Turkic States sign charter to strengthen audit cooperation

The charter of the Union of Supreme Audit Institutions of Turkic States was signed in Antalya on October 24.

According to Turkish media reports, representatives from Turkiye, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan expressed their support for the document, which establishes the legal framework for the organization’s activities.

Speaking at the meeting, the current chair of the Union and head of the Turkish Court of Accounts, Metin Yener, recalled that the declaration on the establishment of the Union of Supreme Audit Institutions of Turkic States was signed in Istanbul on November 22, 2025.

He expressed confidence that the new structure would facilitate the exchange of knowledge and experience among Turkic states.

“The charter is not merely a legal document, but a declaration of a shared vision for the future. It will enable us to harmonize common auditing standards, share best practices, and strengthen the principles of transparency and accountability. Ultimately, all of this will have an impact on both the performance of public institutions and people’s quality of life,” Yener said.

Alikhan Smailov, chairman of Kazakhstan’s Supreme Audit Chamber, noted that signing the document marked the beginning of a new era in cooperation among the audit institutions of Turkic countries. He also emphasized that Astana was ready to host the Union’s next meeting in 2029.

Almazbek Akmatov, head of the Accounts Chamber of Kyrgyzstan, and Mehriddin Abdullayev, first deputy chairman of Uzbekistan’s Accounts Chamber, also highlighted the importance of cooperation in auditing.

Nasir Sadigov, deputy chairman of Azerbaijan’s Chamber of Accounts, addressed the participants via videoconference.

Kubanichbek Omuraliev, Secretary General of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), attended the ceremony.

Power crisis leaves millions exposed to global El Niño heatwave

Nigeria’s fragile electricity supply is leaving households and businesses increasingly vulnerable as an intensifying El Niño threatens to expose millions of people to extreme heat, raising the cost of cooling homes, disrupting businesses and increasing health risks in a country where reliable power remains out of reach for many.

Nigeria has some of the world’s largest energy access deficits, with about 92 million people lacking access to electricity, according to data from Austria-based Sustainable Energy for All, an international organisation working in partnership with the United Nations.

This data is compounded by warnings from researchers at the University of Chicago’s Climate Impact Lab, who said Nigeria could record 31,400 additional heat-related deaths between September 2026 and February 2027, making it the country with the highest projected toll from the weather phenomenon of El Niño. The estimate is part of a wider forecast of 66,800 additional deaths across Africa’s Sahel region.

For Africa’s most populous country, the development is becoming more urgent as electricity distribution companies struggle to secure sufficient power from the national grid, forcing consumers to endure shorter supply hours and rely on generators, inverters and other costly alternatives to keep essential activities running.

Data from Nigeria’s electricity distribution system showed that 11 distribution companies had a combined allocation of 3,176 megawatts as of 1 p.m. Nigerian time on October 23.

Abuja Disco received the most at 575 MW, followed by Ikeja Disco at 467 MW and Eko Disco at 458 MW. Ibadan Disco was allocated 355 MW and Port Harcourt Disco 291 MW. Benin (240 MW), Enugu (230 MW), Kano (173 MW), Kaduna (167 MW) and Jos (146 MW) got far less. Yola Disco, serving the north-east, received just 74 MW.

The northern allocations matter because that is where the heat is most severe due to distance from the Atlantic Ocean, proximity to the Sahara Desert and low rainfall. The Nigerian Meteorological Agency recorded 41°C in Nguru, in Yobe State, in recent days. Lagos reached 34°C.

Heat of that magnitude, combined with unreliable power, leaves people with few ways to cool their homes or keep food and medicine cold.

‘Not having stable electricity during this heatwave period is very disastrous,’ said Toyosi Akinbobola, head of energy at Sofidam Capital.

Gas shortages compound the problem. The generators’ association says supply to thermal plants is below 43 percent of daily need. Pipeline vandalism destroyed 128 transmission towers in 2024.

‘Nigeria’s stranded power crisis is a transmission failure, not a generation failure,’ Joy Ogaji, chief executive of the generators’ association, said in July.

She described the toll on small businesses: ‘A small tailor earning N4,000 a day can spend N3,000 of it on generator fuel.’

Greg Odogwu, national coordinator at Centre for Renewable Energy, said Nigeria’s power shortages make it vulnerable to global heatwaves.

‘Even households connected to the grid may be unable to depend on electricity throughout the hottest hours of the day,’ Odogwu said. ‘When supply fails, consumers with sufficient resources turn to petrol or diesel generators, solar systems, batteries and inverters. Others have no practical alternative.’

BusinessDay’s findings showed the resulting costs extend beyond household comfort.

Shops may need to run generators for longer, manufacturers face additional operating expenses, and healthcare facilities must maintain power for essential equipment and medicines that require controlled temperatures.

Apart from rising costs, the weather risk is climbing at the same time.

Celeste Saulo, Secretary-General of the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO), said the current El Niño could peak toward the end of 2026, with effects lasting well beyond that.

El Niño is a natural pattern, marked by warming surface waters in the central and eastern tropical Pacific. But climate change is adding to its force, raising baseline temperatures and widening the gap between what people face and what they can cope with.

