El Clásico: Mbappé double fires Real Madrid to 2-1 win over Barcelona

Kylian Mbappé scored twice as Real Madrid defeated Barcelona 2-1 in Sunday’s El Clásico at Camp Nou, handing the La Liga leaders their first league defeat of the season and cutting the gap at the top of the table.

Mbappé opened the scoring four minutes before half-time and netted a late winner in the 87th minute after Raphinha equalised for the defending champions.

The result ended Barcelona’s unbeaten start to the La Liga campaign and handed them a second consecutive defeat following Tuesday’s loss to Paris Saint-Germain (PSG) in the Champions League.

Barcelona remain top of the table on 27 points after 10 matches, with a two-point advantage over second-placed Atletico Madrid. Real Madrid sit third, one point behind Atletico.

Real Madrid manager Jose Mourinho praised his team’s discipline and composure in his first El Clásico back in charge of the club.

‘My team had an extraordinary game, very organised, good concentration, with courage to play out from the back against a team that presses you a lot,’ Mourinho told reporters.

‘We had chances for the second goal. Obviously, Barcelona had a strong reaction, but we were calm and organised, and at 1-1 we never lost our tranquillity.’

Barcelona had won six of the previous seven El Clásico encounters since Hansi Flick took charge, but struggled to impose themselves against Mourinho’s side.

‘You saw today, we lacked freshness,’ Flick said.

‘It’s the first defeat in La Liga. We won nine in a row. This is what we have to see.

‘Defeats are a part of the game. We have to analyse; we have to make things better. Now we must make a reaction.’

Real Madrid, who were without suspended forward Vinicius Junior, secured their fifth consecutive victory across all competitions, strengthening their early-season momentum under the veteran Portuguese coach.

After two trophyless seasons, Real Madrid turned to Mourinho to halt Barcelona’s dominance, and Sunday’s result offered encouragement that the team is moving in the right direction.

NDC to inaugurate campaign council, unveil new Abuja secretariat Monday

The National Democratic Congress (NDC) will on Monday, October 26, inaugurate its National Campaign Council, present Certificates of Return to its candidates and commission a newly acquired national secretariat in Abuja.

The party disclosed this in a statement issued on Sunday by its National Publicity Secretary, Osa Director, Esq., outlining a three-part programme of activities scheduled to hold across the Federal Capital Territory.

The day’s activities will begin with a meeting of the party’s National Executive Committee (NEC) at 10 am at the JD Vance Centre, opposite A-Class Park, Kashim Ibrahim Way, Maitama, Abuja.

The party said attendance at the meeting would be strictly by invitation and limited to NEC members.

At 2 pm, the NDC will commission its newly acquired national secretariat in Jabi, Abuja, before proceeding to the inauguration of its National Campaign Council (NCC) at 5 pm.

The campaign council’s inauguration will be followed by the presentation of Certificates of Return to the party’s candidates and a dinner.

According to the statement, attendance at the NCC inauguration will be restricted to members of the National Working Committee (NWC), the party’s presidential candidate and running mate, governorship candidates and National Assembly candidates.

The packed schedule places the party’s executive meeting, secretariat commissioning and campaign council inauguration on the same day, bringing its leadership and candidates together for a series of activities in the capital.

The statement reaffirmed the party’s appreciation for the support and loyalty of its members nationwide, restating its slogan, ‘Together, we can make a New Nigeria Possible.’

Decoupling sovereignty index (4): Money, land, mind as diagnostic vectors

In the earlier instalments of this series, we left the comfort of capital city seminar rooms to confront the reality of fractured spaces. We established the operational safety protocols and deep immersion methodologies necessary for a researcher to step onto the tarmac and observe a territory where the formal state has receded.

But collecting raw street-level observations is only the first half of the battle. This instalment lays out the full indicator architecture of the Decoupling Sovereignty Index (DSI) – the nineteen-indicator diagnostic engine designed by the Sundiata Post Knowledge Lab to score, weight, and track the velocity of sovereign decay across three vectors: Money, Land, and Mind.

The Three-Vector Operational Matrix

The DSI does not look at states as passive recipients of macro-shocks. It maps the active, asymmetric peeling away of de facto governance across three vectors. Each vector is calculated on a scale of zero to ten based on specific, observable field indicators. A score of zero represents total formal state function. A score of ten represents complete sovereignty decoupling. The nineteen indicators are distributed across three vectors: six for Money, seven for Land, and six for Mind. Each vector contributes equally-one third-to the composite DSI score, regardless of the number of indicators it contains. This weighting ensures that no single dimension of sovereignty decoupling dominates the composite or masks developments across the other two.

Why Nineteen Indicators

The nineteen indicators are a deliberate design, not an accumulation. Shadow Order environments punish single-source measurement: respondents self-censor, official data is compromised, and any one signal can be an artefact of local circumstance. The DSI therefore builds in overlap on purpose. Adjacent indicators, such as L2 and L4 or M6 and L6, observe related phenomena from different angles, so each score can be checked against its neighbour. Where they diverge, the divergence is itself diagnostic. Because each vector carries one third of the composite, the seven Land indicators weigh slightly less individually than those of the Money and Mind vectors. This is intended: territorial decoupling has more dimensions, but it is not allowed to dominate the composite. Where full fieldwork is not feasible, a minimum scoring set of anchor indicators (M1, L2, MD2 and MD5) gives a provisional reading, to be completed to all nineteen for the formal DSI record.

