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UN leadership race exposes growing West-Global South divide

While the world keeps its eyes on wars, tariffs, and oil prices, a story is quietly unfolding in the corridors of the UN headquarters in New York, one that will largely shape the face of the organization for the decade to come. On December 31, 2026, António Guterres steps down as Secretary-General after serving two terms, and as early as January 1, 2027, his seat will be taken by the tenth head of the UN. Seven candidates are officially in the race, four of them women. Whoever ends up the winner, difficult tasks await, because the significance, the influence, and the financial capacity of the UN are all under ever closer scrutiny from the global public.

According to the UN Charter, the Secretary-General is “equal parts diplomat and advocate, civil servant and CEO.” The person holding this post oversees several key UN bodies, among them the Security Council, which carries the responsibility of maintaining peace and security across the planet. The new Secretary-General will be elected by the UN General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council, whose permanent members are China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. That is why the pool of potential contenders is limited, and the process itself promises to be complicated and strewn with obstacles.

Seven candidates are officially in the race, four of them women. They are Latin Americans and Africans with solid diplomatic credentials behind them. The former president of Senegal and ex-chairman of the African Union, Macky Sall. The head of the IAEA, Rafael Grossi of Argentina, a man used to putting out the hottest nuclear crises. The economist Rebeca Grynspan of Costa Rica, who currently leads the UN Conference on Trade and Development. The former president of the General Assembly, María Fernanda Espinosa of Ecuador, and her compatriot, the diplomat Ivonne A-Baki. Guyana’s permanent representative Carolyn Rodrigues-Birkett and the veteran of UN diplomacy from Uganda, Olara Otunnu. Until recently the list also included the former president of Chile, Michelle Bachelet, but she was the first to drop out of the running, having received only a single vote of support last week.

The heated arguments are already beginning. Yet behind this outwardly orderly process lies a genuine battle of meanings. And the main dividing line runs along the fault of West versus Global South.

There are two unwritten rules at the UN that this time work against the established order. The first is the principle of regional rotation. By long tradition the post is meant to pass from region to region, and now, by common consensus, it is Latin America and the Caribbean’s turn. In the entire history of the UN there has been only one Secretary-General from there, the Peruvian Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, and even he served back in the eighties. In 2016 this tradition was already broken once, when, contrary to expectations, the Portuguese Guterres was chosen rather than a representative of Eastern Europe, which has never yet led the organization. Skipping the regional queue a second time in a row will be far harder. As the International Crisis Group expert Richard Gowan aptly noted, if Latin America’s claim is disregarded again, it will come back to haunt everyone next time.

The second rule is even more sensitive. In eight decades the UN has never once been led by a woman. All nine previous Secretaries-General were men. In September 2025 a resolution appeared that directly calls on states to nominate women. And at the latest BRICS summit, which by now gathered 21 countries, the final communiqué sounded almost like a reproach aimed at the UN. It reminded everyone that a woman has never been elected to this post, that only one person came from Latin America and the Caribbean, and only two each from Africa and Asia.

The economic outlook is hardly encouraging either. Today there is stubborn inflation, which may be driven in large part by the surge in energy prices caused by the war in the Middle East as well as in Ukraine. This hits hardest those who already struggle with the high cost of living. Because of inflation, central banks are forced to raise rates at a time when debt levels are already very high. Under these conditions the UN has to operate in an even tougher situation. The Security Council can barely pass weighty decisions, and the withdrawal of the United States under the Trump administration has forced cuts to operations. Some institutions, such as the International Criminal Court, are under direct attack. The security architecture that was patiently built after the Second World War lies in ruins, and the chances of creating a new one are close to zero.

Between now and the end of the year, a candidate needs to gather at least nine votes out of fifteen, and at the same time none of the five permanent members may cast a veto. And that permanent five is the United States, China, Russia, the United Kingdom, and France, among whom lately there has been no agreement. That is precisely why three rounds of secret balloting have still failed to reveal a clear favorite.

But whoever is chosen in the end, the inheritance handed to them will be a heavy one. The Security Council, in Guterres’s own words, is practically paralyzed by constant vetoes. The main donor, the United States, has slashed its funding, and hopes that the shortfall would be covered by China or Europe have so far come to nothing. What is more, experts admit that many states are, deep down, even glad that Trump is forcing a regime of austerity on the UN. The superpowers are no longer able to solve the world’s problems on their own.

There is one more paradox here. People, on the whole, believe in the UN more than its own leaders do. According to a GeoPoll survey for the UN Foundation, six people out of ten trust the organization on the things that truly matter to them. Yet at the same time 85 percent admitted that they had heard almost nothing about how the new Secretary-General is being chosen.

So what is at stake? At first glance, just a single post, largely ceremonial and, as they say, “remarkably powerless.” But behind the argument over the candidate hides a far more fundamental question. Who really sets the tone in the planet’s main international institution. The answer we will learn by the end of this year.