Researchers behind the Climate Impact Lab analysis said the numbers reflect poverty and power shortages as much as the weather.

Michael Greenstone of the University of Chicago and Tamma Carleton of the University of California, Berkeley, wrote in an analysis published by Gavi’s VaccinesWork that ‘this makes Nigeria the country most likely in the world to have the highest heat mortality under the super El Niño.’

They added that ‘much of Africa lacks the electricity needed for air conditioning,’ and that ‘poorer, hotter countries will lack the money and reliable electricity needed to protect people.’

‘More than 60 percent of Nigerians were estimated to live below the national poverty line in 2025,’ Chicago researchers noted, and even homes with electricity connections face frequent outages.

The most exposed are people who work outdoors, such as farmers, traders, construction workers and commercial drivers. They are joined by residents of communities with little access to cooling, steady power or health care.

Hospitals and clinics that rely on diesel generators face higher fuel costs and the risk of equipment failure just as heat-related admissions rise.

In Lagos, Nigeria’s commercial capital, residents have been enduring sweltering conditions with limited relief.

‘The heat is unbearable, and with no power, we can’t even turn on fans or air conditioners to cool down,’ lamented Adeola Okonkwo, a resident of Mushin Local Government Area in Lagos. ‘It’s like being trapped in an oven.’

For those who can afford it, the answer is self-supply. Generators and solar-battery inverters have become routine in Nigerian homes and shops, but they are expensive to buy and run.

Diesel and petrol costs eat into household budgets, and small firms that need cold storage, such as food sellers and pharmacies, face rising overheads or spoiled stock.

This development means wealthier urban households can buy their way through a heat wave while poorer families in dense neighbourhoods and rural northern states, where temperatures are highest, mostly cannot.

Microsoft warns Windows users of possible update issues in 2027

Microsoft has warned users who have disabled Windows Update or neglected system maintenance that they may be blocked from downloading future patches and security updates through official channels starting in 2027.

The coming disruption is caused by the expiration of digital certificates used to authenticate Windows Update servers, which are set to lapse on May 17 and June 19, 2027. Devices that fail to install updated certificates prior to these cut-off dates will lose the ability to establish secure connections with Microsoft’s update infrastructure.

Digital certificates function as virtual identity cards, allowing Windows to verify that it is connecting to genuine Microsoft servers rather than fraudulent entities. Microsoft said that while expired certificates will not prevent PCs from booting or affect running software, affected devices will be unable to pull automated updates.

Users of Windows 11 who perform regular maintenance will experience no issues, as Microsoft has already begun distributing updated certificates. The required credentials are standard in Windows 11 version 25H2 and later, while version 24H2 requires patches issued from September 2025 onward. Meanwhile, supported editions of Windows 10 and Windows Server require updates released from July 2026.

Systems facing the highest risk include legacy platforms and devices where update features have been permanently switched off. Devices running Windows 10 Enterprise 2019 LTSC, Windows Server 2019, and Windows Server 2016 face an earlier deadline of May 17, 2027-roughly a month ahead of other editions.

Users who miss the deadline will not need to reinstall their operating system. Required patches can be manually retrieved from the Microsoft Update Catalogue to install the new certificates and restore automated update services, provided the OS edition remains within its official support lifecycle.

Microsoft said these expiring digital certificates are separate from the Secure Boot certificates that drew media attention previously. Secure Boot handles system validation during startup, whereas the certificates in question strictly govern connections to Windows Update servers.

To ensure uninterrupted service, users simply need to navigate to Settings > Windows Update > Check for updates and complete all pending installations. The issue primarily impacts users who deliberately block updates and organisations running unpatched legacy systems.

For Windows 10 users, Microsoft advised checking whether devices remain within active support periods or are covered under Extended Security Updates (ESU), stressing that installing new digital certificates will not extend support for end-of-life systems.

Decoupling sovereignty index (4): Money, land, mind as diagnostic vectors

In the earlier instalments of this series, we left the comfort of capital city seminar rooms to confront the reality of fractured spaces. We established the operational safety protocols and deep immersion methodologies necessary for a researcher to step onto the tarmac and observe a territory where the formal state has receded.

But collecting raw street-level observations is only the first half of the battle. This instalment lays out the full indicator architecture of the Decoupling Sovereignty Index (DSI) – the nineteen-indicator diagnostic engine designed by the Sundiata Post Knowledge Lab to score, weight, and track the velocity of sovereign decay across three vectors: Money, Land, and Mind.

The Three-Vector Operational Matrix

The DSI does not look at states as passive recipients of macro-shocks. It maps the active, asymmetric peeling away of de facto governance across three vectors. Each vector is calculated on a scale of zero to ten based on specific, observable field indicators. A score of zero represents total formal state function. A score of ten represents complete sovereignty decoupling. The nineteen indicators are distributed across three vectors: six for Money, seven for Land, and six for Mind. Each vector contributes equally-one third-to the composite DSI score, regardless of the number of indicators it contains. This weighting ensures that no single dimension of sovereignty decoupling dominates the composite or masks developments across the other two.

