In the last four years, Uganda’s housing deficit has averaged around or over two million units, a figure that has barely budged, even as the population grows by more than a million people annually.
It is not that nobody is building. Drive through Naguru, Kololo, or Nakasero, the emerging elite areas, on any given morning, and the cranes are hard to miss.
But the homes popping up are rarely for the 80 percent of Ugandans economists call lower- and middle-income earners, which is to say, most people.
We examine the demand side: why those who need homes most cannot access the financing to get one, and what is beginning to change.
The second will tackle the supply side: why developers are not building enough for them, and what it would take to make them.
The arithmetic of exclusion
Uganda’s median urban worker earns between Shs220,000 and Shs230,000 a month. Rural incomes are lower still, at around Shs168,000.
To house someone at that level, the National Planning Authority estimates a home would need to cost between Shs14m and Shs24m. Nobody is building there.
What the market calls ‘affordable housing’ starts at around Shs90m and stretches to Shs350m and beyond, a label that, as the National Social Security Fund (NSSF) Deputy Managing Director Gerald Kasaato says, is ‘always going to be a very, very difficult thing to achieve against those kinds of numbers.’
Bridging that gap, therefore, requires a functioning mortgage market, patient capital, and a government willing to act on policy levers it has long left untouched.
Mortgages require payslips, documented salaries, and formal credit histories, things that most Ugandans have none of. Of 9.3 million workers, only about one million qualify for mainstream lending because their income is known monthly.
Broll Managing Director Moses Lutalo describes a mortgage market that is ‘almost comically thin.’
‘Fewer than 40,000 mortgages exist in a country of over 50 million people. Mortgage debt accounts for less than 1 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), compared to 65 percent in Britain, numbers that mirror much of sub-Saharan Africa,’ he says.
The price of borrowing
For the minority who qualify for a mortgage, the terms are punishing. Rates sit at between 16 and 18 percent per annum, roughly double the single-digit threshold at which housing finance specialists consider mortgages genuinely affordable.
Uganda Bankers Association Executive Director Wilbroad Owor blames this on the absence of patient capital.
‘Commercial banks are short-term funded institutions. The mismatch between the short-term deposits they hold and the long-term loans housing requires is inherently costly, and that cost is passed directly to borrowers,’ he says.
It is a structural problem that even Uganda’s largest institutional investor cannot easily solve alone.
NSSF manages assets worth over Shs26 trillion and holds what the industry calls patient capital, yet its real estate portfolio manager Matthew Rukaari is measured in his optimism: ‘We fully recognise that it’s difficult.’
The Mortgage Refinancing Act
The Mortgage Refinancing Act, signed in February and now awaiting a regulatory framework, is designed to fix the structural mismatch that hobbles both banks and the pension scheme approach.
The logic is that mortgage refinancing companies, regulated by Bank of Uganda, would sit between commercial banks and long-term capital markets.
Instead of a bank funding a 20-year mortgage out of short-term deposits, the refinancing company steps in with long-term capital, absorbs a portion of the default risk, and allows banks to price mortgages more competitively.
‘Banks will sell that mortgage to the refinance company. The refinance company can wait much longer. Initial capital would come from government, supplemented by concessional finance from institutions like the World Bank and the African Development Bank,’ Owor explains.
It is a model Kenya has used to develop its mortgage market. Lutalo argues that cheaper credit would send a signal to developers that real customers, with real financing behind them, are waiting at the affordable end of the market, a signal that has been absent until now.
But Uganda Retirement Benefits Regulatory Authority (URBRA)’s investment and risk analyst Eric Mugisha cautions that you ‘might have all these refinancing entities, but you will find that the capacity is restricted to a few. It may not be helping the low-income earners.’
His concern is that without deliberate design choices about who the institution is meant to serve, the benefits will again flow to borrowers who are already close to bankable, leaving the majority behind.
Owor is measured but less pessimistic, pointing to Bank of Uganda’s involvement as a sound foundation.
The caveat, he acknowledges, is that the Mortgage Refinancing Act is still just an Act. The regulations that would create and capitalise the actual refinancing institutions have not yet been gazetted.
