Category: Sunday Standard

Botswana Power Corporation (BPC)’s application to hike tarrifs by 46 percent has met stiff resistance from business groups and other consumers. They argue that a proposed 46% average electricity tariff increase would punish consumers for failures the utility itself has yet to fix.

The application, submitted by BPC for the 2026/27 financial year, would lift the weighted average tariff from P1.56 to P2.28 per kilowatt hour and eliminate government subsidies altogether. Stakeholders say the plan risks turning electricity pricing into a blunt instrument for cost recovery rather than a lever for reform.

One of the most detailed critiques comes from Mokenti Raborokgwe of the Botswana Exporters and Manufacturing Association (BEMA), who argues that the tariff application fundamentally misdiagnoses the problem. Drawing on BPC’s 2023 annual report, the most recent published, Raborokgwe contends that nearly half of the P9.039bn revenue requirement underpinning the application reflects avoidable inefficiencies rather than unavoidable structural costs.

‘Nearly P4.343bn of the revenue requirement is driven by inefficiency rather than reform,’ he says, warning that households and businesses are being asked to underwrite operational failures.

The sources of inefficiency are well documented. Presenting at the ‘Tariff Application Public Hearing’ hosted by the regulator Botswana Energy Regulatory Authority (BERA) recently, Raborokgwe says system losses remain well above international best practice, payroll costs are high relative to customer numbers, and capital expenditure has repeatedly fallen short of plan, undermining reliability. Renewable penetration remains low, he says, leaving the system exposed to volatile imports.

‘Most damaging is the chronic underperformance of Morupule B Power Station, the country’s flagship coal facility. Operating at roughly 63% availability in 2023, it has forced BPC to import expensive power and rely on emergency generation, inflating costs that are then passed directly to consumers.’

Benchmarking against regional peers reinforces the point. On losses, generation availability, renewables share and staff productivity, Botswana’s utility lags comparable operators.

Raborokgwe argues that approving tariffs on a simple cost-recovery basis would entrench these shortcomings. ‘Approving tariffs on a cost-recovery basis would force households and businesses to subsidise inefficiency rather than reform,’ he says, insisting that regulation should focus on cost-reflective tariffs, prices aligned to efficient costs, rather than a blanket pass-through of all expenses.

He argues if avoidable inefficiencies were addressed, the revenue requirement would fall sharply, implying that only a single-digit tariff increase would be needed to restore balance. Even allowing for gradual improvement, Raborokgwe recommends a conditional, phased adjustment capped at about 24%, explicitly linked to measurable performance milestones in loss reduction, generation availability, payroll rationalisation and renewable deployment. Concerns about transparency add to the unease. BPC’s 2024 annual report has yet to be published, limiting scrutiny of recent performance and claimed improvements. Raborokgwe warns that ‘it is impossible for stakeholders to responsibly contribute to this debate without access to BPC’s 2024 Annual Report’, urging the regulator to withhold any final approval until current, auditable data are available. Without such disclosure, he argues, tariff decisions risk being made in an atmosphere of opacity.

Business groups echo these concerns, but focus more squarely on the economy-wide consequences. In a submission to the regulator, Business Botswana warned that the proposed increase is ‘unreasonable, unaffordable, [and] economically devastating for businesses and job creation’, adding that it is ‘based on flawed methodologies’.

Electricity is a key input across mining, manufacturing, tourism and services; a sudden increase of this magnitude would, the group argues, cascade through costs, prices and employment.

The timing is particularly sensitive. An average 24% tariff increase took effect in July 2025, and many firms are still adjusting. Imposing another sharp rise months later risks accelerating what economists describe as a ‘utility death spiral’: higher tariffs push customers to cut consumption or invest in self-generation, shrinking the sales base and forcing further increases. Business Botswana’s survey evidence is stark. Nearly 78% of respondents opposed the proposal, describing it as excessive and unjustified. Micro and informal enterprises-often thinly capitalised-would be hit hardest, while larger manufacturers anticipate multi-million-pula annual cost increases.

‘Electricity is already a major operating cost,’ the submission notes, warning of cost-push inflation and job losses. The regulator, BERA, sits uncomfortably between competing imperatives. It must ensure the commercial sustainability of the utility while protecting consumers and promoting economic efficiency. Business Botswana argues that a 46% jump fails test of necessity and proportionality, particularly amid weak growth and high unemployment.

It calls instead for predictable, multi-year pricing with single-digit annual increases, complemented by demonstrable efficiency gains and targeted relief for vulnerable sectors such as health, manufacturing and agriculture.

BPC insists that decisive action is unavoidable. Decades of tariff suppression, it says, have left the utility financially fragile and unable to invest adequately. Solar projects coming online will help diversify supply and reduce import costs, but legacy issues; debt, maintenance backlogs and unreliable generation, remain. Without a step change in revenues, BPC argues, these problems will persist.

