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Is it only charismatic leaders and dynamic political messiahs who deliver results? We continue from where last week’s column began to analyse political leadership styles along the paradigms of definitions, theories, styles and roles; by adding processes, values, impacts and frameworks.

The discussion of the past weeks feeds food for thought into the much debated smorgasbord of an issue – as to whether Sri Lanka ever truly benefitted from the ‘strongman’ model of political leadership, as was assumed in the past for a plethora of reasons, including patriotism and propaganda machines doing their part.

This ongoing survey of the extant literature on key facets of political leadership the world over is an attempt to discern if there is an ideal model – one that would lead Sri Lanka away from the myths about political saviours and the misadventures of national messiahship in which we as a country and people suffered.

Processes

Processes follow on from roles played by leaders. And because ‘political leaders gain their initial authority through election not appointment, they require continuing consent from those who they govern and serve’ (Hartley, 2010), which is a cyclical and even chronic process.

Other processes entailed in political leadership necessitate ‘maintaining a critical mass of political support, developing strategic policy direction, seeking to further leadership priorities outside the organization [or party, or government organ such as cabinet, or legislative assembly] and ensuring task accomplishment’ (Hartley, 2010).

Three types of political leadership are also involved in processes: to wit, the ‘Creative’ type/style – demonstrating ‘an effective ability for the new development of the system’; the ‘Administrative’ type – showing ‘effective ability for efficient management of operations and the nation in an existing system’; and the ‘Symbolic’ style – leading with ‘effective ability in a mature country and society in the process of establishing traditional values and a sense of loyalty’ (Ishii, 2010).

Processes in political leadership have ups and downs, especially as ‘relationships inside a partnership can be damaged by processes or assumptions that don’t take account of the fact that partnerships have to work differently . and by the failure of partners to recognize their own cultural assumptions about what is ‘normal” (Goss and Tarplett, 2010). Perhaps one could cite Jayewardene v. Premadasa, Kumaratunga v. Wickremesinghe, and Wickremesinghe v. Sirisena as characteristic of the partnership-relationships that failed to succeed in the governance project?

The process of working with others in political leadership involves a ‘transaction cost’, which is ‘typically time spent discussing and agreeing what to do and how to do it’ (Goss and Tarplett, 2010); and the more people who are involved, the greater these transaction costs tend to be. Cohabitation (2001-2004) and Yahapalanaya (2015-2019) were short-lived experiments that had such costs, which set the national developmental clock back by years if not decades!

However, as some point out, ‘rather than seeing these additional costs as a problem, it is possible to see ‘the cost’ of additional time spent thinking and understanding each other as a benefit’ (Goss and Tarplett, 2010). Dare we essay that the NPP and the JVP start doing the same… in our national interest, as much as theirs.

Political leadership processes involve fresh ideas and novel ways of interacting with partners in the projects at hand, as ‘the complex cross-cutting problems facing citizens and communities require governments to develop new paradigms of whole thinking, and new patterns of inter-organizational working for [better] outcomes’ (Benington and Hartley, 2010).

As projects, parties and partnerships grow, evolve and change, Turnbull observes – quoting Larry Griener writing in The Harvard Business Review (Griener, 1998) – that ‘the original creative activities are not always the most appropriate to lead the organisation through predicted periods of both evolution and revolution’ (Turnbull, 2010). The failure of the Rajapaksa regime to beat their swords into ploughshares, but rather continue the ethnic war by political means, exemplifies such lack of imagination and integrity.

Grenier adds: ‘Both the original founders and their chosen ways of working – which were essential for the company [or party, project, or political organ] to get off the ground – may become a problem as the company grows’ (Turnbull, 2010), which becomes a challenge to leading a winning team through a collective vision. The loss of popular support for the jingoistic Rajapaksa war machine when the conflict came home to roost among southern dissenters is a case in point.