Universal Indicators, Context-Specific Sub-Indicators

The nineteen indicators are universal. They measure the same dimensions of sovereignty decoupling in every zone, which keeps scores comparable across contexts. How each indicator is observed, however, depends on the setting. Each indicator therefore carries context-specific sub-indicators, selected according to the peculiarities of the zone under assessment, including its economic structure, terrain, population characteristics, livelihood systems, settlement patterns, and prevailing security and governance conditions. These factors determine how sovereignty decoupling manifests and how it can be observed in different environments, whether agrarian, pastoral, mining, riverine, or urban. Such adaptations shape how each indicator is measured without altering its underlying meaning, thereby preserving consistency across zones.

The sub-indicators used, and the reasons for choosing them, are recorded with every zone score. Their detailed specification is set out in the DSI Methodology and Indicator Manual.

The Money Vector: Fiscal Sovereignty Indicators

This vector measures the structural insulation of a local economy from the formal state apparatus and central bank – tracking the exact point where state fiscal tools lose their operational teeth. It carries six indicators.

M1 – Parallel Taxation Rate. The frequency, consistency, and monetary toll of shadow levies imposed by non-state actors on commercial activity, market stalls, artisans’ work permits, and the transport of goods. M1 is the anchor indicator of the Money vector – the most directly observable and earliest signal of fiscal sovereignty decoupling. It is scored through direct field count of shadow levy collection points and trader testimony on levy frequency, amount, and enforcement character. Levies on agricultural output at the point of production are scored under M6.

M2 – Formal Tax Compliance Deficit. The gap between the state’s projected revenue expectations and actual tax collection within the micro-environment – measured primarily through field observation rather than state-published data, which in high-decoupling zones is itself a product of the Institutional Mirage.

Observable through the proportion of businesses reporting formal tax payment in the current cycle and the operational status of revenue offices within the zone.

M3 – Shadow Currency Penetration. The degree to which unofficial mediums of exchange displace official legal tender in commercial transactions. Scored through the proportion of observed market transactions conducted in foreign currency, commodity barter, or informal tokens, and through the parallel market exchange rate premium within the zone. Scoring thresholds are anchored to IMF parallel market premium research, World Bank informal economy thresholds, and context-specific Central Bank data – weighted inversely to the zone’s overall DSI score, since the higher the decoupling the less reliable formal monetary authority data becomes.

M4 – Remittance Dependency Ratio. The extent to which household survival depends on external transfers rather than state-linked economic activity. M4 is a change-sensitive indicator – only remittance dependency that has intensified during or following decoupling onset contributes to the score. A pre-decoupling baseline is required for reliable scoring. Without it, M4 must carry a reliability flag in the composite DSI record.

M5 – Formal Banking Exclusion Rate. The deterioration of formal banking access to wealth storage and credit during or following sovereignty decoupling onset – distinct from pre-existing structural underdevelopment of financial infrastructure. M5 measures deterioration rather than absolute absence, ensuring the DSI does not conflate structural underdevelopment with active sovereignty decoupling. A pre-decoupling baseline is required.

M6 – Harvest Tax Rate. The shadow order’s direct extraction from agricultural yield at the point of production – the monetary toll imposed on farmers at the moment their labour crystallises into a tangible, countable, and transportable commodity. Distinct from farming levies which tax land access and belong to the Land vector.

The Land Vector: Territorial Sovereignty Indicators

This vector maps the physical and spatial contraction of the state’s productive geography – tracking roads, fields, courts, and checkpoints not as lines on a map but as the active arteries and organs of shadow order territorial control. It carries seven indicators – one more than the Money vector, reflecting the greater empirical complexity of territorial sovereignty decoupling across its physical, spatial, and institutional dimensions.

L1 – State Security Footprint Index

The true geographic and operational reach of formal state security forces versus the territorial perimeter dominated by a Shadow Order – capturing whether formal forces are garrisoned in isolated urban barracks or can safely and consistently patrol the interior. The critical distinction is between operational and ceremonial security presence. A formal security convoy that moves only between fixed points on a predictable schedule without engaging shadow order activity scores closer to ten than zero regardless of its physical presence within the zone.

L2 – Shadow Checkpoint Density

The frequency, location, and structural permanence of non-state territorial control points and roadblocks relative to formal military or police outposts along critical transit corridors. Scored through direct field count of shadow checkpoints per kilometre of transit corridor and transporter testimony on checkpoint consistency and enforcement character. Transport cost differentials between zones with and without confirmed shadow checkpoints provide a corroborating economic signal – shadow checkpoint taxation embeds itself in transport pricing as a structurally observable market reality.

L3 – Agricultural Displacement Rate

The percentage of fertile productive agrarian land vacated, abandoned, or forcibly occupied due to non-state violence or shadow order territorial control. L3 requires a pre-decoupling baseline to distinguish sovereignty-driven displacement from natural causes.

L4 – Transport Route Capture

The proportion of primary and secondary movement corridors controlled, monitored, or systematically taxed by shadow actors. Analytically distinct from L2 – shadow checkpoint density measures the nodes of control while transport route capture measures the arteries. A zone can have low checkpoint density but high route capture where shadow authority is enforced through mobile rather than fixed control mechanisms. Both indicators are necessary for a complete territorial sovereignty picture.

