The sudden decision by Thamanat Prompow, the patriarch of the Klatham Party, to defect from the Pheu Thai-led government and throw his support behind a new minority coalition with Anutin Charnvirakul as premier has jolted the already fragile Thai political landscape.
At face value, it is a significant coup for Mr Anutin and his Bhumjaithai Party, who need all the support they can get to cobble together parliamentary legitimacy.
Yet under the surface lies a deeper question: is Thamanat truly shifting allegiance, or is he positioning himself as a Trojan Horse, working covertly to safeguard the interests of Pheu Thai and its de facto leader, Thaksin Shinawatra?
Thamanat is no stranger to controversy, nor to the art of political manoeuvring. His career has been marked by both scandal and resilience.
Despite a criminal conviction in Australia decades ago, he rose steadily in Thai politics, leveraging local patronage networks in the North and with his ability to build and dismantle alliances. The Phayao MP once served as secretary-general of the Palang Pracharath Party (PPRP), which was the main party of the Prayut Chan-o-cha administration.
However, even at the height of his time in the PPRP, there were suspicions about his true political loyalties. During a no-confidence debate against Gen Prayut, Thamanat was accused of playing a pivotal role in attempts to orchestrate his downfall. Opponents say his actions were less about party loyalty than about engineering a pathway favourable to Pheu Thai, which has long sought to reassert itself as the dominant political force.
Those accusations cemented Thamanat’s reputation as a political operator whose public affiliations often concealed private allegiances.
Central to the speculation about Thamanat’s current move is his long-standing close relationship with Thaksin. While many politicians maintain pragmatic ties across party lines, Thamanat’s association with Thaksin has proven remarkably durable, surviving his years in the PPRP and now his defection from the Pheu Thai-led administration.
To many watchers, this connection is not merely social but strategic. Thaksin has historically relied on figures like Thamanat to act as intermediaries within hostile or uncertain political environments.
By cultivating leaders with strong regional networks and a reputation for pragmatism, Thaksin has been able to maintain influence even when Pheu Thai has been in opposition or constrained by coalition dynamics. Thus, Thamanat’s sudden embrace of Bhumjaithai raises the possibility that he is not abandoning Thaksin but instead positioning himself to monitor, influence or even undermine Mr Anutin’s fledgling coalition from within.
If Thamanat is indeed a Trojan Horse, the implications for Mr Anutin’s administration are serious.
Leading a minority coalition is already a precarious endeavour, reliant on fragile parliamentary arithmetic and a constant need to negotiate with smaller partners. The entry of a figure like Thamanat, whose loyalty is suspect, could exacerbate his fragility rather than strengthen it. The risks manifest in several ways.
First, Thamanat may act as a conduit of information, relaying internal coalition strategies back to Pheu Thai. Second, he could subtly steer policy debates or legislative votes in ways that weaken Bhumjaithai’s credibility while leaving Pheu Thai in a stronger position for a future election. Third, he could use his party’s bargaining power to destabilise Mr Anutin’s coalition at critical moments, such as during budget debates or no-confidence motions, echoing the tactics he reportedly deployed against Gen Prayut.
In short, while Mr Anutin may view Thamanat’s support as an immediate boost, it could prove a poisoned chalice.
To be sure, not all interpretations cast Thamanat as a covert operative. There are plausible reasons why he might genuinely have broken with Pheu Thai.
Pheu Thai’s internal power dynamics, especially the dominance of Thaksin’s family and close allies, have left limited space for ambitious secondary players. Thamanat, who sees himself as a kingmaker, may have concluded that his ambitions would be permanently capped by Pheu Thai.
Moreover, Mr Anutin offers an alternative platform. The Bhumjaithai’s reputation as a pragmatic, deal-oriented party aligns well with Thamanat’s own style. The promise of influence in shaping agricultural or regional development policies – areas central to Thamanat’s political base – could have persuaded him that his future lies outside Pheu Thai’s orbit.
The truth could be somewhere in between. Thamanat has built his career on calculated ambiguity – remaining close to Thaksin while aligning with governments that seem ideologically opposed to Pheu Thai. This dual positioning allows him to hedge against political volatility. If Mr Anutin’s minority government survives, Thamanat can claim a role in sustaining it. If it collapses, he can plausibly pivot back to Pheu Thai, citing his enduring ties with Thaksin.
Such ambiguity is not merely self-serving; it reflects the broader reality of Thai politics, where no alliance is ever fully stable and where political actors often prioritise survival over ideology.
Ultimately, whether Thamanat is a Trojan Horse or a genuine defector will be revealed in his actions over the coming months. Should he consistently vote in support of Mr Anutin’s initiatives and defend the coalition in moments of crisis, sceptics may rethink their suspicions. But should he waver at critical junctures, or should rumours emerge of clandestine coordination with Pheu Thai, the Trojan Horse theory will gain renewed credibility.
