Category: Business Daily

The International Air Transport Association (IATA) has criticised President William Ruto’s government for supporting Kenya Airways while simultaneously imposing charges and policies that increase the cost of air travel and undermine the national carrier’s growth.

IATA’s Regional Vice President for Africa and the Middle East, Kamil Al-Awadhi, said Kenya is among several African countries imposing excessive taxes, levies and charges on aviation, with the recently introduced mandatory travel insurance for international visitors adding to the burden.

Kenya Airways, he said, cannot thrive when it is being squeezed by taxes and charges in Kenya and across the continent, which push up fares and erode airlines’ already thin profit margins amid rising fuel costs and other industry pressures.

‘What bothers me is that the entities within the African governments are squeezing more and more out of their airlines,’ Mr Al-Awadhi said in a press briefing on the sidelines of the Aviation Africa Conference in Nairobi on Thursday.

‘You hear the same guy say, ‘I want to create a national carrier, the pride of Africa,’ and I agree with him. That same guy, ‘we’re going to charge $5 API-PNR.’ Why are you charging something that passengers have nothing to do with?’

Advance Passenger Information and Passenger Name Record (API-PNR) are separate datasets that airlines transmit to border control authorities before passengers arrive. Kenya charges airlines $4.95 (Sh640) per passenger for processing the data, a fee that has drawn criticism from the aviation industry.

The API-PNR fee comes on top of the $50 (Sh6,470) Air Passenger Service Charge (APSC) imposed on international travellers, while domestic passengers pay Sh600. The international charge was increased from $40 and the domestic charge from Sh500 in 2018.

Mr Al-Awadhi also criticised Kenya’s introduction of mandatory health insurance for international visitors, saying the additional $44 cost will ultimately increase the price of travelling to the country and could suppress demand.

‘Kenya has just added $44 for medical insurance to the ticket. Don’t you think there’s gonna be an impact on the number of passengers travelling?’ he said.

He attributed the proliferation of aviation charges partly to poor coordination among government agencies and a failure to appreciate the wider economic contribution of aviation.

The criticism comes as the government supports Kenya Airways’ turnaround efforts, including helping guarantee the airline’s debt and seeking a strategic investor to inject fresh capital into the carrier.

But IATA argues that such support is undermined if government agencies continue extracting more revenue from the airline and the wider aviation sector through taxes, levies and fees.

According to IATA, African airlines, including Kenya Airways, are expected to make an average net profit of only $0.40 (Sh52) per passenger seat this year, down from $1.50 (Sh194) last year.

‘This is because of the ridiculous prices of fuel today in Africa specifically, and the crazy, illogical, down-to-theft charges, levies, and fees on aviation,’ Mr Al-Awadhi said.

In June, African states, including Kenya, committed through the Lomé Ministerial Declaration to reduce excessive taxes, levies and fees on aviation as part of efforts to lower operating costs and improve the competitiveness of African airlines.

However, IATA says governments have yet to take meaningful steps to reduce the charges.

President Ruto this week signed the Air Passenger Service Charge Amendment Act into law, expanding the purposes for which APSC proceeds can be used to include the Kenya Meteorological Department, alongside the Kenya Airports Authority and the Kenya Civil Aviation Authority.

The development increases the number of government agencies relying on the passenger charge, even as the aviation industry calls for lower costs to support the growth of air connectivity and airlines such as Kenya Airways.

Kenya Airways has restructured its top management, changing the reporting lines of different business segments, in a bid to strengthen its business amid continued financial and operational pressures.

The restructure, effected days after the airline’s acting CEO George Kamal resigned for personal reasons, will see at least four segments previously under the Strategy and Innovation division transferred to the Commercial division headed by Julius Thairu.

Ms Hellen Mathuka headed the restructured Strategy and Innovation division.

The four affected segments include the head of pricing and revenue management, head of network planning and alliances, head of media and public relations, and head of government affairs.

In an internal memo seen by Business Daily, the airline said the changes were part of an organisational realignment intended to make Kenya Airways more ‘competitive, commercially agile, and operationally excellent’. The changes took effect on September 7, 2026.

‘The management changes outlined below are designed to strengthen alignment, sharpen accountability, and accelerate delivery against our strategic priorities,’ KQ’s acting chief people officer Judith Maye said in the internal communication.

She said the consolidation was intended to create a more integrated approach to revenue generation, market positioning and stakeholder engagement.

The move effectively brings functions that directly influence how the airline prices its seats, deploys its network, manages its brand and engages governments and regulators under one commercial umbrella.

It is meant to bring more of KQ’s commercial decisions under Mr Thairu, the commercial manager, who reports to the CEO, and has been tasked with boosting the airline’s sales and marketability.

The airline said the changes would allow pricing, network, brand and government relations to operate as a ‘cohesive commercial ecosystem’, enabling faster decision-making and a more coordinated go-to-market strategy.

The airline also moved the head of fleet development from Ms Mathuka’s division to the technical division, a move it said will ‘ensure fleet planning decisions are closely integrated with our engineering, maintenance and operational readiness capabilities, enabling a more seamless approach to fleet lifecycle management’.