However, consumers question why the costs of delayed projects, weak governance and underperforming assets should be socialised through tariffs rather than addressed through shareholder support, restructuring or tighter oversight. They urge more sophisticated pricing-time-of-use tariffs, differentiated rates for energy-intensive industries, and targeted subsidies to soften the economic blow while reforms take hold.

On paper, Botswana enjoys privileged access to the American market under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), a cornerstone of Washington’s trade policy toward sub-Saharan Africa. In practice, officials here say, the pathway is narrower than it appears.

Chief Negotiator at Botswana’s ministry of Trade and Entrepreneurship, Phazha Butale, argues that while the zero-tariff policy under AGOA may be low, the regulatory terrain is anything but. ‘There are hidden rules and processes that producers, businesspeople, exporters – and by extension Africa – must comply with,’ he said, noting that complying with them imposes a significant financial burden.

As an example, for Botswana’s horticulture producers, that terrain includes complex pesticide residue limits and detailed labelling requirements that echo European consumer expectations. For large agribusinesses in Europe, such systems are routine.

Under AGOA’s rules of origin, a specified share of a product’s inputs must be sourced domestically. Butale said ‘the rules of origin’ require that a certain proportion of inputs, in some cases up to 60 percent, be sourced locally. ‘There are other requirements for standards,’ says Butale, adding that ‘You have to meet the standards of the US regulations’ whether the export is pharmaceuticals, fresh produce or manufactured goods.

For years, the European Union (E.U) has imposed stringent standards on imports, requiring traceability systems, veterinary controls and disease-free zones that are costly to maintain. Botswana, one of Africa’s most established beef exporters, has invested heavily to comply. It built an elaborate cattle identification system and upgraded facilities at the Botswana Meat Commission (BMC). Yet exports have been periodically suspended when outbreaks of foot-and-mouth disease were detected in parts of the country, even when those outbreaks were geographically distant from export zones.

In 2011 and again in 2015, the EU temporarily banned beef imports from Botswana after such outbreaks, citing biosecurity concerns. The suspensions hit rural farmers hardest, reducing slaughter volumes and export revenues. While European regulators described the measures as necessary to protect animal health within the bloc, officials in Gaborone argued that the blanket restrictions did not always reflect the realities on the ground.

Butale indicated that the Botswana Investment and Trade Centre (BITC) is ‘actively working with people in the North-West to try and improve their productive capacity to be able to meet these quality criteria of the US market.’ Yet the burden of proof often falls disproportionately on exporters from countries such as Botswana. Butale said Botswana is working with the Botswana Bureau of Standards in order to ‘reach a point where we standardise so that the standards applicable in Botswana are also the same standards applicable in the US, Europe and in China so that there is a level playing field.’

The European Union’s rules are not unique. In the United States, the Food Safety Modernisation Act expanded requirements for foreign suppliers, obliging exporters to demonstrate compliance with preventive controls and hazard analysis standards. For Botswana, navigating these frameworks can mean hiring consultants, upgrading cold chains and absorbing delays at ports, costs that can erode already thin margins.

Trade economists describe these measures as ‘non-tariff barriers.’ Unlike tariffs, which are transparent taxes on imports, regulatory standards are often justified on health, safety or environmental grounds. In many cases, they reflect legitimate public concerns. European consumers expect strict oversight of food safety; American lawmakers are under pressure to prevent contamination and disease.

Critics argue that while Western standards may be scientifically defensible, they can function as de facto trade barriers when applied rigidly. A temporary suspension can shutter abattoirs and ripple through rural economies in countries such as Botswana.

With the clock ticking on the preferential trade pact that has anchored much of its access to the American market, Botswana is mounting a late-stage drive to expand beef exports to the United States under the African Growth and Opportunity Act, or AGOA, which is set to expire in December 2026.

Earlier this month, President Donald Trump signed legislation extending the trade program for eligible African nations through December 31, 2026, restoring benefits retroactively to September 30, 2025, when the agreement briefly lapsed. For Botswana, whose textile industry has largely withered after once serving as its principal AGOA export, the extension represents both opportunity and reckoning.

Adding beef to the American export market would mark a strategic pivot for a country long reliant on diamonds and preferential access that it now concedes it failed to fully exploit.

Phazha Butale, chief negotiator in the ministry of Trade and Entrepreneurship, said the country sees itself as ‘the premium most beef destination in the whole world.’ He pointed to neighbouring Namibia as a recent example of what is possible. ‘As recent as last year (2025) Namibia got clearance to export beef [to the U.S]. So we will be looking at how they were able to meet the requirements so that we can replicate,’ he says.

