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Nigeria cannot achieve $1tn economy with current budget size, budget minister says

Nigeria cannot achieve its ambition of becoming a $1 trillion economy without significantly expanding its national budget, Atiku Bagudu, minister of Budget and Economic Planning, has said.

Bagudu said Nigeria’s budget remained one of the smallest among the world’s 10 most populous countries, raising questions about how the country could finance the infrastructure, human capital and other investments required to achieve the target within the next four years.

He made the submission in Abuja at the 2026 Capacity-Building Workshop of the Senate Press Corps, organised with the theme, ‘Leveraging Legislative Oversight and Media Collaboration to Safeguard the National Budget from Unlawful Insertions.’

According to the minister, the starting point of the national budget conversation should not simply be how much money the government currently has, but how much is required to achieve its development objectives.

His comments come at a time when the National Assembly is expecting both the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) and Fiscal Strategy Paper (FSP), Nigeria’s statutory multi-year economic blueprint that sets macro-fiscal projections, revenue targets, and spending limits before the presentation of the annual national budget.

‘Perhaps the starting point for this discussion should be: What should the national budget be? Because without starting from there, maybe we will not reach the right conclusion,’ Bagudu said.

He said Nigeria’s budgetary limitations were particularly significant when compared with other populous countries.

‘I don’t have one definitive answer, but I would say that of the 10 most populous countries in the world, Nigeria has the smallest national budget,’ he said.

Bagudu said the issue was particularly important in view of the Federal Government’s ambition under President Bola Tinubu’s Renewed Hope Agenda and the long-term Agenda 2050.

He asked how Nigeria could grow into a $1 trillion economy within the next four years while ensuring that the benefits of such growth were widely shared.

‘How can we, as a step towards that wider dream, generate a $1 trillion economy in the next four years? And not just a $1 trillion economy, but a $1 trillion economy that includes everyone?’ he asked.

The minister cautioned against a budgeting approach that simply limits government’s ambitions to its current revenue position.

Using the analogy of making clothes according to one’s present size, Bagudu said such an approach could prevent Nigeria from creating the fiscal capacity required for future growth.

‘If I decide to cut my coat according to my size, then I should remain in the same shape. Maybe I will not even have the spare capacity to sew a cloth for another person,’ he said.

He consequently urged the media to help drive a wider national conversation around revenue mobilisation and the appropriate size of the national budget.

‘Should we continue with a budget that gives our populace one of the smallest budgets among comparable countries? Or should we imagine how we can mobilise more resources?’ Bagudu asked.

Bagudu pointed to Brazil as an example of the disparity in fiscal capacity between Nigeria and another large federal country.

He said Brazil’s 2025 budget was at least 25 times larger than Nigeria’s, raising questions about whether Nigeria could expect similar development outcomes with significantly fewer resources.

‘But Brazil’s 2025 budget is at least 25 times the size of Nigeria’s budget. So do I expect to achieve the same outcomes as Brazil? Is it that these needs do not exist in Nigeria? I believe they do,’ he said.

The minister also defended the constitutional role of the National Assembly in the appropriation process, saying legislative participation in budget-making should not automatically be regarded as improper.

‘We chose constitutional democracy, and under constitutional democracy, the National Assembly has a critical role,’ he said.

Bagudu said some projects that might appear unnecessary to observers in Abuja could represent genuine needs identified by lawmakers from their constituencies.

He cited cases where communities lacked basic amenities, including access to water, saying such realities could explain why particular interventions found their way into appropriation bills.

‘So you see something in the budget, and because it is not a priority in your own area, you wonder why it is in the budget.

‘But to that member of the House of Representatives or Senate who was elected from that community, it represents what their constituents consider a priority,’ Bagudu said.

He also recalled the controversy over the provision of freezers in an earlier budget, explaining that the equipment was intended for women in fishing communities who lacked facilities to preserve their catch.

‘The women there needed freezers because they did not have a way of preserving their fish,’ he said.