Cyprus Department of Meteorology – Forecast for the Sea Area of Cyprus (A)

Atmospheric pressure at the time of issue: 1012hPa (hectopascal)

Weak low pressure is affecting the area. The weather will be mainly fine, but locally increased cloud coverage will be present at times. From late afternoon, local showers and isolated thunderstorms are expected, spreading from the west. THUNDERSTORMS MAY BE ACCOMPANIED BY SUDDEN CHANGES IN WIND DIRECTION AND INCREASES IN WIND SPEED.

Visibility: Good, but moderate to poor in showers

Sea surface temperature: 28°C

Warnings: NIL

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PERIOD

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STATE OF SEA

West Coast

Morning

Southwest to West 3, gradually 3 to 4

Smooth to Slight

Afternoon

West to Northwest 3 to 4, at times locally 4 to 5

Slight

Night

West to Northwest 3 to 4, later 4

Slight

South Coast

Morning

Southwest to Northwest 3, gradually Southwest to West 4

Smooth to Slight

Afternoon

Southwest to West 4, at times locally 5

Slight

Night

Southwest to West 3, at times locally 3 to 4

Smooth to Slight, at times locally Slight

East Coast

Morning

West to Northwest 3, gradually South to Southwest

Smooth to Slight

Afternoon

South to Southwest 3 to 4, at times locally 4 to 5

Smooth to Slight

Night

Southwest to West 3, at times locally 3 to 4

Smooth to Slight, at times locally Slight

North Coast

Morning

South to Southwest 3, gradually Southwest to West 3 to 4

Smooth to Slight

Afternoon

Southwest to West 3 to 4, at times locally 4 to 5

Slight

Night

Southwest to West 4, later offshore 4 to 5

Slight, later offshore Slight to Moderate

Time of issue: 0530

Date: 27/09/2026

Bola Ahmed Tinubu and the art of political engineering

WHAT does it mean to be a good political leader? This is one fundamental question that straddles political philosophy and political science. Political theorists have always been concerned with the idea of the political community and how its leadership can facilitate social harmony for further socioeconomic development. This makes the question of leadership a very critical one for democratic theory, and the determination of the essence of democracy and good governance. All across the world, there are series of indices by which the characteristic features of good leadership are determined. For instance, the human development index references a composite achievement of political leadership in terms of the living standards of the citizens. For many years, the top positions have always been the preserves of the Scandinavian and European countries, from Finland and Norway to the Netherlands and Germany. The highest-performing African countries are not only interspersed within the index, they also constitute the bulk of the countries that make up the bottom rung of the list.

Such indices and indicators of poverty and prosperity make the determination of leadership even all the more interesting and sometimes confounding, especially in a country like Nigeria that carries the burden of geopolitical, regional and continental possibilities and challenges. Since her return to democratic experimentation in 1999, Nigeria’s search for a good political leader has become redoubled, especially given that Nigeria’s postcolonial and post-independence predicaments have become even more grinding for millions of average Nigerians. As we drive slowly and steadily towards another general election in 2027, the discourse around leadership and the future of Nigeria has become even more accentuated. The apprehension about the impending democratic decision process is not only palpable but also fundamentally existential. Millions are asking whether their political and electoral choices this time around would be defining enough to swing Nigeria’s political, and hence economic, fortunes.

And at the very heart of that democratic apprehension is the possibility that President Bola Ahmed Tinubu will return to political power for another four years. Or that the opposition will be able to wrest power from him either jointly in strategic concert or singly through individual political and charismatic appeal. We must concede: within the force-field of the typical gains and pains that necessarily attend a root-and-branch brand of structural adjustment-grounded reforms, things are very difficult in Nigeria. The indices for multidimensional poverty are depressing. Millions have also been traumatised by insecurity from banditry and insurgency. Then there are the severe macroeconomic expressions of a governance system that is struggling to make sense of Nigeria’s oscillating fortunes. No one can envy any political leader who makes the decision to take on the heavy burden of shouldering Nigeria’s predicament at this moment in time. I do not envy such a leader given my background in governance, policy, and institutional reform. While I have been trying to make sense of the Nigerian civil service system, the President of Nigeria is trying to make sense of the political and economic dynamics of making Nigeria work. That is enormous. But then, people can argue that those who present themselves for leadership positions cannot be pitied because they had a sense of what it would entail, and they presumed that they had what it takes to steer the nation out of her challenges. This is a good argument that must be put in proper context.

President Bola Ahmed Tinubu knew the task involved in managing the affairs of Nigeria. He has been involved at several political levels of Nigeria’s unfolding for decades; from being in the trenches of the pro-democracy movement, locally and in exile, to being in the legislative arm as a senator, to governing a state, and in the management of party politics and its combustible dynamics at challenging times, and participating as a core stakeholder in geopolitical policymaking at the highest levels through numerous but disruptive transitions. When he brazenly insisted that it was his turn to get to that highest level of overseeing Nigeria’s fate-when he served the notice to all political agents that ‘Èmi lókàn’ (it’s now my turn)-we have all missed the courage embedded in that political decision. And this for me is where we must start in our reflection on President Tinubu’s performance after four years in office, and whether or not his administration deserves a second term.