His comments reflect a broader sense of urgency within government ranks. ‘We haven’t made optimal use of the US market, especially outside of diamonds. We really should have done more by now but there are hindrances to why that is the case,’ he says. The recent AGOA extension, he adds, is an opportunity but a fleeting one. ‘The window is short to utilise the AGOA extension,’ he says, questioning ‘how much can we do between now and the end of year that we haven’t managed to accomplish in the last 10 or 15 years?’

Enacted in 2000, the African Growth and Opportunity Act grants eligible sub-Saharan African countries duty-free access to the American market for thousands of products. While apparel and textiles have dominated AGOA success stories in countries like Kenya and Ethiopia, Botswana is now positioning beef as its next strategic export.

The country’s beef sector, built on decades of disease control protocols and traceability systems, has traditionally served European markets. But shifting global demand and uncertainty about what comes after AGOA have prompted policymakers in Gaborone to reconsider their export map.

Butale said he would prefer a more durable framework. ‘We would have a replacement of AGOA through reciprocal trade agreement between SACU, Botswana being part of SACU, and the United States. That way we will have certainty and we will negotiate the kind of standards that we will be able to meet to send exports to the United States.’

He added, ‘The challenge with AGOA is its unilateral.’

Trade specialists caution that tariff-free access is only the first hurdle. Exporters must meet rigorous U.S. Department of Agriculture standards, navigate complex sanitary and phytosanitary requirements, and build supply chains capable of delivering consistent volumes to a highly competitive market.

Butale indicated that the standards are stringent but they are working on meeting them.

With less than a year remaining before AGOA’s scheduled expiration, the country faces a compressed timeline to translate ambition into export-ready shipments. Whether Botswana can transform its self-described premium beef into a foothold in American supermarkets may determine if the final chapter of AGOA becomes a missed opportunity or a turning point.

The Umbrella for Democratic Change (UDC) government has reportedly made only limited headway on its sweeping election promises as it achieved just 13 percent progress in its first year in office.

This is according to a study by the Southern African based Sivio Institute which is a non-governmental (NGO) organisation focusing on governance across Africa titled ‘Settling In Amid Fiscal Challenges: An Assessment of the Government of Botswana’s First Year in Office.’ The study paints a stark picture of a government grappling with economic headwinds and struggling to translate campaign pledges into tangible results.

According to the study, the UDC manifesto contained 171 promises. Of these, only 23 promises representing 13 percent are currently ‘In Progress,’ while none have been fully implemented or broken. The overwhelming majority, 148 promises, remain at the ‘Not Commenced’ stage. ‘In the past 12 months, 25 actions have been recorded,’ the study states adding that ‘after a year in office, the Government of Botswana has made 13% progress towards fulfilling the promises made in the election manifesto.’

The Economy sector recorded the highest number of actions, with 10 initiatives underway, followed by Social Services with seven. Social Services, which accounts for the largest share of promises at 62 or 36 percent of the total manifesto has seen minimal progress. Only six promises in the sector are currently in progress, while 56 have not commenced, translating to a score of just 12 percent. The study says one of the flagship promises was to increase the old age pension from P830 to P1,800. The government has partially fulfilled this by raising the pension to P1,400 at the start of the 2025/2026 financial year and pledged to increase it further ‘as the economy recovers,’ according to the report. Housing was another major pledge, with the UDC promising to build 100,000 houses over five years. The government launched the Bonno Housing Scheme in March 2025, targeting 61,000 houses across all constituencies.

However, the report notes that ‘almost 30,000 of these housing units will come from a collaboration with the Botswana Housing Corporation and the private sector.’ The government also introduced free sanitary pads for schoolgirls at a cost of P69 million and announced a P300 allowance for new mothers, although the latter has since been deferred to the 2026/2027 financial year.

The study shows that some promises remain untouched, including increasing tertiary student allowances to P2,500 which is a delay that has sparked discontent among students and ‘almost culminated in a demonstration.’ Meanwhile, government attempts to ease living costs have been mixed. A 30 percent cut in electricity tariffs for domestic users was announced in March 2025, but President Duma Boko later warned that increases could follow because subsidies were becoming unaffordable.’Overall, 55 out of the 62 promises under Social Services remain at the ‘Not Commenced’ stage,’ the report states.Touching on the economy, the report says out of 57 economic promises, only 10 are in progress, giving the sector a score of just 9 percent.

