Category: Sunday Standard

Lawyers representing Bakang Seretse have warned the state that they will launch an application for a permanent stay of execution at the High Court if the Regional Magistrate Court does not agree with them Thabo Malambane – Deputy Director in the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC) – has no legal authority to prosecute Seretse.

On June 11, Gaborone Regional Magistrate Mareledi Dipate will make a ruling on Seretse’s application for the charges levelled against himself and his co-accused to be dropped as Malambane was not lawfully authorized to draw up and sign the charge sheet or even to prosecute the matter.

In papers filed before court, attorneys Unoda Mack and Kabo Motswagole issued a stern warning to the DCEC and Attorney General that, should Dipate not rule in their favour, they will approach the High Court to have the charges quashed or permanently stayed.

‘We implore the state to abandon these charges. There is no reasonable cause to believe that the accused committed any of the offences,’ warned Motswagole and Mack. ‘Kindly treat this letter as a statutory notice that, should you not heed our request, we shall approach the High Court for relief upon lapse of the requisite notice period.’

RIGHT TO FAIR TRIAL

The lawyers also accused the DCEC of violating Seretse and his co-accused’s rights to a fair trial by reviving charges related to an investigation that was conducted some 10 years ago.

Investigations into Seretse, his business partners, Kgori Capital and their dealings with the National Petroleum Fund (NPF) commenced in 2016. At the time, the DCEC focused on a consultancy and advisory services contract that government had signed with Basis Point Capital in December 2015. In executing that contract, Basis Point Capital sub-contracted Kgori Capital to discharge some of its obligations.

In 2017, Seretse, Sharifa Noor, Alphonse Ndzinge, Kgori Capital and Kgori Holdings were charged with money laundering, stealing by agent, forgery of an official document and conspiracy to defraud government. Specifically, Seretse and his co-accused were accused of issuing a false official document instructing Kgori Capital to pay Kgori Holdings P31, 360 000.00 for delivery of a revenue collection and management system to the NPF. The state also alleged the group submitted a false P4 million maintenance claim to the Department of Energy and laundered money through a series of transactions involving suspected proceeds of crime.

An earlier statement from the DCEC claimed, ‘The funds were suspected to have been derived from defrauding government. These transactions were intended to conceal, disguise or transfer the illicit proceeds.’

All the charges were ultimately quashed by the Extension II Magistrate Court in December 2020, only to be reinstated by Malambane in March 2026. In papers filed before court, Seretse’s lawyers accused the DCEC of violating his right to be tried fairly and within a reasonable time.

‘Initiating the charges in 2026 was highly prejudicial as the accused are being subjected to double jeopardy. As such, they are entitled to relief,’ argued the lawyers.

PERMANENT STAY OF PROSECUTION

According to court documents, Basis Point Capital delivered the online fuel levy management system to the government in 2017 and was paid the P31,360,000.00. The defense notes that the system is currently operating to the satisfaction of officials at the Ministry of Energy and Minerals, adding that the millions the DCEC alleges were stolen constituted a legitimate, one-off payment for the infrastructure.

Furthermore, the government has already settled the P4 million maintenance fee claimed by Basis Point Capital in a March 2017 invoice. The Sunday Standard has seen a consent order signed before Justice B. Makhwe on August 3, 2023, confirming this payment.

Motswagole and Mack argue that any administrative questions regarding whether the procurement of the system was properly sanctioned should be directed at government officials, not Seretse and his co-accused. They also highlighted that the validity of the contract between the government and Basis Point Capital was previously reasserted by the Court of Appeal in Kgori Capital vs. The DPP and Another. Given these prior judicial findings, the lawyers argue the state lacks the baseline evidence required to move forward.

‘A person should never be prosecuted in the absence of minimal evidence upon which he might be convicted,’ Mack and Motswagole argued. ‘Accordingly, the charges against the accused persons should not be maintained.’

The defense reiterated that if the state does not abandon the case, the matter will be escalated to the High Court for a permanent stay of proceedings.

For more than two decades the presidency has followed a remarkably predictable path. Vice presidents ascended almost seamlessly to the highest office in Botswana, inheriting incumbency without first seeking a direct mandate from the electorate as presidential candidates. What began as a constitutional mechanism intended to guarantee stability during unexpected transitions gradually evolved into an entrenched political tradition.

