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Mahmood Mamdani’s new book, Slow Poison: Idi Amin, Yoweri Museveni, and the Making of the Ugandan State, is that rare kind of academic work that still smells of earth, sweat, and just enough of that old college library scent that lingers in university hallways. It has the big ideas you’d expect from Mamdani-about the making and unmaking of states-but this one also comes loaded with “supu” and nyama choma; the kind of storytelling that a bar philosopher in Mpororo can chew over with a calabash of bushera. It’s not dry, it’s not polite, and it’s not afraid to offend.

There are moments in Slow Poison that will make your neck twist, especially when Mamdani draws from an unpublished manuscript by Amin’s son, Jafeer Amin. And there are hot political potatoes. Some of the revelations about the war in northern Uganda are so intense that you’ll want to sit down and grip the chair tightly before reading on. At the heart of the book is a controversial argument: that although both Idi Amin and Yoweri Museveni made violence the organising principle of their rule, their motives and methods were worlds apart.

Amin, he says, sought to build a unified Black Ugandan nation-even if that meant expelling Asians and silencing opponents-while Museveni’s politics have done the opposite, fracturing Uganda into tribal fragments that echo the British colonial strategy of divide-and-rule. I’ll stop there before I spoil the meal. I am reliably informed that a Nairobi publisher is about to release an East African edition, which will be more affordable and easier to find in bookstores near you. But the book got me thinking about something else-the man behind the uniform, the fellow behind the presidential desk, the villager before he became His Excellency. What else, I wondered, might Amin, Museveni, and their predecessor Milton Obote share, especially outside the rough business of politics and war? The answers were surprising.

First, all three were religiously fluid. None of them fit neatly inside one box. Amin, born Catholic in Koboko, converted to Islam and became one of its loudest champions, though he was known to drop into a church or shrine without fuss. Obote, raised Anglican, drifted into a kind of spiritual mix that combined Christian and traditional beliefs-the sort of Ugandan syncretism where a man can recite the Lord’s Prayer in the morning and still pour a libation for the ancestors at dusk.

Museveni, on the other hand, has blended Christianity with a thin thread of traditional spirituality, at times referring to himself as “Born-Again” when it suits his political agenda, and at other times speaking like a village sage, quoting ancestral wisdom.

Each of them is also tied to sport or physical discipline. Amin was a boxer and swimmer (as we all famously know); Obote an athlete in his youth at Makerere (I had never heard or read of that before, so I am not sure it is true); Museveni a long-distance walker (an essential ability in a guerrilla leader in the African bush), with the discipline of a cattle-herder who learns early that survival depends on patience and stamina. Then there’s the shared simplicity of their beginnings. Each of them came from pastoral country, grew up as children herding cows or goats, and learned early to live off what nature provided. Some have remarked that this rural grounding partly shaped their self-reliant, brutal (and autocratic) personas.

When it came to fashion, all three had unmistakable signatures. Amin’s love for medals and flamboyant uniforms was legendary, and the Kaunda suit, of course. Obote kept it tidy-Western suits, clean lines, suspenders, a touch of African modesty, and a Kaunda suit. Museveni wore the same Kaunda suits in the early days before settling on his now-iconic look: the bush jacket, the untucked shirt, and the wide-brim hat. Food told the rest of the story. They were/are all conservative eaters with strong local tastes-matooke (plantain), millet bread, goat meat, and ghee-based sauces. Amin was known for hearty meat dishes; Obote for traditional northern staples (and wine or whisky); Museveni for plain, unprocessed foods, famously saying he avoids “city delicacies”.

None of them ever turned into the champagne-and-caviar type. The story all this was supposed to tell us is that they were not bohemian elites-just pragmatic men of simple tastes. Their clothes and food tastes were statements-a careful mix of tradition, authority, and self-myth. And that, in a different way, is how one might read Slow Poison-that Uganda’s rulers have always returned to the soil for legitimacy, drawing from its myths even as they preside over its decay. The actual slow poison isn’t just violence or corruption-it’s the endless cycle of power. Each new generation of leaders claims to reject the past, but they all end up sipping from the same cup.

They were not bohemian elites-just pragmatic men of simple tastes.

Fly high, hawklike, in the twilight sky over Greater Kampala, and you will see a great unspoken migration of small businesses. As the lights dim in the hustling nooks and crannies of the central business district, they flicker into life, following the herds of commuters as they return to their dormitories on the city’s outskirts.