The report attributes much of the sluggish progress to Botswana’s deteriorating economic outlook, driven largely by a collapse in diamond sales.’The sale of diamonds by De Beers also remains low, having fallen by almost 50% by the end of 2024 and still showing no signs of recovery in 2025,’ the study notes, adding that this has significantly weakened foreign reserves. President Boko had pledged to fast-track a new diamond deal with De Beers, but the report says ‘there has been very little information on the deal, and the public remains largely uninformed.’ The government has, however, taken steps to cancel more than 80 percent of infrastructure projects under the controversial Development Manager Model citing ‘mismanagement and financial irregularities.’ In line with its promises, the government also established a Sovereign Wealth Fund, injecting P76 million into its initial capital, and introduced progressive taxation, reducing the burden on low-income earners while increasing taxes on high earners.

Despite these measures, unemployment continues to rise, the study says, with the government pointing to projects such as the Khoemacau Mine and the Bonno Housing Scheme as future job creators aligned with its pledge to create 500,000 jobs over five years.

Still, the study states that, ‘The bulk of the promises (47 out of 57 promises) remain as ‘Not Commenced’.’

With regard to governance reforms which is another cornerstone of the UDC campaign, the study suggests that they have seen even less progress. Out of 43 governance promises, only three are in progress, resulting in an assessment score of just 3 percent. Among the symbolic actions highlighted was the decision to allow the burial of San community member Pitseng Gaoberekwe in the Central Kalahari Game Reserve, fulfilling a long-standing demand denied by the previous administration.

At the burial, President Boko ‘reiterated the promise of his party to ensure justice and protect human rights for all, especially the marginalised groups.’ The study says the government has also pledged to base public appointments strictly on merit and has made several key appointments, including to the Court of Appeal and the leadership of the Botswana Defence Force.

However, the study shows, major structural reforms including drafting a new constitution, overhauling the intelligence services and addressing wage inequalities have yet to begin.

Corruption accounted for just six promises in the manifesto. Three are now in progress, while three have not commenced yielding a 22 percent score. The report highlights the trial and sentencing of a former Permanent Secretary to the President as a notable example of the government’s pledge to ensure fair trials in corruption cases.

‘International best practice today places the fight against corruption as one of the key areas of good governance,’ the report states, while noting ‘very little progress, especially in empowering the Directorate of Corruption and Economic Crimes.’

Climate change ranked lowest in priority with only three promises made. Of these, one is in progress, giving a 17 percent progress score. One key step was the passage of the Forest and Range Resources Act in August 2025, aimed at strengthening environmental protection.

UDC Executive Secretary Dr Patrick Molutsi had not responded to Sunday Standard queries at the time of going to press.

A decision by Dinah Marathe, the Commissioner of Botswana police Service, to launch a forensic probe into a controversial police welfare fund is shaking one of law enforcement’s most entrenched cultures: the so-called Blue Wall of Silence.

In a move widely seen as unprecedented, Marathe has commissioned R4 Forensics, led by Robert Masitara, to scrutinize the half-billion Pula BPS Welfare Scheme. The investigation follows years of mounting pressure from serving and retired officers who have demanded transparency around the fund’s management.

For many within the ranks, the decision signals a dramatic shift from the historical tendency of police institutions worldwide to shield internal misconduct, a practice commonly kwon as the ‘Blue Code.’

‘I was pleasantly surprised when I was called for an interview by R4 Forensics. I never in my life thought any of our commissioners could be brave enough to launch the investigation’, said a retired officer who spoke on condition of anonymity, citing fear of retaliation and the long-standing culture discouraging officers from speaking out.

Masitara would neither confirm nor deny the investigation.

Calls for an independent audit intensified after a 2020 controversy in which P10 million donated by police to the national Covid-19 Relief Fund was allegedly deducted from officers’ savings without their consent. The incident deepened distrust among rank-and0file officers and fueled suspicions about governance within the welfare scheme, formally known as the BOS Savings Fund and Loan Guarantee Scheme.

By the time Marathe took office in 2024, becoming Botswana’s first female police commissioner, she inherited not only the unresolved dispute but also an institution facing broader scrutiny over accountability.

Her appointment coincided with findings published in the 2024 African Security Review, which warned that Botswana lacked independent mechanisms to hold police accountable. The study noted that the Internal Affairs Branch struggled with both capacity and perceived impartiality, pointing out that only about half of 105 misconduct cases recorded between 2019 and 2023 had been finalised by early 2023.

The concerns echoed earlier criticism from a 2021 report by Al Jazeera and the Legal Resources Centre, which linked persistent police impunity to the absence of an independent investigative body and weak human rights structures.

Since assuming office, Marathe has repeatedly signaled a reformist agenda. During his visits to police districts in Francistown and Mahalapye in August 2025, she warned officers that misconduct and corruption would erode public trust and pledged to steer the service towards a human-rights centered model aligned with the current government’s priorities.

The welfare scheme probe now appears to be the clearest test yet of that pledge, and of how far institutional culture can shift.