Addressing allegations of unlawful insertions into the national budget, Bagudu said it was necessary to distinguish between legitimate amendments by lawmakers and genuinely irregular provisions.

He acknowledged that the complexity of the budget process, which involves several institutions and individuals, could create room for mistakes.

‘We are dealing with processes, human beings and human errors. Therefore, vigilance is important. The media and legislative oversight should continue to be vigilant,’ he said.

Bagudu, however, urged stakeholders to balance the demand for transparency with legitimate national security considerations.

He argued that full disclosure of certain government policies or expenditures could compromise strategic objectives, particularly in security operations.

‘I may be fighting a war in the area of security, but how much of my security policy should I make public? Not because I am doing something wrong, but because there are legitimate strategic considerations,’ he said.

The minister also challenged the conventional assumption that capital expenditure was automatically more important than recurrent spending.

Using security personnel as an example, he questioned the consequences of failing to fund the personnel responsible for protecting the country.

‘If I am fighting a war and I don’t pay security personnel, what happens? So which one is more important?’ he asked.

He said the quality of government spending should ultimately be measured by what it delivers to citizens rather than merely by whether an allocation was classified as recurrent or capital expenditure.

‘The conversation should be about what we are trying to achieve, what resources are required to achieve it, how we mobilise those resources, and how we maintain public confidence while ensuring accountability and transparency,’ Bagudu said.

Godswill Akpabio, president of the Senate, called for stronger collaboration between the National Assembly, the media and civil society organisations to improve scrutiny of the national budget.

Represented by Yemi Adaramodu, chairman of the Senate Committee on Media and Public Affairs, Akpabio urged journalists covering the legislature to deepen their understanding of parliamentary procedures to improve the quality and accuracy of budget reporting.

Adaramodu, who served as chief host of the workshop, said the media remained an important accountability mechanism in monitoring budget implementation.

He urged journalists to investigate public expenditure, expose waste and ensure that reports on budgetary provisions reflected the circumstances surrounding the projects and programmes involved.

Taiye Odewale, Chairman of the Senate Press Corps, said the controversy surrounding an alleged N1.3 billion provision for a purported Presidential Foreign Intervention Promotion Council demonstrated the need for stronger scrutiny of budget documents.

Odewale said investigations by the Senate Press Corps showed that the controversial provision was not part of the N9.853 trillion added by the National Assembly to the N58.47 trillion executive proposal, which brought the 2026 Appropriation Act to N68.32 trillion.

He said the controversy reinforced the need for closer cooperation between journalists and legislative oversight bodies in scrutinising appropriation documents.

According to him, the workshop was also designed to expose journalists to emerging tools, including artificial intelligence, that could assist in examining complex budget documents.

Representing Auwal Rafsanjani, Executive Director of the Civil Society Legislative and Advocacy Centre, Ebu Emmanuel said every budget provision should be justified, properly costed, measurable and linked to identifiable beneficiaries.

He cited findings attributed to the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission that 4,508 inserted or padded projects valued at N434.5 billion, as well as 66 duplicated projects worth N6.43 billion, were identified in the 2022 budget.

Emmanuel urged lawmakers to interrogate proposed projects by examining their locations, beneficiaries, costs, purposes and expected outcomes before approving them.

Vahyala Kwaga, country director of BudgIT, representing the organisation’s Director, Oluseun Onigbinde, said public discussion of the budget often focused more on allocations than on the outcomes expected from them.

He identified delayed submission of the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework and Fiscal Strategy Paper as a recurring concern and proposed that the budget should be submitted to the National Assembly at least 90 days before the end of the financial year.

Cane farmers earnings hit Sh33bn as deliveries surge 52.3pc

Kenya’s sugarcane farmers earned an estimated Sh33.5 billion in the seven months to July as cane deliveries surged, boosting domestic sugar output and easing consumer prices.

Farmers delivered 5.94 million tonnes of cane during the period, up from 4.12 million tonnes in a similar period a year earlier, with the increased supply lifting domestic sugar production to 528,874 tonnes.