Why Nineteen Indicators

The nineteen indicators are a deliberate design, not an accumulation. Shadow Order environments punish single-source measurement: respondents self-censor, official data is compromised, and any one signal can be an artefact of local circumstance. The DSI therefore builds in overlap on purpose. Adjacent indicators, such as L2 and L4 or M6 and L6, observe related phenomena from different angles, so each score can be checked against its neighbour. Where they diverge, the divergence is itself diagnostic. Because each vector carries one third of the composite, the seven Land indicators weigh slightly less individually than those of the Money and Mind vectors. This is intended: territorial decoupling has more dimensions, but it is not allowed to dominate the composite. Where full fieldwork is not feasible, a minimum scoring set of anchor indicators (M1, L2, MD2 and MD5) gives a provisional reading, to be completed to all nineteen for the formal DSI record.

Universal Indicators, Context-Specific Sub-Indicators

The nineteen indicators are universal. They measure the same dimensions of sovereignty decoupling in every zone, which keeps scores comparable across contexts. How each indicator is observed, however, depends on the setting. Each indicator therefore carries context-specific sub-indicators, selected according to the peculiarities of the zone under assessment, including its economic structure, terrain, population characteristics, livelihood systems, settlement patterns, and prevailing security and governance conditions. These factors determine how sovereignty decoupling manifests and how it can be observed in different environments, whether agrarian, pastoral, mining, riverine, or urban. Such adaptations shape how each indicator is measured without altering its underlying meaning, thereby preserving consistency across zones.

The sub-indicators used, and the reasons for choosing them, are recorded with every zone score. Their detailed specification is set out in the DSI Methodology and Indicator Manual.

The Money Vector: Fiscal Sovereignty Indicators

This vector measures the structural insulation of a local economy from the formal state apparatus and central bank – tracking the exact point where state fiscal tools lose their operational teeth. It carries six indicators.

M1 – Parallel Taxation Rate. The frequency, consistency, and monetary toll of shadow levies imposed by non-state actors on commercial activity, market stalls, artisans’ work permits, and the transport of goods. M1 is the anchor indicator of the Money vector – the most directly observable and earliest signal of fiscal sovereignty decoupling. It is scored through direct field count of shadow levy collection points and trader testimony on levy frequency, amount, and enforcement character. Levies on agricultural output at the point of production are scored under M6.

M2 – Formal Tax Compliance Deficit. The gap between the state’s projected revenue expectations and actual tax collection within the micro-environment – measured primarily through field observation rather than state-published data, which in high-decoupling zones is itself a product of the Institutional Mirage.

Observable through the proportion of businesses reporting formal tax payment in the current cycle and the operational status of revenue offices within the zone.

M3 – Shadow Currency Penetration. The degree to which unofficial mediums of exchange displace official legal tender in commercial transactions. Scored through the proportion of observed market transactions conducted in foreign currency, commodity barter, or informal tokens, and through the parallel market exchange rate premium within the zone. Scoring thresholds are anchored to IMF parallel market premium research, World Bank informal economy thresholds, and context-specific Central Bank data – weighted inversely to the zone’s overall DSI score, since the higher the decoupling the less reliable formal monetary authority data becomes.

M4 – Remittance Dependency Ratio. The extent to which household survival depends on external transfers rather than state-linked economic activity. M4 is a change-sensitive indicator – only remittance dependency that has intensified during or following decoupling onset contributes to the score. A pre-decoupling baseline is required for reliable scoring. Without it, M4 must carry a reliability flag in the composite DSI record.

M5 – Formal Banking Exclusion Rate. The deterioration of formal banking access to wealth storage and credit during or following sovereignty decoupling onset – distinct from pre-existing structural underdevelopment of financial infrastructure. M5 measures deterioration rather than absolute absence, ensuring the DSI does not conflate structural underdevelopment with active sovereignty decoupling. A pre-decoupling baseline is required.

M6 – Harvest Tax Rate. The shadow order’s direct extraction from agricultural yield at the point of production – the monetary toll imposed on farmers at the moment their labour crystallises into a tangible, countable, and transportable commodity. Distinct from farming levies which tax land access and belong to the Land vector.

The Land Vector: Territorial Sovereignty Indicators

This vector maps the physical and spatial contraction of the state’s productive geography – tracking roads, fields, courts, and checkpoints not as lines on a map but as the active arteries and organs of shadow order territorial control. It carries seven indicators – one more than the Money vector, reflecting the greater empirical complexity of territorial sovereignty decoupling across its physical, spatial, and institutional dimensions.

L1 – State Security Footprint Index

The true geographic and operational reach of formal state security forces versus the territorial perimeter dominated by a Shadow Order – capturing whether formal forces are garrisoned in isolated urban barracks or can safely and consistently patrol the interior. The critical distinction is between operational and ceremonial security presence. A formal security convoy that moves only between fixed points on a predictable schedule without engaging shadow order activity scores closer to ten than zero regardless of its physical presence within the zone.

L2 – Shadow Checkpoint Density

The frequency, location, and structural permanence of non-state territorial control points and roadblocks relative to formal military or police outposts along critical transit corridors. Scored through direct field count of shadow checkpoints per kilometre of transit corridor and transporter testimony on checkpoint consistency and enforcement character. Transport cost differentials between zones with and without confirmed shadow checkpoints provide a corroborating economic signal – shadow checkpoint taxation embeds itself in transport pricing as a structurally observable market reality.