As nightfall brings the curtain down on commerce in the centre, it only pushes it farther out, extending the night economy closer to where the city workers live. Drive through any suburb in Greater Kampala and beyond, and you will see a thriving night economy that defies all odds and has evolved perhaps despite the lack of a deliberate public policy.

It is more than the pubs offering late-night drinks and bands. Shops selling everything from apparel to electrical items are open till late. Want to get a haircut at 2am? You can find an open salon. Feeling peckish at 4 in the morning? You can find a rolex stand or a chicken grill.

Part of this evolution emerged from the pain of electricity loadshedding (something we shall look at before the end of this mini-series). Small businesses carried on later than usual when the power was on to make up for the days when it was off all day, until it became normal to find a welding shack sparking with activity at midnight.

It has since become so entrenched that mobile money service providers struggle to find a quiet window late in the night when they can switch off their servers for maintenance or upgrades.

Mobile money has been one of the enablers of the night economy. While mobile money agents close early to avoid being separated from their takings, digital wallets enable traders to carry on without having to worry about cash and the crime it attracts. Of course, relatively peaceful neighbourhoods help, as does the power of numbers, expanded electricity supply, and cheaper lighting.

Expanding the night economy is key to creating jobs and widening opportunities, especially in the rapidly urbanising parts of the country. Providing security would expand activity and allow bigger transactions, including at agency banking nodes.

At least two major policy changes will have to be considered to support this engine of a 24/7 economy. The first — tax reform — is already underway with recent amendments that introduced income tax exemptions to small local start-ups from this financial year. This needs to be deeper and more intentional, with a larger proportion of tax being paid to local authorities where people and businesses reside.

This would encourage faster and more spending on local infrastructure like roads, schools and streetlights, as well as services like rubbish collection and local amenities. Local councils that make the right investments will attract more businesses and higher-income residents, increasing their tax revenues and the quality of life all around. For this to happen, the tax regime must change to give a bit less to the central government and a lot more to the local governments.

The second reform — reforms in policing — would feed off the first. A significant share of the policing human and other resources today is devoted to the protection of VIPs, with very little left over for old-fashioned policing work. When was the last time you saw the police patrol your street in the absence of a political gathering? Where is the nearest fire brigade station to where you live, and how many fire tenders do they have?

As more money flows into the night and into the outskirts, it will increasingly attract more crime. While private security firms currently fill this void, they cannot be relied upon to detect or investigate crime. We would need more policing resources to be redeployed to neighbourhoods and for a bit more oversight by the elected officials in charge of those areas, as happens in other cities elsewhere.

With more resources, elected local government officials can improve the welfare of police officers, teachers and other service personnel, improving the quality of life and attracting more investment and income.

Small businesses have shown their ability to follow the money, defy the clock and create value in the peri-urban areas. Kampala City has its marabou storks; Greater Kampala can have economic eagles. Those seeking political office can watch, learn and support them, or they can get out of the way.

Government figures show that Uganda’s public debt stock has nearly tripled between 2018 and 2025, with the debt burden per citizen rising from Shs1 million to approximately Shs2.5 million over the same period.

According to statistics from the Ministry of Finance and a 2024 audit report by the Office of the Auditor General, total public debt surged from Shs41 trillion in June 2018 to Shs116 trillion by June 2025.

This steep increase, driven in part by a growing reliance on domestic borrowing, is raising concerns among economists, who warn it could stifle local businesses and strain essential services such as healthcare and education.

While the Ministry of Finance maintains that the country’s debt remains sustainable, public finance experts argue that the mounting debt burden is exposing weaknesses in Uganda’s fiscal framework and limiting the government’s ability to meet critical needs.

Dr Fred Muhumuza, the director of the Makerere University Business School Economic Forum and Trustee of the African Forum and Network on Debt and Development (AFRODAD), underscores the gravity of the situation.

‘Almost 50 percent of the budget is for debt management (not even service),’ Dr Muhumuza observes.

‘This implies reduced degrees of freedom for the government to address emerging critical needs such as the provision of social services (education and health) and basic infrastructure such as roads and energy.’

Flaws in the frameworks

Ms Hilda Tumuhe, a public finance expert at SEATINI-Uganda, echoes these concerns. She says Uganda’s economic realities reveal flaws in the frameworks used to assess debt sustainability.