The higher deliveries translated into a 52.3 percent increase in estimated farmer earnings, as the average cane price also rose to Sh5,643 per tonne from Sh5,343 over the comparable period.

The jump in cane supplies has provided sugar factories with more raw material after last year’s shortages constrained milling and contributed to a sharp decline in domestic sugar production.

Sugar output rose 44.5 percent to 528,874 tonnes by July from 366,007 tonnes in the same period last year, according to KNBS data sourced from the Kenya Sugar Board.

The recovery has started feeding through to consumers, with the average retail price of sugar falling 3.1 percent to Sh167.02 per kilogramme from Sh172.36 over the comparable seven-month period.

The improvement follows a prolonged period of weak cane availability that forced factories to reduce operations, leaving Kenya more dependent on imported sugar to bridge domestic supply gaps.

The country had last year faced severe shortages of mature cane in western Kenya, prompting the Sugar Board to direct seven factories to suspend milling from July to allow the crop to mature.

The shortage also sent Kenya’s sugar import bill from Uganda and Tanzania soaring 708 percent to Sh6.17 billion in the three months to September 2025, according to official trade data.

The turnaround in cane deliveries marks a significant reversal for factories that struggled to maintain production when farmers had insufficient mature cane to supply mills.

KNBS monthly data shows the recovery gathered pace from November last year, when cane deliveries reached 800,196 tonnes compared with 566,584 tonnes a month earlier.

By June, cane deliveries had reached 998,000 tonnes, 109.03 percent above the 477,439 tonnes recorded in June 2025, before rising to a record high of 1.01 million tonnes in July.

The increased cane flow has been accompanied by a sharp improvement in factory output, with July alone producing 91,022 tonnes of sugar compared with 42,255 tonnes in July 2025.

The recovery is partly linked to improved cane availability following sector reforms, including the reopening of previously dormant State-owned factories under private management arrangements.

Four State-owned factories-Nzoia, Chemelil, Muhoroni and Mumias-were targeted for private management as part of efforts to revive production, reduce losses and improve factory utilisation.

The larger farmer payout comes at a time when the sugar industry entering a more competitive trading environment after Kenya ended 24 years of protection from cheaper Comesa sugar imports.

The country exited the regional safeguard regime in January, removing restrictions that had shielded local millers from cheaper sugar produced by other Comesa members.

The safeguards had allowed Kenya to import up to 350,000 tonnes of sugar from Comesa countries to cover domestic deficits while protecting local producers from cheaper regional supplies.

The removal of that protection means local factories must compete with imported sugar even as they work through higher cane procurement costs and investment requirements.

The pressure was visible in July when sugar millers in western Kenya were reported to be holding large stocks of unsold sugar amid competition from imported and allegedly smuggled supplies.

Nzoia Sugar, for example, was reported to have accumulated 269,750 bags of unsold sugar by July 28, highlighting the challenge of converting higher cane deliveries into stronger factory revenues.

A stronger MICE is Kenya’s next tourism frontier

Kenya’s tourism story has long been defined by our extraordinary wildlife, beaches and culture. These remain powerful attractions, but as we pursue our ambition of reaching 5.5 million international visitors by 2028, Kenya is looking beyond traditional leisure tourism to identify the next engines of growth.

One opportunity clearly stands out, Meetings, Incentives, Conferences and Exhibitions (MICE).

Globally, MICE has become an important driver of tourism and wider economic activity. According to the International Congress and Convention Association, more than 11,000 international meetings were held globally in 2024.

The exhibitions industry on the other hand illustrates the scale even more clearly.

According to UFI, the Global Association of the Exhibition Industry, exhibitions generated approximately $150 billion in direct spending in 2024, attracted 318 million visitors and supported 1.8 million direct jobs and 4.3 million jobs in total.

These numbers matter to tourism because the value of a delegate extends far beyond the conference room. A visitor attending a three-day event needs accommodation, transport, food and other services.