Globally, police corruption and internal cover-ups remain persistent challenges, often attributed to tight-knit occupational solidarity that discourages whistle-blowing.

Leading Global Organizations: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Amnesty International; Human Rights Watch (HRW); Transparency International (TI) have all reported that police corruption and, by extension, the tendency to cover up misconduct, is a worldwide issue rather than isolated to specific regions. It is often described as an outgrowth of group camaraderie that encourages closing ranks to protect officers. By ordering an external forensic investigation, Marathe is positioning the Botswana Police Service as a rare outlier willing to confront that norm head-on.

Whether the inquiry will lead to prosecutions, structural reforms or simply deeper institutional tensions remains uncertain. What is clear, however, is that the investigation has punctured a long-standing silence and placed the future credibility of Botswana’s policing family in the public eye.

Another week, another State-Owned Entity (SOE) at the centre of a corporate governance storm. Leadership changes across Botswana’s SOEs have begun to resemble a game of musical chairs, a comparison now frequently voiced by an increasingly frustrated public. Every time an SOE makes headlines for the wrong reasons be it financial distress, executive misconduct, or service delivery breakdowns, the spotlight almost instinctively falls on management. Investigations are launched, executives are scrutinised, the CEO is questioned and, in some cases, suspended. Yet beyond the noise of the scandal and the headlines lies a crucial question that requires serious interrogation but rarely receives equal attention. Where was the Board?

When organisational challenges become the norm, it is necessary to examine not only the operational decisions but also the strength of oversight. Corporate governance failures within Botswana’s SOEs are often treated as isolated crises when they in fact point to a deeper issue of Board effectiveness.

Unlike private entities, SOEs are custodians of national assets. They are entrusted with the duty to manage these strategic national assets, deliver essential public services and operate using public resources which can ultimately impact citizens and the national fiscus. Their Boards carry a dual responsibility of commercial oversight and public accountability which makes their effectiveness more than just a technical governance issue but a matter of national interest.

Central to the mandate of an SOE’s Board is its role as steward of the organisation. This entails setting strategic direction, supervising executive management, safeguarding assets, and ensuring that emerging risks are identified and addressed before they escalate into public crises. It is for this very reason that they should be held to a higher standard of accountability than their counterparts within the private sector. Holding the Board to a higher standard of accountability is not intended to be punitive but to reflect the weight of their mandate.

In the context of SOEs, board effectiveness cannot be separated from national accountability. The Board is the layer of governance entrusted with ensuring accountability and transparency. Their oversight entails questioning assumptions, interrogating strategic decisions, and ensuring management actions are consistent with ethical, legal and financial standards. The Board’s oversight demands independence of thought and the willingness to challenge, particularly when decisions carry fiscal and reputation risk. It is important for the Board to be able to balance its independence with oversight as this will allow it to challenge management without conflict of interest which then creates room for objective judgement.

Should the corporate governance debate continue to centre exclusively on management, systemic vulnerabilities will remain largely unchecked. Executives will change and investigations will be launched, but the structural safeguards intended to prevent failure will still be compromised.

Board effectiveness also depends on balance. A well-constituted Board combines executive management insight with objectivity from the non-executive directors. Executives should bring institutional knowledge and operational context, while non-executive directors provide the external perspective and independent scrutiny. It is this balance that enables the Board to interrogate management proposals thoroughly while still offering strategic guidance.

In 2025, the Botswana Accountancy Oversight Authority (BAOA) released its Financial Reporting Monitoring and Corporate Governance Report for the 2024 review period. The report, which assesses governance disclosures and practices across Public Interest Entities (PIEs), offered a snapshot of the state of corporate governance, within that group, in Botswana. According to the report, a total of 40 corporate governance reviews were conducted in 2024, consisting of 24 first-time reviews and 16 re-reviews. None (0%) of the 24 entities reviewed for the first time met the corporate governance requirements which was a decline from 21% in 2023. The report further states that of the 15 significant entities reviewed, only 2 achieved full compliance while among the 6 public bodies assessed, compliance was also achieved by just 2.

The report also highlights major gaps in board performance, with 40% of deficiencies linked to Boards and Directors, 12.6% to Audit Committees, and 12% to Internal Audit. Independence of non-executive directors and chairpersons was often compromised, and Board composition frequently fell short of best practice.

This does not necessarily mean that the Boards reviewed were negligent but shows that the practice of governance needs strengthening. The pattern emerging should therefore prompt an honest reflection on how oversight functions are being executed at the top.

While the Board carries the formal responsibility of overseeing executive management, another equally important question that often arises is – ‘who checks the checker?’ Boards, too, are not immune to governance challenges and it is becoming increasingly evident that oversight can drift if not exercised with discipline and ethical clarity. Boards may lose focus, become overly aligned with management, or neglect the very mandate they were appointed to uphold, and when that happens, they too find themselves under scrutiny.