‘When it comes to aspects such as debt sustainability frameworks that are provided to us by the IMF, that is why you find that while our debt as Uganda could be sustainable according to the debt sustainability framework, we still see our government struggling to pay back the debt and also meet the day to day expenses and priorities of the citizens,’ she observes.

‘This means that either the framework has some loopholes. Let us see the case of the Covid-19 scenario and climate disasters that happen; some of these factors are not included in some of these frameworks,’ she adds.

Mr Ramathan Ggoobi, the Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Finance, notes: ‘The Debt-to-GDP ratio of 51.3 percent remains within regional convergence thresholds, but underscores the need for prudent fiscal management.’

However, Dr Muhumuza cautions against relying solely on the Debt-to-GDP ratio to justify further borrowing, citing Japan as a contrasting example.

‘Japan has the highest Debt-to-GDP ratio, but Japan lends its money to the US and picks up enough money from there to settle all its debt obligations. It doesn’t even touch its economy,’ he explains.

‘Japan is the biggest buyer of American bonds, close to a trillion. But their debt structure: very low interest rates, but also Japan has a declining population. So that’s a different context,’ he continues. Dr Muhumuza also expresses concern over the government’s growing appetite for domestic borrowing.

‘Domestic borrowing increased by 57 percent in the last two financial years, with almost 50 percent as Debt Restructuring,’ he says.

‘Excessive domestic borrowing at high rates is not only crowding out the private sector but the public sector as well.’

Audit flags rising debt distress

A 2024 special audit by the Office of the Auditor General reveals that Uganda is currently facing moderate debt distress, largely due to increased domestic borrowing. The debt sustainability framework categorises risk levels as low, moderate, or high.

‘Uganda’s overall risk of debt distress has shifted from low to a moderate level, and Fitch, a credit rating agency, has revised Uganda’s credit rating from B+ Stable to a negative outlook,’ Auditor General Edward Akol states in the report.

He adds: ‘Public debt may be sustainable in the medium term as evidenced by the liquidity indicators set by the World Bank and IMF.’

The report further recommends that ‘the government is encouraged to take more caution regarding contracting new debt in the future, increase its revenue mobilisation, and continue to rationalise its expenditure to achieve sustainable debt.’

Mr Akol also raises concerns about how borrowed funds are being utilised.

‘I noted that 15 out of the 49 loan-funded projects included in the Project Implementation Plan between 2018/19 and 2023/24 financial years were implemented without having both the pre-feasibility and the detailed feasibility studies,’ the report reads.

‘There is a growing number of non-performing government loans meant to finance government projects and programmes. A total of five credit facilities were observed to be non-performing. The funds have not been put to use and the government is incurring costs in terms of interest repayments, commitment fees and associated penalties,’ it adds.

Solutions

Dr Enock Nyorekwa Twinoburyo, a senior economist at the Sustainable Development Goals Centre for Africa and former World Bank consultant, suggests that the government should boost domestic revenue collection to curb rising public debt.

‘As we talk today, looking at our debt profile, 48 percent of our debt is actually now domestic, and external is 52 percent. One of the reasons for domestic borrowing, of course, is the ease with which the government can raise financing from the domestic community,’ he notes.

‘But also because a lot of the saving groups within the economy do not have alternative investment options, and in very recent years, there’s been a great uptake.’

Dr Nyorekwa attributes both domestic and external borrowing to ‘stagnating with a low tax effort.’

‘For a long time, our tax-to-GDP ratio has stagnated at about 13 percent. And 13 percent is what you need to meet the basic functions of the state. But also tax effort and collection is the basic indicator of state efficiency in being able to organise, mobilise, deepen, and also it reflects, in part, lack of civic trust,’ he argues.

Why domestic borrowing

Mr Ggoobi explains that the rise in domestic borrowing is part of the government’s strategy to strengthen the domestic capital market and secure more predictable financing.

‘Overall, the shift towards higher domestic borrowing explains the rise in both the nominal debt stock and the cost of debt,” he says.

He emphasises the need for cautious fiscal management, noting that maintaining debt sustainability will require a balanced mix of external and domestic borrowing, enhanced revenue collection, and more efficient use of borrowed funds.

Mr Ggoobi adds that the government aims to ensure borrowed resources fuel economic growth that outpaces debt accumulation.

Debt crisis.

‘Almost 50 percent of the budget is for debt management (not even service). This implies reduced degrees of freedom for the government to address emerging critical needs such as the provision of social services (education and health) and basic infrastructure such as roads and energy,’ Dr Fred Muhumuza, the Director of Makerere University Business School Economic Forum and Trustee of the African Forum and Network on Debt and Development (AFRODAD).