Given the heat of Nigeria’s pressing situation, we often gloss over the provenance and complexity of current predicaments. Nigeria did not become the way it is under Tinubu. In other words, Nigeria under the Tinubu administration is already a composite of complex and complicated dysfunction and debilitation. From independence to date, the political and developmental circumstances of the Nigerian state have kept fluctuating so much so that millions of Nigerians have been the worse for it. The commencement of the democratic experiment has not brought much relief. The issue is not to therefore articulate platitudes and excuses on why the Tinubu administration could not be considered to be magicians who are expected to transform Nigeria overnight. On the contrary, the critical analysis lies elsewhere.

This is where my interest in political philosophy enables an analysis that deepens the understanding of Bola Ahmed Tinubu beyond the usual political commentaries that often dissolve into petty and abusive vitriols. How does political philosophy enable us to figure the political style and leadership dexterity of Bola Ahmed Tinubu as the president of the Nigerian state at this moment in time? One critical lens derives from the trajectory of his political evolution from a pro-democracy agitator to the sitting president of Nigeria. This alone is sufficient to necessitate an astute study of his political tenacity. In this regard, he has earned a space among the political avatars that have bestraddled the Nigerian space. Only a few leaders ever could survive Nigeria’s chaotic and violent political space, not to talk of ascending to the zenith of its governance structure. My interest, however, is not just taking on a measure of his political unravelling. Rather, I am intrigued by what his over three decades of political actions could reveal to us in terms of a distinct framework of political leadership, a schema of political power and the dynamics of nation-building.

It is very clear to me that, as a Tinubu acolyte, Western political understanding and global parameters of leadership will sit uneasily on Tinubu. This is not something to be lamented, because a leader is a function of the confluence of context, ideology, temperament and temporal situatedness. There is a level of unfairness in judging a postcolonial leadership by the parameters of Western political theory or democratic institutionalism. I will hazard the hypothesis further that, compared to Chief Obafemi Awolowo, Tinubu will still not be able to measure up in terms of a leadership grounded in value credentials. This is because Tinubu is already bedevilled by serious reputational negatives that derive from his political rising. However, the crucial difference between Awolowo and Tinubu is simply that the latter is at the helm of affairs of the Nigerian state at a time when it is most difficult to be a president. And this is doubly so for him because he has not only a running knowledge of the dynamics of the Nigerian predicaments; he also specifically asked to be president.

And yet, Tinubu has converted his political position into a stance of strength. His enigma persona, I insist, derives from his capacity for political engineering. This is an amorphous term that I need to unravel to capture my measure of respect for someone I consider to be a typology of a good leader. The rise of Tinubu from pro-democracy activist to governor of LAGOS State to political kingmaker and ultimately to president reveals a Machiavellian streak that speaks to his capacity to balance shifting alliances, strategically navigate complex and fragmented ethno-regional landscapes, and preside over an immense political machinery that manoeuvres between loyalists and rivals. He has become the ultimate Machiavellian strategist who is not just passively deft in deflecting oppositions, allegations and controversies. On the contrary, his strategic competences and alliances are meant to forge a pathway for rethinking Nigeria’s future.

This is a political persona that defies easy location in existing populist or bureaucratic leadership typology. We have a leader who has to ride through the rough and tough waters of the Nigerian political terrain and democratic context to be able to lay the foundation of a new Nigeria. This demands not just a visionary and ideological framework but also a transactional realism that demands systematic patronage structures which leverage the assistance of loyalists and experts around whom nation-building and political engineering can be facilitated. In the political discourse literature, the apt term for this patronage is political gardening-a framework of harnessing competences, expertise and alliances that could be deployed for political and non-political objectives. What makes Tinubu’s political rising fascinating and formidable is the emergence of a political machinery founded on political gardening, his capacity to headhunt political, economic and technocratic capacities that transcend generational and regional limitations.

This political machinery has not been founded for the sake of merely obtaining power for the sake of power. This is a difficult argument to sell given the generations of political powerbrokers who have passed through Aso Rock and left Nigeria worse than they met it. But then, why headhunt a critical mass of technocratic brainpowers if the endgame was simply to seize and exploit political power? If this harnessing of technocratic competence worked in his grand modernising plan for Lagos State, why would Nigeria be any different with the same strategy? This is where the Machiavellian label deserts our characterisation of Tinubu. This is because Machiavelli’s understanding of political power was for the maintenance of the state’s boundaries; Tinubu’s understanding of political power dwells at the very tight juncture where institutional patronage and strategic resilience must meet visionary policymaking, and power consolidation must be balanced by political engineering.

Four years are not sufficient for balancing power play while trying to inject structural reform into the Nigerian system. But what is more, for a nation-state that has been run into a complicated national dysfunction, there is no gainsaying the urgent necessity of swallowing hard pills of stringent policies like the fuel subsidy removal, the unification of the foreign exchange rates and the tightening of the monetary policy in ways that seek to eliminate price instability as an act in economic stabilisation that has crystallised. These are a few of the policies already put in place to alleviate the policy errors of the past and achieve fiscal growth and accountability.