Another key challenge is ‘the extent to which leaders agree and achieve a cohesive vision when faced with divergent cognitive sets’ (Lelièvre-Finch, 2010). Again, Sri Lanka’s chequered history of coalition politics wreaking havoc on the nation’s growth, development progress speaks volumes for the fallout from a lack of such agreement and cohesion.

A decade and more ago, some academics felt that ‘the time is now ripe for a major new initiative to promote and cultivate leadership capabilities for working across the public service system’ (Benington and Hartley, 2010).

In Sri Lanka, in 2024/2025 and beyond, this takes on added emphasis in the time of not only presidential and parliamentary elections, but the process of system change following regime change.

Values

For political leadership, a person’s values are ‘an integral part of the office’ (Du Gay, 2000; 2005) and ‘leadership in this context is linked to organizational turnaround and change management’ (Salaman, 2005). We’ve seen how the vision of transparency and accountability stumbled and fell headlong when the proponents of the programme were detected with their friends’ hands rummaging around in state coffers: seen under Good Governance as much as GR.

And for shared political leadership in a team context, ‘only minor variances exist between followers and leaders’ (Burns, 2003) while ‘individual, climate, and group interaction processes [work] as predictors of work team innovation’ (Burns and West, 2003).

In such a sharing of leadership as well as values, ‘partnership working cannot be successful without agreeing collectively to a set of shared goals’ (Goss, 2005) and ‘without shared goals, partnerships often exhibit what we have called the ‘leadership paradox’ – a partnership full of proven and successful leaders in which no one is demonstrating leadership’ (Goss and Tarplett, 2010). We could cite the so-called Viyathmaga fiasco as an instance of such a paradox, where latterly at least the experts and professionals were as guilty as bumbling amateurs of successive imbroglios?

Where goals are not necessarily at least initially shared or where partnerships have yet to be formed and formalized, ‘leaders must be able to engage with dissimilar stakeholders and mobilize support for defined causes acceptable to all’ (Lelièvre-Finch, 2010).

And where political leadership runs the risk of being compromised because values and where these values derive from are not explicit, leaders must pay ‘careful attention to the sources of legitimacy . including clarifying the relationship between authority and leadership’ (Hartley, 2010). The failure of ‘I am the state’ approaches and ‘government by gazette’ under the Gotabaya administration reek of such conflation of authority and leadership, and the ensuing confusion that ended in national bankruptcy.

Most helpful in our later formulation of a Sri Lankan leadership framework are the following from Turnbull: that it is important to ‘exemplify values and integrity’; to value ‘diversity, including diversity of thought’; improve performance, maintaining ‘optimism and energy’; set ‘a tone of openness’ and ‘a consistent course’; show ‘ability to take decisions’; encourage ‘partnership and sharing’; and ‘treat others as you would wish to be treated yourself’ (Turnbull, 2010). The ships of state of JR, CBK, RW, MR and GR all foundered on these shoals to Sri Lanka’s great distress at the time – national calamities from which our image is still recovering.

Impacts

In an age where everything is results-oriented, political leadership is much more than the sum of its processes. American philosopher Sydney Hook, elaborating on this, highlighted the impact that could be made by the ‘eventful man’ compared to the ‘event-making man’ (Dobbins and Platz, 1986).

If, per Drucker et al., ‘leadership is about ‘doing the right things’ and management is about ‘doing things right” (Drucker, 1966; 1986; Drucker and Zahra, 2003), then governance is about ‘ensuring that the right things are done by the right people, in the right way, in the right places with and for the right people’ (Brookes, 2010). If only the ‘Good Governance’ impetus of 2015 had lasted beyond the Central Bank expose, a resurgence of ultra-nationalism would not have made a farrago of fiscal policy as it did in the years between 2019 and 2022.

It is also clear leaders are expected to focus on their followers’ needs and ‘input into their lives in such a way as to empower and motivate them, and transform them into leaders themselves’ (House and Aditya, 1997).