L5 – Formal Justice Absence Index

The physical retreat, closure, or total operational paralysis of state magistrate courts, police divisions, and formal legal enforcement mechanisms – and the degree to which shadow order dispute resolution has filled the resulting vacuum. L5 is directly corroborated by MD1 – Population Trust Transfer Index – in the Mind vector. Where formal justice is entirely absent and shadow dispute resolution commands community compliance, the Mind vector should independently corroborate through measurably reduced institutional trust in formal state authority.

L6 – Farming Levy

The shadow order’s territorial taxation of the right to occupy and use productive agricultural land – imposing recurring levies on farmers for continued land access, distinct from harvest tax which extracts from yield. L6 is the Land vector’s most direct empirical link to the Money vector. Its placement in the Land vector reflects its primary character as a territorial control mechanism – the shadow order asserting ownership rights over productive land rather than merely extracting commercial revenue from it. Farming levies must be distinguished from legitimate customary land use tribute systems that predate decoupling and carry community consent.

L7 – Population Displacement and Return Patterns

The degree to which civilian movement into, out of, and within the zone reflects confidence in or fear of the prevailing territorial authority. L7 is simultaneously a territorial sovereignty signal and a cognitive sovereignty signal – people vote with their feet for the authority they believe can protect them. A pre-decoupling baseline is required for reliable scoring.

The Mind Vector: Cognitive Sovereignty Indicators

This vector targets the ultimate battlefield – the invisible shift in human consciousness that determines which authority the population recognises, obeys, and protects. The Mind vector is the most methodologically challenging of the three because cognitive sovereignty is the least directly observable dimension of decoupling. Its six indicators are therefore designed around behavioural proxies – what people demonstrably do – rather than attitudinal surveys alone, which are unreliable in Shadow Order environments where respondents self-censor.

MD1 – Population Trust Transfer Index

The measurable expressed shift in trust away from formal judicial and administrative state bodies toward alternative traditional, religious, or armed arbiters. MD1 measures institutional trust – which body the population believes has legitimate authority to govern and adjudicate. Distinct from MD5 which measures immediate protection preference. Scored through civilian testimony on where disputes are taken first and observed attendance at formal versus shadow arbitration sessions. Behavioural proxies override attitudinal responses where the two diverge.

MD2 – Compliance Orientation Score

The behavioural alignment of the population – whether daily rules of engagement are oriented toward formal state law or Shadow Order mandates. MD2 is the Mind vector’s most behaviourally grounded indicator, scored through five specific observable markers: property boundary compliance, movement compliance, commercial compliance, dispute initiation, and civic duty orientation. Its five-marker architecture ensures scoring is based on observable conduct rather than stated attitudes – making it the most resistant to self-censorship bias.

MD3 – Institutional Legitimacy Deficit

The structural gap between the formal state’s rhetorical claims to sovereign authority and the population’s de facto acknowledgement of that authority as binding. Legitimacy is the deepest cognitive dimension – distinct from trust and compliance. Trust asks whether an institution will serve well. Compliance asks whether its rules are followed. Legitimacy asks whether the institution has the right to govern at all. Legitimacy loss is the hardest to reverse – it survives even after security conditions improve and requires active legitimacy reconstruction rather than merely security restoration.

MD4 – Narrative Control Index

Which actor controls the dominant explanatory framework governing how the population interprets local events, security incidents, and governance decisions. Scored through four observable proxies: crisis explanation – whose account the population repeats and acts upon; warning compliance – whose security directives the population follows; information source preference – where the population turns first for zone intelligence; and blame attribution – which actor the population holds responsible for governance failure. Behavioural responses to information override stated media preferences where the two diverge.

MD5 – Protection Source Preference

The truest vote of confidence a population can cast – who they turn to first when physical safety is threatened. MD5 measures the immediate survival decision made under conditions of acute threat rather than general institutional preference. It is the Mind vector’s most immediate and least self-censored indicator – crisis-moment behaviour bypasses the social desirability bias that distorts attitudinal surveys in Shadow Order environments. Scored through community testimony on contact sequence during the most recent security incident and response time comparison between formal state and shadow order intervention.

MD6 – Socialisation and Education Capture

The degree to which the shadow order has extended cognitive sovereignty reach into the formation of the next generation – through control of schooling, religious instruction, youth mobilisation, and community socialisation channels. MD6 is the Mind vector’s leading indicator – it measures future cognitive sovereignty trajectory rather than current alignment. A zone scoring low on MD1 through MD5 but high on MD6 is in a deceptively stable condition. The next generation is being formed entirely within shadow order cognitive parameters while current cognitive sovereignty appears partially intact. A high MD6 score is a critical forward-looking warning signal regardless of the current Mind vector composite score.

The foregoing presents the nineteen universal indicators of the DSI and the general principles governing their application. The detailed scoring rubrics, operational thresholds, context-specific sub-indicators, evidence protocols and aggregation procedures will be set out in the DSI Methodology and Indicator Manual, to be issued by the Sundiata Post Knowledge Lab (SPKL).

However, scoring the nineteen indicators is only the first step. How those scores interact across the three vectors, and what they imply for the order in which sovereignty can be restored, is the subject of the next instalment.

AI agents open new security front for Kenyan businesses

Kenyan businesses are moving from using artificial intelligence (AI) for simple tasks like answering customer questions to deploying systems that can execute tasks on their behalf, and experts point to an emerging cybersecurity challenge – how to protect the digital identities and privileges granted to these AI agents.

Conventional chatbots such as ChatGPT, Gemini and Claude mainly generate responses. But AI agents can be connected to company applications, databases and internal systems to perform tasks with limited human intervention.