Many also extend their stays, experience local attractions and return later for leisure. MICE therefore creates an opportunity to grow arrivals, bed nights, visitor spending and repeat travel simultaneously.

Destinations are already demonstrating what is possible, Singapore, for example, recorded $2.3 billion in MICE tourism receipts in 2025, a 35 percent increase from the previous year. It also hosted 156 international association meetings, an eight percent increase year-on-year.

These gains demonstrate how deliberately developing business events can strengthen a destination’s tourism economy.

For Kenya, the opportunity comes at an important moment, we are already building the infrastructure needed to compete for larger international events. For many years, the Kenyatta International Convention Centre has been a cornerstone of Kenya’s conference industry and one of the region’s established convention facilities.

It has enabled Nairobi to host major international, regional and diplomatic meetings while connecting delegates to the city’s wider tourism offering.

Today, that capacity is expanding, the private sector continues to invest in hotels and hospitality properties with modern conference and meeting facilities. This is important because Kenya’s MICE proposition cannot depend on a single venue. It must be an ecosystem bringing together hotels, convention facilities, airlines, restaurants, destination management companies, tour operators and attractions.

Government investment is also changing the scale of what Kenya can offer. The Bomas International Convention Complex, currently under development, is expected to significantly expand the country’s capacity to host large-scale international conferences, exhibitions and events.

With major convention spaces, additional halls and numerous meeting and breakout rooms, the facility will enable Kenya to pursue events requiring capacities beyond those currently available.

The government is also taking a more deliberate approach to attracting international events, with the Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife working to identify, bid for and secure major conferences and other business events for the country.

MICE is increasingly being positioned as a strategic component of Kenya’s broader effort to reach 5.5 million international visitors by 2028, bringing together public resources and private-sector partnerships to strengthen the country’s proposition to international event organisers.

But infrastructure alone will not win the business, we must become more deliberate in identifying the right events, bidding competitively for them, packaging the destination and creating experiences that encourage delegates to stay longer.

The Kenya Tourism Board will continue to position Kenya as a place where people meet, connect and experience. A conference in Nairobi can extend into a wildlife experience in the Maasai Mara, a coastal holiday, a cultural encounter, a culinary experience or an adventure across one of our many tourism circuits.

The 16th Magical Kenya Travel Expo (MKTE) provides a timely platform for this ambition. As we bring together international buyers and Kenya’s tourism industry, our objective extends beyond selling leisure excursions. We are also using these relationships to open conversations around conferences, exhibitions, incentive programmes and corporate events that can bring more visitors to Kenya.

If we are serious about reaching 5.5 million international visitors, MICE must be part of the equation. Kenya has the connectivity, experiences, growing hospitality investment and expanding convention infrastructure to strengthen its position in this market.

Our task now is to turn that potential into sustained international business.

Travellers claim bribery to skip queues at crowded JKIA

Kenyans flying back into the country have accused Immigration officers at the Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (JKIA) of soliciting bribes from passengers, to move up the long queues as congestion hits the country’s main airport due to capacity constraints.

The Business Daily has learnt of multiple recent incidents when some travellers were moved up the queues at the immigration checkpoint at JKIA after paying enticement to officials.

“Having just arrived from a country where systems are applied consistently and without favour, I found this experience extremely disheartening,’ a traveller, who requested to remain anonymous, told Business Daily.

“Such practices create a perception of preferential treatment and undermine confidence in the fairness and professionalism of our public institutions. As a Kenyan, I left feeling genuinely disappointed.’

Another traveller said he was expedited through the immigration checkpoint after parting with a Sh5,000 enticement.

The incidents point to a deeper problem at Kenya’s main international gateway, where congestion and long queues are creating opportunities for immigration officials to bypass established clearance procedures, and solicit unofficial payments from frustrated passengers.

The Directorate of Immigration Services did not respond to Business Daily queries on the bribery claims. The Kenya Airports Authority (KAA), which manages airports and is tasked with ensuring travellers have a good experience, asked affected travelers to report such incidents.

