Category: The Bangkok Post

Thai e-payment transactions in July hit a new record of 4.57 billion with a combined value of 10.6 trillion baht, according to the Digital Economy and Society (DES) Ministry.

The uptick underscores the country’s acceleration towards a digital and cashless economy, said the ministry.

Transactions rose 12.2% year-on-year and 2.59% from the previous month, marking the second consecutive month of growth and a new record high.

July transactions exceeded the 12-month average of 4.23 billion, while for the first seven months of 2026, Thailand recorded a cumulative 30 billion e-payments, up 10.5% from 27.2 billion year-on-year.

The average monthly volume for the year increased to 4.29 billion transactions, up from 3.88 billion year-on-year, said deputy DES minister Nan Boonthida Somchai, adding low-value interbank transfers are propelling digital payments.

In related news, the Anti-Online Scam Operation Centre reported an average of 839 cases were reported daily in July, involving average losses of 31.1 million baht per day. The daily number of reported cases fell 16.5% year-on-year.

The number of daily complaints for the month was significantly lower than the 12-month average of 1,010 cases, suggesting the situation has improved from earlier in the year, she said.

However, continued vigilance and stronger preventive measures remain necessary as online threats continue to evolve, said Ms Nan.

The ministry regards building public trust as equally important to driving e-payment growth, she noted.

The government has identified 767 factories operating illegally nationwide, but mostly in the Eastern Economic Corridor (EEC), with 131 already shutdown.

The finding follows the Ministry of Industry’s shift from routine inspections to a new model that utilises data and technology to analyse for and detect irregularities at factories, deputy government spokeswoman Lalida Persvivatana said on Monday.

The system looked at multiple sources of information, including industrial waste management practices that do not align with production data, imbalances between water, electricity and raw material usage, and actual production processes or output volumes, Ms Lalida said. Some information also indicated possible trade fraud.

The detected irregularities were forwarded to field inspectors through the “i-Auditor” system, helping establish inspection standards, record findings and generate electronic reports, she said.

So far this year, the system had identified unlawful activities at 767 factories nationwide. Of these, 131 factories had already been ordered to suspend operations, 636 were instructed to undertake corrective action and 391 factories faced legal proceedings.

No further details of the detected operations were released.

Ms Lalida said 53% of the factories found in violation were in the EEC, a special economic development zone spanning in Chon Buri, Rayong and Chachoengsao, and surrounding provinces.

According to the Department of Industrial Works, Thailand currently has 77,058 industrial factories registered in the system, with 5,961 factories in industrial estates.

Of those outside the estates, 47 smaller factories had minimal environmental or safety impact, not required to obtain an operating licence (Category 1), and 3,361 medium-sized plants were required to notify authorities before commencing operations (Category 2), along with 67,689 large-scale operations that must obtain an operating permit before establishing and operating the factory (Category 3).

Ms Lalida said the government placed equal importance on protecting the public and ensuring fair competition within the industrial sector.

“Businesses that invest in wastewater treatment systems, waste management and safety standards should not be disadvantaged by operators who cut costs by failing to comply with legal requirements,” she said.

The ministry also opened a channel for public and community participation in monitoring factory activities through the “Jaeng Ut” (report the industry) platform, which allows citizens to report factory-related concerns or provide tips.

People are asked to provide the location of the incident, details of the issue, date and time and any supporting evidence they can safely collect, Ms Lalida said.

Plans have been put into motion by the government to build two major bridges in the nation’s southern region with an aim to improve transport connectivity, support tourism and stimulate local economic activity.

Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul on Monday witnessed the signing of construction contracts for the projects in Hat Yai district of Songkhla.

He was joined by Deputy Prime Minister and Transport Minister Phiphat Ratchakitprakarn, Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Ekniti Nitithanprapas and Natural Resources and Environment Minister Suchart Chomklin. Stephen N Ndegwa, incoming World Bank country director for Thailand and Myanmar, also attended.

The Songkhla Lake bridge has been planned to link tambon Koh Yai in Krasae Sin district of Songkhla with tambon Chong Thanon in Khao Chaison district of Phatthalung.

The approximately 7-kilometre link will cost 4.604 billion baht and is expected to shorten the journey between the locations by about 80km, cutting travel time from around two hours to 10 minutes.

The two-lane bridge will have 4-metre-wide traffic lanes and 2.5-metre-wide shoulders on both sides. Its main structure will include a cable-stayed section with a maximum span of 140 metres, while the connecting sections will use prestressed concrete box girders.

The design will incorporate elements inspired by Manora, a traditional southern Thai performing art, to reflect the local identity and encourage tourism.

The Department of Rural Roads and the World Bank have also joined hands to implement protections of the Songkhla Lake ecosystem, conserve Irrawaddy dolphins and restore relevant habitats.

The second project, Koh Lanta bridge, will connect Koh Klang with Koh Lanta Noi in Krabi at a cost of 1.781 billion baht.

The 2.24-kilometre, two-lane bridge will be 13.5 metres wide. Its main section will use a cable-stayed design with a maximum span of 200 metres, while the remaining sections will use prestressed concrete box girders constructed using the balanced cantilever method.