The managing director for cargo has also been moved from the strategy division to head a separate division that will report directly to the CEO, as the carrier capitalises on cargo growth to grow its revenues.

The restructuring comes at a critical point for KQ, which is seeking to improve its financial position by restoring aircraft capacity and pursuing fresh capital.

Insiders who spoke to Business Daily said Mr Kamal and his predecessor Allan Kilavuka had championed the disbanded work structure.

The structure, however, is said to have caused several frictions at the carrier, with the commercial chief said to have limited control over the departments meant to help execute his role.

Kenya Airways’ net loss for the six months to June 2026 jumped by 31.9 percent to Sh16 billion after its costs grew exponentially to a record level, due to the Middle East conflict.

The national flag carrier’s costs during the period surged by 12 percent to a record Sh97.7 billion, up from last year’s Sh86.7 billion, pushing up its losses from the Sh12.2 billion reported in the first half of 2025.

This was largely due to a surge in fuel costs, which rose to Sh29 billion, accounting for roughly 32 percent of its operating costs, up 66 percent from Sh17.47 billion, which was 22 percent of operating costs.

The airline’s revenues rose to Sh81.2 billion from Sh74.5 billion, supported by growing passenger numbers and demand on key routes, with several international travellers being rerouted through African routes amidst the Middle East shutdown.

Artificial intelligence (AI) company Anthropic has revealed how its Claude chatbot was used to mass-produce fake social media posts praising Energy Cabinet Secretary Opiyo Wandayi and attack Kenya’s opposition.

The AI safety and research firm said a Claude user generated Kenyan political content designed to appear as organic public sentiment, including batches of fake posts on the social media platform X.

The content praised Mr Wandayi for allegedly stopping a scheduled electricity tariff increase.

The operation also pushed claims that the United Opposition coalition was breaking apart ahead of the 2027 elections, targeting politicians including former deputy president Rigathi Gachagua and former president Uhuru Kenyatta.

It reveals how AI is emerging as a new tool for political influence in Kenya ahead of the 2027 General Election, as political operators use the technology to manufacture apparent public support for politicians.

‘We identified and removed an account that was used by a single actor to mass-produce Kenyan political content,’ Anthropic said in a new report detailing AI misuse cases on its platform between December 2025 and August 2026.

‘The operation was built to look like spontaneous, grassroots public sentiment. The actor used Claude across several sessions to generate batches of exactly 50 tweets.’

The Claude prompts instructed the chatbot that the posts should look like organic grassroots commentary rather than a coordinated campaign. They used hashtags including #PowerReliefKE and #PoweringTheNewKenya to amplify the messaging.

While Anthropic’s investigation did not establish the identities of those behind the operation, the company said the pro-government tone and specific hashtags suggested that it was plausibly aligned with President William Ruto’s supporters.

‘We believe this was a local Kenyan political astroturfing campaign,’ the report said, referencing an organised effort that looks like a natural, spontaneous public movement, but is sponsored by hidden political interests.

‘The network’s pro-administration tone and specific hashtags suggest it was plausibly aligned with the ruling coalition, though we have not identified the exact organisation responsible.’

Read: Protecting your reputation in age of AI, and fake news

It said the operation did not ultimately reach real people, with its activity remaining isolated within a network of fake accounts and local influences on a single platform.

Anthropic said it probed Kenya following a tip from the rival US firm OpenAI about undisclosed criminal activity on its ChatGPT platform.

‘While a social media site usually sees an operation once its content is already circulating, we may see it on Claude while the operation is still being built,’ the company said.

The investigation comes amid growing concern about the use of AI to manipulate political and civic discourse.

Kenya’s information ecosystem is increasingly dependent on social media platforms such as Facebook, X, Instagram, TikTok, YouTube and WhatsApp, creating new avenues for political messaging outside traditional platforms like television, newspapers and radio.

A recent Kenya ICT Action Network (KICTANet) study found that alternative media actors on social media are shaping political narratives, often with less editorial accountability than traditional media.

The study, based on monitoring conducted between January and March 2026, found a pattern in which misleading narratives can move across platforms and become progressively harder to challenge.

The think tank flagged Facebook for providing the starting point through fabricated newspaper headlines, doctored political graphics, and impersonated editorial content.

It said TikTok then accelerates the narratives through emotionally charged and selectively edited clips, while YouTube and podcast channels give them a longer life through extended commentary and speculation on platforms like podcasts.

‘Platform algorithms play an important role… Content that generates stronger emotional reactions-anger, humour, outrage, fear, or political loyalty-is often amplified more widely through recommendation systems and reposting behaviour,’ said the report.

‘As a result, sensational political narratives may receive greater visibility than balanced or evidence-based reporting.’

Read: How Raila deepfake exposes digital weak spot, sparks AI alarm

The growing use of generative AI raises the risks, as experts warn that AI-generated deepfakes and manipulated content will become more sophisticated ahead of the 2027 elections.

‘False content may become more convincing and harder to detect; manipulated media may spread rapidly across platforms; and verification processes may struggle to keep pace,’ KICTANet said.