That tradition was broken in October 2024 when President Duma Boko led the Umbrella for Democratic Change (UDC) to victory over the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), ending the latter’s nearly six-decade hold on power. The transfer of authority did more than merely change governing parties. It interrupted the succession cycle that had defined Botswana’s executive politics since the late 1990s.

As a result, Vice President Ndaba Gaolathe will not enjoy the advantage that elevated successive Botswana Democratic Party vice presidents to the presidency without first contesting a general election as the leading face of their parties. Unless President Boko were to leave office before the expiry of his constitutional term, Gaolathe would have to face the electorate in a national election if he is ultimately to become president.

The implications are significant because Botswana’s constitutional framework places firm limits on presidential tenure. Section 34 of the Constitution provides that a president may hold office for an aggregate period not exceeding ten years from the date of first assumption of office. Since Boko assumed office following the 2024 general election, his tenure would ordinarily expire around the time of the 2034 elections, assuming he serves the full constitutional period.

That reality sharply contrasts with the political trajectory followed by former presidents Festus Mogae, Lt General Ian Khama and Mokgweetsi Masisi, all of whom reached the presidency through automatic succession while serving as vice president.

The roots of the succession tradition stretch even further back than the post-1998 period. Following the death of founding president Sir Seretse Khama in 1980, then vice president Sir Ketumile Masire automatically succeeded him to the presidency. Masire had served as Seretse Khama’s vice president since September 1966, shortly before independence, making him the country’s longest-serving vice president at the time of succession. Unlike later transitions driven by retirement and political timing, Masire’s ascent occurred under circumstances for which the constitutional succession mechanism had originally been intended, ensuring continuity after the death of a sitting head of state.

Yet it was Masire’s own retirement nearly two decades later that transformed succession from an emergency constitutional safeguard into a recurring political pathway. In 1998 Masire decided to retire before the completion of his term. His departure, coming eighteen months before the 1999 general election, fundamentally reshaped Botswana’s political succession architecture.

At the same time, constitutional amendments introduced in 1997 imposed the ten-year presidential term limit. The combination of the term limit and Masire’s early exit created a political opening that allowed Mogae, then vice president, to assume office and subsequently contest the 1999 elections as incumbent president.

What followed was the institutionalization of a pattern that increasingly appeared less like an emergency constitutional provision and more like an accepted route to State House.

Mogae completed the constitutionally mandated ten years in office before handing power to Khama in 2008. Khama would likewise serve the full constitutional limit before relinquishing office to Masisi in 2018. In each case the sitting vice president inherited incumbency ahead of elections, therefore gaining the political advantages associated with occupying the presidency before seeking an electoral mandate.

That sequence has now been disrupted. Unlike his predecessors in the vice presidency, Gaolathe serves under a president who himself entered office through direct electoral victory rather than succession. Because Boko’s presidency originated at the ballot box rather than through mid-term inheritance, the constitutional clock attached to his tenure aligns naturally with election cycles.

Consequently, unless there is an unexpected resignation or inability to continue in office, there is no automatic pathway for Gaolathe to become president before the next constitutional transition.

In an interview with this publication, former cabinet minister David Magang said Masire’s 1998 decision emerged from both political calculation and personal considerations.

‘By 1998 Masire had come to the conclusion that he wanted to retire,’ Magang said. ‘But he had to retire at the appropriate time. Firstly retire before the then upcoming general elections. And secondly to give his vice president the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the electorate and campaign for the elections.’

Magang said the political environment within the ruling party also favoured transition.

‘Of course the party also felt it was time for him to leave. He was also tired and wanted to do his private business before he could depart this world,’ he said.

Masire’s departure would prove historically consequential. Until then Botswana had experienced relatively straightforward presidential continuity anchored around Seretse Khama and later Masire himself. The constitutional amendment limiting presidential tenure changed the calculations surrounding leadership succession by effectively introducing an expiry date to every presidency.

The vice presidency subsequently became not merely a supporting office but the recognized waiting room to the presidency. Under the arrangement, vice presidents enjoyed prolonged periods of national visibility while serving under sitting presidents. By the time succession occurred, the incoming leader already possessed the advantages of incumbency, state profile and party machinery. The presidency effectively transferred internally before being endorsed externally through elections.