Let us return to the critical comparison between Awolowo and Tinubu. We are all apprised of the legacy of Chief Obafemi Awolowo, especially in terms of human and infrastructural development. Tinubu’s legacy is still in the making, and the quest for a second term in office will go a long way not only to douse the immediate threat of political opposition (directed towards reputational damage) but to also allow freer avenue for the consolidation of the foundations of transformational policies. To secure a spot in the annals of political leadership in Nigeria, Tinubu is faced with the challenge of converting his political strategies and pragmatic orientation towards not just stabilising the fractured Nigerian state but also laying a policy architecture of economic recovery and growth.

Caucasus after Karabakh: from conflict zone to connectivity corridor

By Mazahir Afandiyev, in collaboration with the Editorial Team

The 27th of September 2020 began for the entire Azerbaijani people as a long-awaited and proud day. It once again demonstrated the strength, determination and bravery of the victorious Azerbaijani Army, a strength that Azerbaijan had experienced throughout its history of statehood and that was demonstrated to the whole world.

On that very day, the Armenian armed forces, which grossly violated the ceasefire regime, launched another aggression against Azerbaijan by intensively striking the positions of the Azerbaijani armed forces along the entire front line, while deliberately subjecting populated areas of the Tartar, Aghdam, Fuzuli and Jabrayil districts to artillery fire. As a result, alongside military personnel, 11 Azerbaijani civilians, including two children, were killed.

Guided by the norms and principles of international law, as well as the four well-known resolutions of the United Nations Security Council that had remained on paper for 27 years, and with the aim of repelling the enemy’s military provocation and putting an end to its aggression, as well as ending the occupation of our territories that had continued for more than 30 years, Supreme Commander-in-Chief and Great Commander, President Ilham Aliyev, immediately ordered the Azerbaijani Army to launch a counter-offensive along the entire front.

Thus, our activities aimed at liberating Karabakh, for which we had yearned for 30 years, began on September 27 with the ‘Iron Fist’ counter-offensive operations and turned into the 44-day Second Karabakh-Patriotic War, ending with the liberation of Shusha, the pearl of Karabakh, from occupation. As a result of successful military operations, by November 9, five cities, four settlements and 286 villages were liberated from occupation, while the victorious Azerbaijani Army defeated the Armenian armed forces and the terrorist groups formed in Karabakh.

On November 10 of the same year, following Armenia’s official appeal to the Russian Federation, the war was stopped with the direct participation of Russia and by agreement of the heads of all three states. A declaration consisting of nine provisions was adopted between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and thus Armenia signed an act of capitulation. As stated by Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, Armenia had no choice but to accept defeat before our Glorious Army. Therefore, the occupying side admitted its defeat and the conflict was officially brought to an end.

Yet the end of active hostilities did not mean that the consequences of the conflict disappeared overnight. The post-war period created a second and equally important task: to turn military victory into a durable political, economic and social reality. This meant restoring communities, rebuilding infrastructure, returning people to their homes, reviving economic life and, ultimately, changing the physical and economic geography of a region that had been shaped by conflict for decades.

As a result of continuing the victory achieved on the military front at the political level, within 20 days after the 44-day Patriotic War, three districts-Aghdam on November 20, Kalbajar on November 25, and Lachin on December 1-were handed over to Azerbaijan. On August 26, 2022, the city of Lachin, as well as the villages of Zabukh and Sus, were taken under control. Thus, in accordance with the trilateral statement, the process of peacefully returning the Aghdam, Kalbajar and Lachin districts was completed.

The War, which lasted only 44 days, and the bravery of our heroic officers and soldiers turned the centuries-old aspirations of our grateful people into reality, liberated our lands that had been under occupation, and restored historical justice.

From the very first day of this war, hundreds of patriotic young Azerbaijanis wholeheartedly volunteered to go to the front and fought heroically against the enemy. Unfortunately, war has its own laws. If there is war, there are also martyrs, veterans and losses. This war was not without casualties either. A total of 2,908 Azerbaijani servicemen made the ultimate sacrifice in the struggle to liberate our lands, while six remain missing and thousands of brave soldiers became war veterans.

As President Ilham Aliyev stated, ‘I once again bow my head before the souls of the martyrs of the First and Second Karabakh Wars and pray to God to have mercy upon them. We avenged their blood! Our heroic soldiers and officers who presented us with this Victory are our source of pride. Their heroism, their bravery and their sacrifice have already become an epic.’

It is no coincidence that September 27, which has become a celebration of national will, national spirit and national dignity, is observed every year in the Republic of Azerbaijan as Remembrance Day, in accordance with the Order of President Ilham Aliyev dated December 2, 2020, as a sign of deep respect for our soldiers and officers who fought heroically in the Second Karabakh-Patriotic War and sacrificed their lives for the territorial integrity of our country, as well as for all our martyrs.

