WHAT does it mean to be a good political leader? This is one fundamental question that straddles political philosophy and political science. Political theorists have always been concerned with the idea of the political community and how its leadership can facilitate social harmony for further socioeconomic development. This makes the question of leadership a very critical one for democratic theory, and the determination of the essence of democracy and good governance. All across the world, there are series of indices by which the characteristic features of good leadership are determined. For instance, the human development index references a composite achievement of political leadership in terms of the living standards of the citizens. For many years, the top positions have always been the preserves of the Scandinavian and European countries, from Finland and Norway to the Netherlands and Germany. The highest-performing African countries are not only interspersed within the index, they also constitute the bulk of the countries that make up the bottom rung of the list.
Such indices and indicators of poverty and prosperity make the determination of leadership even all the more interesting and sometimes confounding, especially in a country like Nigeria that carries the burden of geopolitical, regional and continental possibilities and challenges. Since her return to democratic experimentation in 1999, Nigeria’s search for a good political leader has become redoubled, especially given that Nigeria’s postcolonial and post-independence predicaments have become even more grinding for millions of average Nigerians. As we drive slowly and steadily towards another general election in 2027, the discourse around leadership and the future of Nigeria has become even more accentuated. The apprehension about the impending democratic decision process is not only palpable but also fundamentally existential. Millions are asking whether their political and electoral choices this time around would be defining enough to swing Nigeria’s political, and hence economic, fortunes.
And at the very heart of that democratic apprehension is the possibility that President Bola Ahmed Tinubu will return to political power for another four years. Or that the opposition will be able to wrest power from him either jointly in strategic concert or singly through individual political and charismatic appeal. We must concede: within the force-field of the typical gains and pains that necessarily attend a root-and-branch brand of structural adjustment-grounded reforms, things are very difficult in Nigeria. The indices for multidimensional poverty are depressing. Millions have also been traumatised by insecurity from banditry and insurgency. Then there are the severe macroeconomic expressions of a governance system that is struggling to make sense of Nigeria’s oscillating fortunes. No one can envy any political leader who makes the decision to take on the heavy burden of shouldering Nigeria’s predicament at this moment in time. I do not envy such a leader given my background in governance, policy, and institutional reform. While I have been trying to make sense of the Nigerian civil service system, the President of Nigeria is trying to make sense of the political and economic dynamics of making Nigeria work. That is enormous. But then, people can argue that those who present themselves for leadership positions cannot be pitied because they had a sense of what it would entail, and they presumed that they had what it takes to steer the nation out of her challenges. This is a good argument that must be put in proper context.
President Bola Ahmed Tinubu knew the task involved in managing the affairs of Nigeria. He has been involved at several political levels of Nigeria’s unfolding for decades; from being in the trenches of the pro-democracy movement, locally and in exile, to being in the legislative arm as a senator, to governing a state, and in the management of party politics and its combustible dynamics at challenging times, and participating as a core stakeholder in geopolitical policymaking at the highest levels through numerous but disruptive transitions. When he brazenly insisted that it was his turn to get to that highest level of overseeing Nigeria’s fate-when he served the notice to all political agents that ‘Èmi lókàn’ (it’s now my turn)-we have all missed the courage embedded in that political decision. And this for me is where we must start in our reflection on President Tinubu’s performance after four years in office, and whether or not his administration deserves a second term.
Given the heat of Nigeria’s pressing situation, we often gloss over the provenance and complexity of current predicaments. Nigeria did not become the way it is under Tinubu. In other words, Nigeria under the Tinubu administration is already a composite of complex and complicated dysfunction and debilitation. From independence to date, the political and developmental circumstances of the Nigerian state have kept fluctuating so much so that millions of Nigerians have been the worse for it. The commencement of the democratic experiment has not brought much relief. The issue is not to therefore articulate platitudes and excuses on why the Tinubu administration could not be considered to be magicians who are expected to transform Nigeria overnight. On the contrary, the critical analysis lies elsewhere.
This is where my interest in political philosophy enables an analysis that deepens the understanding of Bola Ahmed Tinubu beyond the usual political commentaries that often dissolve into petty and abusive vitriols. How does political philosophy enable us to figure the political style and leadership dexterity of Bola Ahmed Tinubu as the president of the Nigerian state at this moment in time? One critical lens derives from the trajectory of his political evolution from a pro-democracy agitator to the sitting president of Nigeria. This alone is sufficient to necessitate an astute study of his political tenacity. In this regard, he has earned a space among the political avatars that have bestraddled the Nigerian space. Only a few leaders ever could survive Nigeria’s chaotic and violent political space, not to talk of ascending to the zenith of its governance structure. My interest, however, is not just taking on a measure of his political unravelling. Rather, I am intrigued by what his over three decades of political actions could reveal to us in terms of a distinct framework of political leadership, a schema of political power and the dynamics of nation-building.