Former president Khama, reflecting on the succession system, said the original rationale behind automatic succession had been understandable under circumstances where a sitting president could no longer continue in office.

‘I was in the BDF when Masire decided to resign then so I don’t know what the arrangement was and why he chose to do that,’ Khama told Sunday Standard. ‘The automatic succession was meant to remove uncertainty about succession in the event a sitting president could no longer continue in office and complete his or her term, so under those circumstances I agreed with it.’

Yet Khama acknowledges that over time the system produced unintended political consequences.

‘But then it had the effect of having presidents changing between elections which became untidy,’ he said. ‘Fortunately with Masisi losing the last elections it had restored national leadership changes aligning with elections.’

Khama said he was pleased that automatic succession had effectively been interrupted following the UDC victory. ‘I am pleased that for now automatic succession has been set aside because its original purpose having been met had started becoming a trend,’ he said.

The 2024 election therefore represented more than a partisan defeat for the BDP. It also restored the alignment between presidential leadership changes and national elections, something that had become increasingly uncommon during the previous quarter century.

The distinction is politically important. Under the earlier succession model, vice presidents could ascend to the presidency without directly fronting a national campaign as presidential candidates beforehand. Once in office, incumbency often strengthened their position heading into elections. In contrast, Gaolathe’s pathway would require direct electoral endorsement unless circumstances unexpectedly trigger constitutional succession provisions.

Khama said while automatic succession had been interrupted, the constitutional mechanism itself remains intact. ‘Automatic succession ended with the UDC victory but it still remains applicable should the need arise for it to be adopted again, then we will be back to the same situation that preceded the victory,’ he said.

Botswana’s Constitution still provides for the vice president to assume office if the presidency becomes vacant due to death, resignation or incapacity. What has changed is the political environment surrounding its use. For the first time in decades a sitting vice president occupies office under a president whose constitutional tenure is naturally synchronized with the electoral calendar. That alignment significantly narrows the prospect of succession occurring before elections. Within the BDP era, succession planning often revolved around identifying and positioning the next vice president as heir apparent. The office became both a training ground and launching platform for future presidents. The expectation of eventual succession shaped internal party dynamics, factional calculations and cabinet appointments.

Under the present arrangement, the political calculus may become less predictable. If Boko serves until the expiry of his constitutional term in 2034, the UDC would have to determine its future leadership through processes more directly tied to electoral politics rather than constitutional inheritance alone. Gaolathe’s prospects would depend not merely on occupying the vice presidency but also on his ability to secure party support and ultimately national endorsement at the polls.

That represents a substantial departure from the political rhythm that characterised Botswana between 1998 and 2024.

Khama suggested reforms that could prevent repeated mid-term transitions in future.

‘I think to ensure we don’t end up with ongoing changes of leadership through automatic succession should the need arise, that rather a vice president who takes over through automatic succession should rather finish the term of his predecessor,’ he said.

‘Then at the next election if he or she wins, then their ten years starts from that point being now their own tenure aligned with elections.’

The UDC victory did not merely remove the BDP from power. It interrupted a succession formula that had become deeply embedded in the country’s post-1998 political culture. The presidency is now tied directly to electoral outcomes rather than anticipated internal transitions. That shift leaves Gaolathe in a markedly different position from his predecessors.

Mogae inherited office after Masire’s early retirement. Khama inherited office after Mogae reached the constitutional limit of his presidency. Masisi inherited office after Khama similarly completed the maximum period permitted under the Constitution. Each transition occurred before a general election, enabling the incoming leader to contest elections as sitting president.

Gaolathe, by contrast, serves under a president whose constitutional timetable points toward remaining in office until the next natural expiry of presidential tenure. Unless circumstances dramatically change, the vice president’s route to State House would therefore pass through the electorate rather than automatic succession. After more than twenty-five years in which Botswana’s vice presidency functioned as the clearest pathway to the presidency, the political order that once appeared settled has been fundamentally altered.

The long troubled Kanye Major Village Sanitation Schemes project has entered another period of uncertainty after engineering consultants suspended onsite services over unresolved payment disputes with the government. The project, one of the most controversial infrastructure works, now faces further delays and escalating costs.

In a letter seen by this publication (dated 11 May, 2026), Estate Construction (Pty) Ltd, the contractor responsible for the project, informed the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Water and Human Settlements that the engineer had withdrawn all site-based services with immediate effect because of unpaid fees.