Kenya has faced politically driven online manipulation before. During the 2017 General Election, British political consulting firm Cambridge Analytica was embroiled in controversy over claims that it used data analytics, psychological profiling, social media ads and grassroots networks to influence voters.

The company was accused of using Facebook user data obtained through a third-party application to target users with fake-news campaigns.

It is the same warning they give you with muratina: that you should not be fooled by the sweetness as the honey-based brew trickles past your tongue. That after a while, it can and will demonstrate that it is alcohol anyway.

So, when I order a canned sweet banana-based alcoholic drink at the Fusion Restaurant in the Hemingways Retreat Kigali, with the alcohol content indicated as 14 percent, I am warned that the sweetness is a Trojan horse; that this drink has the power to make me attempt a Guinness World Record for the longest vernacular weeping soliloquy.

‘Vernacular? No. I’ll do it in the King’s English if it comes to that. The fluent-est English I will ever speak,’ I say. This is because I do not wish to drag my community in the mud any further because Embarambamba has already done the do.

It is a Thursday evening, and a calm Kigali breeze pats my face as I sit with fellow Kenyans P-, C- and R- to patronise the bar. They are not too sure about my choices, having seen me commit sacrilege by adding soda as a chaser to prosecco (an equivalent of champagne) the previous day.

Our venue used to be called the Heaven Retreat before it was acquired by Hemingways, and you can tell why someone would name it Heaven. A couple of tourists laze by the swimming pool not too far from us, and everything oozes luxury.

The spoons on the table aren’t too big but this is the place where patrons eat life with big spoons. It is an eco-conscious luxury boutique hotel and it shows. For instance, no drinks are served in plastic bottles. In the rooms, they have a notice asking whether you really want to have your towel washed every day.

The cocktails at the bar range from Rwandan kari vodka to something called blood Mary that is a mix of vodka, tomato juice, lemon juice, worcestershire, tabasco, and celery.

P- and C- order their cocktails while R-, a teetotaller, sips something mild. I settle on my banana drink. It is so good I order a second.

True to the promise, it is more juice than alcohol to the tongue, though it doesn’t take long before I start feeling pop-up notifications on the upper reaches of my cranium. Not today, Embarambamba, er Satan. Not today.

James Mworia took up the role of founding CEO of the newly created National Infrastructure Fund (NIF) on Monday, marking his exit from Centum Investment Company after nearly 17 years.

Through the fund, he aims to mobilise at least Sh400 billion annually to relieve the pressure of development spending on commercially viable infrastructure from the Exchequer.

Business Daily sat down with him to discuss his agenda for infrastructure development in the country.

You are banking on the growing domestic capital pools and, more so, the Sh3.1 trillion assets under management held by pension funds to crowd in on infrastructure projects. Fund managers will, however, tell you that they are worried about asset-liability mismatch when it comes to investing in infrastructure as an asset class. How do you address this hurdle?

One of the solutions I have in mind to address the asset-liability mismatch risks is that we create a National Infrastructure Development Fund, which can borrow from the Regulation of Development Real Estate Investment Trusts.

This will then allow investors to come into a liquid instrument and automatically address the asset-liability mismatch concerns. It will also address the challenge of political perception risk because if investors come directly into National Infrastructure Fund-financed projects, some will argue that it borders on privatisation via the backdoor, but with a vehicle that is listed, all investors can come in transparently.

Can we infer then that NIF will be a Fund of Funds such that we have subsidiary funds within for co-investment purposes?

It is important to have funds because for those who have fundraised, they appreciate that it is very tedious to fundraise on a project-by-project basis and from a pension fund-to-pension fund basis where you are moving from one fund manager to another. If we create a fund, we can then have investment criteria that the projects need to meet for the fund to then invest in at a prescribed commitment level.

There’s a finite number of assets that can be privatised, whether partially or wholly, and that means the National Infrastructure Fund needs to have a robust liquidity-generating mechanism beyond privatisation proceeds. How do you plan to realise this?

The National Infrastructure Fund Act allows us to make investments in government securities. The yield we are expecting to get there is about 12.5 percent in annual return, and so we should be making just about Sh42 billion income per year.

We are working with Sh40 billion as a benchmark. The idea is to ensure that we preserve the seed capital because, as you pointed out, there are limited assets that can be privatised.

How do you see the National Infrastructure Fund fitting within the country’s larger public finance framework as far as Kenya’s annual budget is concerned?

If we do our job well, then we should easily take out just about Sh400 billion from the national budget because then we will reduce reliance on the Exchequer for commercially viable infrastructure projects.

Right now, what’s happening is that any infrastructure project taken to the National Treasury and is considered to be commercially viable is then routed to my team at the National Infrastructure Fund.

In fact, a few projects were directed to us over the weekend of September 5 and 6, just before I was appointed CEO.

The National Infrastructure Fund targets a crowd-in factor of 1:10, meaning for every one shilling from privatisation, the fund should be mobilising another Sh10 from private sector players. That is, by all means, very ambitious. How much have you crowded- in so far, and how do you intend to realise this crowd-in factor?

I don’t think it is ambitious. Pension funds are currently at Sh3.2 trillion in assets under management and mobilising an average of Sh350 billion in fresh capital from Kenyans every year. So, over the next five years, we will have mobilised another Sh1.5 trillion into pension fund assets, and that is ignoring the returns.