This leader-follower dynamic is influenced by the nuance that ‘skilled leaders in partnerships will be more interested in achieving the right result than being seen to be in charge’ (Goss and Tarplett, 2010).

Unsurprisingly, such leadership has to ‘resist the pressure from followers to act as a god or guru who can provide magical solutions to complex problems, and instead has to persuade stakeholders to accept themselves as part of the whole system, and therefore part of the problem’ (Benington and Hartley, 2010).

Political leadership is also about the following factors: balance of diverse public good objectives; subordination of local or specific organizational objectives to the pursuit of the public good; and recognition of ultimate accountability to the electorate (Tilley, 2010).

In addition, elected politicians have to address complex and difficult choices facing society (such as climate change, power generation or sorting out transportation infrastructure) and so ‘the role of politicians is not only to use state authority and state resources [but] in some cases, their role is to tackle complex problems and make tough choices, knowing that whatever decision is made it will not please everyone’ (Hartley, 2010).

There is a fine line to be trodden by political leadership in these instances, since they ‘use state authority to direct or even coerce citizens to engage in activities deemed to be for the public good’ (such as ‘going to war, taxation levels, police powers and military conscription’ [and] ‘their decisions involve judgments based on political leadership’ (Hartley, 2010) and related savvy, skills and experience to make an impact.

Certainly, and perhaps contrarily to our hopes or expectations, impactful national leaders ‘can have huge influence on economic progression [and such] leaders have [the] highest impact in autocracies, where they seem to considerably influence both economic development and the evolution of political organizations’ (Ahmad, Jan and Irem, 2017).

That ‘these results call for amplified focus on national economic strategies and the procedure of leadership selection’ (Ahmad, Jan and Irem, 2017) leads us to consider frameworks for political leadership next.

Frameworks

Some academics have classified leadership into four frames: structural, human resources, political and symbolic (Ahmad, Jan and Irem, 2017). These thinkers emphasise ‘a need for leadership that links the political, racial, cultural and economic boundaries’ (Ahmad, Jan and Irem, 2017). And although there exists a certain degree of agreement on the relevance of political leadership theory and practice, ‘there is still deficiency in literature on viable approaches, enabling factors and suitable personality characteristics’ (Ofusu-Anim and Back, 2021).

On the contrary, other thinkers on political leadership note that there are ‘numerous explanations, classifications, theories and definitions about leadership’ in the contemporary literature, and they add that ‘substantial effort has gone in to classify and clarify different dimensions of active leadership, thus generating considerable organizational and social research of leadership styles and behaviours’ (Khan, Nawaz and Khan, 2016).

One most valuable element that emerges in such efforts is the recognition that if ‘the creation and demonstration of public value is the key outcome of effective public leadership, then the development of trust and legitimacy by public leaders must therefore represent one of the key determinants of a new public leadership framework’ [and] ‘the importance of trust in engaging with stakeholders cannot be underestimated’ (Brookes and Grint, 2010).

In formulating a holistic framework based on all of the above in the literature on leadership and political leadership, the trio of ideas below will be helpful.

That ‘the purpose of public leadership is to set out clearly what it is that public leaders seek to attain through clearly stated intentions or aims’…

That ‘the process of public leadership represents the sequence of leadership actions that are required to transform the purpose of public leadership into a practice and how activities are coordinated’…

And that ‘the praxis of public leadership represents the actual practice of particular public leadership styles at all levels’ (Brookes, 2010).

Sri Lanka’s public spending on education remains among the lowest in its income group, lagging far behind comparable developing economies, according to Tax Giveaways, Struggling Schools – a new report by Human Rights Watch (HRW).

Citing data from the World Bank and UNESCO, the report said Sri Lanka spends around 2% of its GDP on education, less than half the average for low- and middle-income countries, which stands at 4.5%. In 2010, the country allocated just 1.7% of GDP to education, while countries such as Morocco, Kyrgyzstan, Senegal, and Tajikistan consistently spent above 5%.