L3 – Agricultural Displacement Rate

The percentage of fertile productive agrarian land vacated, abandoned, or forcibly occupied due to non-state violence or shadow order territorial control. L3 requires a pre-decoupling baseline to distinguish sovereignty-driven displacement from natural causes.

L4 – Transport Route Capture

The proportion of primary and secondary movement corridors controlled, monitored, or systematically taxed by shadow actors. Analytically distinct from L2 – shadow checkpoint density measures the nodes of control while transport route capture measures the arteries. A zone can have low checkpoint density but high route capture where shadow authority is enforced through mobile rather than fixed control mechanisms. Both indicators are necessary for a complete territorial sovereignty picture.

L5 – Formal Justice Absence Index

The physical retreat, closure, or total operational paralysis of state magistrate courts, police divisions, and formal legal enforcement mechanisms – and the degree to which shadow order dispute resolution has filled the resulting vacuum. L5 is directly corroborated by MD1 – Population Trust Transfer Index – in the Mind vector. Where formal justice is entirely absent and shadow dispute resolution commands community compliance, the Mind vector should independently corroborate through measurably reduced institutional trust in formal state authority.

L6 – Farming Levy

The shadow order’s territorial taxation of the right to occupy and use productive agricultural land – imposing recurring levies on farmers for continued land access, distinct from harvest tax which extracts from yield. L6 is the Land vector’s most direct empirical link to the Money vector. Its placement in the Land vector reflects its primary character as a territorial control mechanism – the shadow order asserting ownership rights over productive land rather than merely extracting commercial revenue from it. Farming levies must be distinguished from legitimate customary land use tribute systems that predate decoupling and carry community consent.

L7 – Population Displacement and Return Patterns

The degree to which civilian movement into, out of, and within the zone reflects confidence in or fear of the prevailing territorial authority. L7 is simultaneously a territorial sovereignty signal and a cognitive sovereignty signal – people vote with their feet for the authority they believe can protect them. A pre-decoupling baseline is required for reliable scoring.

The Mind Vector: Cognitive Sovereignty Indicators

This vector targets the ultimate battlefield – the invisible shift in human consciousness that determines which authority the population recognises, obeys, and protects. The Mind vector is the most methodologically challenging of the three because cognitive sovereignty is the least directly observable dimension of decoupling. Its six indicators are therefore designed around behavioural proxies – what people demonstrably do – rather than attitudinal surveys alone, which are unreliable in Shadow Order environments where respondents self-censor.

MD1 – Population Trust Transfer Index

The measurable expressed shift in trust away from formal judicial and administrative state bodies toward alternative traditional, religious, or armed arbiters. MD1 measures institutional trust – which body the population believes has legitimate authority to govern and adjudicate. Distinct from MD5 which measures immediate protection preference. Scored through civilian testimony on where disputes are taken first and observed attendance at formal versus shadow arbitration sessions. Behavioural proxies override attitudinal responses where the two diverge.

MD2 – Compliance Orientation Score

The behavioural alignment of the population – whether daily rules of engagement are oriented toward formal state law or Shadow Order mandates. MD2 is the Mind vector’s most behaviourally grounded indicator, scored through five specific observable markers: property boundary compliance, movement compliance, commercial compliance, dispute initiation, and civic duty orientation. Its five-marker architecture ensures scoring is based on observable conduct rather than stated attitudes – making it the most resistant to self-censorship bias.

MD3 – Institutional Legitimacy Deficit

The structural gap between the formal state’s rhetorical claims to sovereign authority and the population’s de facto acknowledgement of that authority as binding. Legitimacy is the deepest cognitive dimension – distinct from trust and compliance. Trust asks whether an institution will serve well. Compliance asks whether its rules are followed. Legitimacy asks whether the institution has the right to govern at all. Legitimacy loss is the hardest to reverse – it survives even after security conditions improve and requires active legitimacy reconstruction rather than merely security restoration.

MD4 – Narrative Control Index

Which actor controls the dominant explanatory framework governing how the population interprets local events, security incidents, and governance decisions. Scored through four observable proxies: crisis explanation – whose account the population repeats and acts upon; warning compliance – whose security directives the population follows; information source preference – where the population turns first for zone intelligence; and blame attribution – which actor the population holds responsible for governance failure. Behavioural responses to information override stated media preferences where the two diverge.

MD5 – Protection Source Preference

The truest vote of confidence a population can cast – who they turn to first when physical safety is threatened. MD5 measures the immediate survival decision made under conditions of acute threat rather than general institutional preference. It is the Mind vector’s most immediate and least self-censored indicator – crisis-moment behaviour bypasses the social desirability bias that distorts attitudinal surveys in Shadow Order environments. Scored through community testimony on contact sequence during the most recent security incident and response time comparison between formal state and shadow order intervention.