Both projects are scheduled to take 1,080 days with completion expected in 2029. Seventy percent of the 6.385-billion-baht cost for the undertakings is to be financed by World Bank loans, while the remaining 30% will come from the state budget.

Deputy Prime Minister Phiphat said the projects would improve people’s quality of life, lay the foundations for sustainable economic growth and strengthen Thailand’s competitiveness.

Meanwhile, Mr Anutin on Monday confirmed that the first off-site cabinet meeting of 2026, scheduled for Tuesday in Songkhla, will consider major development initiatives covering social and economic issues as well as disaster preparedness.

He chaired a workshop outlining 96 projects for five southern provinces, worth a combined more than 13 billion baht.

Mr Anutin said the mobile cabinet meeting would consider proposals gathered by the Office of the National Economic and Social Development Council. The aim is to ensure policies reflect the needs of communities in Songkhla, Satun, Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat.

In late July, Internet Dialogue on Law Reform (iLaw) Director Yingcheep Atchanont presented evidence alleging that nine Bhumjaithai Party (BJT) figures, including party leader and Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul, manipulated the 2024 Senate election.

Since then, Mr Yingcheep has drawn both praise and criticism, but has vowed to continue his exposé and urged the Election Commission (EC) to take legal action against those implicated.

If the commission fails to act, he warned, he will publish all the evidence online by the end of this month, amid growing scrutiny over whether the EC will recommend legal action against all 229 suspects involved.

How did it all start?

In 2024, the EC was preparing to hold an election for a new 250-member Senate to replace the chamber appointed by the now-defunct National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), whose term expired that year.

EC secretary-general Sawaeng Boonmee admitted it was “the most complex” contest of its kind in the world. The election was divided into several levels, with selections across 20 professional groups, double the 10 used for the previous chamber.

At the district level, three successful applicants in each professional group would advance, or 60 candidates across the 20 groups in each district.

A provincial intra-group election would then narrow the field to two candidates per group, or 40 across 20 groups in each province, leaving 3,080 candidates from 77 provinces nationwide.

At the national level, the 3,080 candidates would enter an inter-group election. The 10 candidates receiving the highest number of votes in each group, or 200 across the 20 groups, would become senators.

Collusion risks

When the rules were announced, critics raised concerns that they could enable collusion, including through the lack of clear definitions for some professional groups.

Parit Wacharasindhu, spokesman for the People’s Party (PP) — then the Move Forward Party (MFP) — said at the time that cross-voting could result in candidates from different professional groups being unable to properly assess the qualifications and credentials of those they were voting for.

A major concern centred on the election’s vulnerability to manipulation by organised groups.

Days before the national-level vote, Mr Yingcheep warned on Facebook that political dynasties known as “Ban Yai” (Big Houses) could intervene in the process.

“Ban Yai can form alliances and even coerce independent candidates … to ensure their candidates secure seats in the final round of the election,” Mr Yingcheep said.

Despite the controversy, the EC proceeded with the election under the previously announced rules, with the new senators announced on June 26, 2024.

Of the 200 successful candidates, more than 150 were found or alleged to have ties to the Bhumjaithai Party (BJT), earning them the nickname “Blue Senators”.

The remainder comprised a mix of independents and those regarded as “new blood” senators.

Investigation ensued

In February 2025, Pol Col Tawee Sodsong, then justice minister, announced that the Department of Special Investigation (DSI) had been ordered to investigate allegations of criminal offences under the Criminal Code related to collusion in the Senate election.

The announcement followed a petition by a group of unsuccessful Senate candidates, later dubbed the “reserve senators”, who alleged that the election fraud claims centred on the group of “Blue Senators” linked to the Bhumjaithai Party (BJT).

Among them was Pol Maj Gen Kamrob Panyakaew, who criticised the EC for moving too slowly in responding to complaints about alleged irregularities in the Senate election.

On March 6, 2025, the DSI board agreed to investigate the alleged collusion. However, the 18-member board voted to investigate only allegations of money laundering, while the EC was looking into possible violations of Senate election law.

A joint investigation committee comprising the DSI and EC was later established as the 26th Investigative Subcommittee.

Two months later, on May 9, 2025, the EC and DSI said 53 senators were implicated in the vote-rigging probe. Six were summoned for further questioning: Alongkot Vorakee, Chokchai Kittithanesuan, Jirasak Chookhwamdee, Pibulat Haruehanprakan, Wuttichart Kalyanamitra and Phisut Rattanawong.

The DSI also said about 1,200 suspects were under investigation for alleged money laundering linked to the collusion case.

In July that year, the 26th Investigative Subcommittee recommended legal action against 229 people, including 138 serving senators and 91 others affiliated with BJT, including party executives and people linked to associated networks.

Overwhelming evidence

Amid the fast-changing political landscape between 2025 and 2026, little progress in the Senate election collusion case had been reported.

However, Mr Parit, now chief opposition whip, began releasing further evidence of the alleged collusion online around June this year. The material points to links between a group of senators, BJT and bribery connected to the Senate election two years earlier.

The evidence included a video clip showing former BJT MP Supachai Phosu speaking at a celebration for Sittikorn Khongyot, who was appointed a senator in August 2024.