In terms of total budget allocation, Sri Lanka dedicated 11.7% of Government spending to education between 1998 and 2000, compared with 18.5% in Benin, 18.8% in Côte d’Ivoire, and over 25% in Morocco and Tunisia. By 2009, Sri Lanka’s ranking had fallen to among the lowest for lower-middle-income countries, Human Rights Watch said.

The disparity is even more visible in per capita spending. In 2010, Sri Lanka spent only $ 516 (PPP) per primary student, while Morocco spent $ 1,278, Namibia $ 1,711, and Bolivia $ 2,121. In comparison, the United Kingdom allocated $ 11,192 per student, more than 21 times Sri Lanka’s level.

Human Rights Watch said the chronic underfunding is tied to Sri Lanka’s weak tax revenues. ‘Had Sri Lanka’s tax revenues as a share of GDP been on par with the average for other countries, it could have brought significantly more resources to fund rights such as education,’ the report said.

It added that inadequate revenue mobilisation has forced the Government to rely on debt to finance education, including loans from the World Bank and other development lenders.

The report called on the Government to raise tax revenues, reduce wasteful exemptions, and increase education spending to meet international benchmarks.

Foreign Minister Vijitha Herath made a statement in Parliament on Thursday, providing an explanation of Sri Lanka’s position at the 60th session of the Human Rights Council. On 8 September 2025, he delivered the country statement during the consideration of the comprehensive report of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on reconciliation, accountability and human rights in Sri Lanka. Almost a month later, on 6 October 2025 when resolution 60/1 on Sri Lanka was adopted by the Council without a vote, Sri Lanka’s permanent representative to the UN in Geneva addressed the Council reiterating the Government’s position and indicating Sri Lanka’s rejection of the resolution.

Interestingly, the Minister’ statement in Parliament, the latest in the series, ascribes to resolution 46/1 (2021) the intensification of internationalisation of ‘domestic’ concerns through the adoption of Sri Lanka Accountability Project (SLAP). It goes on to criticise the previous Governments being responsible for internationalisation and for the resolutions adopted in 2012, 2013 and 2014, and then in 2021 and 2022 after failing to defeat them, only having wasted public funds.

The statement seems to grudgingly acknowledge some positive developments made since 2015, including the establishment of the Office on Missing Persons and the Office for Reparations during that period.

Regrets have, however, been expressed regarding the inconsistent approaches adopted by different Governments from 2009 to 2022, with regard to resolutions promoted/adopted. Such approaches varied from initiation of own resolution (2009), canvassing against and outright rejection of resolutions (2012, 2013, 2014), endorsement of resolutions (co-sponsorship, 2015, 2017, 2019), rejection of resolutions with a strong emphasis on certain paragraphs (2021, 2022), to consensual adoption of a ‘smart’ resolution (roll-over, 2024).

An attempt at historical revisionism

Withdrawal of co-sponsorship from resolution 30/1 of 2015, announced by the Gotabaya Government in 2020, which was followed through in 2021 at the Council, was a manifestation of an attempt at historical revisionism, marking a radical approach in this context, influenced by the attitude of that Government to polarise the domestic vote base in its favour through divisive rhetoric.

Importantly, the Foreign Minister’s statement notes the futility of the requests made for a call of vote on previous occasions, which led to Sri Lanka’s ‘defeat’ at the Council. The point made there is about the waste of public funds as a result of a number of foreign trips undertaken by Ministers and officials, obviously for canvassing against resolutions which had the remotest chances of being defeated.

The argument made in this respect was that the Governments concerned were ostentatious and unnecessarily drained financial resources, in the name of fighting resolutions which they were to lose, in order to create public impressions in Sri Lanka that they were indeed asserting the sovereignty of the country. It also indicates that, had such efforts and resources been directed to solving the issues that gave rise to the resolutions, Sri Lanka will not be facing a Geneva process today.