The governance architecture does not end at the boardroom table. It extends upwards to the shareholder, and in the case of SOEs, to the responsible Minister acting on behalf of the state. This layer of oversight exists to ensure that Boards discharge their duties within legal, ethical and strategic boundaries. Effective governance therefore requires a functioning chain of accountability. Executive management must answer to the Board. The Board must answer to the shareholder. The shareholder, represented by the Minister, must exercise responsible stewardship without undermining operational independence. If at any point, the link in that chain of authority weakens, the entire structure becomes vulnerable.

Checks and balances are crucial to safeguarding against the concentration of power. A well-designed governance system includes clear performance monitoring, transparent reporting, periodic evaluations and defined escalation mechanisms at every level. These ‘fail-safe’ triggers ensure that underperformance or misconduct are identified early and corrected before they escalate into organisational risk.

The appointment of SOE Boards has, at times, attracted public debate on whether factors other than expertise and competence influence selection decisions. Where appointments are perceived to align with prevailing political interests, the implications extend beyond reputation and may affect the integrity of the governance structure itself.

This reality underscores the importance of institutional checks and balances. Parliamentary oversight, including scrutiny from opposition leadership, plays a vital role in ensuring that Ministers responsible for SOEs exercise their shareholder authority within clear ethical and legal boundaries. This form of oversight is less about politics and more about ensuring transparency, accountability and the responsible stewardship of public assets.

When Boards fail to exercise disciplined, independent, and informed supervision, risks go unchecked, strategic drift takes hold, and public resources are left exposed. Governance frameworks may exist on paper, but without effective oversight, they risk becoming symbolic rather than functional. If Botswana is to break the cycle of governance lapses in SOEs, it is imperative to strengthen Board accountability. The question is no longer just what went wrong with executives, but how the Boards entrusted with national assets carried out their oversight mandate.

The Industrial Court has ruled that employers must disclose the salaries of senior managers to junior staff during salary negotiations, in a decision expected to influence collective bargaining practice across the country.

In a judgement delivered last week and raising the bar for fair bargaining in Botswana,

the court ordered the Motor Vehicle Accident Fund (MVA Fund) to disclose its management salary structure, ruling that its refusal to release the information amounted to bargaining in bad faith.

In a judgment delivered recently, Maun Industrial Court Judge Sampa Kaisara directed the MVA Fund to provide the Botswana Public Employees Union (BOPEU) with salary details covering management Bands 1 to 4 within 14 days of a renewed request subject to confidentiality safeguards.

‘The Respondent’s failure to disclose information on pay structure covering Bands 1 to 4 constitutes bargaining in bad faith,’ ruled Kaisara.

The dispute arose during a review of the MVA Fund’s organisational structure and job evaluation exercise where BOPEU argued that it could not meaningfully participate in negotiations without access to the full salary structure including senior management pay.

BOPEU maintained that the information was essential to ensure fairness, transparency and reasonableness across the organisation.

‘The disclosure of the information will allow the union to make considerations on the impact of its submissions, determine reasonability and guard against causing any conflict or distortion of the remuneration structure,’ the union argued.

However, the MVA Fund had refused to release the information arguing that management employees fall outside the union’s bargaining unit and that their salary details were confidential.

The Fund insisted that there was ‘no specific clause in the Collective Labour Agreement that compelled the Respondent to disclose the management salary structure.’

But the court rejected this argument as it found that management salary information was directly relevant to the ongoing salary review and collective bargaining process.

‘The nature of information sought is linked to the present exercise on review of Respondent’s job evaluation and remuneration structure,’ Kaisara said.

‘The information will be crucial to gauge Respondent’s financial ability to afford the union’s wage proposals,’ the judge added.

The court emphasised that disclosure of relevant information is a fundamental part of negotiating in good faith.

‘Disclosure of information is a critical component of bargaining in good faith. Employers are under a duty to disclose relevant information to enable effective collective bargaining,’ the judgment stated.

The court further found that withholding the information would harm the union’s ability to negotiate effectively.

‘In the absence of the information, the union will be constrained to carry out a more effective and meaningful bargaining,’ Kaisara said.

The judge also dismissed concerns that disclosure would violate management privacy, noting that the information related to salary bands and pay structures rather than personal employee data.

‘It is rather information on the identified management structure mostly on salary bands and recommended pay. Hence, no substantial harm is likely to be occasioned by its disclosure,’ the court ruled.

However, the court ordered that safeguards be put in place to protect confidentiality, including limiting access to specific union officials and requiring discretion.

Despite the ruling, the legal battle is far from over.