In the clip, Mr Supachai referred to Mr Sittikorn as being part of the “blue faction”, an apparent reference to BJT.

Another piece of evidence concerned a money trail during the Senate election period totalling 860,000 baht, which allegedly linked Yanee Sifa, a member of the Amnat Charoen Provincial Administrative Organisation (PAO), to EC officials.

Other evidence included a video recorded at a hotel in Rangsit on June 25, 2024, a day before the national-level vote. Witthaya Khampuang, mayor of Phon Sa municipality in Nong Khai, was identified as one of those appearing in the video and was heard telling others to “do it for those above”.

Mr Witthaya later admitted he appeared in the footage. However, he said “those above” referred to the EC, while “doing it for those above” meant complying with the EC’s procedures and timetable.

What next?

The developments culminated in Mr Yingcheep’s disclosure of a call log involving a Senate candidate from Ang Thong, Prime Minister’s Office Minister Paradorn Prissananantakul and BJT list MP Korawee Prisananantakul.

The call was allegedly made at the election venue during a period when the use of mobile phones was prohibited.

Mr Yingcheep then urged the EC to take legal action against the 229 suspects allegedly linked to the collusion case by the end of August.

If it failed to do so, he warned that he would publish all the evidence online for public scrutiny.

On Tuesday, the DSI filed a complaint with the Crime Suppression Division over the leaking of documents related to the case.

PP leader Natthaphong Ruengpanyawut later said the move amounted to an attempt by the DSI to pursue a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) against those who had exposed the alleged collusion to the public.

BJT, meanwhile, expressed concern over the leaked evidence and called on the EC and related agencies to ensure fair treatment for those implicated in the vote-collusion case, despite the alleged links between some of the 229 suspects and the party.

On Thursday, the EC filed criminal cases against 1,767 senators whose qualifications were found to have failed to meet election requirements.

Opposition whip Mr Parit questioned why the EC had taken two years to act.

He also noted that four of the seven election commissioners had been appointed by senators elected in 2024.

The EC held a meeting on the collusion case on Aug 28 as previously scheduled. It is expected to vote on whether to submit the case to the Supreme Court on Sept 14.

Thailand has aspired to become a high-income economy for several years, dating back to the military-led government that outlined the 20-year national strategy for 2018-2037.

The current administration is targeting this goal within 12 years, hoping to elevate Thailand from the upper-middle-income category.

According to the World Bank’s income classification, high-income economies are those with a GNI (gross national income) per person exceeding US$14,375, while upper-middle-income economies have a GNI per person between $4,636 and $14,375.

Most large Southeast Asian economies are in the upper-middle-income group, including Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and two newcomers — Vietnam and the Philippines.

Neighbouring Malaysia is on course to enter the high-income group by 2028, as its GNI per person has outperformed its peers.

To achieve high-income status, the government targets raising average annual income per person to 500,000 baht, which will be challenging amid growing economic pressures. GDP growth alone may not be the answer, as structural reforms are also needed.

GDP-DRIVEN FUTURE

Thailand must raise its average annual economic growth rate to 5.4% if it hopes to become a high-income country in the future, said Pimjai Leeissaranukul, chairwoman of the Federation of Thai Industries (FTI).

The target is highly ambitious given Thailand’s sluggish economic performance in recent years.

GDP growth slowed from 2.9% in 2024 to 2.4% in 2025, according to the National Economic and Social Development Council. Growth remains weak this year, edging up to 2.8% in the first quarter before slowing to 1.9% in the second quarter.

“If we want to escape the middle-income trap, an average annual growth rate of 5.4% is essential,” Mrs Pimjai said.

Business leaders representing 48 industries under the FTI agreed that Thailand must achieve 5.4% annual GDP growth to attain high-income status by 2037, she said, citing discussions at an FTI meeting on Aug 25.

The government tasked the FTI with developing a joint strategy as the industrial sector remains one of the country’s key economic engines.

Under the proposed framework, the manufacturing sector must help create “industries of the future” to drive growth, contributing 0.8 percentage points to the target of 5.4% GDP expansion.

These future industries include S-curve sectors such as electric vehicles and high-tech manufacturing.

Another growth driver identified by the FTI is “firms of the future”, which are expected to contribute growth of 0.7 percentage points through modernisation of business models, trade and investment practices.

A further 0.7 percentage points is to come from developing a “future workforce” by upgrading the skills and knowledge of Thai workers to meet global market demands.

“Cities of the future”, focused on infrastructure development and smart city projects, are projected to add another 0.4 percentage points to annual growth.

“All these elements must be integrated if Thailand is to achieve 5.4% annual GDP growth,” said Mrs Pimjai.

“Industry offers the largest contribution at 0.8 percentage points, which is why the FTI is bringing together experts and industrial leaders to help formulate practical strategies.”

Thailand’s manufacturing sector must become more competitive globally and maintain manageable production costs if it is to create successful future industries, she said.

However, manufacturers continue to face challenges related to production costs and international competition. Thailand also needs to improve access to advanced technologies and accelerate human capital development to close workforce skills gaps, said Mrs Pimjai.