The contractor said the engineer’s notice warned that supervision would remain suspended ‘until such a time as the outstanding payment issues are resolved.’

The suspension effectively halts key project functions, including inspections, testing oversight, certification of works and issuance of contractual instructions. Estate Construction said the withdrawal of those services made it impossible to continue the works lawfully and safely.

The development marks the latest setback for a sanitation project that has become synonymous with delays, cost overruns, compensation disputes and allegations of poor planning since construction began nearly a decade ago.

Initially awarded to Estate Construction for about P707 million to P725 million, depending on government reporting periods, the project’s total cost has since surged to between P3.3 billion and P3.6 billion, according to figures presented before Parliament and the Public Accounts Committee.

The project was originally expected to be completed between 2019 and 2020 after a 48 month construction schedule. It has since missed several deadlines and remains incomplete in 2026.

Government officials have attributed the spiralling costs to multiple factors, including geological miscalculations, land compensation disputes, inflation, VAT increases and disruptions caused by the Covid-19 pandemic.

One of the most contentious issues surrounding the project has been the discovery that initial geotechnical studies significantly underestimated the amount of rock beneath Kanye village. Officials told lawmakers that consultants initially estimated rock density at about 8%, while excavation later revealed hard rock levels approaching 80% to 90% in some sections. The error resulted in extensive blasting operations, redesign work and the costly transportation of backfill material from outside the village.

The Ministry of Water and Human Settlements has acknowledged the error publicly. Minister Onneetse Ramogapi told Parliament last year that the project’s escalation from roughly P700 million to more than P3 billion was linked largely to the rocky terrain and difficulties accessing work sites in unplanned residential areas. The project has also generated widespread frustration among residents whose homes and properties were affected by trenching and pipeline construction.

Government records show more than 1,000 properties were impacted, while compensation costs rose from an initial estimate of P5 million to at least P24 million and later exceeded P37 million, according to various official updates.

Residents in several wards complained of damaged yards, open trenches, disrupted access roads and unfinished sewer connections. More than 1,400 complaints linked to the project were recorded over the years, with hundreds still unresolved by 2025.

The project also attracted the attention of anti-corruption agencies after questions emerged over the scale of the overruns and procurement decisions. Officials told the Public Accounts Committee that the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime was investigating aspects of the project, including allegations of professional negligence connected to the flawed rock assessments.

Government officials have repeatedly denied corruption allegations, maintaining that the overruns were driven primarily by technical and logistical complications rather than fraud.

Even as the project neared completion, technical problems continued emerging. Earlier this year, Water Utilities Corporation officials told councillors in Kanye that some pump station motors had broken down during testing while certain valves installed in the system were found to be substandard and required replacement.

The latest payment dispute now threatens to deepen those difficulties. Estate Construction said unpaid Interim Payment Certificates numbered 118 to 123 have remained outstanding since November 2025. The company warned that without engineering supervision there could be no approvals, testing, commissioning or certification of completed works for payment.

The contractor said the absence of the engineer had also created a vacuum in project administration, including the inability to obtain instructions or determinations required under the contract.

Estate Construction Managing Director Kegone Sebina requested an urgent tripartite meeting involving the government, the engineer and the contractor within 48 hours to stabilise the project, establish interim arrangements for inspections and supervision, and determine how outstanding payments would be settled. Sebina also requested discussions on measures to protect the project programme and address contractual entitlements under FIDIC provisions governing suspension of works and delays. Estate Construction said it remained committed to completing the project.

Botswana’s fiscal savings account has staged its strongest rebound in more than a year, but fresh data suggests government remains heavily reliant on central bank support as the aftershocks of the diamond downturn continue to ripple through public finances.

New figures from the Bank of Botswana show the Government Investment Account (GIA) rose to P1.66 billion in January 2026, nearly doubling from P846 million a month earlier and marking a sharp recovery from the record low of P251.3 million recorded at the end of 2024. The account consists of P1.16 billion held in the Pula Fund and P500 million in the Liquidity Portfolio.

The rebound offers a rare bright spot for government finances after years of depletion. The GIA, which represents government’s share of foreign reserves, once stood at more than P37 billion during the peak years of diamond revenue inflows. Since then, budget deficits, economic shocks and weaker mineral receipts have steadily eroded the account.