Tracing the rising debt

Timeframe and total debt increase

Start Year: 2018

End Year: 2025

Duration: 7 years (from June 2018 to June 2025)

Debt in 2018: Shs41 trillion

Debt in 2025: Shs116 trillion

Total Increase: Shs116 trillion – Shs41 trillion = Shs75 trillion

Average annual debt increase

To find the average increase per year:

Shs75 trillion ÷ 7 years = approx. Shs10.71 trillion per year

Debt burden per citizen

2018: Shs1 million

2025: Shs2.5 million

Increase: Shs1.5 million over 7 years

Average annual increase per citizen: Shs1.5 million ÷ 7 ˜ Shs214,286 per year

What this means

Between 2018 and 2025, Uganda’s public debt rose by an average of Shs10.71 trillion per year, while GDP grew steadily at around 5-6 percent annually. The debt-to-GDP ratio increased from 41.3 percent in 2018 to about 52 percent in 2025, indicating a growing debt burden relative to economic output.

The government’s plan to introduce Lenacapavir, a new twice-yearly injectable drug for HIV prevention, early next year has sparked excitement and questions about the future of other prevention methods like condoms.

The drug, developed by Gilead Sciences, a US-based company, was tested in Uganda and South Africa, with studies showing over 99 percent efficacy in preventing HIV infection.

According to Dr Vincent Bagambe, the director of planning and strategic information at the Uganda Aids Commission (UAC), Uganda has endorsed a combination prevention approach, not a single method.

‘Our strategy is the use of a combination prevention approach. Lenacapavir offers 99-point-something percent protection, so we recommend other methods like condom use to make it 100 percent,’ he said.

‘Besides HIV, condoms also prevent infections like syphilis, gonorrhoea, human papilloma virus, and other STIs. So we will still be using condoms,’ he added.

Despite this, condom use in Uganda is steadily declining even as 730 people contract HIV every week.

The drop comes amid high rates of teenage pregnancies, many of which could be prevented with consistent condom use and behavioural change.

Concerns

Mr Boniface Epoku, the condoms programme officer at the Ministry of Health, attributed this decline partly to the introduction of new HIV prevention methods such as Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis (PrEP).

‘As the ministry embraces a combination prevention approach, we’ve realised that when new technologies come in-like PrEP-people tend to abandon condoms,’ he explained. ‘So there’s been a decline in condom use mainly because of that,’ he added.

Government statistics show that condom use among adolescent males dropped from 946,892 in the 2020/2021 financial year to 779,081 in 2022/2023. Among adolescent females, usage declined from 23,090 to 20,266 during the same period. Health experts fear the introduction of Lenacapavir could worsen this trend unless effective communication strategies are put in place.

Currently, individuals who participated in the Lenacapavir clinical trial continue to receive the twice-yearly injections, while the wider rollout awaits an increased supply expected next year. Other PrEP options are already available in Uganda, including daily oral pills, the Cabotegravir injection (taken once every two years), and a vaginal ring for women.

Study findings

A 2024 report by Susan Waako from the Uganda National Institute of Public Health revealed that at least 32,000 adolescent girls and young women at elevated risk of HIV were initiated on PrEP between 2017 and 2022.

However, adherence remains a challenge, especially with oral PrEP, underscoring the appeal of a long-acting injectable like Lenacapavir. Uganda’s rollout will depend on the number of doses secured through global partnerships.

Dr Herbert Kadama, the Ministry of Health’s PrEP coordinator, said the country is expecting 36,000 doses through the Global Fund-World Bank partnership, though the quantity from the US government remains uncertain.

‘We still don’t know the exact number of doses from the US government. The Government of Uganda is making procurement along with the Global Fund. We expect around 36,000 doses,’ he said. While this figure is modest for a country of 45.9 million people, health officials view it as a critical first step. The doses are expected early next year.

Low-cost plans

The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation also announced a partnership with Hetero Labs, an Indian manufacturer, to produce low-cost generic versions of Lenacapavir for low- and middle-income countries.

Following Gilead’s royalty-free licensing agreement with six generic manufacturers, the generic drug could be available by 2027 at roughly $40 (Shs136,000) per patient per year, compared to the current commercial price of $28,000 (Shs96 million).