“The success of this strategy is not the responsibility of any single industry. All sectors must move forward together because every part of the value chain is closely connected,” she said.

For example, even if future industries successfully develop innovative products, the strategy could fail if future-oriented firms are not ready to market and distribute those products effectively, said Mrs Pimjai.

In her view, the government is moving in the right direction and Thailand should aim to join the ranks of high-income economies.

“This is a very challenging task, but if we can achieve it Thailand’s economy will become more prosperous and stable, bringing long-term benefits to the country in every dimension,” said Mrs Pimjai.

HARNESSING AI

Earlier this month the government disclosed it aims to raise total investment from 23% of GDP to 30% by 2029, enabling Thailand to achieve high-income status in 12 years.

Five working groups, including an artificial intelligence (AI) and digital group, were created to achieve this goal.

The AI and digital group seeks to lure 100 billion baht in investment in AI semiconductors and chip design by 2027, while raising the AI contribution to 5% of GDP through investment in infrastructure development and commercial adoption.

Suphachai Chearavanont, chairman of True Corporation, said Thailand needs to harness AI to generate a broad economic impact and develop new industries that can serve the regional market.

“The goal is to create new engines of growth that can ultimately help Thailand break out of the middle-income trap,” he said.

A key challenge is the scale of Thailand’s infrastructure. In 2025, the country had data centre capacity of around 0.2 gigawatts, compared with 31.9GW in China and 53.7GW in the US.

Adding 1GW of capacity requires around 300 billion baht in construction investment.

If Thailand can expand its cloud and AI infrastructure to 10GW within five years, this could generate investment of around 3 trillion baht, said Mr Suphachai.

In addition, Thailand has an estimated 1,003 AI professionals and needs to rapidly expand the pool of skilled talent, he said.

A strong domestic structure could help Thailand attract investment across the AI supply chain, said Mr Suphachai.

Global technology players such as TSMC and SK Hynix may consider expanding their supply chains in Southeast Asia, creating competition among countries seeking to capture these investments.

“If Thailand can attract major global players, it could strengthen the entire value chain from upstream to downstream, and potentially accelerate growth significantly,” he said.

To transform Thailand into an “AI nation”, Mr Suphachai proposed positioning the country as a regional technology hub, fostering an AI startup structure, and developing a large pool of tech professionals to support the expansion of the digital and AI industries.

EMPLOYMENT CHALLENGE

Chanwit Boonchuay, president of the AI Entrepreneurs Association of Thailand and chief executive of Synapes (Thailand), said the government’s ambition to attract a huge amount of AI investment is achievable.

The greater concern is much of this massive investment would be concentrated in infrastructure. The main challenge for Thailand is how to ensure that roughly 300,000 new graduates entering the workforce annually can find jobs, while also creating new career opportunities for the tens of thousands of workers who could be laid off each year by AI, he said.

Thailand’s AI startup sector has expanded rapidly in recent years, but local companies risk being squeezed out by foreign technology providers unless the government provides a more supportive regulatory and procurement environment, said Mr Chanwit.

The number of AI-related companies in Thailand has surged to 677 over the past few years from 300-500.

Although AI is widely expected to create new categories of employment to replace some jobs displaced by automation, these new jobs are not being generated quickly enough in Thailand, he noted.

The domestic AI market is estimated to be worth about 50 billion baht, but foreign companies capture roughly 47 billion of that amount, said Mr Chanwit.

TOURISM ENGINE

Adith Chairattananon, honorary secretary-general of the Association of Thai Travel Agents, said relying heavily on the tourism sector like in the past, when its GDP contribution reached 17-18%, is insufficient to reach a high-income target.

He said Thailand is in dire need of structural reform across all sectors, including the tourism industry. Counting on tourist arrivals is no longer a measure of success, as a higher GDP requires higher income from tourists.

The government’s initiative to shift the tourism economy to a “visitor economy” is a step in the right direction, helping tourism maximise its potential, said Mr Adith.

For example, he said visitors should benefit not only hotels and restaurants, but also other segments such as health and medical services, cultural products, technology, retail, and other creative economic sectors.

The country can raise the value per visitor by upgrading the quality of these segments, which should distribute income to more stakeholders than in the past, capturing demand from foreigners rather than relying solely on domestic consumption, noted Mr Adith.

The government should also set up a visitor economy intelligence platform to provide data-sharing with the private sector, allowing businesses to align their strategies, he said.

For instance, airlines can plan sufficient seat capacity for the next season, while hotels can start employing more workers if demand is expected to rise, said Mr Adith.

Meanwhile, an intelligence platform would give investors an indication of where and when to invest effectively if they have precise predictive analysis, leading to ample supply as well as profitability in tourism areas, which translates into growing economic value, he said.

This type of data can help industries prepare strategies for how many and what kinds of skilled workers will be needed over 5-10 years, allowing the government to work with the education system on recruitment, as well as advising workers on which destinations or fields they can look to for jobs, said Mr Adith.

This strategy relates to Thailand’s goal of finalising its membership in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, as the accession process not only considers economic size, but also covers standards in investment, the labour market, education and good governance.