So far, so good for now
Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul has seen his popularity rise sharply, with the latest Nida Poll showing his approval rating more than doubling in just three months.
In the third quarterly survey on political popularity, about 20.4% of respondents backed Mr Anutin as prime minister, up from just 9% in the second quarter before he took office.
He now trails only People’s Party (PP) leader Natthaphong Ruengpanyawut, whose support dropped from 31.4% to 22.8%. Another 27.2% of voters were undecided, a group, analysts say, the Bhumjaithai Party can win over if it does things right over the next four months.
According to Suvicha Pouaree, director of Nida Poll Centre, there are three reasons behind the surge in Mr Anutin’s popularity.
First, being prime minister gives him an aura of leadership. As prime minister, his profile is no longer that of a coalition partner but of the country’s leader, with every decision and public appearance carrying weight.
Second, his pledge to revive the popular spending-stimulus Khon La Khrueng co-payment scheme within his short government stint has resonated with low- and middle-income earners. Introduced during the Prayut Chan-o-cha administration, it subsidised 50% of the cost of food, beverages, and general goods for participants in a bid to support small vendors and street food operators.
The upcoming scheme, tentatively set for a launch late this month or early next month, is expected to benefit 13 million state welfare cardholders and 20 million members of the general public.
At the same time, patriotism has surged amid the border conflict with Cambodia, and people are looking for firm leadership to handle the situation. Many Thais also believe Mr Anutin is prepared to take a tough line, even keeping border checkpoints closed without hesitation, a stance that has further boosted his popularity.
Mr Suvicha said that this short period in office – a product of the agreement he struck with the main opposition People’s Party in return for backing him becoming prime minister – before a House dissolution, is a ‘golden window’ for Mr Anutin, unless there are serious blunders.
‘People will not criticise him harshly unless something goes badly wrong,’ Mr Suvicha said.
Olarn Thinbangtieo, a political science and law lecturer at Burapha University, said Bhumjaithai’s rising popularity is tied to disarray within the Pheu Thai Party, while conservative actors such as the United Thai Nation (UTN) Party led by Pirapan Salirathavibhaga and the Palang Pracharath Party (PPRP) led by Gen Prawit Wongsuwon have haemorrhaged members and are in no position to lead the bloc.
This void will most likely be filled by Bhumjaithai as conservative voters are expected to rally behind a party with the strength to win the next election and head the next government.
He said MPs and ban yai – powerful political families in the provinces – have been quick to defect to Bhumjaithai or signal their support, which enhances the party’s chances of becoming the main party in the next coalition government.
The latest is a faction known as the ‘Group of 16’ led by Natural Resources and Environment Minister Suchart Chomklin, who confirmed that he and his team of MPs will soon move from the UTN to Bhumjaithai.
On Wednesday, Mr Anutin offered a warm welcome to veteran politician Santi Promphat, who quit the PPRP for Bhumjaithai. Mr Santi tendered his resignation as PPRP secretary-general on Monday before obtaining membership of Bhumjaithai the following day.
Mr Santi, whose son, Pattana Promphat, currently serves as public health minister, controlled a faction in the PPRP, and it is unclear if the group will follow him to his new home.
As for the Group of 16, talks are reportedly under way to straighten out whether and how incumbent MPs in the group can retain their right to contest their constituencies in the next election. While Mr Suchart has resigned from the UTN to become a minister, the MPs in the group remain with the UTN.
‘Even if it is not the best option, Bhumjaithai is currently the only viable party for voters in the conservative camp,’ Mr Olarn said.
Nationalist sentiment has been particularly helpful to Mr Anutin, according to Mr Olarn.
A strong performance by newly appointed Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow at the United Nations General Assembly recently – where he firmly rebutted Cambodia’s allegations against Thailand – has reinforced the sense that Thailand is regaining dignity on the world stage.
However, the analyst noted that risks persist regarding the Khao Kradong land dispute and alleged Senate election collusion, which could damage Bhumjaithai’s credibility.
The Khao Kradong land dispute in Buri Ram involves the Chidchob family, who wields major influence over Bhumjaithai, whereas alleged vote rigging in the Senate elections last year represents the largest case of electoral fraud this country has ever seen, implicating 229 people, including 138 current senators and individuals linked to Bhumjaithai.
If the government can effectively implement crucial policies and keep dealmakers and old-style politicians from dominating the party, it can maintain public confidence and political momentum.
Mr Olarn said Bhumjaithai will need to recruit a new generation of candidates with clean images, balancing its reliance on ban yai networks with fresh faces that can appeal to younger voters and the undecided 27%.
‘The government has made an impressive start. Mr Sihasak did a remarkable job at the UN General Assembly, boosting public confidence and enhancing the country’s standing on the global stage. This has been a huge boost for the government,’ he said.