Who will benefit first?

According to Dr Hudson Balidawa, the officer-in-charge of monitoring Global Fund HIV investments in Uganda, the first doses will go to existing PrEP sites already serving high-risk populations such as sex workers, people in discordant relationships, and individuals who inject drugs. ‘We already have the sites offering oral PrEP, vaginal rings, and injectable Cabotegravir,’ he said.

‘These will be the same sites offering Lenacapavir. A new client can start on Lenacapavir, and existing clients can switch from oral or Cabotegravir to the new drug,’ he added.

Despite the optimism surrounding Lenacapavir, public health experts emphasise that condoms remain essential for comprehensive protection. The UAC urges Ugandans to continue using available PrEP options and to maintain consistent condom use even as the country prepares to roll out the new injection.

Background

Data shows a noticeable decline in condom distribution and use among adolescents in recent years.

Among adolescent males, the number of condoms distributed fell from 946,892 in the 2020/2021 financial year to 779,081 in 2022/2023.

A similar trend is seen among adolescent females, where distribution dropped from 23,090 condoms in 2020/2021 to 20,266 in 2022/2023.

Health experts attribute this downward trend to a growing reliance on newer HIV prevention technologies, such as oral Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis (PrEP) and injectable drugs like Cabotegravir and the soon-to-be-introduced Lenacapavir

A section of health rights advocates from The AIDS Support Organisation (TASO) have expressed worry over what they described as increasing cases of Sexual Exploitation, Abuse, and Harassment (SEAH) occurring in various institutions and in the communities, which are bound to hinder efforts being taken to end the spread of HIV/AIDS.

Ms Irene Birungi, the Senior Technical Advisor for Protection from Sexual Exploitation, Abuse, and Harassment at TASO, while officiating at the launch of a campaign code-named “Sexual Exploitation, Abuse, and Harassment” in Nakaseke District, said that growing sexual abuse and exploitation is retarding the efforts gained towards fighting HIV/AIDS.

She noted that the most vulnerable people are young girls looking for employment, who are being vehemently exploited and abused by officials holding various positions in public and private institutions.

“We investigated a case of 108 girls of sexual exploitation, abuse, and harassment in Nakaseke district, who allegedly experienced the act under one perpetrator. Out of the said number, three confirmed being abused, and the rest decided to keep quiet,” she said. She added, “So we realized that this is a big number and needs intervention, and that’s why we are doing this campaign so that we boost the reporting.”

Ms Birungi said that the pilot project, which is being funded by the Global Fund, is targeting to end Sexual Exploitation, Abuse, and Harassment in the three districts of Nakaseke, Hoima, and Buikwe. “When sexual exploitation happens, you are at risk of acquiring HIV because there is an exchange of sex at the end of the day.

Given that a person is in a position of power over a vulnerable person, you will not tell them to get an HIV test. After all, they have a position there, you will not tell them to use protection because they are your bosses, and in the end, they will end up acquiring the disease,” she said.

She warned that if this continues, it’s bound to increase the risk of HIV transmission and new HIV infections, especially among adolescent girls and young women.

“We decided to come up and activate the campaign in question in Nakaseke district because there are many cases that happened previously, and they involved a political leader who harassed and abused the project beneficiaries, and this was already a red flag prompting them to kick-start the campaign here,” she said.

Speaking at the launch, the Deputy Resident Commissioner for Nakaseke District, Sarah Nakitende, confirmed that these cases are indeed happening, but they require more interventions. “I will appreciate you people to begin with Nakaseke.

Of course, some very many girls have been sexually exploited. You see many young girls holding children, and for them, they think they are mature enough, but when you ask them their age, they are 18 and 20 years of age. But they should continue to say No to sexual harassment as the slogan of the campaign stipulates,” she noted.

The District Community Liaison Officer, Nakaseke District Assistant Inspector of Police, Ojiambo Bernard, said cases of sexual abuse and harassment have been occurring in the district, but it’s so rampant when the school-going children are on holiday.

The Kabale Chief Magistrate, Mr Derrick Byamugisha on Wednesday sentenced a 22- year-old man to 23 months imprisonment after he pleaded guilty to charges of escaping from lawful custody.

Daudi Tukamushaba is accused of committing the offence contrary to Section 96 of the Penal Code Act

Prosecution led by Ms Julie Najunju told court that Tukamushaba who is a self-employed resident of Rutabonana cell, Kahara parish, Muko Sub County in Rubanda District, escaped from custody at Kabale Police Station in Kabale District on October 10, 2025, but was later re-arrested.