‘Immigration clearance is undertaken by the Directorate of Immigration Services, within the State Department for Immigration and Citizen Services under the Ministry of Interior and National Administration,’ it said in a response to Business Daily queries.

‘KAA remains responsible for coordinating airport service delivery and working with the relevant agencies to address concerns affecting the passenger experience. We would welcome the travel dates, approximate times, clearance locations and any other relevant details, to enable referral to the Directorate for investigation and follow-up.’

Beyond the financial and time cost to travellers, air travel experts argue such practices threaten to undermine confidence in JKIA, at a time when Kenya is seeking to position the airport as a competitive regional aviation hub and expand its capacity to handle rising passenger traffic.

Travellers have expressed frustration with such incidents.

Sources said the immigration officials typically approach people with Kenyan passports, while foreign travellers are moved up the queue with the help of local tour firms or hotels waiting for them at the airport.

Travellers are typically expected to be treated the same at ports of entry, except for unique situations that may require a traveller to be moved up the queue or processed separately.

For instance, priority passengers, including elderly travellers, pregnant women, disabled people or sick individuals, do not need to queue for immigration checks. But as the airport increasingly gets congested, frequent flyers worry fast service may become a reserve for a few individuals willing to bend the law and pay more to the detriment of other travellers.

KAA says there are ongoing projects to ease congestion at JKIA.

‘The Directorate of Immigration Services, in partnership with KAA, is currently installing electronic immigration gates, beginning with Terminal 1A. Installation at this terminal is expected to be completed by the end of October 2026. Once operational, the e-gates are expected to expedite clearance for eligible passengers and reduce pressure on staffed counters,’ the agency told Business Daily.

‘The JKIA modernisation project, which is ongoing, also provides for the optimisation and reconfiguration of existing terminals, modernisation of passenger-processing systems and development of additional terminal capacity. These interventions are designed to ease current bottlenecks and accommodate growing traffic.’

This year, JKIA is expected to handle over 9 million passengers, far above the 7.5 million it was designed to process every year. This has meant that passengers mostly have to endure abnormally long queues at immigration checkpoints and airline check-in counters, according to consultancy firm Dar, which was last year hired by KAA to design the development masterplan for the airport.

The current terminal is supposed to be upgraded to immediately raise capacity to at least 12 million passengers a year, while a new terminal will raise the airport’s capacity to 25 million passengers a year.

HBM Nigeria in fresh push for skilled labour, begins training for female tilers, block layers

In a positive response to the dearth of skilled labour in the construction industry, HBM Nigeria Plc has commenced training for female tilers and block layers in Lagos and Ogun states.

HBM Nigeria, formerly known as Lafarge Africa Plc, is a leading provider of innovative building solutions and manufacturer of cement, ready-mix, mortar and Plaster of Paris products.

The company is a member of the Huaxin Building Materials Group, a globally recognized manufacturer of construction materials founded in 1907 and headquartered in Wuhan, China. Listed on the Nigerian Exchange Limited (NGX), HBM Nigeria Plc is actively contributing to Nigeria’s urbanization and economic growth.

The 2026 Female Tilers and Block-Laying Training initiative will equip 120 women across the two South Western states with practical construction skills to expand their participation and economic opportunities in the building and construction sector.

The six-week training is being implemented across three locations, with 40 women each in Ayobo and Epe in Lagos and another 40 participants in Abeokuta, Ogun State. The Lagos component of the programme is being delivered in partnership with the Lagos State Employment Trust Fund (LSETF) and other relevant state stakeholders, following a joint orientation and launch held recently.

The beneficiaries will receive hands-on training in wall and floor tiling and block-laying, alongside sessions on entrepreneurship, financial literacy, soft skills, digital tools, business management and sustainable construction practices.

The programme also covers health and safety, circular economy principles, practical project work and mentorship, with participants expected to complete capstone projects in tiling and masonry before graduating at the end of the six-week training.

