of juniors graduating to full members after their 25th birthdays, there are occasional membership discounts that prospective signees can grab.

‘Sometimes we have [recruitment] drives. So, for those who want to join and they do not have resources right now, I encourage them to keep looking out for when we have drives. And during drives, sometimes we give up to 50 percent of the classes that we present to potential members,’ he says.

A top contributor to younger Kenyans joining private clubs is the fact that some corporates have been buying membership for some of their staff.

Mr Okatch, who is a marketer by profession, joined his first club because his employer paid for it.

‘The aim then was for me to meet people who matter in business circles. In the club, there was encouragement for me to play golf as my children were busy enjoying swimming and other things,’ he says.

The United Kenya Club, where he is a director, has a package for corporate membership where a company can pay Sh650,000 to admit up to five employees. This is followed by an annual subscription of Sh100,000 for the members.

The thinking behind some employers getting their staff in such clubs, he says, is to give them access to potential clients.

‘It’s not to sell your product, but to meet the who-is-who. It opens ways for you to get into the marketing field,’ argues Mr Okatch. ‘Corporate organisations can pay for their members up to Sh1 million.because you meet those who matter.’

Dr Mike Iravo, a specialist in human resources management and a lecturer at the Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology, says there are many benefits that an employer gets from buying club membership for an employee.

He adds that such an arrangement can improve “productivity, motivation, among many other things that an individual employee would benefit [from]’.

Asked what portion among the 2,800 members of Ruiru Sports Club were brought in by corporates, Mr Ndegwa says there is less than five percent. He attributes this to the fact that Ruiru has not been widely known.

‘Ruiru, until recently, was not known in the circles of clubs. The clubs that were known were Muthaiga, Karen, Limuru, and Sigona,’ he says, noting that the club – which sits on 235 acres of land – is currently on a rapid expansion drive, driven by a 45-year masterplan.

The benefit a corporate gets by buying club membership for staff, Mr Ndegwa says, is that it gets ready buyers.

‘Being a member, knowing that you are going to interact with these people day in, day out, every other week, gives you an opportunity for people whom you would not have spoken to if you met in the streets just like that. But in the evening here, if you join a table, you join as a member and it is very easy to start a conversation. And they already trust you and you already trust each other,’ says Mr Ndegwa.

The World Bank Group has linked entrenched market dominance and weak competition in sectors such as electricity, telecommunications and fertiliser distribution to stagnating investments and expansion of formal jobs in Kenya.

The multilateral lender said in a report that domination by a few powerful players in the key economic sectors is raising business costs, suppressing investments and constraining expansion of firms that drive formal employment.

The World Bank’s latest Kenya Economic Update unveiled Monday lists Safaricom in telecommunications and Kenya Power in electricity distribution among firms operating under weak competition policies.

Kenya Power, the report states, retains a near-monopoly over electricity distribution and influences tariffs and reliability of energy.

This translates into high prices, limited alternatives, and slow efficiency gains, which curb growth in investments in labour-intensive sectors such as manufacturing.

Manufacturers- who have one of the biggest potential to generate large volumes of formal jobs- have over the years partly blamed high cost of electricity as a barrier to scaling operations.

Safaricom’s tight grip on mobile money and data services, the World Bank’s report suggests, has shaped pricing and market access in ways that smaller digital players struggle to overcome.

The lender says that Safaricom’s mobile broadband prices for monthly bundles, for example, are higher than those of its competitors in Kenya and in key regional markets such as Ghana, Nigeria, Rwanda and Zambia.

These distortions, the report goes on, are feeding directly into Kenya’s shrinking share of formal jobs.

‘Kenya has the foundations of a strong economy but unlocking its full potential requires reducing distortions, further opening markets and ensuring that policy frameworks are transparent, predictable and grounded in evidence,’ World Bank Country Director Qimiao Fan said during the launch of the Kenya Economic Update.