The detention facility was being manned by D/CPL William Katushabe when Tukamushaba escaped.

‘The accused was arrested in Kabale town on October 10 at around 2am when he was found in possession of a panga whose purpose he could not account for at the time. After reaching Kabale police station, he scaled the behind gate and ran away before he was re-arrested. The convict deserves a deterrence sentence that will scare away other would be offenders,’ Ms Najunju said.

Upon conviction, Tukamushaba asked the court for forgiveness.

The magistrate said that although the convict did not waste court’s time in full trial, cases of criminals moving with pangas were rampant in Kabale town and therefore, he deserved a punishment that would deter other people from committing the same offence.

‘I hereby sentence the convict to 23 months imprisonment. He has a right to appeal against this sentence in case he is not comfortable with my decision,’ Mr Byamugisha ruled.

When the towering glass-and-steel structure of Uganda Business Facilitation Centre (UBFC) rose above Kololo Hill, it gleamed with promise.

Funded jointly by government and the World Bank, the centre was billed as the future of doing business; a sleek one-stop shop where entrepreneurs could register companies, acquire investment licenses, and obtain permits without the usual bureaucratic pilgrimage from one dusty office to another.

Conceived under the Competitiveness and Enterprise Development Project (CEDP), a World Bank-supported initiative, the idea was simple; bring key agencies such as Uganda Investment Authority (UIA), Uganda Registration Services Bureau (URSB), and Capital Markets Authority (CMA) under one roof.

By eliminating the maze of separate offices, government promised shorter processing times, lower transaction costs, and an end to the endless paper-chasing across town and saving taxpayers more than Shs4b annually in rent.

Three years after completion, the centre stands only partly operational; a symbol of unfulfilled potential.

While some agencies have moved in, the official commissioning has never happened, and the vision of a fully functional one-stop hub remains unrealised.

The building currently houses URSB, UIA, and CMA, among others. The ground floor was designed as a one-stop service hub with booths for URA, NSSF, URSB, UTB, UNBS, NIRA, NWSC, UEDCL, Federation of Uganda Employers, and Ministry of Lands, among others; all meant to provide investors with quick access to essential government services.

KCCA also maintains a presence, while Pearl Bank (formerly PostBank) is setting up to handle tax collection and provide other financial services.

Yet, many booths on the expansive floor remain empty, and the foot traffic into the centre falls far short of expectations.

John Kyewalabye, the head of CEDP under the Ministry of Finance, says the subdued activity is largely due to automation and digitalisation of services.

‘The aspiration now is to transition to an electronic service centre where people can access services digitally,’ he says.

But one wonders how government would inject huge sums of money into a project without correlating it with planned digital investment in services such as business registration, land verification, and environmental licensing.

But beyond this, Kyewalabye concedes that integrating all agencies into a truly unified system remains a major challenge.

‘It’s not just about putting agencies in one building. They must also be linked to provide seamless services across the board,’ he says.

To that end, NIRA, which provides national identification, is upgrading its ID systems, while NITA-U, also based in the UBFC, is working to integrate government databases and improve interoperability.

However, Kyewalabye is quick to note that CEDP’s role was limited.

‘Our job was to deliver the infrastructure. Implementation is government’s responsibility,’ he says.

On paper, the UBFC was designed to host at least 15 government service desks, including immigration, tax, standards, and environmental licensing; all under one roof.

In practice, many agencies continue to operate as silos across Kampala, which undermines both the promise of saving on rent and the convenience that the facility promised.

Investors still make multiple trips across Kampala, battling ‘process fatigue’ in the very system the UBFC was meant to fix.

Worse still, a turf war has overshadowed the centre’s purpose.

Even before the facility opened, cracks began to show. What was meant to be a joint venture between URSB and UIA quickly turned into a power struggle over control and branding.

In August 2023, URSB Registrar General Mercy Kainobwisho accused UIA of ‘forcefully taking over’ the facility and rebranding it as its own, contrary to a 2014 MoU between the agencies.

UIA denied the accusation, noting that: ‘We are not hijacking anything. The one-stop centre is part of our institutional identity. We are here to make it work.’

As the agencies sparred over signage and space, operational rollout stalled.

Government later clarified that the UBFC belongs to the state and would ‘serve all agencies as intended’.