“Thailand will not reach high-income status anytime soon if we still rely on the same structures and income-generating tools. Tourism has potential, but it must be shifted to a demand-driven engine to ramp up the country’s productivity, human capital and local economy,” he said.

EDUCATION REFORM

Aat Pisanwanich, a lecturer at the Institute of Economics, Rangsit University, said Thailand is unlikely to achieve high-income status given its current fundamentals.

Thailand’s economic structure has significant disparities between large and small businesses. Large companies have the resources and growth potential, concentrating income among a select group, while most of the population has not experienced a meaningful uptick in income, he said.

“GDP is a myth. When we discuss GDP growth, we should ask how much more money Thais actually have. People are sinking deeper into debt because their incomes are insufficient,” said Mr Aat.

Both household debt and public debt levels are high, with the government borrowing funds for distribution to people rather than investing in structural reforms that would enhance national capability and create sustainable income.

“Governments have failed to address Thailand’s structural economic problems,” he noted.

The country also needs to address corruption, which appears to be worsening, said Mr Aat.

To improve the nation’s prospects, the education system must be reformed because it is the foundation for developing skilled human resources, he said.

The education system should be aligned with the needs of global industries. If specific technical skills are required, educational programmes must adapt to meet those demands, said Mr Aat.

Students should also be equipped to use AI effectively, he said, and AI should be treated as a tool or an assistant. People must understand core subject fundamentals before using AI.

“For foreign companies operating factories in Thailand, the country should develop a Thai workforce that can eventually replace foreign employees in positions such as managers and engineers, enabling more income to remain in the country,” said Mr Aat.

A well-educated populace is more likely to elect capable politicians who can deliver meaningful reforms and enable Thailand to compete with other countries, he noted.

Mr Aat also urged the government to enhance the competitiveness of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).

“SMEs are becoming weaker because they struggle to compete with foreign companies and imported goods,” he said.

Northern speciality khao soi is already a familiar sight in Thailand. But in Myanmar, they also have khao swè. How could the two noodle dishes that look and sound so similar taste so different?

The names may sound almost interchangeable, but behind the similarities is a diverging story of borders, migration and cultural memory.

Myanmar cuisine was once unfamiliar to the world, mostly because of the isolation the country experienced through decades of authoritarian rule.

However, in recent years, Myanmar restaurants have been dotting many countries, Thailand included, adding to the country’s already vibrant culinary diversity.

For Bangkok in particular, where Myanmar restaurants and tea shops are becoming increasingly visible, foods like khao swè are doing more than introducing diners to a neighbouring cuisine. They are windows to Myanmar — once known as Burma — as a nation.

Political scientist Joseph Nye’s concept of soft power describes the ability to influence through attraction and persuasion rather than coercion or payment. Culture is one of its principal sources.

In food diplomacy, influence does not come through government policy or economic pressure, but through the appeal of a country’s culture.

For Myanmar, this diplomacy is largely informal.

For much of its modern history, Myanmar has been relatively isolated from the outside world. Even though Thailand and Myanmar share a border, many Thais have historically encountered their neighbour through politics, migrant labour or conflict rather than through everyday life.

That is beginning to change, partly through the people who have crossed the border and brought pieces of home with them.

Tun, who is from Taunggyi in Shan State, has lived in Thailand for more than a decade. He remembers a time when speaking imperfect Thai could lead people to look down on him.

Since the coup in his homeland, he says, attitudes have shifted as Thais have encountered a broader spectrum of Myanmar society — students, professionals, business owners and younger migrants alongside the labourers who were already part of Thailand’s economy. That visibility complicates older stereotypes.

Khaosoi Shwe Taung, where Tun works, serves as an introduction to the many places and identities that make up Myanmar.

Sippachai Kunnuwong, owner of Khaosoi Shwe Taung, revealed the philosophy of the eatery: “Rather than simply selling Burmese food, it makes a point of explaining where dishes come from. Shan noodles from Shan State and Shwe Taung khao swè from central Myanmar.”

For a country made up of an array of ethnic and regional identities, that distinction is important.

“Myanmar culture cannot be reduced to a single cuisine any more than it can be reduced to a single ethnicity. Food becomes a map — one that allows customers to encounter places such as Shan State or Shwe Taung before they may ever see them geographically,” said Sippachai.

The same table, then, can work in two directions.

For a Burmese customer, it can preserve memory. For a Thai customer, it can create a first encounter.

Restaurants and tea shops are becoming places where Myanmar nationals keep hold of home while Thai diners meet a country they might otherwise know mainly through headlines. The exchange is informal, personal and, importantly, two-way.

But the cultural exchange taking place here is not entirely symbolic. It is also tied to migration and labour.

In Bangkok’s Phra Khanong district, Ben — who runs a local Burmese tea shop — describes a neighbourhood that has become increasingly crowded with Myanmar residents. Many Myanmar nationals in Bangkok, he says, have settled around the area, while significant numbers work across the food industry — preparing ingredients, cooking and serving.

Here, food diplomacy looks very different from the carefully constructed experience of an upscale restaurant.

There is no need to explain Myanmar to the people drinking tea inside. The shop functions instead as a piece of Myanmar transplanted into Bangkok: a place where familiar words, habits and foods require no translation.