There were numerous instances in the past when not just the Ministers and officials were sent abroad for lobbying to ‘protect’ the Government from ‘sinister’ international forces which they claimed were all out to see a ‘regime change’ including through the imposition of resolutions ‘against’ the Government. Also, some selected representatives of NGOs and religious leaders allegedly received Government backing to go to some key European cities to lobby for the ‘defeat’ of resolutions.

The Foreign Minister’s concern regarding the waste of public funds is explicable by taking a not-too-distant example of a former Foreign Minister’s visit to Geneva.

His immediate predecessor travelled to Geneva twice in September/October 2022. During his first visit at state expense in September 2022, it was loudly clear that the resolution, if put to vote, would carry, and not be defeated. Some countries indicated to him as well as to Sri Lanka’s representatives elsewhere that the Government was to lose the vote. Nevertheless, his immediate predecessor made another visit to Geneva, second time during the same session, to ‘canvas’ the rejection of the resolution in vain. Officials had pointed out that the Minister travelling to Geneva for a second time was not necessary, as the Government was poised for a defeat. On both occasions, he was accompanied by at least three officials from Colombo. Hasn’t the State meaninglessly coughed out a further sum of money for his and his team of officials’ travel and stay there?

Utter waste of public funds

The utter waste of public funds in the name of fighting resolutions which the respective Governments lost was a public concern. It was a concern of the Sri Lankan citizens at a time when the economy wouldn’t sustain such a lavish expenditure. After the economic crisis came to a head in 2022 and immediately thereafter, any foreign travels costing the State billions of rupees cumulatively or otherwise, for purposes that were either private or of a private-official mix, or in the worst case scenario, on missions whose results were predictably not positive, could only amount to a criminal waste of public funds.

Such wasteful trips only peaked during 2009 and 2014, and almost became the norm immediately after the economic crisis. For instance, in 2012, the Opposition MP Sajith Premadasa questioned the Foreign Minister of the time about the number of delegates who travelled to Geneva that year for the Council session and the Government expenditure in this regard. In reply, the then Foreign Minister refused to disclose the number of delegates citing ‘national security’ but admitted that a staggering Rs. 59 million had been spent on this visit. In 2012, the Government secured only 15 out of 47 votes at HRC, resulting in the adoption of the resolution.

Coming back to the question of a call of vote on resolutions that came up within the Council in 2009, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2021 and 2022, there are some direct references in Minister Herath’s statement to the number of votes most resolutions received when they were put to action by the Council. Since 2009 when Sri Lanka floated its own resolution — a ‘victory’ for the 13th Amendment, and for the Presidential assurance to the UN secretary general in their joint statement of May 2009 regarding accountability process– all resolutions that were put to vote thereafter saw a progressive reduction in the number of votes recorded ‘Against’. If this was the case, what then to say of it: Was it a national shame or success?

In 2012, 2013 and 2014, the MR Government built Sri Lanka’s position with regard to resolutions adopted and the voting pattern observed, on three particular points: 1. No solutions to the problems raised in Geneva should be externally imposed; 2. The Government should be allowed ‘time and space’ to evolve such solutions; 3. All abstentions during the Council’s actions on resolutions should be added to the opposing votes such resolutions recorded. It was argued that the resolutions thus adopted lacked credibility and legitimacy since abstentions and opposing votes together outweighed affirmative votes.

It was further argued that the number of affirmative votes was less than the simple majority of the total membership of the Council (meaning less than 24 of 47-member Council). Needless to say that no progress on ‘home grown’ solutions took place despite this rhetoric. On the contrary, the government ignored the work of its own LLRC.

Evolving appropriate local mechanisms

Strikingly, Foreign Minister Herath uses the same argument in relation to the need for evolving appropriate local mechanisms. On the other hand, he completely rejects the Malthusian calculus on counting the votes. With regard to ‘time and space’, unlike the earlier approach of leaving it open-ended without doing anything substantive, he seems to suggest that the Government would take domestic action in such a manner that the SLAP would be concluded.