The Retirement Benefits Authority allows up to 10 percent allocation to Infrastructure Funds, and yet right now we are at 0.02 percent. I also saw the submissions of the Capital Markets Authority to the National Assembly on the Investment Policy Statement, and one of the proposals was that they will develop regulations to allow the development of Infrastructure Funds under Collective Investment Schemes. So, if anything, what we may end up being short of is not the capital but viable projects.

When I read that Investment Policy Statement tabled in the National Assembly, I found the document wanting as far as spelling out risk mitigation mechanisms goes. What safeguards do you have in place for such a colossal fund?

We are required to prepare a Risk Management Framework to be approved by the Fund’s Governing Council, but we first had to work on the Investment Policy Statement and get it approved before we can work on the Risk Management Framework. Parliament approved, with comments, the Investment Policy Statement at the end of August, and we are currently finalising it for gazettement. We have also prepared the Risk Management Framework, which is now with the Governing Council for approval.

Lastly, is the National Infrastructure Fund, in any way, looking to crowd-in capital from Development Finance Institutions (DFIs)?

We are having conversations with some DFIs to set up a Project Preparatory Fund so that by the time projects are coming to market, they are more or less getting to financial close because pension fund money is not appropriate for use at those very early stages.

So, by that time, it will be a project that has line of sight on debt, clarity on income, technical questions have been answered, and board approvals have been done. There are different views about how large this Project Preparatory Fund could be, but it might be just about $100 million (Sh12.94 billion).

My take on Magadi soda. When we are through with politicking and election-cycle optics, we will still be facing big choices that will shape our mineral sector for years to come.

How do we split royalties with developers? What should be the local community share? How much value addition and local processing should we be demanding from developers? How should we manage and implement the rule requiring mining companies to relinquish unused or excess prospecting land back to the State so that the resource base can be opened to multiple players?

These questions will continue to rankle and divide us regardless of who the tenant at State House is.

Kenya has for now made a tactical retreat from its attempt to kick out Tata Chemicals. The parties are back at the negotiating table. But this is precisely where the stakes become dangerous.

When negotiations involve billions of shillings in royalty and rent arrears, land surrender, and reconciliation of production and export records, there is enormous room for suspicion. And when such negotiations are conducted behind closed doors, away from public scrutiny, allegations of rent-seeking-and of attempts by political and business elites to shake down foreign investors-are inevitable.

In hindsight, Kenya’s trajectory echoes the late President John Magufuli’s 2017 Permanent Sovereignty Act and Indonesia’s nickel export ban-both cases where governments insisted on in-country processing and tighter export controls.

Did those moves pay off? Partially. Both countries secured higher domestic value capture and stronger industrial linkages. The trade-off was a hit to investor perception.

Faced with this reality, Kenya now has two paths: double down on coercive tactics-arbitrary licence terminations, forced land surrender-or pursue a negotiated transition that locks in fresh investment for beneficiation while giving incumbents a credible compliance route, for instance through phased value-addition targets, tax incentives and infrastructure support.

Last week’s events were happening against the background of a much bigger subtext. Close observers of recent developments in the mining sector must have noticed the eerie resemblance between the stand President William Ruto has taken and this week’s pronouncements by the visiting US Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Frank Garcia.

At the AmCham Kenya Business Summit on Wednesday, Mr Garcia explicitly endorsed local processing of Kenyan minerals, framing “extract and ship” as an illegitimate partnership.

He said: “American companies are not here to extract and ship. We want processing done right here on the ground in Kenya… You keep the value here, create Kenyan jobs, and build a true regional processing hub.”

This is significant because it publicly locks the US into Ruto’s value-addition narrative at the same moment Nairobi is enforcing that doctrine on Tata Chemicals.

Make no mistake: Mr Garcia was not speaking from a “high-minded standpoint.” Even as he was validating Ruto’s domestic crackdown on “extraction without value addition,” it was clear to observers that there was a connection between this rhetoric and the fact that American companies are presently engaged in a do-or-die battle for the biggest thing in the mineral sector today; namely, Mrima Hills.

The battle for Mrima is not just an African mining concession; it has quietly become a focal point of global critical-minerals geopolitics.

The shortlist reads like a roll-call of the new great-game players: Chinese State-backed heavyweights such as Shenghe Resources and China National Nuclear Corporation on one side, and Western-aligned consortia backed by American, British and Australian private equity on the other.

But the real fulcrum here is what might be termed ‘the American variable’. Long before bidders were named, the geopolitical stakes had already surfaced at the G7 summit in Évian-les-Bains, where President Ruto made a pointed declaration: Kenya was finalising a landmark critical-minerals pact with the US, explicitly tying rare-earth extraction to in-country processing.

The signal to Washington was unmistakable-Nairobi was ready to plug into the West’s reconfigured supply chains and help erode China’s roughly 90 percent dominance of downstream rare-earth refining.

The plot thickens further. International outlets, including the Financial Times, have reported quiet, high-level manoeuvring by venture-capital firms linked to political dynasties in Washington.