MD6 – Socialisation and Education Capture

The degree to which the shadow order has extended cognitive sovereignty reach into the formation of the next generation – through control of schooling, religious instruction, youth mobilisation, and community socialisation channels. MD6 is the Mind vector’s leading indicator – it measures future cognitive sovereignty trajectory rather than current alignment. A zone scoring low on MD1 through MD5 but high on MD6 is in a deceptively stable condition. The next generation is being formed entirely within shadow order cognitive parameters while current cognitive sovereignty appears partially intact. A high MD6 score is a critical forward-looking warning signal regardless of the current Mind vector composite score.

The foregoing presents the nineteen universal indicators of the DSI and the general principles governing their application. The detailed scoring rubrics, operational thresholds, context-specific sub-indicators, evidence protocols and aggregation procedures will be set out in the DSI Methodology and Indicator Manual, to be issued by the Sundiata Post Knowledge Lab (SPKL).

However, scoring the nineteen indicators is only the first step. How those scores interact across the three vectors, and what they imply for the order in which sovereignty can be restored, is the subject of the next instalment.

State, Dangote haggled over Sh0.46 in KPC deal

State-backed pension schemes, including the National Social Security Fund (NSSF), failed in their push to sell Kenya Pipeline Company (KPC) shares to Aliko Dangote at Sh9.50 a piece, with the 46 cents difference having threatened to kill the deal.

Mr Dangote, Africa’s richest man, had threatened to walk away from the transaction if the fund managers acting for the pension schemes insisted on demanding a 5.3 percent premium on the shares’ market price at the Nairobi bourse, say the deal makers familiar with the deal.

In the end, the pension schemes accepted Sh9.04 per share, a small premium on the KPC’s market price of Sh9.02.

Mr Dangote sweetened the deal by forgoing the dividends he would have earned for closing the deal before closure of KPC books, ceding Sh1.4 billion to the eight pension schemes that sold the tycoon 24.7 percent stake for Sh42.5 billion.

KPC declared a dividend of Sh0.32 a share that was to be paid to investors on the firm’s books by November 30.

Mr Dangote offered to factor in the Sh1.4 billion dividend or Sh0.32 on the offer prices, pushing the cost of the deal to Sh9.36.

He snatched the Sh42.5 billion KPC share purchase deal from global oil majors who dragged their feet when presented with the opportunity to acquire the 24.7 percent stake in the newly listed firm.

Kenne Belgrad, the managing director of Rock Investment Bank, which acted as the selling broker, argues the final price of Sh9.36 was a fair valuation of KPC shares, insisting that there was no other premium to be extracted from the deal.

The NSSF, the Public Service Superannuation Fund (PSSF) and the County Pension Fund (CPF) sold part of their stakes in KPC while smaller schemes including Lapfund, Laptrust, Kenya Power Pension Scheme and the Kenya Ports Authority (KPA) Pension Scheme made full exits.

The Unclaimed Financial Assets Authority (UFAA) and Kenya Re Insurance Corporation did not sell any shares.

The broker says they engaged with fund managers acting on behalf of the holders and not the entities.

UFAA and Kenya Re have no external fund managers, explaining why they were left out of the transaction.

‘We began initial discussions with Dangote with an asking price of Sh10 and then brought it down to Sh9.50. Even after four rounds of negotiations, he (Dangote) did not accept that price,’ Mr Belgrade told the Business Daily in an interview.

He dismissed claims that the pension schemes lost money in the deal, arguing that the transaction costs were capped at around one percent of the transaction.

The State-backed agencies, the NSSF, the PSSF, CPF and UFAA, had a combined stake of 38.35 percent.

Others were pension funds in parastatals such as Kenya Power, KPC and Kenya Ports Authority (KPA).

Their combined stake has been cut to less than 15 percent, altering the ownership of KPC, less than eight months since its listing on the Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE).

‘At Sh9.36, you have a four percent return for the holding period, translating to an annualised return of eight percent, which is above inflation. Even after adjusting for a maximum one percent transaction costs, you still get a return close to the prevailing T-bill rates,’ said Mr Belgrad.

‘The narrative that money was lost is misguided and malicious. Reading from the lens of an investor, chasing the dividend earlier was the right thing to do as the cash can be allocated elsewhere instead of waiting to receive the same 32 cents in December with a static share price of Sh9.’

KPC share remained little changed at the NSE when compared to its IPO price of Sh9.

But the share has rallied post the sale of the 24.76 percent stake. It continued rallying on Friday, reaching an all-time high of Sh10.55 at the close of trading on Friday, signalling the Dangote investment as a vote of confidence in KPC.

KPC opened trading at Sh9 a piece on the day the Dangote transaction was executed.

Mr Dangote’s presence at KPC has been likened to strategic Vodacom ownership at Safaricom Plc-with the South African telecom giant viewed as an anchor steward of the Kenyan telco.

With the acquisition, Mr Dangote is now the second-largest shareholder of KPC behind the Kenyan government, which retained a 35 percent stake in the company at the IPO.

The government of Uganda holds a further 20.15 percent through the Uganda National Oil Corporation (UNOC).

No other shareholder holds a significant stake, with the ownership of local pension schemes combined falling below 15 percent.

Mr Dangote is set to nominate a director to the board of KPC, handing him influence and voting rights on the strategic direction of the firm, having attained a significant stake in line with the company’s articles of association.