What does this mean in practical terms? Would some concrete actions on some more serious pending concerns follow before the 66th session of the Council (September 2027)? By which time, the core-group, co-sponsors and other concerned actors in the international community would hopefully see little reason or incentive to prolong the consideration of the question of human rights, accountability and reconciliation in Sri Lanka.

In 2015, the late Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera stated that the reason the then-Government co-sponsored resolution 30/1 was to take into its own hands, matters which have been ‘internationalised’ due to the failure to implement the recommendations of the LLRC, and the lack of domestic actions and commitment by the MR Government.

Interestingly, the statement made in Parliament seems to absorb this idea and use it with a different thrust. It speaks about bringing back to the domestic level matters that have been internationalised since 2021 when the Gotabaya Government rejected the Geneva resolution (46/1) and walked away from resolution 30/1 of 2015.

A highly nationalistic approach and a serious lack of imagination

It was a combination of a highly nationalistic approach and a serious lack of imagination and strategy that landed the country in the vortex of an external evidence-gathering mechanism via operative para 6 of resolution 46/1 of 2021. It’s certainly a dangerous threshold for the government of the day and the Foreign Ministry to have stepped up to. And in the evolution of the Geneva process involving Sri Lanka, it undoubtedly marked an all-time low.

Apparently, the challenge before the NPP Government today in dealing with Geneva is three-fold: how to salvage Sri Lanka with the least damage (damage control); how to present itself as a responsible Government that does things on its own without being confrontational (non-confrontational approach); and what dividends such a strategy would yield, influencing outcomes of other global or regional processes potentially beneficial to the country in the long term as it emerges from the economic mess that the public still suffers (beneficiality).

Critics may question the decision of the Government not to ask a friendly country, a member of the Council, to request a vote on the resolution. But such an approach, if it had been pursued this time, would have led once again to divisive vote within the Council and possibly led to a harsher resolution.

Do those who criticise, now remember how Sri Lanka ‘surrendered’ its sovereignty willingly, even in a nominal sense, in the very process of seeking the support of other countries to vote against resolutions? Haven’t the MR, Gotabaya and RW governments signed up to pledges to support various candidatures and other interests of such countries in the UN system and outside, in return for their support to defeat the resolutions which anyway carried? Is Sri Lanka not indebted to those countries at least for the next 10 years, or so?

It is all the more evident that every Government since 2009 has adopted a different approach to dealing with human rights concerns in Geneva. As explained, it has ranged from; the initiation of its own resolution; total rejection followed by a call of vote, and confrontation; endorsement and co-sponsorship; rejection with a special focus on certain paragraphs; and to a consensual adoption (2024). Are these not time-piece approaches, only limited by change of government, or by other constraining political factors? If these are among actions that the previous Governments pursued avowedly in the interests of the country, one may ask what prevents this Government from pursuing what it thinks is the most appropriate of all options available in the current circumstances.

This is not a defence of the Government. There are a number of issues on which one may disagree. Its continued prevarication on the Gaza situation/the Question of Palestine until it was clear in New York that the multilateral pendulum swung in favour of calling for an independent state of Palestine through a two-state solution, represented an ostrich-like behaviour, which can never be justified.

The elephant in the room

All this said, it must be conceded, nevertheless, that a long-term sustainable approach to Geneva concerns is what is still missing in the equation. The elephant in the room is the security and law sector reform. If the Government can ensure that there are independent, inclusive, credible, well-resourced, and robust institutions that work best, without political or intelligence meddling, and that the rule of law prevails, it could go a long way in shifting the locus of action from Geneva or elsewhere back to Sri Lanka in the manner the Government desires to bring such concerns to the ‘domestic level’.

Such an approach requires engagement and dialogue. A non-confrontational posture which puts premium on respectful engagement should continue to be manifested even if an outcome of a particular process bearing upon the same concerns as have impelled actions on the external front, may not be formally subscribed to, or even rejected.