In general, the Azerbaijani state has always shown the highest respect for the memory of our martyrs who sacrificed their lives for the Motherland, keeping the perpetuation of their memory, as well as the treatment and restoration of the health of our veterans, at the centre of its attention.

The Victory Park, created with the aim of perpetuating the names of our martyrs and heroic sons; the Victory Arch, built as a symbol of the 44-day Patriotic War, with a height of 44 metres, a width of 22 metres and 44 columns; the Patriotic War Memorial Complex; and the Victory Museum will always keep alive the heroic epic of our people.

But remembrance is only one part of the post-war transformation. The other is rebuilding the geography of everyday life. Roads, railways, airports, energy infrastructure, digital networks, industrial zones, residential settlements and social facilities are changing the physical landscape of Karabakh and Eastern Zangezur. Reconstruction is therefore not simply about repairing what was destroyed. It is about creating the infrastructure through which people, goods, capital and ideas can move again.

This is where the meaning of the post-Karabakh period becomes broader than the restoration of territories. The strategic question is increasingly how a region that was once associated with closed borders, military positions and competing territorial claims can become a region of roads, railways, trade routes and economic cooperation.

Today, the Azerbaijani people are closer to peace than ever before. The South Caucasus is transforming from a centre of conflict into a region where all peoples can live in prosperity. The signing of the Washington Declaration on August 8, 2025, between President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev, President of the United States Donald Trump and Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan, as well as the initialling of the text of the Peace Agreement, became an important point towards achieving lasting peace. The Washington Declaration explicitly emphasised the opening of communications between Azerbaijan and Armenia for domestic, bilateral and international transportation and referred to unimpeded connectivity between mainland Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic through the territory of Armenia, with reciprocal benefits for regional connectivity. It also established the framework for the proposed Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity, or TRIPP.

This is an important change in the language of the South Caucasus. For decades, the region was discussed primarily through the vocabulary of conflict: ceasefires, front lines, occupied territories, displaced populations, security arrangements and negotiations. The emerging agenda increasingly uses a different vocabulary: connectivity, transit, investment, logistics, energy, digital infrastructure and trade.

The strategic significance of this shift should not be underestimated. Geography, which once appeared to be one of the region’s greatest sources of vulnerability, can increasingly become one of its greatest economic assets. Azerbaijan’s position on the Caspian Sea places it at the intersection of routes connecting Central Asia with the South Caucasus, Trkiye and Europe. The Middle Corridor, or Trans-Caspian East-West International Transport Corridor, already connects China and Central Asia with the Caucasus and Europe through a multimodal network of rail, maritime and road infrastructure.

In this emerging architecture, Karabakh and Eastern Zangezur are no longer viewed only through the prism of their recent conflict history. Their reconstruction is becoming connected to a wider economic geography that includes the Caspian Sea, the Middle Corridor, Nakhchivan, Trkiye and European markets. The restoration of roads and railways inside Azerbaijan can therefore serve not only local communities but also the wider movement of goods and people across the region.

The logic is particularly significant because connectivity is rarely limited to transportation. A functioning corridor requires customs cooperation, border infrastructure, logistics centres, digital systems, energy supplies, investment and predictable commercial conditions. In this sense, a transport corridor can become an economic ecosystem. The more efficiently these components operate together, the greater the potential for transit routes to generate investment, employment and new commercial relationships.

The restoration and reconstruction work being carried out in our Karabakh and Eastern Zangezur economic regions in accordance with modern urban planning standards, the further growth of the region’s economic potential against the backdrop of geopolitical changes taking place in our world, and Azerbaijan’s transformation into a strategic transportation hub between East and West, as well as North and South, are increasing the international community’s interest in achieving lasting peace.

A peaceful South Caucasus would also have significance far beyond Azerbaijan and Armenia. The region sits between major economic spaces and transport networks. Its stability can affect routes linking Central Asia with Europe, the Caspian basin with the Black Sea, and Trkiye with the wider Turkic world. For this reason, the economic value of peace is increasingly inseparable from the strategic value of connectivity.

The same principle applies to energy. Azerbaijan’s established role as an energy supplier to European markets has already given the country an important position in the continent’s diversification efforts. The next stage is broader: energy corridors can increasingly develop alongside transport and digital corridors, creating a more integrated regional infrastructure network. The result could be a South Caucasus in which energy, logistics, communications and trade reinforce one another rather than developing as separate projects.

This is also why the post-war reconstruction of Karabakh should be viewed within the wider transformation of Azerbaijan’s economy and infrastructure. The rebuilding of roads and settlements, the development of industrial and economic zones, the expansion of renewable energy capacity and the strengthening of transport connections can collectively create the foundations for a new regional economic model.

In this context, the recent visit of representatives of the diplomatic corps accredited in Azerbaijan to Karabakh and Eastern Zangezur from September 11 to 13, 2026, was not accidental. That visit once again demonstrated that the countries they represent unequivocally recognise and support Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. At the same time, within Armenian society, revanchist forces that are hostile towards our country made unfounded and false statements and attempted to undermine the process of achieving peace.