Yet the latest figures also reveal the limits of the recovery.

At the same time that the GIA improved, advances from the Bank of Botswana to government remained at P3.2 billion, unchanged from December, indicating that the state is still relying on temporary central bank financing to manage cash flow pressures.

The data points to a government attempting to rebuild savings while simultaneously borrowing to bridge revenue shortfalls.

Meanwhile, Botswana’s foreign assets increased to P53.6 billion in January from P47.4 billion in December, helped by gains across reserve portfolios. The Pula Fund alone rose to P28.8 billion from P27.9 billion.

While the GIA’s recovery is encouraging, it remains a fraction of its historical levels, underscoring how far Botswana’s public finances have yet to travel.

A new academic paper published in the Statute Law Review argues that Botswana’s courts have increasingly dismissed election petitions on procedural technicalities at the expense of substantive justice, undermining public confidence in the country’s electoral dispute system.

The paper, authored by University of Botswana law scholars Baboki Jonathan Dambe and Olebile Daphney Muzila, examines how Botswana’s courts have handled election petitions over the years. It concludes that strict procedural formalism has rendered the constitutional right to challenge election outcomes ‘largely ineffective.’

Titled ‘The absence of judicial discretion to condone non-compliance in election petitions in Botswana: procedural formalism over substantive justice?’, the paper was published this year by Oxford University Press.

The authors argue that although Section 116 of the Electoral Act grants aggrieved parties the right to challenge election outcomes in court. It says many petitions never reach a hearing on their merits because they are dismissed for procedural non-compliance, sometimes involving delays of only a single day or technical defects in filing documents.

The paper points to a series of election cases in which petitions were struck out despite allegations of serious electoral irregularities. Among the cases discussed is Rankgomo v Independent Electoral Commission, arising from the 2004 elections in Gabane North West ward, where 278 votes were reportedly unaccounted for. According to the paper, the petition was dismissed because an application to substitute a deceased petitioner was filed one day late.

The judges in that matter acknowledged the seriousness of the alleged irregularities, with the court noting that the disappearance of nearly one-third of ballots called into question ‘the credibility of the entire process.’ Nevertheless, the petition was dismissed because the court held it lacked the power to condone non-compliance with statutory deadlines.

The paper traces the origins of the strict compliance doctrine to the landmark Court of Appeal decision in Kono v Lekgari, where the court ruled that election petitions must comply meticulously with procedural requirements and that courts lacked discretion to excuse defects or delays. According to the authors, the Kono judgment has since shaped Botswana’s electoral jurisprudence, with subsequent courts repeatedly holding that even minor procedural defects render petitions ‘fatally defective and a nullity.’

The paper further argues that Botswana’s failure to enact dedicated election petition regulations since the Electoral Act was introduced in 1968 has worsened the situation. Without clear procedural rules, the authors contend, courts have relied inconsistently on portions of the Rules of the High Court while excluding others that would ordinarily allow judges to condone minor procedural irregularities.

The article devotes substantial attention to the wave of election petitions filed after the 2019 general elections, in which opposition parties alleged widespread electoral irregularities, including unlawful interference by state institutions and irregularities involving the voters’ roll. Many of those petitions were dismissed on preliminary objections, including failures to file what courts considered proper ‘notices of presentation’ or omissions relating to sureties for legal costs.

The paper acknowledges that some High Court judges have dissented from the majority approach.

Justice Michael Leburu, in one dissenting judgment cited extensively by the authors, warned that excessive procedural formalism risked turning electoral remedies into ‘a mirage and a denial of electoral justice.’ He argued that courts should prioritise substantive justice and avoid dismissing petitions on immaterial technicalities.

Another dissenting judge, Justice Godfrey Nthomiwa, argued that courts should not ignore ‘glaring electoral irregularities’ because of minor procedural defects, particularly in the absence of detailed election regulations.

The paper also criticises the current constitutional framework that bars appeals to the Court of Appeal in parliamentary election petitions. The authors argue that this leaves the High Court as both the court of first and final instance, creating the risk of conflicting decisions among different judges.

As part of its recommendations, the paper calls for urgent reform of Botswana’s electoral laws, including the enactment of comprehensive election petition regulations, the granting of judicial discretion to condone minor procedural lapses and constitutional amendments allowing appeals in election disputes.