This makes them useful for automating business processes, but also creates another potential entry point for cybercriminals if their access is compromised or poorly controlled.

For Kenyan businesses adopting AI to streamline operations, an agent with extensive permissions could expose sensitive information or allow an attacker to move deeper into corporate systems if its identity is hijacked.

‘AI agents are what we call privileged users in your environment,’ Robert Ng’etich, the team lead for threat intelligence in East Africa at the global IT services firm NTT Data, told the Business Daily.

‘For such users, one of the biggest risks they present is that if their identities are compromised, they can lead to a broader business compromise.’

The risk reflects a wider shift in cybersecurity, where attackers increasingly exploit existing identities and login credentials rather than relying only on technical vulnerabilities to break into systems.

Using legitimate credentials can help hackers disguise their actions as routine user activity, making it harder for organisations to identify an intrusion.

Because AI agents gain access to business applications and data, cyber experts say companies will need to extend identity protection and access controls to these non-human users, just as they do for employees and other privileged accounts.

This includes ensuring that agents have access only to the information and systems needed for their assigned tasks, monitoring their activity and protecting the credentials that allow them to operate. An agent that can access several business systems may become an attractive target if its permissions are not carefully managed.

The threat is emerging as cybercriminals increasingly harness AI to improve the speed, scale and credibility of their attacks.

The Communications Authority of Kenya (CA) detected 11.1 billion cyber-threat incidents in the year to June 2026, a 29 percent increase from 8.6 billion a year earlier.

Distributed denial-of-service attacks, where hackers flood websites, servers and networks with huge volumes of malicious traffic to make them inaccessible, rose 114.3 percent to 72.16 million in the year ended June 2026, up from 33.68 million a year earlier.

This was the highest growth among the cyber threats tracked by the regulator, highlighting the growing exposure of businesses and public systems as more services move online.

Web application attacks targeting flaws, poor coding, or security gaps in websites, web services, and application programme interfaces increased 99 percent to 51.51 million, from 25.89 million in the previous year.

Cyber experts say attackers are using AI to generate more convincing phishing messages, translate scams into local languages such as Swahili, and create deepfake voices and videos that imitate real people.

These techniques can be used to trick employees into disclosing information, authorising payments or carrying out instructions they believe came from a colleague or senior executive.

‘Before, it used to take a lot of time for attackers to find ways to exploit systems. But now, with the help of AI, what would have taken maybe three weeks to one month is now taking hours,’ said Mr Ng’etich.

‘We are seeing a lot more attacks on websites and other systems because attackers are using AI to enhance their vulnerability research, increasing the speed with which they are finding loopholes.’

Still, the same technology is being adopted by cybersecurity teams to strengthen their defences, setting up a contest in which both sides are seeking to improve their speed and effectiveness.

Security operations centres (SOCs), which monitor networks and investigate suspicious activity, are using AI to analyse and correlate far more signals than human analysts could reasonably examine manually.

Events such as a user login, access to a file and other seemingly minor activities can be assessed together to reveal patterns that might indicate a wider attack.

Mr Ng’etich says AI can help security teams examine hundreds of data points and connect events that, viewed individually, may appear insignificant.

‘We can also do summaries using AI, report on incidents using AI, whether to technical or executive teams in a business,’ he said.

‘The SOC is also able to use AI for vulnerability search too, the same way as attackers. And because of that, they can arrest, or they can address vulnerabilities at a much faster pace.’

Security practitioners are also deploying AI agents to handle repetitive work, including case summaries, event correlation, prioritisation and certain standardised responses, such as blocking elements associated with an attack.

The aim, he says, is not to replace human analysts but to help them respond more quickly and concentrate on decisions that require judgement. It increases the volume of security events they investigate and shortens the time between detecting a threat and taking action.

Kenya intensifies push to exit global financial grey list

The Treasury has committed to uncovering secret owners of companies as part of measures to exit the money laundering grey list and boost the country’s economic turnaround.

The plan, outlined in the draft 2027 Budget Policy Statement, seeks to improve beneficial ownership transparency, helping authorities identify the individuals who ultimately own or control companies and trace suspicious financial transactions.

Kenya has struggled to comply fully with regulations that demand disclosing the identities of secret shareholders who control more than 10 percent in firms to the Attorney-General through the Business Registration Service (BRS).

The requirement for filing beneficial ownership information seeks to cover risks of the entities being misused to facilitate criminal activity such as corruption, money laundering, financing of terrorism and the proliferation of tax evasion.

The international crime watchdog Financial Action Task Force (FATF) placed Kenya on its “grey list” of countries that require special scrutiny in 2024 on concerns about money laundering and terrorist financing.

The Treasury push comes after FATF maintained Kenya’s grey-list status in June, more than two years after the country was placed under increased monitoring in February 2024.

The details required for filing in the beneficial ownership disclosures include the names of the substantial shareholder, KRA PIN, National ID or passport copies, postal address, residential address, occupation, telephone number and the date when the investor became a beneficial owner.

‘The National Treasury chairs the National Taskforce on AML/CFT/CPF and will continue to lead a Whole-of-Government effort to complete the remaining items in the FATF Action Plan,’ the Treasury writes in the draft 2027 Budget Policy Statement (BPS).

Countries on the list undergo increased monitoring and must actively work with the FATF, a body that groups countries from the United States to China to tackle financial crime, to correct deficiencies. Research suggests an upgrade from the grey list could trigger more foreign direct investment.