Amid this, UIA has shifted its focus toward its digital one-stop platform (eBiz) and plans to open regional one-stop hubs in Gulu, Mbarara, Mbale, and Arua.

Attempts to reach UIA Director General Robert Mukiza for comment were unsuccessful by press time.

For many observers, the story of the UBFC epitomizes Uganda’s broader development paradox: ambitious projects undermined by coordination failures and bureaucratic turf wars.

For the Bagwere people of eastern Uganda, the last four years have been marked by uncertainty. Once united under a strong cultural leader, they now find themselves adrift, entangled in court cases, rival factions, and political interference that have left their cherished cultural institution without a head.

The absence of an Ikumbania, the traditional cultural leader of the Bagwere, has become more than just a political crisis-it has shaken the very identity of a people whose traditions and unity have long revolved around their cultural leader.

The Bagwere, an ethnic group native to eastern Uganda, mainly in Budaka, Butebo, Kibuku, and Pallisa districts, revere their Ikumbania as the guardian of their heritage, the mediator in disputes, and the custodian of their spiritual and cultural values.

For years, John Chrysostom Wayabire, the first cultural leader of Obwa Ikumbania Bwa Bugwere, provided stability and direction. His death on February 6, 2021, left a void that has since plunged the institution into turmoil.

The succession battle

Traditionally, the Ikumbania is elected by the council of clan heads (Itanbangis). After Wayabire’s death, the expectation was that an orderly election would soon be held. Instead, rival factions, lawsuits, and government interventions have stalled the process.

Three main contenders-Mr Balaam Samuku Kintu Mubbala, Mr Geoffrey Wayabire, and Mr Joshua Wilber Musimami-have all claimed legitimacy as the rightful Ikumbania. Each insists they were duly elected by the council of elders, and each has court documents to back their claim.

The first major dispute arose when Mr Mubbala petitioned the Mbale High Court, seeking to stop elections that he claimed violated an earlier ruling recognising him as the legitimate cultural leader.

The court issued an interim order on March 1, 2024, signed by Deputy Registrar Robert Mukanza, barring any further elections or activities until the main case was resolved.

The order prohibited the Ministry of Gender from recognising or gazetting any other person as Ikumbania pending the outcome of the case. It also stopped Mr Musimami and Mr Wayabire from presenting themselves as leaders of the cultural institution.

Court battles and contradictions

The legal maze surrounding Obwa Ikumbania Bwa Bugwere has become increasingly complicated. In January 2022, the Mbale High Court, under Deputy Registrar Margaret Apiny, ruled that Mr Balaam Kintu Pagholi Mubbala was lawfully elected by the council of elders, which had been duly registered on July 29, 2021, and gazetted on August 27, 2021.

The Ministry of Gender even sought legal guidance from the Attorney General on how to implement this ruling. In response, Attorney General Kiryowa Kiwanuka confirmed that Mubbala had been properly elected by 64 clan heads and advised them ministry to implement the court order.

Despite this, rival groups continued organising parallel elections. In June 2022, another group of clan heads elected Mr Joshua Musimami as the new Ikumbania, while in July 2022, a separate faction declared Mr Geoffrey Wayabire as their cultural leader.

The Minister of State for Gender and Culture Affairs, Ms Peace Regis Mutuuzo, nullified all these elections, citing ongoing court cases. Her letter, dated July 11, 2022, instructed local authorities in Budaka to treat any such elections as illegal and potential security threats.

Repeated government attempts to mediate the conflict have failed. On February 1, 2024, Minister of Gender, Labour and Social Development, Ms Betty Amongi, convened yet another crisis meeting in Kampala with the three rival camps in attendance. The aim was to forge a compromise and pave the way for a legitimate election.

However, even before any consensus could be reached, Mr Mubbala went back to court, arguing that the ministry’s plan to conduct fresh elections violated standing court orders.

His lawyers, Nangulu and Mugoda Co Advocates, filed an injunction at the Mbale Chief Magistrate’s Court, further freezing any possible resolution. Speaking to Daily Monitor, Mr Mubbala insisted that his 2021 court victory and gazettement make him the rightful Ikumbania.

‘All those self-imposing themselves and all activities related to new elections should be treated as null and void,’ he said. He accused the Attorney General and the ministry of ignoring lawful court orders and warned that any new election would be ‘a sham and a hoax.’

According to the Institution of Traditional or Cultural Leaders Act, 2011, a cultural leader’s recognition must follow both community election and government gazettement.