Citing data from the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, the report shows that despite Kenya creating 782,000 jobs in 2024, nearly nine of 10 jobs created were informal. The share of Kenya’s formal employment has fallen from 18.5 percent in 2010 to 15.5 percent in 2024, a trend the bank attributes partly to weak competition that raises input costs and limits firm growth.

The report identifies Kenya as having the most restrictive product market regulations among all countries with available global data, with an overall Product Market Regulation (PMR) score of 2.92.

This poor scoring – driven by firms operating behind protective barriers rather than earning market share through efficiency, innovation, or better products – has stifled private investment, limited new entries, and slowed formal job creation.

The result is an economy where the informal sector – characterised by low-productivity activities with limited earnings, security and prospects for growth – dominates job creation.

‘When you have competition, prices go down and Kenyans can buy more for their money. And that means more demand for goods and services which means more jobs within the economy,’ World Bank economist for finance competitiveness and investments Ryan Kuo said.

Mr Kuo added that competition also improves productivity, enabling firms to generate more value per worker and pay higher wages.

‘When competition is fair and vigorous, it means firms are always trying to improve their productivity. The net effect is that average wages go up,’ he said.

Kenya, the economist said, has unusually high gross operating surpluses – higher than in competitive advanced economies – indicating that dominant firms in Kenya could be charging above-cost prices due to low competitive pressure.

The report cites the State-funded fertiliser subsidy programme – which relies on a narrow distribution chain controlled by leading suppliers Yara and ETG – has created geographic distortions, reduced availability of high-demand blends and locked out many private players.

The weak competition in the subsidised input market, the World Bank says, has suppressed agricultural productivity, thereby slowing growth in formal jobs in agri-processing, logistics and retail sectors.

Kenya’s transport sector, on the other hand, suffers from opaque licensing, regulatory fragmentation and barriers to market entry, raising logistics costs which hurt margins for manufacturers and exporters.

Albert Mwenda, the director-general for budget, fiscal and economic affairs at the Treasury, said that Kenya’s dominant micro and small-sized enterprises have made it difficult to enforce competition policies because they ‘fear formalisation’ and prefer to operate outside structures where competition policy can reach them.

‘Competition works well if there are more people working in the formal economy. Competition policy will be effectively implemented if we have more people working in the formal economy,’ Mr Mwenda said. ‘We have a challenge especially in the informal sector – the MSMEs – where the experience we have seen, through the credit guaranteed scheme, is that there is a fear of formalising operations.’

Competition Authority of Kenya (CAK) director-general David Kemei said in a speech that the agency was widening its focus beyond enforcement to advocacy in collaboration with other regulators.

‘Pro-competitive reforms have the power to unlock growth by removing unnecessary barriers and improving market access,’ Mr Kemei said in a speech read by CAK’s director for competition and consumer protection, Amenya Omari.

‘Businesses already have enough hurdles to jump towards success, so we collectively have a duty to reduce legal and policy issues that increase chances of failure rather than success.’

Betty Maina, the East Africa director at Genesis Analytics and a former Trade Cabinet Secretary, cited a lack of a strong consumer constituency to counterbalance large firms, represented by powerful industry groups such Kenya Association of Manufacturers (KAM) and Kenya Private Sector Alliance (Kepsa) as a challenge in enforcing competition policies.

‘Without a strong consumer body, it is difficult to manage those conversations on competition when they confront strong bodies like the KAM,’ Ms Maina said.

When one steps back and observes the collapse of the Nairobi Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) deal, originally worth Sh7.76 billion and backed by the United States through the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), it becomes painfully clear: President Donald Trump has not only undermined Kenya’s development ambitions but also dealt a heavy blow to the trust between Nairobi and Washington.

The abrupt cancellation of this funding represents more than a policy shift; it is an affront to Kenya’s sovereignty and its people’s aspirations.

The agreement, signed under Trump’s predecessor, was hailed as a milestone in Kenya-US relations.