The MVA Fund has since filed an appeal with the Court of Appeal in Gaborone, arguing that the Industrial Court erred in law and fact.

In its appeal papers, the Fund argued that management employees ‘do not form part of the bargaining unit’ and that their consent was not obtained before ordering disclosure of their salary information.

People who create products that we need and are willing to pay for must be allowed, as much as possible, to keep the fruits of their labour. These people must not be punished through taxation. We have to acknowledge that society becomes prosperous if we let the entrepreneurs or makers keep the proceeds of their labour. That also incentivises them to improve their products and offerings, and to innovate even more.

And a typical example is the United States of America. Because tax as a proportion of national income is manageable compared with Europe, America has a lot of innovation and creativity that you do not find in other jurisdictions.

This then brings us to taxation and its role in economic growth. We saw in the recently presented budget that there is a move to increase taxes. The nation is poised for a rise in corporate tax, personal income tax, and, obviously, capital gains tax. However, we cannot raise our taxes and still enjoy growth and prosperity. So the truth of the matter is that we cannot have both. It just doesn’t happen that way.

This then compels us to look critically at whether we see taxation as a way out of our economic downturn. And clearly it is not. The way out is to lower our taxes and also reduce public expenditure, especially the bloated public service.

Taxation, on the other hand, should be used to fund essential infrastructure that cannot be provided by the private sector. In other words, it must fund goods, which we all enjoy without necessarily having to pay for them individually.

That being the case, taxation must not be used to promote so-called fairness or equality. That should not be its purpose. The moment taxation is used to finance fairness or equality, it becomes a political weapon against successful, rich, or hard-working people. And politicians then use it to beat up high-income earners and even call them pejorative names.

The thing about taxation is that people should be allowed to keep as much money as possible in their pockets. Instead of giving it to the government in the form of taxation, individuals can be counted on to spend their money, not only wisely but efficiently too than the government.

And the more money the government takes from people, the less they have to save and invest. Without savings to invest, the economy suffers from a loss of productivity. We know, of course, that the government claims it needs taxes to invest. But much of what the government calls investment is really wasteful spending.

This is why the government needs to take as little money as possible from the people. This is why the government needs to ensure that tax rates are lowered and that people have enough money to invest.

High tax rates also lead to capital flight and brain drain. As more high-income earners feel that a greater share of their income is taken away, they look for low-tax destinations. This also has a serious impact on investment and capital formation. A flight of skills is also not in the interests of Botswana or any other country that keeps raising its taxes.

This is why high-income earners engage in aggressive tax planning, involving lawyers, trust counsellors, and accountants, leading to an industry that would be unnecessary were it not for the high tax environment.

Taxation should also not be punitive because businesses create the goods and services we need. That’s the first thing they do for us. So all this talk about businesses having to give back is unhelpful. Taxation should also not be used to kill innovation by seeming to punish the makers.

To use Botswana as a low-tax destination compared to our regional neighbours as a justification for raising taxes is to miss the point. Our competition in the region is not the high-tax locations. We have to compare ourselves to the best. And it is Mauritius.

It’s too early yet for the UDC to start to panic.

It is much, much early for them to even start thinking of giving up.

Yes, there are difficulties; very serious difficulties.

But the government is not imploding. Far from it!

The difficult phase they are going through is natural for any government, especially a government that is manned by inexperienced hands.

And the UDC government does not have too many experienced hands in it.

They only came to power just over year ago.

They were replacing a party that had been in power for close to sixty years.

Once in office, the UDC has found itself compelled to play games of political psychology – to buy time, but also to appease the powerful interests that still control the economy of this country.

That for me was strategic maturity. Safety first!

Rattling the powerful interests immediately upon taking office was a risk not worth taking.

As a result, the UDC government has been forced to rely on a big number of known names from the previous administration to continue doing work for the new government.

There has been demonstrable reticence to remove even the most toxic of these key names.

Keeping them was also a risk – perhaps a risk worth taking.

Maintaining such people in their jobs had reasons.

First it had to do with maintaining stability. Threatening entrenched interests inside government could easily cause a blowback.

This was a wise decision. A new and still very weak government can only succeed if it is deemed to be harmless especially by powerful and wealthy interests.

Second it had to do with the fear of shaking the status quo too fast and too hard.

Any shakeup had to be slow and incremental.

If the above assertions are true, then it follows that the UDC has accepted that Botswana is a conservative society. It also means an admission by UDC that the previous administration had left deep roots and tentacles across the public service.

For the UDC to succeed, the party had to accept going through a phase of self-denial.

This was not voluntary but strategic.

This means effectively means being what they are not – as a way of being accepted broadly by the entrenched interests that control both power and wealth. In other words, traditional BDP backers.

There is another reason why UDC felt a compelling need to keep key figures from the previous administration.