The diplomatic visits to the liberated territories also carry a wider message. For years, international attention to Karabakh was overwhelmingly associated with conflict, displacement and political negotiations. Today, international representatives can also see reconstruction, new infrastructure and the changing economic landscape on the ground. This creates an opportunity for the international community to assess the region not only as a former conflict zone but as an emerging component of a wider connectivity network.

The transformation will not happen automatically. Infrastructure alone cannot guarantee economic integration. Roads and railways must be accompanied by political stability, functioning institutions, investment, cross-border cooperation and confidence among the countries of the region. Sustainable connectivity requires predictable rules and respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and jurisdiction. The Washington Declaration itself places these principles alongside its call for the opening of communications.

This is particularly important because the South Caucasus has historically been influenced by competing geopolitical interests. A new connectivity model can succeed only if the region’s countries and external partners see economic cooperation not as a zero-sum competition but as an opportunity to expand the overall regional market.

The emerging role of Azerbaijan is therefore not simply that of a country rebuilding territory after war. It is increasingly that of a country attempting to connect different economic and geographical spaces. The Middle Corridor gives Azerbaijan a role in the movement of goods between Asia and Europe, while routes towards Nakhchivan and Trkiye create additional possibilities for north-south and east-west connectivity. The planned TRIPP framework, meanwhile, places the opening of communications between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan within a broader regional connectivity agenda.

The United States and Azerbaijan have also explicitly placed regional connectivity, including the Middle Corridor, energy, trade, transit, data connectivity and multimodal logistics within the framework of their strategic partnership. This demonstrates how the post-war transformation of the South Caucasus is increasingly connected to wider international economic and strategic calculations.

In this sense, the phrase ‘after Karabakh’ should not be understood merely as a reference to a period that follows a war. It describes a fundamental change in the region’s strategic logic. The question is no longer only how the South Caucasus can prevent another war. It is increasingly how peace can produce tangible economic benefits for societies that have lived with conflict for decades.

Connectivity can become one of the mechanisms through which that peace is made visible in everyday life. A functioning railway, a modern highway, a logistics centre, an industrial facility, an energy project or a digital connection may appear to be an economic development individually. Together, however, they can change the strategic importance of the entire region.

For Azerbaijan, this transformation is particularly significant because the country’s geography has historically been both a challenge and an opportunity. Situated between the Caspian Sea, Russia, Iran, Georgia, Armenia and Trkiye, Azerbaijan occupies a position through which multiple regional routes can converge. The post-war environment creates the possibility of linking this geography more effectively with neighbouring countries and international markets.

For Armenia, the opening of regional communications could also create new economic possibilities, particularly if connectivity develops on the basis of mutually agreed principles and reciprocal benefits. For Georgia, Trkiye, Central Asian states and European partners, greater stability and improved transport links could provide additional routes for trade and investment. In this sense, the benefits of connectivity need not be confined to the countries directly involved in the former conflict.

The transformation of the South Caucasus from a conflict zone into a connectivity corridor is therefore not merely an infrastructure project. It is a long-term political and economic process. Its success will depend on whether the region can replace the habits and structures of confrontation with practical cooperation.

The legacy of the 44-day war will always remain inseparable from the sacrifices of Azerbaijan’s martyrs and the suffering caused by decades of conflict. The remembrance of those who lost their lives cannot be separated from the country’s determination to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity. At the same time, the strongest guarantee that the next generation will not experience the same cycle of conflict may be the creation of conditions in which peace becomes economically valuable, politically sustainable and socially meaningful.

The South Caucasus is therefore standing at a historic crossroads. The road that once carried armies can become a road that carries trade. Territories once defined by military confrontation can become places of reconstruction and investment. Borders that once represented division can become points of regulated movement and economic exchange. And geography that once intensified strategic competition can become the foundation of regional connectivity.

Despite all this, under the leadership of the Victorious Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Azerbaijan will not take even a single step back from its firm position and will continue to shape new realities in the region. This new reality created by our Glorious Victory will protect not only the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our country, but also the peaceful, secure and prosperous future of the region and its peoples as a whole.

The next chapter of the South Caucasus will ultimately be judged not only by what was won on the battlefield, but by what is built after the battlefield falls silent. If the region succeeds in converting peace into connectivity, connectivity into trade, and trade into shared economic opportunity, then the post-Karabakh era could mark something much larger than the end of a conflict. It could mark the beginning of a new economic geography for the South Caucasus, one in which the region moves from being known primarily as a frontier of confrontation to becoming a bridge between continents.

Insurance regulator limits buying of foreign reinsurance

The Insurance Regulatory Authority (IRA) has tightened rules on offshore reinsurance, requiring insurers to first exhaust local capacity before seeking approval to place Kenyan risks with foreign reinsurers.