The greater disclosure push also targets trusts, following the enactment of the Trust Administration Act, 2026, which requires existing trusts to submit registers of their beneficial owners within 24 months of the law coming into force.

The law, enacted in September, provides for ownership information to be accessible to authorities such as the Financial Reporting Centre (FRC) and reporting institutions, including financial institutions and designated non-financial businesses and professions.

Greater transparency is intended to make it harder for individuals to conceal their interests behind legal entities, helping authorities investigate suspicious transactions and identify people who benefit from potentially illicit financial flows.

Beneficial ownership requirements already apply to companies trading with the government, partly to expose individuals who secretly benefit from fatty public contracts, including politically exposed persons and public officials.

The Treasury’s latest commitments come as Kenya seeks to end increased monitoring imposed in February 2024 over deficiencies in its efforts to combat money laundering and terrorism financing.

FRC Director-General Naphtaly Rono told Parliament earlier this month that Kenya had addressed 19 of the 21 items in the country’s FATF action plan.

‘Where we are in our efforts to delist from the grey list as a country is …a fairly good place,’ Mr Rono told the National Assembly Committee on Delegated Legislation.

‘We are optimistic that with the momentum and with the support from yourselves and the other stakeholders, we should be able to exit the grey list by April next year,’ he added.

The plan on secret company owners is part of reforms aimed at stepping up money laundering investigations and prosecutions, strengthening the use of financial intelligence and tightening oversight of financial institutions through risk-based supervision.

The government also intends to introduce risk-based regulation of non-profit organisations, which can be vulnerable to abuse for terrorism financing, and align its targeted financial sanctions framework with FATF standards.

These measures build on legislative changes, including the Anti-Money Laundering and Combating of Terrorism Financing Laws (Amendment) Act, 2025, and the Virtual Asset Service Providers Act, 2025, which established a framework for licensing and supervising digital asset firms such as cryptocurrency firms.

The Public Benefit Organisations Regulatory Authority has said Kenya’s grey listing reflected deficiencies in prosecuting money laundering and terrorism financing offences, regulating non-profit organisations, addressing virtual asset risks and enforcing beneficial ownership requirements.

Despite the reforms, risks persist in sectors exposed to illicit financial flows. A 2025 FRC risk assessment found that 282 of 442 entities profiled across four sectors fell into medium- or high-risk categories.

Real estate recorded the highest exposure, with 153 agencies classified as medium or high risk, compared with 40 rated low risk. Law firms followed, with 74 firms in the medium-to-high-risk category and 12 considered low risk.

The findings underline the challenge of ensuring that new laws and tighter supervision translate into effective enforcement, stronger investigations and successful prosecutions.

The Treasury says it will continue reporting progress to FATF and the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group as Kenya works to complete its action plan.

‘Safeguarding the integrity of Kenya’s financial system remains a priority, given its importance for investor confidence, correspondent banking relationships and the cost of external financing,’ the Treasury says in the draft 2027 budget plan.

’Imported’ malaria cases muddle eradication efforts in 3 counties

Murang’a, Kirinyaga and Nyeri are reporting imported malaria cases, making it harder for them to eradicate the disease even as confirmed infections have increased.

According to health sector data, Murang’a recorded a 92 percent increase in confirmed outpatient malaria cases between 2021 and September 2026, while cases in Kirinyaga rose by 33 percent and in Nyeri by 12 percent.

However, the latest data does not specify the counties or regions where the imported infections in the three counties are originating.

Imported malaria occurs when a person contracts the infection in one area but is diagnosed in another. Infected travellers can carry the parasite into counties with low local transmission, where mosquitoes may spread it to others.

These infections may be linked to travel from regions with higher malaria transmission, including areas around Lake Victoria and the coast.

These three counties, alongside Laikipia and Nyandarua, are among the five targeted by the government for malaria elimination by 2027/28.

Earlier in the year, the Principal Secretary for Public Health, Mary Muthoni, said that Kirinyaga had recorded near-zero malaria cases acquired through local transmission in recent years.

‘Kirinyaga has recorded near-zero indigenous cases in recent years and is part of the Mt Kenya region counties targeted for elimination,’ she said.

Nationally, confirmed outpatient malaria cases declined from 5.54 million in 2023 to 3.64 million in the 12 months to September 2026. The confirmed case rate also fell from 104.4 per 1,000 people in 2023 to 64.2 in the latest reporting period.

“The changes deserve investigation”

Despite the national decline, 12 counties recorded increases in confirmed cases, while 35 registered reductions.

‘Most counties recorded fewer confirmed malaria cases than in 2021, but increases were concentrated in 12 counties.’ Mandera had the largest percentage rise, followed by Homa Bay and Murang’a. These changes deserve investigation, particularly given that the increase in cases also represents a substantial number of patients,’ the health sector document stated.

Mandera recorded the largest percentage increase in confirmed cases, at 362 percent, followed by Homa Bay at 142 percent and Murang’a at 92 percent.

This trend was also evident in the malaria rate, relative to the population size. Six counties recorded higher confirmed rates per 1,000 people: Mandera, Homa Bay, Murang’a, Marsabit, Kirinyaga and Turkana. Wajir and Migori remained relatively stable, while the other counties recorded declines.