Through the MCC, the US had pledged to support the development of a modern BRT system for Nairobi, a project envisioned to unclog the city’s notorious traffic, reduce pollution, enhance safety, and provide a more equitable transport option for women, low-income commuters, and marginalized groups.

Kenya had already committed significant resources of its own, demonstrating genuine partnership and ownership of the initiative.

Then came the reversal.

When the Trump administration cancelled the MCC Threshold Program as part of its foreign-aid review, the BRT project was abruptly thrown into uncertainty. Kenya’s Treasury confirmed receiving the termination notice, leaving a carefully negotiated, legally binding project in limbo.

Such a sudden withdrawal is not merely bureaucratic reshuffling; it is a profound injustice.

Why is it unjust? First, because Kenya loses most. Nairobi’s transport crisis is not a theoretical concern; it affects millions of people every day. Congestion drains productivity, worsens air quality, and makes commuting a daily struggle.

The BRT system was not just an infrastructure upgrade; it was a lifeline for a city desperate for modern transit. When the US backed out, it was ordinary Kenyans who paid the price in lost opportunity and prolonged hardship.

Second, the move reflects a troubling lack of commitment. International partnerships depend on predictability. When a change of government in Washington can instantly nullify agreements signed in good faith, developing countries are left exposed.

This unpredictability weakens Kenya’s long-term planning capacity and discourages the kind of transformative projects needed to push the country forward.

Third, it damages US credibility on the world stage. For decades, America positioned itself as a development partner that honors its commitments and supports governance reforms through reliable assistance.

By abandoning the BRT deal, the Trump administration signaled that US development partnerships are conditional not on mutual goals but on domestic political whims. That makes it difficult for Kenya or any country to trust the U.S. with ambitious, multi-year projects.

This is precisely why Kenya and many other nations have increasingly turned to China for infrastructure. It is not because China offers the cheapest or simplest deals, but because it offers certainty.

When China commits to build a road, a railway, a port, or an energy installation, it rarely reverses course due to leadership changes or shifting domestic priorities. Western governments often criticize Beijing’s approach, citing concerns over debt or geopolitical influence, but from the perspective of developing nations, reliability is priceless.

Kenya cannot afford to wait endlessly for partners whose policies shift every four years. It needs roads, energy grids, railways, ports, and modern public transit – and it needs them delivered without sudden cancellations. When the US tears up agreements, China naturally steps in to fill the vacuum. The BRT saga is simply another example of a broader trend: countries gravitate toward consistent partners.

Trump’s decision to halt other USAid contracts in Kenya – affecting sectors such as education, energy, and civic engagement – only strengthens this perception.

Cuts totaling tens of billions of shillings in development commitments weaken vital sectors and leave long-term projects stranded. These abrupt contractions send a clear message: American support is not guaranteed.

Some may argue that every administration has the right to review foreign aid and reallocate funds. That is true. But renegotiation is different from abandonment.

When deals are terminated without meaningful consultation, without transition plans, and without regard for the people affected, it shows disrespect. It suggests that Kenya’s development priorities can be dismissed at the stroke of a pen.

Kenya is not simply a recipient of aid; it is a strategic partner with clear development ambitions. By signing the MCC compact, Nairobi demonstrated faith in long-term cooperation with the US The cancellation of the deal undermines that faith.

The MCC was designed to support countries committed to reform and good governance. Kenya met those conditions. America did not meet its own.

In the broader geopolitical picture, Trump’s actions reveal a failure of US soft power. Development diplomacy is not about rhetoric; it is about delivering real infrastructure and helping partner nations achieve tangible progress. When America falters, others rise to the occasion.

Ultimately, the scrapping of the Sh7.76 billion BRT deal is not only a broken promise – it is an injustice to Kenya’s development agenda and a betrayal of Nairobi’s commuters who deserve better.

It weakens trust, undermines collaboration, and accelerates Kenya’s pivot toward partners who offer more consistent engagement. If the United States wants to remain relevant in Africa, it must learn that reliability, not rhetoric, is the foundation of meaningful partnership.