Under the Revised Penal Code, a person commits bigamy by contracting a second marriage during the existence of a valid first marriage. In earlier Supreme Court rulings, bigamy had two consequences for the offending spouses: (1) they cannot remarry, and if they do, (2) they cannot use the invalidity of the prior marriage as a defense unless they have secured a prior judicial declaration of its nullity.
Ramon Paul L. Hernando, en banc), the Supreme Court unanimously modified item (2), holding that a prior void ab initio (from the beginning) marriage is a valid defense even without a judicial declaration of its invalidity. Recently, the Court-in Lapira v. Fariscal (Feb. 26, 2026, per J Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, Third Division)-reiterated this change by acquitting a woman convicted of bigamy in the lower courts.
Let me briefly explain the facts in the recent decision. Imelda Lapira and Jimmy Fariscal married in a civil ceremony in 2001. In 2004, Imelda went to Japan ostensibly to work. Unfortunately, Jimmy lost communication with her and later discovered, to his disappointment, that his wife had married a Japanese national, Takahiko Sato, in 2000, before their marriage in 2001.
Charged with bigamy, Imelda claimed that her marriage to Sato was a ‘sham,’ allegedly arranged only to facilitate her entry into Japan. She maintained that no marriage ceremony took place and that she merely signed a blank paper at the instruction of ‘Jo’ who arranged her travel documents.
Nevertheless, the regional trial court convicted her of bigamy as there was no evidence that her marriage to Sato had been dissolved legally. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that she remained criminally liable since, per existing jurisprudence, her first marriage had not been judicially declared void prior to contracting her second marriage.
THE SUPREME COURT RULED with three significant aspects.
First, it held in Lapira, as it did in Pulido, that though Article 40 of the Family Code requires a court declaration of nullity for ‘purposes of remarriage,’ it did not prohibit the accused from collaterally attacking the validity of a prior void marriage.
Therefore, the accused in a prosecution for bigamy can freely raise the defense of a prior void ab initio marriage without first securing a court declaration. Imelda was acquitted because her prior marriage to Sato lacked the essential and/or formal requisites to a contract of marriage-like a valid marriage license and marital ceremony.
Second, citing settled jurisprudence, the Court in Lapira further clarified that a marriage certificate is ‘prima facie evidence of its contents’ and may be used to prove bigamy when the offending spouse appears in two marital certificates. However, such prima facie evidence may be rebutted by ‘substantial evidence.’
Thus, the prima facie validity of the marriage certificate of Imelda’s first marriage to Sato was effectively overthrown by the certification of the Local Civil Registrar, stating that it did not issue the certificate; in fact, no marriage license had been applied for. This rebuttal was sufficient to overcome the prima facie presumption and to justify the acquittal of the accused.
Third, the Lapira ruling adopts a liberal view on the civil aspects of marriage. It noted that the alleged first marriage of Imelda to Sato was nonexistent, and the subsequent marriage to Jimmy was solemnized in a civil ceremony. Because no sacramental union was celebrated, the Church had no reason to interfere. The acquittal of Lapira of bigamy was a purely civil action.
DRAWING FROM JUSTICE HERNANDO’S RULING in Pulido, Justice Caguioa in Lapira clarified that: first, a judicial declaration of nullity of a prior void marriage is no longer necessary to secure an acquittal in a prosecution for bigamy; second, the prima facie validity of the contents of a marriage certificate may be rebutted by a certification by the Local Civil Registrar that no marriage certificate was issued; and third, a prior declaration of nullity is nonetheless necessary to enable any of the erstwhile spouses to remarry.
These principles recognize that while our courts are duty-bound to defend the inviolability of marriage, they cannot-and should not-impose the heavy criminal penalties based on a marital bond that, from the very beginning, was nothing but a phantom. Indeed, our civil institutions cannot protect a covenant that never was.
These latest decisions do not transgress the constitutional protection of the sanctity of marriage as an ‘inviolable social institution.’ Likewise, they do not infringe upon the Catholic Church’s doctrine of marriage as a sacrament because the ecclesiastical aspects were untouched.
To conclude, the defense of a void ab initio marriage without prior court declaration balances our constitutional reverence for matrimony with the demands of criminal justice. Moreover, our jurisprudence harmonizes the strictures of temporal law with the rhythms of divine justice: guarding the sacred rings of a valid marriage, while freeing the innocent from the shackles of a void union.