‘Six counties recorded higher confirmed malaria rates per 1,000 people: Mandera, Homa Bay, Murang’a, Marsabit, Kirinyaga and Turkana. Wajir and Migori remained relatively stable. The remaining counties recorded reductions, although continued surveillance is needed to understand local differences,’ the document stated.

State, Dangote haggled over Sh0.46 in KPC deal

State-backed pension schemes, including the National Social Security Fund (NSSF), failed in their push to sell Kenya Pipeline Company (KPC) shares to Aliko Dangote at Sh9.50 a piece, with the 46 cents difference having threatened to kill the deal.

Mr Dangote, Africa’s richest man, had threatened to walk away from the transaction if the fund managers acting for the pension schemes insisted on demanding a 5.3 percent premium on the shares’ market price at the Nairobi bourse, say the deal makers familiar with the deal.

In the end, the pension schemes accepted Sh9.04 per share, a small premium on the KPC’s market price of Sh9.02.

Mr Dangote sweetened the deal by forgoing the dividends he would have earned for closing the deal before closure of KPC books, ceding Sh1.4 billion to the eight pension schemes that sold the tycoon 24.7 percent stake for Sh42.5 billion.

KPC declared a dividend of Sh0.32 a share that was to be paid to investors on the firm’s books by November 30.

Mr Dangote offered to factor in the Sh1.4 billion dividend or Sh0.32 on the offer prices, pushing the cost of the deal to Sh9.36.

He snatched the Sh42.5 billion KPC share purchase deal from global oil majors who dragged their feet when presented with the opportunity to acquire the 24.7 percent stake in the newly listed firm.

Kenne Belgrad, the managing director of Rock Investment Bank, which acted as the selling broker, argues the final price of Sh9.36 was a fair valuation of KPC shares, insisting that there was no other premium to be extracted from the deal.

The NSSF, the Public Service Superannuation Fund (PSSF) and the County Pension Fund (CPF) sold part of their stakes in KPC while smaller schemes including Lapfund, Laptrust, Kenya Power Pension Scheme and the Kenya Ports Authority (KPA) Pension Scheme made full exits.

The Unclaimed Financial Assets Authority (UFAA) and Kenya Re Insurance Corporation did not sell any shares.

The broker says they engaged with fund managers acting on behalf of the holders and not the entities.

UFAA and Kenya Re have no external fund managers, explaining why they were left out of the transaction.

‘We began initial discussions with Dangote with an asking price of Sh10 and then brought it down to Sh9.50. Even after four rounds of negotiations, he (Dangote) did not accept that price,’ Mr Belgrade told the Business Daily in an interview.

He dismissed claims that the pension schemes lost money in the deal, arguing that the transaction costs were capped at around one percent of the transaction.

The State-backed agencies, the NSSF, the PSSF, CPF and UFAA, had a combined stake of 38.35 percent.

Others were pension funds in parastatals such as Kenya Power, KPC and Kenya Ports Authority (KPA).

Their combined stake has been cut to less than 15 percent, altering the ownership of KPC, less than eight months since its listing on the Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE).

‘At Sh9.36, you have a four percent return for the holding period, translating to an annualised return of eight percent, which is above inflation. Even after adjusting for a maximum one percent transaction costs, you still get a return close to the prevailing T-bill rates,’ said Mr Belgrad.

‘The narrative that money was lost is misguided and malicious. Reading from the lens of an investor, chasing the dividend earlier was the right thing to do as the cash can be allocated elsewhere instead of waiting to receive the same 32 cents in December with a static share price of Sh9.’

KPC share remained little changed at the NSE when compared to its IPO price of Sh9.

But the share has rallied post the sale of the 24.76 percent stake. It continued rallying on Friday, reaching an all-time high of Sh10.55 at the close of trading on Friday, signalling the Dangote investment as a vote of confidence in KPC.

KPC opened trading at Sh9 a piece on the day the Dangote transaction was executed.

Mr Dangote’s presence at KPC has been likened to strategic Vodacom ownership at Safaricom Plc-with the South African telecom giant viewed as an anchor steward of the Kenyan telco.

With the acquisition, Mr Dangote is now the second-largest shareholder of KPC behind the Kenyan government, which retained a 35 percent stake in the company at the IPO.

The government of Uganda holds a further 20.15 percent through the Uganda National Oil Corporation (UNOC).

No other shareholder holds a significant stake, with the ownership of local pension schemes combined falling below 15 percent.

Mr Dangote is set to nominate a director to the board of KPC, handing him influence and voting rights on the strategic direction of the firm, having attained a significant stake in line with the company’s articles of association.

‘So long as oil marketing companies (OMCs) jointly, or any other shareholder, hold at least 20 percent of the issued share capital of the company, 30 days before the date of each annual general meeting shall be entitled to nominate one director to the board (the institutional director),’ reads part of KPC’s articles of association.

PPP deals ruling tests investor confidence

On September 17, the High Court handed down a judgment that will shape how Kenya structures public-private partnerships (PPPs) for years to come.

In the petition brought by the Katiba Institute, Justice Nyaundi declared sections 59, 60 and 72(1) of the Public Private Partnerships Act, 2021 unconstitutional to the extent they allow PPP projects that create government expenditure, guarantees, public debt or other public liability to proceed without parliamentary approval.

Parliament need not approve the project itself, but it must approve the spending and commitments that come with it.

The hard question is, with Kenya increasingly relying on private capital to build infrastructure, what message does the ruling send to investors, lenders and project sponsors that the country depends on? PPPs involve collaboration between a government agency and a private-sector company.