What is more important in this context is how a responsible state internalises norms, finds ways and means of resolving issues and concerns, leaves no incentive for future violations of human rights, and ensures fairness and justice, undone either by itself or by a different dispensation later. Such would be the progressive policy underpinned by guarantees of non-recurrence.

Minister Herath speaks about the importance of non-recurrence of conflicts. But one is well advised not to look at it from a conflict angle alone. It’s common knowledge that armed conflict engenders serious violations of the principles of humanitarian law in addition to gross violations of human rights. They should be prevented, and when they occur, should be fully accounted for. Non-recurrence, nevertheless, is also about systemic discrimination or violence against people and as well as about serious violations of human rights.

Bringing the focus back to his Parliamentary statement, Foreign Minister Herath seems to have clarified why the NPP Government adopted the approach it did at the just-concluded 60th session of the Council. Perhaps it testifies to the commitment of the Government to continue to engage with the concerned actors in the international community, likely ensuring that the Government emerges from the Geneva process, by committing itself to taking, apparently of its own volition, pragmatic domestic actions.

Even as the Government has clothed its official stance, obviously for domestic political consumption, in a language of rejection, it is apparent that there is pronounced emphasis that it is not pursuing a path of confrontation, but is quite willing to remain engaged.

But as the axiom goes, actions speak louder than words.

In view of Deepavali public and bank holiday and the long weekend, the Daily FT will not be published on Monday, 20 October.

Sri Lanka and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) yesterday signed agreements for a $ 106.9 million financing package to support the Strengthening Integrated Health Care and Governance for Universal Health Coverage Program.

The funding includes a $ 100 million loan under ADB’s Regular Ordinary Capital Resources and an additional $ 6.9 million grant from the Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness and Response Trust Fund. The program will be implemented under a results-based lending model.

According to the Ministry of Finance, the initiative aims to improve the efficiency and quality of secondary health services as the first level of referral care, ensuring progress toward universal health coverage.

It will focus on three core areas – enhancing first referral care services, improving pandemic prevention and preparedness, and strengthening technical capacity and pharmaceutical supply chain management.

The Ministry of Health and Mass Media will serve as the main executing and implementing agency, while all nine Provincial Departments of Health Services will participate as implementing agencies.

The agreements were signed by Treasury Secretary Dr. Harshana Suriyapperuma, on behalf of the Government of Sri Lanka, and ADB Country Director Takafumi Kadono.

The ADB said the program aligns with Sri Lanka’s national strategic framework for health sector reform and aims to build resilience in the country’s health system through improved governance and service delivery.

The Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB) has introduced a new tariff structure to purchase electricity generated from Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS) linked to existing ground-mounted and rooftop solar power plants.

In a statement, the CEB said electricity discharged from battery storage during the night peak hours, between 6.30 p.m. and 10.30 p.m., will be bought at Rs. 45.80 per kilowatt-hour (kWh).

The new tariff aims to promote the adoption of energy storage technologies by solar power producers, enabling them to store daytime solar generation and feed it into the national grid during peak evening demand.

According to the CEB, the scheme applies to developers of existing ground-mounted solar power projects as well as rooftop solar photovoltaic (PV) customers who integrate battery storage into their systems.

President Anura Kumara Disanayake yesterday said the Government will introduce measures in the upcoming Budget to increase the allowance paid to teachers serving in rural schools.

Speaking at the 28th convention of the Ceylon Teachers’ Union, the President said the decision aims to ease the financial challenges faced by teachers working in difficult areas.

He said the proposal will be discussed with trade unions representing the teaching profession before finalisation.

In celebration of Diwali, City of Dreams Sri Lanka will host Signature Diwali Glitz, a three-night extravaganza from 23 to 25 October featuring powerhouse performances and exclusive moments with South Asia’s biggest stars. The spotlight shines brightest on Bollywood legend Suniel Shetty, who will grace the grand finale on 25 October and be a part of an intimate meet-and-greet with guests.