The authors compare Botswana’s framework unfavourably with Kenya’s, where election petition rules expressly empower courts to overlook technical non-compliance where no prejudice arises and where appellate review is permitted. The paper concludes that Botswana’s current approach to election petitions elevates procedural compliance above substantive justice, limiting the courts’ ability to assess the merits of electoral disputes and weakening electoral accountability.

Botswana’s worsening fiscal position is emerging as a growing threat to economic recovery, with the Bank of Botswana warning that rising government borrowing could drain liquidity from the financial system and squeeze credit to businesses.

In its April Monetary Policy Report, the central bank painted a picture of an economy facing pressure from multiple fronts: weak growth, rising inflation, tighter liquidity and an expanding government financing gap.

While public attention has largely focused on inflation and the recent interest rate increase, the deeper concern may lie in the state’s increasing appetite for debt.

The revised 2025/26 budget projects a deficit of P25.5 billion, equivalent to 9.3 percent of GDP, up from the original estimate of P22.1 billion, largely due to weaker mineral revenues as the diamond market remains under pressure. For 2026/27, the deficit is projected at P26.4 billion.

With government investment balances critically low and part of the financing gap still unfunded, authorities are leaning more heavily on borrowing, including domestic debt instruments.

For the central bank, that carries consequences.

The report warns that greater government borrowing could crowd out private sector access to credit at a time when businesses already face tight liquidity and slowing economic activity. Commercial bank credit growth slowed to 2.6 percent in February, down from 5.8 percent a year earlier, suggesting lending appetite is already weakening.

The Bank’s decision to raise the monetary policy rate by 200 basis points to 5.5 percent was partly aimed at improving monetary policy transmission in a strained liquidity environment, not simply containing inflation.

For Botswana’s private sector, the risk is straightforward: as government borrows more to stay afloat, less room may remain for businesses trying to fund expansion, investment and survival.

Botswana’s inflation rate surged into double digits in April, delivering a sharp cost-of-living shock that could complicate the Bank of Botswana’s policy path in the months ahead.

Latest figures from Statistics Botswana show annual inflation accelerated to 10.3 percent in April, up from 4.2 percent in March, marking one of the steepest month-on-month jumps in recent years.

The spike was overwhelmingly driven by transport costs after the March fuel price adjustment filtered through the economy and public transport operators raised fares from the start of April.

Transport alone contributed 7.4 percentage points to the inflation figure, dwarfing all other categories. The transport index rose 21.1 percent in a single month, with the cost of operating personal transport climbing 33.8 percent, while transport services rose 16.6 percent.

The data underscores how vulnerable Botswana remains to imported inflation shocks. Imported tradeables inflation climbed to 17.8 percent, from 6.6 percent in March, reflecting the pass-through effect of higher fuel and import costs.

Rural households appear to have taken the hardest hit, with inflation in rural villages reaching 11.8 percent, compared to 10.1 percent in urban villages and 9.6 percent in towns and cities.

Beyond transport, inflation pressures are broadening. Insurance costs jumped 13 percent, helping push miscellaneous goods and services up 6.8 percent.

More worrying for policymakers, core inflation is beginning to stir. Trimmed mean core inflation rose to 8.8 percent from 4.8 percent, suggesting price pressures are spreading beyond one-off administered increases.

For households already stretched by stagnant incomes, April’s inflation print signals that the squeeze is no longer confined to the petrol station – it is moving across the economy.

Shrinking government to allow the private sector to grow should be our nation’s motto. That is how it works and has worked all over the world. Even those nations frequently held up as paragons of welfare and compassion have moved on.

You see the cash crunch we are facing with your own eyes. Go to a government building for a meeting, and you see things for yourself. They can’t even serve you bottled water. They are unable to serve simple refreshments, even though that was not always necessary in many cases. So the signs of the cash crunch are out there for everyone to see.

But the long and short of this cash crunch is that, over time, the public sector has become outsized. There is no running away from that. This is where the correction needs to take place. And we all understand that the correction is bound to be painful. Over time, many in this country have behaved as though the government, by nature, has a perennial source of funds. They never imagined that the government could one day run short of money, despite repeated warnings from esteemed international organisations.

They saw countries in the region struggle, with some even failing to pay salaries on time but could not conceptualise that, something that happens to a country that has a large and unproductive public sector compared to the private sector. You need a bigger private sector simply because that is where wealth creation occurs. The bulk of the stuff they do in government adds little to wealth creation.