In a circular, the IRA said the increase in the mandatory reinsurance cession to Kenya Reinsurance Corporation (Kenya Re) to 25 percent from 20 percent would be the first move in strengthening local reinsurance capacity as insurers begin renewing their reinsurance contracts.

‘Going forward, ensure exhaustion of the local capacity by arranging reinsurance programmes with local reinsurers before seeking approval to reinsure with foreign reinsurers,’ said Godfrey Kiptum, IRA chief executive in a circular dated September 16.

Primary insurers transfer part of their risks to reinsurers to whom they pay premiums, reducing their exposure from massive or catastrophic losses.

The regulator’s intervention comes as insurers prepare their reinsurance programmes for 2027, with companies required to begin negotiations early and file final cover notes with the Authority by October 31.

A reinsurance cover note is a temporary but legally binding document that proves a reinsurance contract is in place before the official policy document is issued.

IRA’s order looks set to curb offshore placement of Kenyan insurance risks in a market that has several other reinsurers including Continental Reinsurance, East Africa Reinsurance, Ghana Reinsurance, WAICA Reinsurance (Kenya) and ZEP-RE.

The 25 percent mandatory business for Kenya Re follows amendments to the country’s reinsurance rules. Under the amended rules, every insurer is required to reinsure with Kenya Re a quarter of each of its reinsurance treaties relating to general business.

The requirement for compulsory cessions will only cease if Kenya Re is privatised. The Nairobi Securities Exchange-listed insurer is 60 percent owned by the government.

The regulator said it had ‘noted with concern’ a trend where some insurers have been flouting reinsurance rules, warning that it will not allow such firms to write new business from January 1, 2027 if their reinsurance arrangements flout rules.

‘You are expected to start your reinsurance negotiations early and the final reinsurance cover notes shall be filed with the Authority for approval latest by 31st October 2026,’ said Mr Kiptum.

‘Please note that unfair contract terms will not be accepted in the treaties and companies will not be allowed to write any new business effective 1st January 2027 if their reinsurance arrangements will not have been approved before that date.

IRA raised concerns about several non-compliance practices by insurers including late submission of reinsurance arrangements for regulatory approval and arranging reinsurance through brokers that are not regulated or registered under Kenyan law.

The regulator said some insurers have also been entering into reinsurance arrangements with ‘lowly rated or unrated’ reinsurers and reinsuring with foreign firms not registered under the Insurance Act.

Insurers have further been told to avoid concentrating more than 50 percent of a risk with a single reinsurer unless they provide justification for the placement.

The IRA is also tightening scrutiny on insurers that enter into reinsurance contracts but fail to honour payments.

IRA said companies submitting their 2027 arrangements would have to provide proof that reinsurance balances up to the second quarter of 2026 have been settled, or present an agreed payment plan with the reinsurers.

The regulator says insurers will have to show evidence of actuarial certification of the adequacy and contractual certainty of reinsurance arrangements.

The actuarial reports must cover the insurer’s five-year claims risk profile, changes in its reinsurance management strategy, the credit ratings of reinsurers and the structure of reinsurance arrangements.

Actuaries will also be required to give an opinion on the adequacy of insurers’ retention levels and purchased reinsurance capacity, ceding commissions, minimum deposit premiums and rates for non-proportional treaties.

The IRA measures collectively tighten the conditions under which insurers can transfer risks to overseas markets, giving local reinsurers a more prominent role in Kenya’s insurance market.

‘All facultative placements, both local and overseas, shall be shared with the authority before placement,’ the IRA said.

President Ilham Aliyev visits Victory Park in Baku on Remembrance Day

President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev and First Lady Mehriban Aliyeva visited the Victory Park in Baku on September 27 on the occasion of Remembrance Day.

The head of state laid a wreath at the Victory Monument and honored the memory of the martyrs.

Then, First Lady Mehriban Aliyeva paid tribute to the memory of the martyrs with deep respect.

Azerbaijan observes Remembrance Day across country

Azerbaijan is commemorating the memory of servicemen who lost their lives during the 44-day Patriotic War.

Commemorative ceremonies have been held across the country’s cities and districts, including the liberated territories, since the morning of September 27. Citizens are paying tribute to the memory of those who sacrificed their lives for the Motherland.

September 27 was designated as Remembrance Day by a decree signed by President Ilham Aliyev on December 2, 2020. The day serves as an expression of deep respect for the soldiers and officers who fought heroically in the Patriotic War that began in 2020 and sacrificed their lives for the country’s territorial integrity, as well as for all martyrs.

Azerbaijan’s tricolor flag is flying in streets, avenues and squares, as well as from balconies of homes. Azerbaijanis living in different countries around the world are also commemorating the memory of the martyrs.

At 12:00, a one-minute silence will be observed across the country in memory of the martyrs.

Azerbaijan MFA issues statement on Remembrance Day

Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has issued a statement marking September 27 – Remembrance Day, honoring the memory of those who lost their lives for the country’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The ministry highlighted the significance of the 44-day Patriotic War, the restoration of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, and the country’s post-war reconstruction and peace efforts.