But its existence changes the surrounding neighbourhood nonetheless.

A tea shop sign, a Burmese menu or a gathering of customers after work makes Myanmar culture part of Bangkok’s everyday visual landscape. Soft power does not always require a campaign. Sometimes familiarity itself is enough.

The political upheaval in Myanmar has accelerated that presence.

Ben describes Thailand as an obvious first destination for many people leaving Myanmar. The nation is geographically close, comparatively affordable and offers more opportunity than many other low-cost alternatives.

But migration is not the only way Myanmar food is being introduced to Bangkok. Some businesses are also deliberately translating the culture for audiences who may have little previous connection to it.

Understanding this means looking back to downtown Yangon in 2014, when founder Htet May Oo of Rangoon Tea House noticed that Burmese food occupied a curious position in the city. It was deeply embedded in everyday life, in neighbourhood curry shops and food venues, but rarely presented in the kinds of spaces associated with business dinners, dates or international hospitality.

His response was to take one of Myanmar’s most ordinary institutions — the tea shop — and place it in a different setting.

That shift allowed a broader question about cultural soft power, taking it beyond what parts of a culture travel to how they are presented and to whom.

“Rangoon Tea House in the Thai capital is significantly more expensive than a traditional tea shop,” Htet readily acknowledged that distinction.

“Its pricing reflects not simply the food, but rent, service, ingredients and the wider dining environment. In Bangkok, the same meal is roughly 20-30% more expensive than in Yangon.”

The result is a version of Burmese food positioned for a different social and economic space — one that can be encountered by middle-class Thai diners, international visitors and Burmese customers in the same room. Htet estimates that the Bangkok clientele is divided relatively evenly between the three groups.

The restaurant’s interior is part of that translation. “By adding Burmese textiles, antique frames from Yangon and furniture made by long-time carpenters in Myanmar, the space is reorganised to express authentic Burmese culture in a Bangkok dining space,” Htet said.

This is not simply decoration. It shows how cultural diplomacy often depends on selection.

No restaurant can represent an entire country, particularly one as ethnically and regionally diverse as Myanmar. What Rangoon Tea House offers is a carefully assembled version of Burmese identity, one that emphasises colour, craftsmanship and urban modernity.

That image exists alongside, and at times in tension with, Myanmar more commonly visible in Thai public discourse through migrant labour, political instability and conflict.

Htet himself has long thought about food in these terms. In a 2017 talk, he described Burmese cuisine as a potential tool of “culinary diplomacy” — a way of influencing how outsiders perceive the country through culture rather than politics.

Bangkok makes that idea especially significant. Many of the people encountering the restaurant have little previous connection to Myanmar. At its Iconsiam branch, Htet estimates that 60-70% of customers had not previously shown much interest in the country.

“But whether through an upscale restaurant, a neighbourhood tea shop or a small stall in a shopping mall, the process is similar. Food creates a space in which Myanmar can be encountered outside the political narratives that have often defined it,” noted Htet.

Perhaps the clearest symbol of that process is not a Burmese dish at all.

It is falooda. The dessert travelled into Myanmar through older exchanges with India and the wider Persian world.

Once there, it did not remain unchanged. Myanmar made it its own, adapting the dessert with ingredients and preferences that gave it a distinctly local character.

Now, as more Myanmar residents build lives in Thailand, that story may be beginning again. What was once imported, adapted and made local could become part of a new Thai-Burmese food culture.

Cultural diplomacy does not always arrive through an embassy, a summit or an official campaign. Sometimes it arrives quietly in a neighbourhood tea shop or in a glass, with jelly and milk, a spoonful of egg pudding and a piece of bread resting on top.

While Thailand was an early regional leader in 5G rollout, unlocking the full potential of next-generation connectivity, the “Industry 4.0” stage will require bridging a substantial adoption gap among small businesses to help the country stay competitive, according to Ericsson.

Anders Rian, president of Ericsson Thailand, said the potential of 5G technology will be unlocked only once the benefits cascade throughout the economy for small and large companies alike.

“This needs to be a big educational effort, I think from everyone. From industry partners, from communication service providers, from government, from academia. It’s not something you can solve alone,” he said.

More innovation labs and sandboxes are needed to encourage companies to experiment and develop new applications, tapping into the higher bandwidth and lower latency that 5G technology offers, said Mr Rian.

While Thailand is experiencing a wave of multi-billion-baht data centre investments, signalling its ambition to become Southeast Asia’s digital and artificial intelligence (AI) hub, centralised computing alone is not sufficient to deliver nationwide benefits, he noted.

“The big hyperscalers are now coming with regional centres. It’s a massive investment in data centres,” said Mr Rian.

“But you need to think about improving your network capabilities because the data lives in the data centre. It has to be transported out and back.”

The explosion of AI-generated data traffic and shift from download-heavy consumer use to more upload-intensive industrial applications all require advanced 5G architecture with real-time, mission-critical processing, he said.

The move towards “physical AI”, where machinery, autonomous vehicles and robotics interface directly with their environments, also places a high requirement on reliability.