‘So long as oil marketing companies (OMCs) jointly, or any other shareholder, hold at least 20 percent of the issued share capital of the company, 30 days before the date of each annual general meeting shall be entitled to nominate one director to the board (the institutional director),’ reads part of KPC’s articles of association.

Atiku’s fate will be decided by voters, not Osuntokun’s tales by moonlight

Akin Osuntokun’s latest intervention, titled ‘Atiku Abubakar Cannot Heckle His Way to the Presidency,’ published in THISDAY on October 16, 2026, is a curious mixture of selective history, political prejudice and recycled allegations masquerading as informed commentary. It is remarkable that at a time when Nigerians are grappling with unprecedented economic hardship, insecurity and growing uncertainty about their future, Osuntokun considers it more important to excavate alleged private conversations from over two decades ago in an attempt to disqualify former Vice President Atiku Abubakar from seeking the presidency.

Of particular interest is his resurrection of a story attributed to former Cross River State Governor Donald Duke, who claimed that former military President Ibrahim Babangida once told President Olusegun Obasanjo that Atiku could not rule Nigeria. This is precisely the sort of tale by moonlight that should have no place in serious political analysis.

According to the account, Babangida allegedly pretended to have forgotten his keys, returned to Obasanjo’s private study and whispered a warning about Atiku. We are then invited to treat this extraordinary recollection of a supposed private exchange as a definitive assessment of Atiku’s presidential suitability.

But where is the independent corroboration? Has Babangida publicly authenticated those precise words? Even assuming, without conceding, that the conversation occurred exactly as narrated, since when did an alleged private judgment made over twenty years ago become a permanent disqualification from democratic leadership?

The irony is that Osuntokun chooses to dwell on what Babangida allegedly said in private while conveniently sidestepping what Obasanjo subsequently declared in public. On October 11, 2018, Obasanjo openly endorsed Atiku for the presidency. He acknowledged their past disagreements, reconciled with his former deputy and offered an unambiguous assessment of his leadership credentials. His words deserve to be recalled: ‘You surely understand the economy better.’ Obasanjo went further, praising Atiku’s business experience, national and international reach, accessibility and capacity to provide leadership superior to that of the incumbent administration.

These were not anonymous whispers behind closed doors. They were public declarations made before political leaders, religious figures and the Nigerian media. Indeed, Obasanjo acknowledged that there had once been an understanding for Atiku to succeed him. That documented admission is considerably more relevant than Osuntokun’s speculative reconstruction of conversations from another political era. One would have expected a commentator concerned with historical accuracy to reconcile these facts rather than cherry-pick episodes that reinforce his preferred conclusion.

As for Babangida, any serious examination of his assessment of Atiku must account for the full history of their political relationship, including subsequent engagements, rather than elevate an uncorroborated remark into an eternal verdict. Neither Obasanjo nor Babangida holds a hereditary franchise to determine who may govern Nigeria. Whatever they may have thought about Atiku at different points in their political lives, the final authority belongs to the Nigerian electorate.

Osuntokun also suggests that Atiku’s age and repeated presidential contests should persuade him to surrender his ambition and become a mentor to younger politicians. This argument is as selective as it is unpersuasive. If age, experience and repeated electoral contests are legitimate subjects of political scrutiny, they must apply equally to all candidates, including President Bola Ahmed Tinubu. They cannot suddenly become disqualifying considerations simply because the candidate under examination is Atiku Abubakar.

Age does not confer competence, but neither does it automatically extinguish it. The appropriate questions concern judgment, capacity, policy, integrity and the ability to assemble a credible governing team.

Atiku has offered Nigerians his experience in public administration, economic management, enterprise development and national leadership. These credentials are open to legitimate scrutiny, just as Tinubu’s performance after more than three years in office must be subjected to rigorous examination.

On zoning, Osuntokun advances the argument that another northern presidency would violate an expectation that power should remain in the South for eight years. Regional balance is important to national cohesion. But zoning is a political arrangement, not a constitutional prohibition against qualified Nigerians seeking elective office. More importantly, it cannot become an instrument for shielding an incumbent from accountability.

Nigerians are entitled to consider regional equity alongside competence, performance, national security and economic survival. It is for voters, not columnists, to decide how these considerations should influence their ballots.

Osuntokun’s attempt to portray Atiku as the principal architect of opposition fragmentation is equally simplistic. The crisis within the opposition cannot credibly be attributed to one individual while ignoring the ambitions, choices and conduct of other political actors. Political parties are collective institutions, and responsibility for their successes and failures must be assessed accordingly. Atiku has participated in efforts to build a broader opposition coalition and now leads the ADC presidential ticket alongside Rotimi Amaechi. Whether that coalition persuades Nigerians is a matter to be settled democratically, not through predetermined assertions about his supposed unelectability.

Then there is Osuntokun’s fascination with Atiku addressing the President as ‘Bola.’ When did addressing a public official by his given name become a constitutional offence or a measure of political desperation? Bola is the President’s name, not an insult. Those who regard its use as an affront should explain why the substance of public accountability matters less to them than presidential titles.