The statement reads:

On the occasion of the anniversary of 27 September – Remembrance Day, we commemorate with deep respect and gratitude the cherished memory of our martyrs who sacrificed their lives for the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan.

The Patriotic War, which began on 27 September 2020 and lasted for 44 days, marked a significant turning point in the modern history of Azerbaijan and resulted in the restoration of the country’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.

The leadership of the Victorious Commander-in-Chief, the solidarity of our people, and the heroism and high level of professionalism demonstrated by the Azerbaijani Army in the service of the Motherland played an important role in achieving this historic outcome.

The establishment of 27 September as a Remembrance Day is an expression of the respect shown at the state and national levels to the cherished memory of our martyrs. On this day, the sacrifice of each and every martyr who gave their life for the Motherland, as well as the bravery demonstrated by military servicemen and veterans, is once again commemorated with respect.

In the period following the Patriotic War, Azerbaijan has been consistently undertaking measures aimed at the restoration and reconstruction of the territories liberated from occupation, eliminating the humanitarian consequences of the conflict, including the landmine threat, ensuring the safe and dignified return of former internally displaced persons to their native lands, as well as determining the fate of persons who went missing during the conflict.

The greatest tribute to the memory of our martyrs who sacrificed their lives in the Patriotic War is to safeguard the values for which they fought – independence, territorial integrity, sovereignty, and national solidarity – as well as to strengthen lasting peace and security in the region.

In this regard, the sacred memory of the heroes of the Patriotic War will forever live on as an important historical and moral legacy to be passed on by Azerbaijan to future generations.

On 27 September – Remembrance Day, we once again commemorate with deep respect the cherished memory of all our martyrs who sacrificed their lives for the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, and wish good health to the military servicemen who sacrificed their health on this path.

Azerbaijan, Vista Equity Partners discuss investment opportunities

Azerbaijan’s Economy Minister Mikayil Jabbarov has met with Robert F. Smith, founder and chairman of Vista Equity Partners, to discuss investment opportunities and prospects for attracting international capital to the Azerbaijani economy.

The meeting was held on the sidelines of the 2nd Azerbaijan International Investment Forum.

The sides exchanged views on Azerbaijan’s investment potential, economic reforms being implemented in the country and opportunities available to international investors.

They also discussed new opportunities emerging in global financial markets and their potential to support investment flows into Azerbaijan.

The meeting focused on areas of mutual interest, including potential new investment directions and prospects for expanding cooperation between Azerbaijan and Vista Equity Partners.

Martyrs’ Fortress monument unveiled in Gakh

A monument complex dedicated to the memory of martyrs, named “Martyrs’ Fortress”, has been unveiled in Qashqachay village of the Gakh district.

According to Azertag, the opening ceremony of “Martyrs’ Fortress” began with a performance by an orchestra. The Azerbaijani national flag was raised on the towers of the fortress, followed by the national anthem and a one-minute silence in memory of the martyrs.

It was reported that the 22-meter-high monument complex features towers on both sides. An Azerbaijani flag flies atop each tower. The fortress has 44 embrasures symbolizing the 44-day Patriotic War, while one additional embrasure represents the anti-terror operation.

Speaking at the opening ceremony, the project’s author Anvar Afandiyev said the site was created as a place where the sacred memory of the martyrs would be preserved and the love of the Motherland and the legacy of heroism would be passed on to future generations.

He noted that schoolchildren could attend “open lessons” at the site, military conscripts could be sent off from there, and newlyweds could make their wishes at the sacred location.

Lala Rahimova, the mother of National Hero Javanshir Rahimov, said that the residents of Qashqachay had always played an important role in Azerbaijan’s history of statehood and had stood in defense of the Motherland, fulfilling their duties at the cost of their blood and lives. She emphasized that the monument reflects the heroism of the village’s brave sons.

Gakh District Executive Authority head Elvin Pashayev spoke about the Patriotic War, noting that the country’s heroic sons had made a major contribution to restoring Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and sovereignty at the cost of their lives.

“The Victory we have today was made possible by the heroism of our martyrs, the sacrifice of our veterans and the unity of our people. In this regard, the ‘Martyrs’ Fortress’ erected in a remote mountain village will go down in history not only as a place preserving the cherished memory of those from Qashqachay, but also as a sacred site honoring the memory of all our martyrs,” Pashayev said.

Other speakers at the event also spoke about state support for the families of martyrs and war veterans and expressed their gratitude.

The ribbon-cutting ceremony for the “Martyrs’ Fortress” monument complex was then held with the participation of mothers and children of martyrs. Wreaths and flowers were laid in front of the monument.

The ceremony continued with military marches performed by the military orchestra.

Qashqachay village is home to the families of 22 martyrs and 18 war veterans. Azerbaijan’s youngest National Hero, Javanshir Rahimov, was also born and raised in the village.

Qashqachay is also known for its prominent generals and officers, as well as patriotic sons who continue to serve in the Azerbaijani Army.