It is very clear to me that, as a Tinubu acolyte, Western political understanding and global parameters of leadership will sit uneasily on Tinubu. This is not something to be lamented, because a leader is a function of the confluence of context, ideology, temperament and temporal situatedness. There is a level of unfairness in judging a postcolonial leadership by the parameters of Western political theory or democratic institutionalism. I will hazard the hypothesis further that, compared to Chief Obafemi Awolowo, Tinubu will still not be able to measure up in terms of a leadership grounded in value credentials. This is because Tinubu is already bedevilled by serious reputational negatives that derive from his political rising. However, the crucial difference between Awolowo and Tinubu is simply that the latter is at the helm of affairs of the Nigerian state at a time when it is most difficult to be a president. And this is doubly so for him because he has not only a running knowledge of the dynamics of the Nigerian predicaments; he also specifically asked to be president.
And yet, Tinubu has converted his political position into a stance of strength. His enigma persona, I insist, derives from his capacity for political engineering. This is an amorphous term that I need to unravel to capture my measure of respect for someone I consider to be a typology of a good leader. The rise of Tinubu from pro-democracy activist to governor of LAGOS State to political kingmaker and ultimately to president reveals a Machiavellian streak that speaks to his capacity to balance shifting alliances, strategically navigate complex and fragmented ethno-regional landscapes, and preside over an immense political machinery that manoeuvres between loyalists and rivals. He has become the ultimate Machiavellian strategist who is not just passively deft in deflecting oppositions, allegations and controversies. On the contrary, his strategic competences and alliances are meant to forge a pathway for rethinking Nigeria’s future.
This is a political persona that defies easy location in existing populist or bureaucratic leadership typology. We have a leader who has to ride through the rough and tough waters of the Nigerian political terrain and democratic context to be able to lay the foundation of a new Nigeria. This demands not just a visionary and ideological framework but also a transactional realism that demands systematic patronage structures which leverage the assistance of loyalists and experts around whom nation-building and political engineering can be facilitated. In the political discourse literature, the apt term for this patronage is political gardening-a framework of harnessing competences, expertise and alliances that could be deployed for political and non-political objectives. What makes Tinubu’s political rising fascinating and formidable is the emergence of a political machinery founded on political gardening, his capacity to headhunt political, economic and technocratic capacities that transcend generational and regional limitations.
This political machinery has not been founded for the sake of merely obtaining power for the sake of power. This is a difficult argument to sell given the generations of political powerbrokers who have passed through Aso Rock and left Nigeria worse than they met it. But then, why headhunt a critical mass of technocratic brainpowers if the endgame was simply to seize and exploit political power? If this harnessing of technocratic competence worked in his grand modernising plan for Lagos State, why would Nigeria be any different with the same strategy? This is where the Machiavellian label deserts our characterisation of Tinubu. This is because Machiavelli’s understanding of political power was for the maintenance of the state’s boundaries; Tinubu’s understanding of political power dwells at the very tight juncture where institutional patronage and strategic resilience must meet visionary policymaking, and power consolidation must be balanced by political engineering.
Four years are not sufficient for balancing power play while trying to inject structural reform into the Nigerian system. But what is more, for a nation-state that has been run into a complicated national dysfunction, there is no gainsaying the urgent necessity of swallowing hard pills of stringent policies like the fuel subsidy removal, the unification of the foreign exchange rates and the tightening of the monetary policy in ways that seek to eliminate price instability as an act in economic stabilisation that has crystallised. These are a few of the policies already put in place to alleviate the policy errors of the past and achieve fiscal growth and accountability.
Let us return to the critical comparison between Awolowo and Tinubu. We are all apprised of the legacy of Chief Obafemi Awolowo, especially in terms of human and infrastructural development. Tinubu’s legacy is still in the making, and the quest for a second term in office will go a long way not only to douse the immediate threat of political opposition (directed towards reputational damage) but to also allow freer avenue for the consolidation of the foundations of transformational policies. To secure a spot in the annals of political leadership in Nigeria, Tinubu is faced with the challenge of converting his political strategies and pragmatic orientation towards not just stabilising the fractured Nigerian state but also laying a policy architecture of economic recovery and growth.