While Mubbala appears to have fulfilled these criteria in 2021, conflicting interpretations of the Bagwere constitution and multiple election claims have created legal paralysis.

Court documents show that Mubbala was first elected in 2006 by 86 clan heads but was later re-elected in 2021 after Wayabire’s death. His opponents, however, argue that the elections were invalid because the minister of Gender had halted the process pending the resolution of ongoing cases.

Historical context

The Bagwere crisis reflects a broader trend among traditional institutions in Uganda. Cultural leadership was abolished in 1967 by President Milton Obote, only to be restored in 1993 under President Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Movement (NRM) government.

Since restoration, several kingdoms and chiefdoms, especially the smaller ones like Obwa Ikumbania Bwa Bugwere, have faced internal wrangles fuelled by elite competition, clan politics, and misunderstandings of traditional authority structures.

According to Mr Badiru Kirya, the chairperson of the cultural council, the divide stems from a clash between educated elites and traditional elders.

‘The war is between the elders and literates,’ he said. ‘Elders rely on totems and traditional symbols, which the educated often dismiss. That misunderstanding has fuelled leadership conflicts.’ The Obwa Ikumbania Bwa Bugwere comprises 108 clans spread across four districts-Budaka, Kibuku, Pallisa, and Butebo. What was once a unifying institution is now a source of discord, with every clan seemingly aligned to one of the three rival leaders.

Since the death of Wayabire, the institution has operated under acting leadership-the prime minister, Mr Joel Mugulusi, speaker Jacob Maiso, and cultural council chairperson Kirya-but this temporary arrangement has limited authority and cannot perform key cultural duties such as blessing marriages, mediating disputes, or presiding over initiation ceremonies.

The Ministry of Gender has been accused by different factions of bias and delay. Letters exchanged between the ministry, the Attorney General, and the Solicitor General show bureaucratic hesitation despite clear court directives.

While the ministry insists it must await the final disposal of all related cases, community members accuse officials of fuelling the impasse for political gain.

The Attorney General’s office has repeatedly emphasised dialogue as the best solution. However, repeated mediation efforts have failed as each faction claims to have court-backed legitimacy. ‘We cannot have three kings in one palace,’ said one clan elder from Budaka, who preferred anonymity. ‘Until they agree on one truth, the Bagwere will remain without direction,’ he added.

Beyond the legal drama, ordinary Bagwere people have borne the real cost of this crisis. Cultural events have been suspended, the traditional council has lost its moral authority, and inter-clan unity has deteriorated. Many fear that younger generations may lose touch with their heritage if the leadership vacuum continues.

‘It is sad that a community once united by its traditions is now known for endless court cases,’ lamented a local elder in Butebo. ‘The Ikumbania is not just a title; it is the spirit of who we are.’

Way forward

Observers believe that only a genuine reconciliation process, grounded in tradition and free from political interference, can restore stability.

Many elders have proposed forming an independent Elders Arbitration Committee to review all claims and consult the entire council of clans for a final binding decision.

Others urge the Ministry of Gender to implement existing court rulings instead of allowing endless litigation. ‘Justice delayed is justice denied,’ said Mr Kirya. ‘The government should enforce the 2021 ruling and let the Bagwere move forward.’

As things stand, however, the Bagwere remain without an Ikumbania four years since the death of their first leader. What began as a simple succession process has become a complex web of legal, political, and cultural struggles, leaving a once-unified community divided. Until the courts or the clans deliver a resolution, the Bagwere will continue to live in the shadow of uncertainty.

The contest

Three key figures have emerged as contenders for the throne. Balaam Kintu Pagholi Mubbala claims to have been duly elected and officially gazetted in 2021. Joshua Wilber Musimami was later chosen by a faction of clan heads on June 25, 2022, while Geoffrey Wayabire was declared leader by another group on July 14, 2022.

Each of these men maintains that his election was legitimate, creating overlapping claims to the cultural seat.

Several institutions have become central to the standoff. The Mbale High Court has issued multiple interim and final orders aimed at halting or clarifying the election process.

The Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development, which oversees the recognition and gazettement of cultural leaders, has been drawn into the dispute as it seeks to mediate among the rival factions.

Meanwhile, the Attorney General’s Office has provided legal guidance-at one point advising that the court’s ruling in favour of Mr Mubbala should be implemented. Despite these interventions, the Bagwere remain without an Ikumbania.