They can be used to finance, build, and operate projects, such as public transportation networks, parks, and convention centres.

The court rejected the proposition that structuring a transaction as a “PPP” can, by itself, take it outside Parliament’s oversight of public expenditure.

The test is whether the arrangement, in substance, exposes the national government to spending, borrowing, a guarantee or other public liability. If so, the court held that parliamentary approval is constitutionally required, regardless of the structure adopted for the transaction.

The PPP Committee was created under Kenya’s PPP framework in 2013 and re-established under the 2021 Act. Under the Act, PPPs do not need prior parliamentary approval, and Katiba Institute argued that leaving final approval with the PPP Committee shuts Parliament out of decisions that commit public funds.

There were counter arguments that Parliament stays informed through annual reports, but the court held that this does not meet the constitutional requirement of oversight. This being the case, the PPP Committee’s sign off will no longer be the last word in the case of PPPs that put public money or guarantees on the line.

This ruling could change the picture for one instrument in particular: the Letter of Support. Letters of Support have long been a compromise instrument providing lenders and investors comfort that government stands behind a project without the rigours, cost and time required for a full sovereign guarantee.

The court names government support measures such as Letters of Support as arrangements that can expose the State to substantial fiscal obligations. This being the case, where a letter contains provisions that work like or may be construed as a guarantee, it may need to be treated, and approved, as one, regardless of its name.

This may have practical consequences for how these instruments get negotiated going forward. Sponsors and lenders will likely push for Letters of Support with genuine payment obligations because that is what makes a project bankable.

They will however have to allow for additional time for parliamentary approval, rather than relying on PPP Committee sign-off alone. Contracting authorities on the other hand may try to draft support provisions that stop short of binding payment commitments, to keep the instrument outside the scope of parliamentary approval.

Whether that satisfies lenders and investors is a separate question altogether.

The court suspended its declaration of invalidity for six months to let Parliament make the necessary amendments. The challenge for Parliament is therefore how to strengthen oversight without undermining investor confidence.

Investors and lenders will be watching for clear guidance as to how parliamentary oversight will be exercised, which support arrangements need approval, a predictable timetable for getting it, and how projects already at an advanced stage will be treated.

Getting this right could strengthen Kenya’s PPP regime but getting it wrong could give way to hesitation by investors and financiers.

As for now, expect longer negotiation cycles in the near term as both sides work out how to navigate the new requirement, at least until Parliament’s amendment gives the market clearer direction.

Treasury eyes Sh42bn toll deals for Nairobi, Mombasa bypasses

The National Treasury eyes Sh42.26 billion toll deals for two major bypass roads in Nairobi and Mombasa under concession terms.

Disclosures show that the Nairobi Southern Bypass, which is complete and in use, is earmarked for a Sh12.265 billion operations, maintenance and tolling concession, while the planned Mombasa Northern Bypass has a proposed investment value of Sh30 billion under a ‘user- tolls; viability gap funding (VGF) financed’ model. The ‘user-pay: tolls’ model for the Southern Bypass means that instead of using general taxpayer money to fund a project, only the motorists or citizens who actually utilise the infrastructure pay for its operations, maintenance and tolling concessions.

In the case of the planned Mombasa Northern Bypass project, the ‘user tolls: VGF’ model means that the construction costs would be split between government grants and private funding, and the private investors would later recover their money directly by charging the public a fee (toll) to use it.

The Treasury said a proposal by the Kenya National Highways Authority(KeNHA) to introduce tolls on the Southern Bypass is awaiting approval.

The 28.6-kilometre Southern Bypass links Nairobi and Kiambu counties through Langata and Kikuyu suburbs.

Mombasa Northern Bypass is a planned 38.6-kilometre road infrastructure project by KeNHA, which is aimed at easing traffic congestion and improving freight movement in Mombasa County.

The road project will have two sections, including the main Mombasa Northern Bypass (27.1 km), which connects the Mombasa-Nairobi Highway (A8) at Miritini to the Mombasa-Malindi Road (A7) at Kwa Kadzengo, Mtwapa.

The second component, known as Bamburi Link Road (11.5 km), links the new bypass to the Mombasa-Malindi Road (A7) at Bamburi.

The proposed concessions would add to the toll-road user charges on the 27-kilometre Nairobi Expressway, where motorists pay between Sh170 and Sh500 depending on the distance travelled and vehicle category.

The government is also pursuing tolling proposals for other major roads, including the Dongo Kundu Bypass in Mombasa, as it seeks to recover infrastructure costs, sustain completed assets and mobilise resources for new projects.

Treasury has also estimated a road infrastructure funding deficit of Sh1.5 trillion over five years and Sh4 trillion over a decade.

The government published a draft tolling policy in March 2026 as it sought to establish a framework for collecting road-user charges to supplement the existing financing mechanisms, including the Roads Maintenance Levy Fund, which is funded through a Sh25 charge on every litre of petrol and diesel.

Besides the Southern Bypass, Nairobi also hosts the 21km Nairobi Northern Bypass highway that serves as a ring road around Nairobi, connecting Ruaka on Limuru Road to Ruiru on Thika Road and the Eastern Bypass.

The Nairobi Northern Bypass traverses areas such as Runda, with an overpass spanning Kiambu Road, Thome Estate, Kahawa West, Githurai, and Ngumba Estate before reaching its eastern terminus.