The real political pollution is not calling a president by his name. It is the growing tendency to treat legitimate criticism of public officeholders as an act of disrespect. What Nigerians require from political commentators is a searching examination of governance. How have the administration’s economic policies affected household incomes? What has happened to the purchasing power of wages? How secure are communities? What measurable relief has reached ordinary Nigerians?

These questions deserve more attention than an alleged conversation about misplaced keys in Aso Rock more than twenty years ago. Osuntokun is entitled to his preferences, prejudices and political conclusions. He is even entitled to believe that Atiku should not be President. What he is not entitled to is the pretence that his personal judgment constitutes the verdict of the Nigerian people. In a democracy, presidential ambition is neither granted nor extinguished by the approval of political columnists.

On January 16, 2027, Nigerians will have the opportunity to examine the competing candidates, evaluate their records, consider their proposals and exercise their constitutional right to determine who governs them. They will not be required to consult Osuntokun’s preferred political history before casting their ballots. Atiku Abubakar does not require Akin Osuntokun’s permission to seek the presidency, any more than Bola Tinubu requires his endorsement to pursue re-election.

Both must submit themselves to the sovereign judgment of Nigerians. Ultimately, Atiku’s presidential fate will be determined by the votes of Nigerians, not by Akin Osuntokun’s biases, recycled anecdotes or tales by moonlight. That is democracy. And that is the verdict that matters.

Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan present joint Silk Road Tour in Berlin

A joint tourism route developed by Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan, titled the “Joint Silk Road Highlights Tour,” has been presented in Berlin. The tour aims to promote the tourism potential of both countries in the European market and attract international visitors.

The presentation was held as part of a joint initiative under a memorandum of cooperation signed in July 2026 between the Azerbaijan Tourism Board and Uzbekistan’s National PR Center.

The project envisages creating a unified tourism product that brings together the historical and cultural heritage of the two countries and their shared traditions associated with the Great Silk Road. The initiative aims to strengthen Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan’s positions in the international tourism market and make the route more attractive to European travellers.

Representatives of more than 20 companies and over 40 German tourism industry professionals attended the presentation. Participants were introduced to a route covering the historic cities of Samarkand, Bukhara and Khiva in Uzbekistan, as well as Baku, Shamakhi and Sheki in Azerbaijan.

The destinations offer travellers an opportunity to explore the region’s rich cultural heritage, architectural landmarks and centuries-old traditions shared by the Azerbaijani and Uzbek peoples.

Meetings with representatives of Germany’s tourism industry formed an important part of the event. Discussions focused on developing business ties, establishing new partnerships and expanding opportunities to promote joint tourism products in the European market.

The initiative is expected to create additional opportunities for international tourism cooperation, diversify tourism offerings and increase tourist flows between the two countries. By bringing together prominent historical destinations in a single itinerary, the route offers travellers broader opportunities to discover the cultural and historical legacy of the Great Silk Road.

NDC to inaugurate campaign council, unveil new Abuja secretariat Monday

The National Democratic Congress (NDC) will on Monday, October 26, inaugurate its National Campaign Council, present Certificates of Return to its candidates and commission a newly acquired national secretariat in Abuja.

The party disclosed this in a statement issued on Sunday by its National Publicity Secretary, Osa Director, Esq., outlining a three-part programme of activities scheduled to hold across the Federal Capital Territory.

The day’s activities will begin with a meeting of the party’s National Executive Committee (NEC) at 10 am at the JD Vance Centre, opposite A-Class Park, Kashim Ibrahim Way, Maitama, Abuja.

The party said attendance at the meeting would be strictly by invitation and limited to NEC members.

At 2 pm, the NDC will commission its newly acquired national secretariat in Jabi, Abuja, before proceeding to the inauguration of its National Campaign Council (NCC) at 5 pm.

The campaign council’s inauguration will be followed by the presentation of Certificates of Return to the party’s candidates and a dinner.

According to the statement, attendance at the NCC inauguration will be restricted to members of the National Working Committee (NWC), the party’s presidential candidate and running mate, governorship candidates and National Assembly candidates.

The packed schedule places the party’s executive meeting, secretariat commissioning and campaign council inauguration on the same day, bringing its leadership and candidates together for a series of activities in the capital.

The statement reaffirmed the party’s appreciation for the support and loyalty of its members nationwide, restating its slogan, ‘Together, we can make a New Nigeria Possible.’

Private investors woo Nigerians to strengthen Palm oil production

Nigeria’s continued reliance on imported palm oil is highlighting the need for greater investment in local agriculture, as private-sector initiatives seek to attract more Nigerians into farming to strengthen domestic production.

Nigeria spent N23 billion importing palm oil in the first quarter of 2026, according to figures cited by Reftop AgroField Limited.

David Assogba, group chief executive officer of Reftop Homes Limited, said the palm oil sector had been neglected despite the crop’s historical importance to West Africa. He argued that changing public attitudes towards farming was essential to unlocking its economic potential.

‘Every Nigerian should consider going back to farming because farm is the next oil,’ he said.

Assogba noted that many Nigerians had grown up viewing farming as an occupation for the poor or uneducated, despite growing global interest in agricultural land. He said agriculture could become a more attractive investment option as countries seek to strengthen food production and reduce dependence on imported commodities.

