The political winds appear to be shifting once again, and the Bhumjaithai Party (BJT) is emerging as the most likely beneficiary although the party’s ability to sustain its edge hinges on strategy it is set to craft.
Once regarded as a mid-sized party whose strength depended largely on regional networks and political brokerage, the party is now touted by academics and political insiders as being in prime position to do well in the next election, possibly crossing the threshold of 100 parliamentary seats, up from 68 now, and consolidating its role as a national power broker.
Yet beneath the momentum lies a critical question: can BJT transform itself from a vote-pulling “catch-all” machine reliant on defectors and patronage into a truly sustainable political institution capable of governing over the long term?
Failure and political space
Olarn Thinbangtieo, a political scientist at Burapha University, said the most important factor behind BJT’s current momentum is not merely its own rise but the decline of its long-time rival, the Pheu Thai Party.
“For the first time in two decades, since the founding of (now-defunct) Thai Rak Thai (TRT), public confidence in the Shinawatra political brand has been shaken in a way never seen before,” Mr Olarn argued.
“The failures of Thaksin Shinawatra, Srettha Thavisin, and Paetongtarn Shinawatra (as prime ministers) have left Pheu Thai vulnerable.” TRT is the predecessor of the Pheu Thai.
He pointed to the Thai-Cambodian dispute, which has fuelled public doubts about the sincerity of Pheu Thai’s handling of national security issues. Combined with longstanding resentment toward Thaksin and disillusionment with Pheu Thai’s governance record, these crises have created fertile ground for BJT’s positioning as a more credible alternative.
The erosion of Pheu Thai has also coincided with the visible decline of other conservative-oriented parties such as the Democrat Party, United Thai Nation, and Palang Pracharath.
Many voters view these parties as “pseudo-conservative” entities with little ideological clarity. This vacuum, Mr Olarn said, has opened the way for BJT to present itself as a “blue nationalist” force.
Role of ‘baan yai’
Another dynamic boosting BJT’s fortunes is the migration of political clans, known as baan yai (political dynasties), into its ranks. The Constitutional Court’s ruling disqualifying Ms Paetongtarn as prime minister and the subsequent parliamentary vote enabling BJT to form a government accelerated this trend.
“The baan yai knew which way the wind was blowing,” Mr Olarn said. “They realised that aligning with BJT offered more political advantages, and as a result, the party grew almost overnight.”
Looking forward, the academic warned that corporate monopolies and powerful business groups may increasingly shift their support toward BJT, making the party even more attractive to baan yai defectors.
However, he also cautioned that such strength carries risks: “When many power brokers converge, it creates internal bargaining and factionalism. We have witnessed this before with TRT. The goal for Bhumjaithai will be not only to gain power but to manage it sustainably.”
For Mr Olarn, the sustainability of BJT’s rise depends on three key conditions.
First, Pheu Thai must continue to weaken. If the Shinawatra family fails to preserve its power base, MPs will continue to defect.
Second, BJT must refine its ideological positioning. “Right now, it has not clearly defined its long-term policy stance. If it can rebrand itself as a modern conservative party — grounded in stability, order, and pragmatic governance — it could transform into a truly sustainable force,” Mr Olarn said.
Third, the party must strike a balance in distributing benefits among defecting baan yai. If left unresolved, internal disputes could destabilise the party.
Finally, he stresses the critical need for BJT to use its current time in government, however brief, to strengthen its base among grassroots voters and lower-middle-class constituencies, traditionally loyal to Pheu Thai. By delivering tangible benefits to these groups, the party could gradually erode Pheu Thai’s historic electoral dominance.
Cautious optimism
Mr Olarn predicts BJT could secure “around 120 seats” in the next election, though likely not more than 150 of the 500 House seats up for grabs. The majority would come from constituency races, given the party’s strong regional networks. Party-list seats, however, remain a weak point.
Such an assessment is echoed by Stithorn Thananithichot, a lecturer at Chulalongkorn University’s Faculty of Political Science, who foresees BJT securing “a little over 100 seats, but not exceeding 120.”
The lecturer pointed out that while BJT enjoys advantages from being in government for four months, its party-list appeal remains limited.
“People still look at BJT as a party dominated by baan yai. That brand alone does not inspire confidence among voters who prefer issue-based politics. Unless the party develops a stronger ideological appeal, it cannot count on a surge in party-list support.”
Nevertheless, he acknowledged that BJT’s status as the ruling party gives it short-term advantages: control of ministries, budgetary allocations, and visibility. “Even four months in government can provide resources to build networks and deliver patronage,” Mr Stithorn said.
Both analysts agreed that BJT does not need to introduce complex or ambitious policies during its short tenure. Instead, it should focus on simple, highly visible populist measures that contrast with Pheu Thai’s perceived failures in government after more than two years in power.
The government is moving ahead with the reintroducing or expanding of the popular Khon La Khrueng (co-payment) scheme to spur public spending, which could reach an estimated 17 million people.
“Such a programme does not require innovation. It only needs execution, and people will remember who delivered the benefits,” Mr Stithorn said.
Other policy areas could include basic cost-of-living relief, regional economic initiatives, and border management–all designed to show responsiveness without overpromising.
Party’s own perspective
Boonjong Wongtrairat, a core member of BJT and ex-deputy interior minister, said the party faces a historic opportunity but also a serious test.
“What we have to contend with is how to spend the next four months proving to the people that we are capable of solving real problems,” he said. “If people see for themselves that we are genuine in addressing bread-and-butter issues, they will reward us at the ballot box.”
Mr Boonjong said that the influx of MPs into BJT is barometer of political realities: “MPs want to be in a stable party, a ruling party that can deliver resources to their constituencies. That is why many knock on our door. But ultimately, the people decide. If we do not deliver, they will turn away.”
The underlying question has to do with whether BJT can transform its newfound leverage into long-term stability.
Mr Stithorn argued BJT is better positioned than Palang Pracharath Party, which relied too heavily on “power suction” without building a solid base. BJT, by contrast, has networks at the tambon and provincial levels.
“At minimum, BJT can remain a large party for two consecutive terms,” he said. “This election could make them a government leader, and if they perform adequately, they will not fade away quickly. In many ways, they are now replacing Pheu Thai as the central force in Thai politics.”
But analysts insisted sustainability will depend on whether BJT can rise above being a merely vehicle for baan yai and defectors. To do so, it must cultivate younger politicians, broaden its appeal, and build an image that resonates beyond transactional politics.