Vehicles associated with Donald Trump Jr, such as 1789 Capital and its backing of rare-earth start-ups, illustrate just how tightly commercial bets are now woven into political access and federal support in the US.

The risk for Kenya is that sovereign choices end up being squeezed by proxy contests where external pressure distorts domestic priorities.

Absa Bank Kenya has appointed its long-serving chief financial officer (CFO) Yusuf Omari as its new chief executive, replacing Abdi Mohamed who left abruptly in June to join the smaller I and M Bank Limited in the same role.

Mr Omari was appointed CFO of Absa -then trading as Barclays Kenya- on July 23, 2009 and has on multiple occasions held the top job in an acting capacity as former leaders left to join other institutions.

He had held the top job on an interim basis since July 1 in the wake of Mr Mohamed’s exit. Mr Omari also led Absa temporarily from November 1, 2022 -following the departure of Jeremy Awori- until April 30, 2023. Mr Abdi took the job on May 1, 2023.

Mr Awori left to lead Togo-based Ecobank Transnational Incorporated (ETI).

The board of Absa said it was confident in Mr Omari’s ability to lead the bank, which has been growing its presence in the retail market, among other strategic objectives.

‘Yusuf’s appointment reflects his proven ability to lead, deliver sustainable growth and create long-term value,’ Absa’s chairman Mohammed Nyaoga said in a statement.

‘His extensive experience across the bank, deep understanding of the Kenyan market, and strong track record of working with customers, colleagues, regulators and other stakeholders position him strongly to lead Absa Bank Kenya into its next chapter.’

Absa, alongside Standard Chartered Bank Kenya, previously dominated Kenya’s banking sector by most measures including assets and earnings.

The local units of multinational banks remain among the largest lenders in the country but they have been eclipsed by homegrown rivals led by KCB Group, Equity Group and Co-operative Bank of Kenya.

The homegrown banks used the twin strategies of retaining most of their earnings and aggressive expansion -including in the regional markets- to ascend to the top of the banking league tables.

Absa and StanChart, whose parents have subsidiaries in other markets, have focused on profitable growth in Kenya and distributing more of their earnings to shareholders.

Absa’s parent firm Absa Group has made it a priority for the Kenyan business to raise more income from non-lending activities in order to reduce the impact of falling interest rates on the group’s earnings. Mr Omari said he would build on the bank’s existing strengths.

‘I am deeply honoured by the confidence that the board and Absa Group have placed in me through this appointment. Absa Bank Kenya has a strong foundation, an exceptional team and an important role to play in supporting Kenya’s economic growth and development,’ Mr Omari said in a statement.

‘My focus will be on building on this foundation, deepening our relationships with customers, accelerating sustainable growth, strengthening our competitiveness and investing in our people and capabilities. Together, we will continue to make Absa Bank Kenya a bank of choice for our customers and a trusted partner in Kenya’s economic development.’

Mr Omari holds a degree in Economics and a Master of Business Administration. He is also a Fellow of the Institute of Certified Public Accountants of Kenya (FCPA) and a graduate of the Advanced Management Programme delivered by Strathmore and IESE Business School.

Absa reported a 9.8 percent fall in net profit to Sh10.5 billion in the half year to June due to lower income from lending and transactions. The bank raised its interim dividend per share to Sh0.5 from the previous Sh0.2.

Banks and Safaricom accounted for 80.2 percent of the total dividends distributed by companies listed on the Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE) in the last full financial year, making them out as the best bet for investors looking for regular income from equities.

The 12 listed banks and the telecoms operator collectively paid Sh197.2 billion to shareholders for the latest financial year, part of the NSE’s total dividends of Sh245.9 billion in the period.

The other 21 companies that paid out dividends for the year distributed a combined Sh48.7 billion, which is just over half of the Sh80 billion that was paid out by Safaricom alone.

The latest full-year cash distribution was also boosted by a one-off interim dividend of Sh13 billion, or Sh8 per share, that was paid by cross-listed Ugandan electricity utility Umeme in July 2025.

Dividends represent a tangible or realised return booked by investors from their holdings, adding to the paper gains they have made over the last three years in the NSE’s bull run. These capital gains can only be earned when one sells their shares, which would then mean an end to the dividend income stream.

This year, the NSE has added 42 percent or Sh1.23 trillion in market capitalisation -the measure of investor wealth- to Sh4. 18 trillion.

Similar to the case of dividends, Safaricom and the banks have driven the market’s valuation, adding a combined Sh916 billion in market value, equivalent to 74 percent of the bourse’s total gain this year. The banking sector’s gain, however, includes the Sh49 billion in new wealth brought into the market courtesy of the listing of Family Bank in June.

The rally in blue-chip share prices has partly been driven by their consistent dividend payment record over the years, which has kept demand for their stocks high even when other segments of the market have suffered a downturn.

Dividend payments by listed companies have also emerged as an important source of liquid cash for individuals and businesses in an economy that is still grappling with costly credit and flat payslips.

Due to their large profits, banks and Safaricom pay the largest total dividends, alongside other selected blue chips such as EABL and BAT Kenya.

