Every serious investor reads a host country twice. The first reading is of its laws and the second is quieter and, in my experience, more decisive: the institutions that will sit across the table for the next thirty years, and whether they can carry their share of the load. Tanzania’s $42 billion LNG project is about to face both readings at the same time.
The project is closer than it has ever been. Commercial terms, taxation and revenue sharing have been negotiated with Shell, Equinor, ExxonMobil, Pavilion Energy and Medco Energi. What remains is the legal architecture: a dedicated law to govern the project, targeted for completion by year end, followed by parliamentary approval and the partners’ final investment decision.
The Energy docket has also just changed hands, and the new minister arrives from Constitutional and Legal Affairs precisely when the outstanding work is legal.
The case for a project-specific law deserves an honest hearing. The 2017 natural wealth and resources laws gave Parliament the power to review and renegotiate agreements it considers unconscionable.
While that was a legitimate assertion of sovereignty, capital however, prices every assertion. A liquefaction project whose first production is still close to a decade away cannot be financed on terms that may be revisited halfway through its life.
The concern on the other side is equally legitimate: a law that grants one project protections the rest of the economy does not enjoy must be drawn narrowly, or it becomes a precedent every future investor will ask for. Both positions are right, and the drafting must hold them together.
Here is what the legal debate tends to miss. A stabilisation regime protects the investor from the state as legislator. It does nothing to protect the investor from the state as shareholder, or from the state as customer.
In this project, Tanzania is both. TPDC sits inside the consortium. The domestic market obligation, one of the issues that pushed the signing past its June target, means part of the gas will be sold at home, where most of the gas already produced goes to power generation.
Lenders will model TPDC’s capacity to meet cash calls, and the domestic buyer’s capacity to pay, long before they debate a stabilisation clause.
I press one question on every client entering a joint venture with a state entity: not what the agreement says, but what happens in year six when the partner’s budget allocation does not arrive. That is the question the LNG law cannot answer on its own.
This is why the conversation in Arusha this week matters to Lindi. At the forum of chief executives and board chairs of public entities convened by the Treasury Registrar, the message was that state enterprises will no longer be judged mainly on the dividends they remit, but on productivity, financial resilience, innovation and competitiveness. That is the right yardstick.
Government investment in public entities has reached Sh92.28 trillion, and the Public Investment Law now in its final stages will create a Public Investment Fund and introduce merit-based recruitment for boards and chief executives.
The problem it responds to is real: public corporations have historically received only a fraction of the capital they requested, which is how strategic institutions end up borrowing expensively to stand still.
TPDC itself reported a Sh73 billion profit for 2025/26 and a Sh15 billion dividend. Respectable for an operating company; not yet the balance sheet of a co-owner of a project this size.
The LNG law and the public investment reforms are being drafted in different rooms. Investors will read them as one document.
Three design choices would close that gap. First, the Public Investment Law should state how the state’s equity in strategic projects is funded, so cash calls never depend on annual appropriations.
Second, TPDC’s scorecard under the new yardstick should include published project-readiness measures: timely audited accounts, a funding plan for its participation, and a governance charter for its role in the consortium. Third, domestic gas pricing and payment security should be settled alongside the LNG law, not after it.
Tanzania has done the harder work of negotiating with some of the world’s most demanding counterparties, and disruption in the Strait of Hormuz has made an Indian Ocean supplier more attractive to Asian buyers than at any point in the life of this project.
The window is real although not permanent. I have not yet heard the LNG conversation and the state enterprise conversation held in the same room, in public and yet they belong together.
Amne Suedi is the Managing Director of Shikana Investment and Advisory, Honorary Consul of Switzerland in Zanzibar, and Chair of the Switzerland-Tanzania Chamber of Commerce. Views expressed are strictly Amne Suedi’s only.