The festivities kick off on 23 October with an electrifying Kathak fusion spectacle by the internationally lauded Kathak Rockers, blending classical rhythm with modern flair in a show that promises to mesmerise audiences.

Adding a touch of sparkle to the celebration is an appearance by Nia Sharma, a glamorous Indian actress and model widely recognised by the Sri Lankan audience as the lead of the hit Indian series Naagin Season 4. Renowned for her bold charisma and captivating performances, Nia will join the festivities in Colombo on 24 October, bringing her star power to the Signature Diwali Glitz.

Suniel Shetty, a cinematic icon whose career spans over three decades and more than 100 films, will light up the stage at the finale on 25 October. Known for blockbuster hits such as Mohra, Dilwale, Border, and the comedy cult classics Hera Pheri and Phir Hera Pheri, Shetty’s versatility, charisma, and enduring star power make him a fitting centrepiece for the grand celebration.

Their arrival continues the trend of A-list Indian celebrities choosing Colombo as a destination of choice since the resort’s opening – a testament to Sri Lanka’s rising status as a cultural crossroads between South Asia and beyond. All artists will be staying at the ultra-luxurious Nuwa at City of Dreams Sri Lanka, which also highlights Colombo’s luxury accommodation offerings.

Diwali, the festival of lights and renewal, lies at the heart of this celebration. In that spirit, Signature Diwali Glitz brings music, dance, and cinematic glamour under one luminous roof.

Colombo is fast emerging as Asia’s next entertainment hub, and for high-net-worth Indian travellers it holds irresistible appeal. With improved air connectivity, luxury infrastructure, luxury shopping, and a vibrant cultural ethos, Sri Lanka is becoming a preferred short-haul luxury escape. City of Dreams Sri Lanka capitalises on this momentum – integrating world-class hospitality, performance venues, and headline talent to position Colombo as a magnet for elite experiential tourism.

Sri Lanka’s tourism vision is ambitious: to evolve into a premium destination for discerning travellers seeking more than beaches – a place of immersive culture, spectacle, gastronomy, and glamour. With Signature Diwali Glitz, City of Dreams Sri Lanka signals its intent to lead that charge. Colombo has prepared a spectacular stage, and Suniel Shetty, Nia Sharma, and Kathak Rockers will bring that stage to life in Diwali’s most dazzling embrace.

The Parliament Secretariat said yesterday that a special committee has been appointed to promote youth entrepreneurship under the Sub-Committee on Education, Labour, and Human Resources of the Sectoral Oversight Committee.

The committee was formed during a meeting chaired by MP Sunil Rajapaksa at Parliament on 9 October. Industry and Entrepreneurship Development State Minister Chathuranga Abeysinghe also participated in the discussions.

According to the Secretariat, the newly appointed committee comprises representatives from the National Youth Services Council, the Ministry of Industries and Enterprise Development, the Export Development Board, state banks, and the Ministry of Finance.

Participants discussed strategies to promote youth entrepreneurship through export-oriented markets and creative industries, highlighting the need to equip young people with the skills and institutional support required to start and sustain businesses.

The meeting was attended by Members of Parliament V .S. Radhakrishnan, Krishnan Kalleichelvi, Chanaka Madugoda, and Ismail Muththu Mohamed, along with senior Government officials.

Hayleys PLC yesterday said it has purchased 778,946 ordinary shares of Harischandra Mills PLC at Rs. 3,300 each amounting to a 40.58% stake in the company for Rs. 2.57 billion from Senthilverl Holdings Ltd.

Harischandra Mills’ shares closed up sharply at Rs. 7,424.50 a share yesterday, gaining nearly Rs. 2,500 from the previous close Rs. 4,949.75.

The company reported a group net asset value per share of Rs. 931.40 as of end-June 2025.