Many of the UDC Members of Parliament had never worked anywhere.

And these were the same people from which cabinet had to be appointed.

One has to scrounge around to find a cabinet minister who has held any real life portfolio prior to them becoming a minister.

It is Pius Mokgware and may be a handful of others.

The trouble though is that there is no probation in politics.

The clock starts counting the moment you enter office.

Such people needed guidance in the form of seasoned public service, even as that public service had long ceased to be apolitical.

But it is now time for UDC to assume its real colours.

It will not be easy.

With the economy fraying, the truth of the matter is that there is not much largesse for the UDC to spread around.

When the going got tough, Ian Khama doled out the Economic Stimulus Package.

When Covid-19 struck, Mokgweetsi Masisi released millions in social welfare.

The UDC does have such luxury.

The UDC faithful are also getting prickly.

They are saying enough is enough.

They are very unhappy that their party has gone to extraordinary lengths to appease and accommodate powerful interests from the previous administrations – at a cost of course.

They are insisting that now it’s the time for UDC to go back to its own territory.

For that to happen the UDC will have to be bolder.

It will also have to take risks. It will also have to do away with self-doubt. And most crucially, the UDC will have to believe in itself and its own people.

The party cannot forever be skirting around its own ideas and ideals for fear of annoying its political adversaries.

The UDC came to power on the strengths of its electoral pledges.

At the very least t was elected based on how unpopular the other contenders were.

UDC leadership reckoned that the country was still dominated by powerful interests aligned to the Botswana Democratic Party.

They figured that threatening those interests could easily backfire. That meant that the UDC had to constrain itself.

That meant it had to disguise its true identity.

Those days are gone.

It is now time to change the status quo.

The UDC will have to pivot towards its inner soul and inner self.

In short it is time for a Reset.

Botswana’s new government which was swept into power on promises of reform and respect for constitutional rights is presiding over an environment where civil society continues to face intimidation, restrictions and bureaucratic hurdles, a new report has revealed.

The report, Enabling Environment Snapshot Botswana December 2025, published by EU SEE, paints a troubling picture of persistent constraints on civic freedoms despite political change following the October 2024 general elections.

‘Botswana’s civil society operates in a dynamic, yet challenging environment,’ the report which was funded by the European Union (EU) states. It warns that ‘events in 2025, such as interference and intimidation from the intelligence services, have constrained civic space.’ The report highlights how administrative powers continue to be used to block civic activism, citing a decision by authorities in August 2025 to deny Student Power Botswana permission to march in Gaborone over student allowances. ‘The Botswana Police Service denied approval, citing a clash with a national event requiring heavy police deployment, and advised students to reschedule,’ the report notes. It says this incident ‘demonstrates how administrative decisions under the Public Order Act continue to limit freedom of assembly, even for peaceful demonstrations.’ The law itself remains a major obstacle. According to the report, ‘the Public Order Act also continues to restrict civic space. Its requirement for police permits for peaceful assemblies and the possibility of having permits denied hinders CSOs’ ability to mobilise, hold events, and advocate.’

Beyond legal restrictions, civil society organisations are also grappling with intimidation and dwindling financial support. The report points to ‘interference and intimidation from the intelligence services’ and warns that resource constraints have worsened because Botswana’s middle-income status has led donors to redirect funding elsewhere. ‘Civil society actors face hurdles such as resource constraints exacerbated by the country’s middle-income status, as donors have redirected their funds to other countries which are low income and perceived to be in greater need of support,’ it states.

Even basic administrative processes remain problematic. The report says civil society organisations ‘continued to encounter difficulties with registration,’ despite the introduction of a digital system meant to simplify procedures. ‘Frequent system malfunctions often require submitting documents physically,’ it says, adding that organisations outside Gaborone are particularly disadvantaged because registration processes ‘remain highly centralised.’

While the government has launched a constitutional review and proposed the establishment of a Constitutional Court through Constitution Amendment Bill No. 14 of 2025, civil society groups remain sceptical. The report notes that civil society considers such a court ‘in principle essential,’ but warns that introducing it without broader reforms would limit its impact. ‘Introducing a Constitutional Court in isolation means it will operate within the confines of a constitution that has already been found to contain significant gaps in the Bill of Rights,’ it states.

The government has allowed civil society participation in technical working groups, showing that engagement is possible. However, the report says such engagement is inconsistent. ‘Civil society. reported a lack of meaningful consultations, engagement, and transparency,’ it says, adding that organisations condemned ‘limited civic education and engagements.’

Despite opportunities for collaboration, the report concludes that ‘early indications under the new government. show that restrictions on civic expression continue.’ The findings suggest that for Botswana’s civil society, political change has yet to translate into meaningful freedom.