Safaricom made the largest distribution at the NSE in the most recent financial year at Sh80 billion, having raised its dividend per share to Sh2 from Sh1.20 previously.

For the year ending March 2026, the company paid out an interim dividend of Sh0.85 per share, and a final dividend of Sh1.15 per share. The payments were made in April and September 2026, respectively.

It raised its payout after recording a 37 percent jump in net profit to Sh95.6 billion for the period -the highest at the NSE- having maintained its policy of distributing 80 percent of its net profit to shareholders.

For the banks, the largest payouts in absolute terms came from KCB Group and Equity Group at Sh22.5 billion and Sh21.7 billion respectively.

They were followed by Co-operative Bank of Kenya at Sh14.7 billion, Standard Chartered Bank Kenya and NCBA Group at Sh11.7 billion each, and Absa Bank Kenya at Sh11.1 billion.

Others were Stanbic Holdings at Sh8.8 billion, I and M Group at Sh6.5 billion, BK Group at Sh3.6 billion and DTB at Sh2.5 billion.

Five of the banks have also announced interim dividends for the first half of 2026, the majority being higher than those paid last year. This signals that their full-year payouts will go even higher and entrench the dominance the sector and Safaricom enjoy in the race to reward shareholders.

KCB will pay Sh9.64 billion in interim dividend on November 10 at a rate of Sh3 per share, up from Sh2 per share in 2025. The increase came after it reported a 14.2 percent growth in net profit to Sh36 billion for the six months to June 2026.

The latest full-year cash distribution was also boosted by a one-off interim dividend of Sh13 billion, or Sh8 per share, that was paid by cross-listed Ugandan electricity utility Umeme in July 2025.

Dividends represent a tangible or realised return booked by investors from their holdings, adding to the paper gains they have made over the last three years in the NSE’s bull run. These capital gains can only be earned when one sells their shares, which would then mean an end to the dividend income stream.

This year, the NSE has added 42 percent or Sh1.23 trillion in market capitalisation -the measure of investor wealth- to Sh4. 18 trillion.

Similar to the case of dividends, Safaricom and the banks have driven the market’s valuation, adding a combined Sh916 billion in market value, equivalent to 74 percent of the bourse’s total gain this year. The banking sector’s gain, however, includes the Sh49 billion in new wealth brought into the market courtesy of the listing of Family Bank in June.

The rally in blue-chip share prices has partly been driven by their consistent dividend payment record over the years, which has kept demand for their stocks high even when other segments of the market have suffered a downturn.

Dividend payments by listed companies have also emerged as an important source of liquid cash for individuals and businesses in an economy that is still grappling with costly credit and flat payslips.

Due to their large profits, banks and Safaricom pay the largest total dividends, alongside other selected blue chips such as EABL and BAT Kenya.

Safaricom made the largest distribution at the NSE in the most recent financial year at Sh80 billion, having raised its dividend per share to Sh2 from Sh1.20 previously.

For the year ending March 2026, the company paid out an interim dividend of Sh0.85 per share, and a final dividend of Sh1.15 per share. The payments were made in April and September 2026, respectively.

It raised its payout after recording a 37 percent jump in net profit to Sh95.6 billion for the period -the highest at the NSE- having maintained its policy of distributing 80 percent of its net profit to shareholders.

For the banks, the largest payouts in absolute terms came from KCB Group and Equity Group at Sh22.5 billion and Sh21.7 billion respectively.

They were followed by Co-operative Bank of Kenya at Sh14.7 billion, Standard Chartered Bank Kenya and NCBA Group at Sh11.7 billion each, and Absa Bank Kenya at Sh11.1 billion.

Others were Stanbic Holdings at Sh8.8 billion, I and M Group at Sh6.5 billion, BK Group at Sh3.6 billion and DTB at Sh2.5 billion.

Five of the banks have also announced interim dividends for the first half of 2026, the majority being higher than those paid last year. This signals that their full-year payouts will go even higher and entrench the dominance the sector and Safaricom enjoy in the race to reward shareholders.

KCB will pay Sh9.64 billion in interim dividend on November 10 at a rate of Sh3 per share, up from Sh2 per share in 2025. The increase came after it reported a 14.2 percent growth in net profit to Sh36 billion for the six months to June 2026.

In 2025, the bank also paid out a special dividend of Sh2 per unit from the proceeds of the sale of National Bank of Kenya to Nigerian lender Access Bank Plc.

NCBA paid Sh6.18 billion on September 8 after raising its interim dividend for the half year to June to Sh3.75 per share from Sh2.50 a year earlier. Stanbic and Absa will make their respective payouts on September 15 and October 15.

Stanbic will distribute Sh1.5 billion after cutting its interim dividend per share to Sh1.64 from Sh3.80, while Absa is paying Sh2.72 billion after enhancing its dividend per share to Sh0.50 from last year’s Sh0.20.

However, even as shareholders of these companies enjoy higher returns from their investments, the increased ownership of the top firms by foreign investors means that a larger proportion of dividends is being shipped out of the country and the local economy.

In June, South African company Vodacom Group tightened its grip on Safaricom by purchasing an additional 15 percent stake from the Kenya government for Sh204 billion, taking its controlling stake to 55 percent.