We have resisted calls to reduce the public sector. And we have even turned the notion of the privatisation of state-owned enterprises into a secular heresy. The very mention of the name privatisation is akin to using a swear word. However, no one gains out of this state of affairs. No one gains from continuing to bury their heads in the sand.

The cash crunch is apparent when you visit public schools or hospitals. The schools are in disrepair, while the ability of some hospitals to provide nutritious food to patients is at risk of being compromised. Surely this is not where we want to be.

There is a tendency among the professional class in government to try to sit out the current crisis, hoping that the situation will somehow improve. While hope is a good virtue, it is not a strategy.

The strategy for turning the situation around should follow what others have done around the world. Sweden is a case in point. We see Sweden and its fellow Scandinavians as our default example of the beauty of big government. However, Sweden has moved on since electing a market-oriented prime minister.

They have embarked on a series of reforms that have borne fruit. They have reformed the pension systems, reduced unsustainable unemployment benefits, reduced business red tape and cut corporate tax to attract investment. The tax cuts have led to the return of entrepreneurs who had fled Sweden’s notoriously punitive taxes. They have allowed the private sector to take over failing public schools and hospitals.

So this shows that a large public sector weighs down on growth and prosperity and needs to be pared back, irrespective of whether you are in Sweden or Botswana.

Access Bank Botswana has delayed the release of its audited financial statements for the year ended December 2025, citing an unresolved audit matter that remains under review.

In an update to shareholders, the Botswana Stock Exchange-listed lender said publication of the results has been pushed back because of what it described as a ‘single open matter’ still being assessed as part of the audit process.

The delay extends uncertainty around the bank’s annual performance, particularly as listed companies are expected to publish audited financial statements within regulatory timelines.

Access Bank, however, sought to calm investor concerns, insisting the unresolved issue does not affect the bank’s underlying financial performance, capital adequacy, liquidity position or its ability to continue operating as a going concern.

The lender did not disclose the nature of the outstanding matter, leaving the market with limited clarity on what has held up the final audit sign-off.

The latest announcement follows an earlier cautionary notice issued on March 27 and a subsequent update on April 15, suggesting the delay has persisted for several weeks.

The board said management remains committed to governance, transparency and regulatory compliance, adding that the audit process is expected to be concluded on or before June 3, 2026.

Until then, shareholders have been advised to exercise caution when dealing in the bank’s securities.

While the bank’s reassurance may temper immediate fears over financial distress, prolonged delays in audited reporting tend to unsettle investors, particularly when details of the unresolved issue remain undisclosed.

For a bank, where confidence is currency, opacity can prove almost as damaging as weak numbers.

The focus will now shift to whether Access Bank meets its revised deadline and whether the eventual results provide clarity on what triggered the hold-up.

Botswana’s small businesses in the catering and butchery sectors are coming under mounting pressure as the suspension of slaughtering cloven-hoofed animals following the Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) outbreak disrupts beef supply chains and pushes operating costs higher.

For many small, medium and micro enterprises, beef shortages are no longer just a supply issue – they are becoming a survival issue.

Botswana Informal Sector Association secretary general Mpho Matoteng says the month-long restrictions have left many small operators scrambling to source beef from FMD-free zones, a process that comes with added transport costs, permit requirements and reduced margins.

‘Business is difficult for our people at the moment because beef is scarce,’ Matoteng told Sunday Standard.

‘For those who have been able to secure it, they have to navigate the complexities of obtaining permits and transporting slaughtered meat. This comes with significant costs.’

The strain is beginning to show across the informal food economy, where small caterers and butcheries depend heavily on affordable and predictable beef supply.

Some businesses have responded by raising prices to protect already thin margins. Others have simply shut their doors.

‘While some have opted to increase food prices, others have unfortunately shut down their businesses,’ Matoteng said.

The situation has been compounded by higher prices at the Botswana Meat Commission, leaving smaller operators with few affordable alternatives.

The outbreak’s consequences extend beyond local lunch counters and butcher blocks. Botswana’s beef export access to the European Union has also come under threat after the outbreak affected Zone 11, home to the country’s only EU-approved slaughter facility in Ramatlabama.

For SMMEs, however, the immediate concern is cash flow.