Mr Rian acknowledged that consumer adoption of technology has outpaced enterprises due to the wide breadth and complexity of industrial transformation.

“Consumer adaptation requires little behavioural change,” he said.

“When you look at industrial adaptation, you need skill sets in process redesign, for instance. Operational digitalisation — you don’t learn that from using AI tools on your phone. Industrial transformation is much bigger. You need to redesign your processes, you need to enhance the skills of your workflow, you maybe need to change your whole production flow based on what you’re doing, and you also need to motivate your owners and investors for the capex investment.”

Swedish giant Ericsson is one of the world’s leaders in mobile infrastructure, powering around half of the global 5G traffic outside of China.

This year the company celebrated its 120th year in Thailand, entering the country in 1906 when it delivered Bangkok’s first central telephone exchange.

Mr Rian said Thailand’s future economic competitiveness will depend on bridging knowledge gaps and ensuring that transformation includes small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).

“If you look at SMEs and micro-businesses in Thailand, there are 3.2 million. What’s really going to push the country forward is to bring those SMEs with you,” he said.

“Not only the big multinationals and Thai conglomerates that have the resources [for digital transformation]. But you also need to enable small businesses to benefit so you don’t create a digital divide.”

Competitiveness in the future will rely less on low labour costs, and more on “AI skill sets, robotics skill sets and connectivity skill sets,” noted Mr Rian.

He said he is optimistic about innovation, as Thai consumers rank among the highest in the world in terms of digital consumption.

“When you look at Thailand’s consumption side, it has been the highest in the region for years,” Mr Rian said.

“But where is the creativity? My dream would be the digital skill sets and the way we use AI, the way we use our infrastructure, will result in creativity coming out of Thailand, with innovation we export across borders to surrounding countries.”

Police investigators on Monday could not reach the point of origin amid the debris of the fire that destroyed the Klongthom Center in Bangkok last week because two upper floors had collapsed on top of it. Arson has still not been ruled out.

Forensic science commander Pol Maj Gen Wathee Asawutmangkun said the fire on Friday night was believed to have started on the first floor of the Klongthom Center. However, the two parking floors above had collapsed on top of it and prevented access.

‘These structures must be removed to make way for a thorough examination,’ he said.

A drone-assisted survey pointed to the fire originating in an area where electronic devices were sold, the forensic police commander said.

Pol Maj Gen Chaiyakrit Pho-ah, commander of the Metropolitan Police Division 6, said they had not ruled out arson. The centre was insured, but they had yet to check the details of the policy.

So far, 170 damaged parties had filed complaints with officials, he said.

The Klongthom Center was well-known for selling tools, electronic devices, car audio systems and accessories, toys, models and home appliances. The three-decade-old shopping centre covered about 1,600 square metres of land on Worachak Road in Pomprap Sattruphai district. It housed about 500 shops.

The section of Worachak Road between SAB and Worachak intersections in front of the centre was closed for another day on Monday to facilitate forensic police access.

Nationwide residential transfers are expected to grow by only 1-2% this year despite double-digit growth in the second quarter, as buyers accelerated transfers ahead of the original June expiry of cuts to property fees.

Mana Nimitvanich, director-general of Real Estate Information Center (REIC), said the double-digit year-on-year growth in residential transfers in the second quarter of 2026 should not be interpreted as a sustained recovery.

“Residential transfers in the second half of the year are likely to slow as some demand was pulled forward into the second quarter ahead of the original expiry of the measures on June 30,” he said.

The measures, which cut transfer and mortgage fees from 2% and 1% respectively to 0.01% for housing units valued at 7 million baht or less, were extended on June 29, 2026 for one year.

Data from REIC showed nationwide residential transfers in the first quarter increased by 11.2% year-on-year to 72,583 units, with transfer value rising 3.1% to 187 billion baht.

Growth accelerated in the second quarter, surging 23% year-on-year to 95,082 units, while total value rose 15.6% to 243 billion baht.

For the first half, transfers grew 17.6% year-on-year to 167,665 units, with total value rising 9.8% to 430 billion baht.

For the full year, REIC projects total nationwide transfers to reach 323,479 units worth 881 billion baht, a 1.8% uptick in volume year-on-year and 2.3% in value.

This estimate implies a slower second half, representing declines of 11% year-on-year in units and 4% in value.

Mr Mana said the number of residential transfers in 2027 is expected to decline by 0.9% to 320,617 units, following the expiry of the fee reductions on June 30, 2027.

However, transfer value is forecast to increase by 3.1% to 908 billion baht, driven by expected increases in residential prices.

“The increase in residential prices next year is expected to be driven by two main factors. The first is rising construction and development costs, fuelled by higher transport costs and inflation,” he said.

The second factor is the new property appraisal values for 2027-2030, which take effect on Jan 1, 2027 and are projected to rise.

New housing loans nationwide in the first half of 2026 and the second quarter followed the same direction as residential transfers, growing by 12.2% and 18.4% year-on-year, respectively.

REIC forecasts new mortgages nationwide will grow by 1.4% to 571 billion baht in 2026 from 564 billion last year, before rising by another 2% to 583 billion in 2027.

Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul’s government may have little to fear from a parliamentary revolt, but its biggest political threat could be building beyond the walls of parliament: a growing public perception that corruption, political collusion and double standards are becoming entrenched under its watch.

That creates a paradox at the heart of the government. Mr Anutin has assembled a formidable political coalition and secured the backing of powerful conservative and institutional networks, giving his administration a level of political stability that makes its early collapse highly unlikely. But the same government is struggling to convince the public that the system it presides over is fair, transparent and accountable.

The tension between these two forms of political strength and weakness could ultimately determine the fate of Mr Anutin’s government.

Tensions and public distrust

Mr Anutin’s rise to the top post marked a significant shift in the country’s political balance. In terms of the distribution of power, his government has one of the strongest institutional foundations in recent years, drawing support from coalition parties, MPs and senators, the state bureaucracy, constitutional bodies and established conservative networks.

This gives the government considerable protection from challenges within the political system. Yet institutional strength alone cannot guarantee long-term legitimacy.

In modern politics, governments can survive parliamentary pressure while gradually losing public confidence. Allegations of corruption and abuse of state power can call into question the government’s integrity and, if left unresolved, its political legitimacy.

A recent Nida Poll, titled “So Many Problems, Will It Survive?”, illustrates this growing credibility problem. The biggest concern among respondents was alleged graft in the recruitment exam for local administrative officials, cited by 62.75%. The controversy has raised questions over transparency and patronage in the bureaucracy, striking particularly hard at public expectations that entry into government service should be based on merit.

The second-biggest concern was the alleged collusion in the 2024 Senate election, cited by 55.88% of respondents. The controversy has cast a shadow over the legitimacy of the Senate and raised broader questions about the integrity of the political system.

The third was parliamentary scrutiny of the Khao Kradong land dispute, cited by 42.29%. The case has become politically sensitive because of its links to the power base and key figures associated with the coalition’s leading party.

Other concerns included energy-price volatility, cited by 37.33%; tensions between Thailand and Cambodia, 33.36%; the government’s 400-billion-baht borrowing plan, 28.78%; and agricultural prices, 28.17%.

The poll’s assessment of the government’s prospects was equally revealing. Some 37.86% of respondents said the government was “certain not to survive”, while 26.03% believed it would survive but be badly battered. Only 17.71% expected it to survive comfortably.

Taken at face value, the findings suggest a government under severe public pressure. But they tell only half the story.

Viewed through the arithmetic of parliament, the Anutin administration remains remarkably strong.

‘Political middleman’

The government coalition has so far shown little sign of serious fragmentation. The ruling Bhumjaithai Party has managed to coordinate with Pheu Thai and other coalition parties while allocating cabinet portfolios and political interests without triggering a major internal dispute.

There are also no clear signs that coalition partners are preparing to withdraw their support. The government whip mechanism remains effective, while its parliamentary numbers give it a substantial advantage over the opposition.

This means Mr Anutin can expect to pass major legislation and budget bills without facing an immediate threat of defeat.

His political position is further reinforced by his ability to act as a middleman between competing power centres. He has maintained working relationships with conservative forces, business interests and established state institutions, presenting his government as a vehicle for political continuity and stability.

For the conservative establishment, this makes the government a useful political buffer: strong enough to maintain order and protect existing institutional interests, but sufficiently pragmatic to work with different political factions.

The Senate provides another layer of protection. Although allegations surrounding the 2024 Senate election have become one of the public’s biggest political concerns, the current Senate’s orientation and relationships with the governing camp mean it is unlikely to become an immediate threat to the government.

Its role in legislation and the selection of candidates for independent organisations also gives the governing coalition greater room to manoeuvre within the broader political system.

For these reasons, the Anutin government is likely to remain in office for most, if not nearly all, of its term, regardless of continuing political controversies. But surviving in parliament is not the same as winning public confidence. This distinction could become increasingly important as the next general election approaches.

The ultimate test

The alleged corruption in the local government recruitment exam has the potential to damage confidence in the civil service, particularly among younger people who expect merit rather than connections to determine access to government jobs.

The Senate collusion case and Khao Kradong land dispute could similarly reinforce perceptions of double standards and a justice system that is more accommodating to powerful individuals and political allies.

None of these issues may be sufficient to bring down the government today. But political damage does not always have an immediate effect. It can accumulate gradually, becoming a burden that a government carries into the next election.

This is where the current government’s apparent strength could become deceptive.

Mr Anutin may have built a political structure capable of shielding his government from parliamentary defeat. What he cannot easily build through coalition negotiations or parliamentary numbers is public faith.

If the government can resolve the controversies, demonstrate accountability and restore confidence in the fairness of state institutions, its political stability could translate into electoral strength. If it cannot, the current parliamentary advantage may prove to be only temporary.

The ultimate test, therefore, will not be whether the Anutin government can survive the next no-confidence motion or coalition dispute. It will be whether voters still trust the political system it represents when they enter the polling booths.

The government may be strong enough to survive until near the end of its term. But the corruption allegations, Senate collusion case and Khao Kradong dispute could leave behind a political cost that is paid not in parliament, but at the ballot box — where voters could once again redraw Thailand’s political map.