South Africa’s Nedbank is buying a 66 percent stake in NCBA for about Sh110 billion in a deal that is expected to close early in the fourth quarter of the year.

Absa Group has recently increased its stake in the Kenyan unit from 68.5 percent to 71.99 percent for Sh6.5 billion through a tender offer that was priced at Sh34.50 per share.

The South African bank had bid for an additional 16.5 percent stake in its Kenyan unit at a cost of Sh30.9 billion, but the offer was undersubscribed after the margin between the market and tender purchase price shrunk in the sale period.

Local firms have increased their holdings in Co-operative Bank of Kenya by 98.97 million shares currently valued at Sh3.75 billion since the start of 2025 as individual investors made profit-taking trades amid a rally in the stock.

Shareholding disclosures show that local firms, including Saccos held 4.88 billion Co-op Bank shares in July this year, up from 4.78 billion at the end of December 2024.

This has lifted their stake from 81.53 percent to 83.21 percent currently valued at Sh184.78 billion.

Over the same period, local individuals reduced their holdings by 95.48 million shares to 966.29 million from 1.061 billion, cutting their stake to 16.42 percent from 18.1 percent.

Co-op Bank has a unique ownership structure in which saccos collectively control a 64.56 percent stake of 3.787 billion shares through Co-opholdings Co-operative Society Limited, an investment vehicle of the co-operative movement.

The remaining 35.44 percent comprises shares that are freely traded on the Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE).

The latest shift in the lender’s shareholding comes against a period of renewed investor interest in large listed companies as earnings, dividends and expectations of improved economic conditions influence trading on the NSE.

Co-op Bank had maintained a dividend of Sh1.50 per share between 2022 and 2024 but raised the distribution by 66.7 percent to Sh2.50 in 2025 amid increasing profitability. The move contributed to the rise in share price, giving individuals room to exit profitably as firms taking a longer-term view piled into the stock.

The bank’s shares closed on Thursday at Sh37.85, up from Sh23.91 at the end of 2025 and Sh16.91 on December 30, 2024. This means the stock had gained 58.3 percent between the end of last year and now, while its value had more than doubled since the start of 2025.

The movement in share price amid increasing dominance of local corporate investors in the lender’s shareholder base has come at a time when the stock has emerged as one of the stronger performers on the NSE. Year-to-date, I and M leads among banks with 83 percent gain, followed by DTB (66 percent).

The NSE has this year gained 41 percent or Sh1.209 trillion, taking the market capitalization to Sh4.154 trillion, pointing to the rally among stocks in diverse sectors including banking, insurance, telecommunications, manufacturing and agriculture.

The rally in Co-op Bank shares has been supported by growing demand for the shares with the lender’s disclosures pointing to increased buying interest from local firms.

The bank’s shareholder distribution data shows the number of investors holding more than one million shares fell by 18 to 192, even as this group increased its collective stake by 24.47 million shares, pointing to greater concentration of Co-op Bank stock among the largest shareholders.

The number of shareholders holding between 5,001 and one million shares dropped by 441 to 45,844, while their combined holdings fell by 29.25 million shares.

However, Co-op Bank attracted 9,931 new shareholders with holdings of between one and 500 shares, who added 1.08 million shares to the register. The number of investors holding between 501 and 5,000 shares also increased by 2,426, adding 3.7 million shares. The increase in institutional ownership has been accompanied by growth in the number of local companies holding the stock.

The number of local companies with investment in Co-op Bank rose to 3,225 in July from 3,007 at the end of 2024, marking an increase of 218 investors. Over the same period, the number of local individual investors increased to 111,371 from 98,588 amid a decline in their aggregate holdings.

The fall in aggregate shares held by local individuals amid a rise in their number suggests that existing investors were reducing their stakes amid new retail shareholders joining but purchasing fewer shares.

Foreign investors have also reduced their exposure to the lender, with their holding falling by 4.28 million shares to 11.83 million. Foreign individuals cut theirs by 285,306 to 3.51 million units. Co-op Bank posted a 28 percent growth in net profit to Sh18.02 billion in the first half of the year ended June 2026, driven by increased interest and non-interest income.

The half-year performance builds on 2025’s when the lender’s full-year net earnings grew to Sh29.75 billion from Sh25.45 billion.

Co-op Bank has enjoyed growth over the years by doubling down on its local expansion unlike its peers like KCB and Equity, which have depended on regional expansion for growth.

Market research firm Statista and Forbes recently ranked Co-op Bank, KCB Group, Equity Group and Stanbic Holdings among the world’s 500 top-performing banks based on four main measures including profitability, growth and earnings quality, capital and funding resilience and asset quality and efficiency.

The lender was established in 1968 and converted into a full-fledged commercial bank in 1994, opening doors to other customers beyond co-operatives. The lender listed on the NSE in 2008.

On September 2, 2026, President William Ruto directed state authorities to shut down small businesses and retail shops operated by foreign nationals, explicitly setting a September 7 deadline for enforcement.

While addressing the micro, small and medium-sized enterprises at State House in Nairobi, the President declared that hawking and small scale retail must be strictly reserved for Kenyan citizens.