One approach being explored is agro-real estate, which combines agricultural land ownership with professionally managed farming.

Emmanuel Oluwatosin, chief operating officer of Reftop Homes Limited, said the company’s PalmCrest initiative had allocated 2,700 acres of land to subscribers across its first two phases, with plantation development also underway.

PalmCrest is marketed by Reftop Homes Limited and managed by Reftop AgroField Limited. The initiative allows subscribers to own designated agricultural land while the company oversees plantation development and farm operations.

However, its contribution to Nigeria’s palm oil supply will depend on crop yields, plantation maturity and the capacity to process harvested palm fruit.

Assogba called on the government to support agricultural development through access to fertiliser, mechanised equipment and improved security for farmers.

Nigeria’s challenge extends beyond attracting investors. Increasing local palm oil production will require productive plantations, efficient processing facilities and sustained support for farmers.

Whether private investment can help reduce import dependence will ultimately depend on how effectively agricultural land is converted into commercially productive farms.

Fobally Gallery, RCCG City of David host 2-week Christian art exhibition in Lagos

To celebrate the beauty, power, and majesty of God through art, Fobally Gallery Ltd, in collaboration with Saviorite Limited and the Redeemed Christian Church of God, City of David, Lagos, has commenced a 2-week Christian art exhibition in Lagos.

The exhibition, which came under the theme, ‘Creation Speaks’, is a showcase of powerful artworks that reflect the beauty, glory and truth of God’s creation.

Speaking at the event, Creative Director of Fobally Gallery Ltd, Abiola Folasade, affirmed that the ongoing exhibition actually aimed at letting all artists know that the gifts, the artistic talent they have, were given by God.

According to her: ‘Most of the artists were born with that talent. They just up-skilled it through formal education. So, God is the giver of talent. The exhibition is a call for reflection for artists and for the people, the society at large’.

Highlighting the theme of the exhibition, ‘Creation Speaks’, Folasade said it was designed as a spiritual encounter, not just an art show.

‘As people walk through the exhibition, we pray that the weary will find rest; the discouraged will find hope; the lost will find Jesus and believers will be reminded of God’s faithfulness from Genesis to Revelation,’ she added.

While stating that art bypasses arguments and speaks directly to the heart, she said that the exhibition hoped to engage culture and redeem the arts for God’s kingdom.

‘God is the first Artist; creativity is divine. For too long, the Church has been silent in the art and culture space. This exhibition is our statement that excellence is worship and beauty is ministry.

‘We want to raise a new generation of Christian artists who know that their talent is a calling.

‘We also want to show the wider society that the gospel is beautiful, intelligent, and relevant’, she submitted.

On the collaboration between Fobally Gallery Ltd, Saviorite Limited, and RCCG City of David, Fobally Gallery Ltd boss said it models unity in the body of Christ, emphasising that the exhibition will also create a platform for artists to be celebrated and supported; families and schools to learn about God through creativity; the public to have a wholesome, uplifting experience in the city.

She expressed optimism that the exhibition will not just be seen, but heard adding, ‘the Holy Spirit will use colors, forms, and stories to speak to every visitor. That Lagos, and Nigeria, will see that the Church is a place of beauty, truth, and excellence.

‘The purpose of ‘Creation Speaks’ is to let God’s creation speak again of His glory, His gospel, and His call on our lives’.

Speaking also, the presiding Pastor of the Redeemed Christian Church of God, City of David, Victoria Island Lagos, Kayode Pitan who was represented by Trevor Akindele, described the exhibition as a unique platform to inspire faith and creativity through art.

While the Director Saviorite Limited, Jide Aiyegbusi, who also spoke at the event, had the Christian art exhibition as a direction from the Holy Spirit, noting that the theme of the exhibition was given to them by God.

To Aiyegbusi, who is an elder in the Redeemed Christian Church of God and a British trained Graphic Designer: ‘God has created us in His own image and in His own likeness. And whatsoever we have, God wants us to use it to honor Him, to glorify His name. God wants us to use whatever we have, our profession, our talent, our faith, to honor His name. And that is what we are here to do’.

On her part an artist, Stella Awoh Mofunanya, expressed excitement over what she described as the first Christian Art exhibition in the RCCG and added that it brought Christian artists together.

‘Some years back, some Christian artists were throwing away their works. Some said that it has to do with rituals, but this exhibition has given Christian artists opportunity to showcase their God’s given talents.’

However, she encouraged artists in the society to work harder adding, ‘art is money making machine now. People are buying artworks and they keep it like gold and resell. Art work is appreciated now.’

One of the exhibiting artists, Peacemaker described his art work as an expression of images that show the truth that God created the whole world.

‘This exhibition resonates well with the faith we preach that God made the whole world and Jesus Christ is the Son of the living God. Whom the world must receive’, he said.

Art works displaced at the ongoing exhibition include a curated collection of: Paintings- depicting biblical themes, nature, and God’s glory; Sculptures and Installations-reflecting on creation, redemption, and hope.

Others were; Mixed media – works that blend faith, culture, and contemporary expression and; Live art sessions and artist talks- insight into the creative process as ministry.