The city also has the Western Bypass, which is a four-lane dual carriageway that connects the Nairobi Southern Bypass at Gitaru to the Northern Bypass at Ruaka. It passes through major hubs like Wangige, Kihara, and Ndenderu, serving as the final ring road to decongest Nairobi.

Quickmart cuts Kenyans shares in IPO, global funds splash Sh7.1bn

Quickmart has cut the allocation of shares to local investors in its initial public offering (IPO) to less than half after high-net-worth investors from the US and Britain splashed Sh7.1 billion on the retailer’s shares.

The retailer has amended the share allocation in a review that has made local investors the biggest losers.

Local investors, both retail and institutional, will receive a maximum of 44 percent of the two billion shares on offer, or half of the supermarket chain being sold via the Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE), down from the initial 67 percent.

The retailer had offered 13 percent of the shares worth Sh1.95 billion to wealthy investors, known as cornerstone investors, who are firms or funds that agree in advance to buy a specific stake in an IPO, signalling confidence in an offer to other buyers.

It has now increased their allocation to Sh7.2 billion or 48 percent of the two billion shares, in a deal that will offer the high-net-worth investors a 24 percent stake in the retailer upon its listing on the NSE on November 11.

This follows the increase in cornerstone investors to four after a US-based investment firm, 337 Frontier, and UK fund manager, RWC LLP, bought shares worth Sh1.94 billion and Sh1.3 billion, respectively.

They joined an arm of the UK government, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), and the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation (IFC), which will buy shares worth Sh1.94 billion each or a 6.5 percent stake in Quickmart.

The scramble for shares by the cornerstone investors has also seen the allocation reserved for foreign investors cut to eight percent from 20 percent, giving them a four percent stake.

Quickmart owners are selling half of the retailer through the IPO, which opened on October 5 and closes in October, with the supermarket chain’s owners sharing the Sh15 billion.

“The indicative allocations are not binding and may be adjusted by the issuer and selling shareholder in consultation with the lead transaction advisors depending on the level and composition of demand received during the offer period and subject to applicable regulatory requirements,” Quickmart says in its supplementary information memorandum.

“Quickmart Plc and the selling shareholder, in consultation with the lead transaction advisors, have accepted applications from the United Kingdom’s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office acting through its MOBILIST Programme; RWC Asset Management LLP; 337 Frontier Capital LP and have admitted each of them as cornerstone investors alongside the International Finance Corporation (IFC),” Quickmart said in the amended memo dated October 23.

The cornerstone investors are betting on dividends and outsized returns from Quickmart upon their exit, on the back of the retailer’s expansion plans and steady shareholder payouts.

The British FCDO announced it will buy a 6.5 percent stake in the retailer via MOBILIST, a UK government programme that uses taxpayers’ cash to buy stakes in private companies.

This will mark MOBILIST’s third mega deal in a firm linked to the NSE as it eyes a new listing to attract other high-net-worth investors to the offer.

For the IFC, this is not the first equity investment in a Kenyan retailer, having participated in a consortium that bought and sold a 31.5 percent stake in Naivas between 2020 and 2022 for a tidy profit.

Quickmart is now the second largest retail chain in Kenya behind Naivas by store count and turnover, with an estimated 15 percent share of the market. The company has a current store count of 72, in 16 counties.

In the year ended December 2025, Quickmart reported a 33 percent growth in net profit to Sh1.51 billion. Sales rose by 9.3 percent to Sh50.43 billion in the year.

The retailer paid its shareholders a dividend of Sh1.65 billion, representing a payout ratio of 109 percent, and is aiming to distribute at least 80 percent of its earnings to shareholders in the coming years.

Quickmart says it intends to more than double revenue and add at least 50 stores over the next four years.

Quickmart Plc is aiming for annual revenue of $1 billion (Sh130 billion) from about Sh60 billion this financial year. The retailer plans to increase the tally of stores to 125.

Quickmart owners, through Sokoni Retail Kenya Limited (SRKL), are selling two billion shares at Sh7.50 each, providing a multi-billion-shilling partial exit route for private equity firm Adenia and the founders of the retail chain.

In SRKL, Adenia holds a 50.79 percent stake; the family of Quickmart founder, the late John Kinuthia (31.83 percent), Tumaini Supermarket founders (12.02 percent), and the CEO of the retail chain, Peter Kang’iri, has a 5.36 percent stake.

They will all cede half their ownership in a transaction that reveals the outsized growth in value of the chain under Adenia, which first bought Tumaini Supermarket in 2018 and the following year acquired Quickmart– which were merged in 2020.

This will add billions of shillings to the worth of the founders of Tumaini Supermarket and Quickmart, which were smaller retailers in a market then dominated by Tuskys and Naivas.

Adenia will bank Sh7.62 billion from the sale of 1.06 billion shares that represent half of its 2.03 billion units in Quickmart.

The fund acquired a 55 percent majority equity stake in Tumaini in 2018 and a 51 percent stake in Quickmart in 2019, before merging the two units under the Quickmart brand in January 2020.

Quickmart CEO, who joined the company in 2019, is set to earn Sh803.3 million in the sale of half of his 214.2 million shares in the retailer.

The Kinuthia family is in line for a total windfall of Sh4.77 billion as they cede half of their 1.27 billion shares in Sokoni Retail.

Tumaini founders Moses Nditika, Joram Ngeruro Njoga and Elijah Omullo Okello will collectively bank Sh1.8 billion from the sale, courtesy of their holding of 12.02 percent in Sokoni Retail.