Notably, the directive is issued at a crucial time where the administration welcomes foreign capital and industrial endeavours that create local employment; while insisting that foreign nationals should not compete with citizens at the micro-level.

To institutionalise this protectionist vision, the Executive instructed parliamentary leadership and the Ministry of Trade to accelerate the passage of the proposed Local Content Bill, 2025.

One can say that these measures respond to genuine domestic socio-economic anxieties – insulating local vendors and curbing high unemployment. However, they illuminate a fundamental tension within African economic governance: the friction between national economic sovereignty and regional integration mandates.

As Africa endeavours to build harmonised economic spaces through regional frameworks, most notably the East African Community (EAC) Common Market Protocol and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), Kenya’s protectionist turn threatens to introduce new non-tariff barriers (NTBs). This nationalistic trajectory risks retaliatory trade measures from neighbouring states and, ultimately, eroding the rule-based foundation necessary for sustainable regional growth.

The operationalisation of Kenya’s new policy manifests through a dual-track framework that combines on-the-street enforcement with statutory reform in Parliament.

At the administrative level, State agencies have executed targeted enforcement operations against foreign nationals managing small shops, kiosks, and street vending outlets in urban commercial hubs. The Executive rationale rests on a rigid interpretation of immigration and labour laws.

Ministry officials maintain that while entry frameworks, such as the Electronic Travel Authorisation (eTA) system, facilitate seamless access for tourists and short-term business visitors, they explicitly do not confer commercial rights. Foreign nationals, authorities argue, are prohibited from engaging in micro-retail or informal trade without specialised work permits.

The immediate result has been widespread uncertainty across regional trader communities. In Nairobi, hundreds of Burundian nationals, including refugees and small-scale traders selling coffee and second-hand clothes, gathered outside their embassy seeking emergency travel documents to return home ahead of enforcement.

Meanwhile, senior government officials have sought to clarify that foreign nationals who hold valid work permits and licences remain legally protected, highlighting the ongoing tension between rapid administrative enforcement and legal due process.

At the legislative level, Parliament is expediting the Local Content Bill, 2025, to codify these principles across formal economic sectors. The proposed statute introduces stringent compliance thresholds, including mandatory workforce targets requiring foreign enterprises to ensure that up to 80 percent of their workforce consists of Kenyan citizens.

Additionally, the bill mandates that foreign-owned firms operating in manufacturing, logistics, and services source a substantial percentage of their raw materials and intermediate inputs locally, reserving micro-enterprise and retail distribution exclusively for domestic citizens.

From an international trade law perspective, domestic policy measures that restrict market access conflict with the binding obligations Nairobi has ratified under regional treaties. Articles 6, 7, 10, and 13 of the EAC Common Market Protocol establish the foundational freedoms governing the regional bloc: the free movement of goods, persons, labor, and the right of establishment. Article 13 explicitly guarantees citizens of partner states the right to establish businesses, provide services, and pursue economic activities in any member state under non-discriminatory conditions.

However, a crucial legal distinction must be drawn between legitimate domestic regulation and treaty breach. Every sovereign state retains the unassailable prerogative to regulate commerce through municipal business permits, tax registration, and immigration controls. Requiring all market participants to hold valid local single-business permits and tax identification numbers is a lawful exercise of regulatory authority.

The legal breach under the EAC Common Market Protocol occurs when administrative regimes move from neutral regulation to nationality-based exclusion. While requiring a business permit is entirely lawful, using permit mechanisms to enact blanket sector exclusions against partner-state citizens, or denying them the administrative pathway to acquire such permits, transforms standard compliance into a non-tariff barrier that violates the principle of national treatment.

Under the AfCFTA framework, unilateral restrictions strike at the foundational ethos of Pan-Africanism. The vision of a borderless, integrated continent under the African Union’s Agenda 2063 relies on Africans being able to trade freely across borders without nationalistic hostility. Consequently, the contrast reduces the Pan-African solidarity to an abstract diplomatic slogan while institutionalising division on the ground.

For Kenya, this protectionist pivot creates a profound crisis of credibility. As one of the first states to ratify the AfCFTA agreement, a flagship participant in the Guided Trade Initiative, and a leading advocate for continental integration, Kenya has long positioned itself as the intellectual and commercial spearhead of the AfCFTA. By enacting domestic exclusions, Nairobi risks undermining its own moral authority and devaluing the very frameworks it championed.

Discretionary work permit regimes, local input quotas, and aggressive retail scrutiny operate as functional NTBs that increase transaction costs, introduce regulatory chaos, and fragment regional value chains. Significantly, by abandoning the principle of open commerce at home, Kenya invites reciprocal countermeasures against its formidable cross-border banking, retail, and logistics networks across the continent.

Kenya serves as an important test-run for the future of trade integration across Africa. While domestic protectionism offers short-term political appeal, it imposes substantial long-term economic costs by fragmenting the broader regional market.

For the EAC and the AfCFTA to succeed, member states must view regional trade agreements not as constraints on national policy, but as the essential framework for building competitive, resilient economies. Kenya’s long-term interest lies not in erecting domestic commercial barriers, but in leading the development of a stable, rule-based East African economic community.