A failed experiment
Before the Mortgage Refinancing Act, Uganda tried something else. Regulations under URBRA allowed pension scheme members to use up to half of their accrued benefits as collateral for a home loan.
Its logic was rational, but it barely moved the needle in practice. Mugisha explains that the 50 percent rule meant a member could pledge whichever was lower: half their accrued benefits, or the property’s market value. The problem was the underlying numbers.
‘The biggest portion of members have money that is less than Shs10m,’ Mugisha notes, adding that: ‘Against a market where the average house costs upwards of Shs250m, someone would need benefits worth at least Shs500m to make the facility work’.
‘The regulation, in effect, reached exactly the people who already had options and missed entirely those who did not,’ he says.
Banks ran into a deeper problem, too. Uganda’s pension laws protect member contributions from attachment, meaning lenders have no clean enforcement mechanism in the event of default.
‘There is nothing that gives comfort to bankers. With collateral they could not legally seize, lenders walked away. Uptake was negligible,’ Mugisha notes. The lesson here is that structural solutions that ignore the legal landscape and the actual asset levels of their intended beneficiaries will not work, however elegantly designed.
Patient capital
Another pool of capital could transform Uganda’s housing market, and it has been sitting largely on the sidelines.
Pension funds, Saccos, insurance companies, and asset managers collectively hold assets that are half the commercial banking system’s Shs61.3 trillion. NSSF alone manages over Shs26 trillion.
In Kenya, pension funds allocate up to 30 percent of their portfolios to real estate. In Uganda, the figure is under 5 percent.
The gap is about returns. A pension fund earning 12 to 15 percent on government bonds, with near-zero risk and minimal effort, has little incentive to take on the complexity of a housing development for a similar yield.
As Lutalo puts it, ‘the market has simply not brought them a product which is de-risked and makes business sense to them.’
A functioning mortgage refinancing framework changes that calculus. Lower risk makes housing more competitive as an asset class, which attracts institutional capital, which funds more mortgage lending and more development.
It is a virtuous cycle that the developed world has already taken advantage of.
Rent-to-own: A bridge or a bandage?
In the absence of a functioning mortgage market, NSSF has been developing a Rent-to-Own policy. A household moves into a unit and pays rent, a portion of which accumulates toward eventual ownership.
‘Your payments will be going towards the ownership of the home. There will be an effective interest rate, obviously, but the hope is that the effective interest rate will be less than the current mortgage rates,’ Rukaari says.
It is a genuinely innovative attempt to meet people where they are. However, Rukaari is also honest about its limits: ‘One hundred million is one hundred million. How you decide to finance one hundred million doesn’t change the fact that one hundred million is very expensive for so many people.’
Kasaato frames the challenge in regional terms, referencing a seminar at an International Social Security Association meeting in the Ivory Coast in 2024.
Sierra Leone, with a GDP per capita of just $521 (Shs1.9m), defines an affordable home at around $30,000, roughly Shs112m. Uganda is richer, yet its institutions have not yet built a product at that price point, let alone below it.
Demand that cannot yet speak
Uganda is urbanising at 5 percent annually, according to the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development, one of the fastest rates in Africa.
Kampala and its satellite towns absorb hundreds of thousands of new residents every year.
The desire to own is not a middle-class aspiration, but a universal one. What is missing is the financial infrastructure to convert want into effective demand: the kind that developers can see, price against, and build for.
The Mortgage Refinancing Act, if properly operationalised and deliberately designed to reach beyond the already-bankable, is the single most important near-term intervention available.
Paired with serious engagement from pension funds and complemented by innovative products like rent-to-own, Uganda has the pieces of a solution.
What has been lacking is the will to assemble them in the right order, at the right speed, and the honesty, as Mugisha’s warning about capacity makes clear, to confront what a given tool cannot do.
Beyond this, there is also need to examine why fixing demand is necessary but not sufficient (we are working on an article).
Even if every Ugandan who needs a home could suddenly access affordable financing, there would still not be enough homes to buy.
The supply side of the housing crisis is, if anything, an even more complex problem.