Speaking on the initiative, Viola Graham-Douglas, Director, Communications, Public Affairs and Sustainable Development, HBM Nigeria Plc, explained that the programme reflects the company’s commitment to creating practical pathways for women to build sustainable livelihoods while addressing the gender gap in skilled construction trades.

Graham-Douglas added that the programme provides participants with exposure to entrepreneurship, financial literacy, business registration, digital skills and professional associations, helping them to understand how to turn their technical skills into viable businesses and build sustainable careers.

‘At HBM Nigeria Plc, we believe that skills development is one of the most practical ways to create lasting opportunities for women, particularly those from underserved communities. Through this programme, we are not only teaching women how to tile or lay blocks; we are equipping them with the technical knowledge, business skills and confidence they need to build sustainable livelihoods and participate meaningfully in an industry where women remain underrepresented,’ she said.

The Female Tilers and Block-Laying Training initiative is part of HBM Nigeria’s broader corporate social responsibility efforts to equip women from underserved communities with technical, entrepreneurial and financial skills while promoting greater female participation in the construction sector. The initiative builds on the company’s previous women-focused programmes, including the BuildHer by Lafarge initiative, which trained 100 women across Lagos, Ogun and Cross River States, following an earlier cohort of 40 women.

Azerbaijani citizen injured in drone attack in Kyiv

An Azerbaijani citizen has been injured in a drone attack in Kyiv, Ukraine, according to the Ukrainian National Police.

According to the police, the injured Azerbaijani citizen is Ilgar Hashem Ahmadov, born in 1980.

Ahmadov was injured when a drone attack targeted the Vyshneve area of Kyiv. He was subsequently taken for medical assistance, and his condition is currently reported to be stable.

The latest incident adds to reports of Azerbaijani citizens being affected by drone attacks in the Ukrainian capital. Several Azerbaijani nationals were previously reported to have been injured in a drone strike on a market in Kyiv.

Drone attacks have increasingly affected residential and civilian areas in Ukraine, including the Kyiv region, amid the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine. Such attacks have resulted in casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure in different parts of the country.

Revised, not reformed: The PSTA Bill (2026) from an information integrity perspective

The Government has published a revised Protection of the State from Terrorism Bill in a Gazette Supplement dated 18 September 2026 and released on 22 September.1

Ambika Satkunanathan’s analysis in the Daily FT on 26 September sets out what has changed and what has not, and I share most of her concerns.2 They fall under scope, supervision and sunset, starting with a definition of terrorism that, though modelled on the UN Special Rapporteur’s, still covers damage to property, the environment, cultural sites and electronic systems even where no life is at risk. On supervision, soldiers and coast guard officers keep police powers with no clear line of command, the Defence Secretary still issues detention orders that a Magistrate must enforce, the ‘Independent’ Review Committee only advises the Minister who appoints it, and police may ban gatherings before any Magistrate approves. On sunset, proscription orders never expire, restriction orders have no outer limit, the President may direct how the law is enforced, and past offences will still be tried under the PTA, police confessions included. Her work on detention, militarisation and executive power and mine on communications, privacy and information integrity meet at the same point, which is how much of this machinery still rests with the Ministry of Defence and with an all-powerful Executive Presidency the current Government does not want to abolish.

What has improved

Several changes deserve acknowledgement, beginning with the deletion of section 55 of the 2025 draft that let a Magistrate order any provider of encryption to ‘unlock or unencrypt’ communications and authorised interception of calls, email and ‘any communication through any other medium’, while section 53 let police demand data from telecommunications and internet companies. Neither appears in the new Bill. The duty to report terrorism offences now excuses information that is legally protected, covered by professional secrecy or self-incriminating. Recklessness no longer suffices for the speech offences, which now protect journalism, research, human rights documentation, satire and dissent, and state that mere expression without intent to incite, and without a ‘real and objective risk’ of terrorism, is no offence. A new public-interest defence covers gathering or sharing sensitive information. Soldiers must hand seized items to the police ‘forthwith’, a Magistrate decides what happens to them, and police interviews must be recorded on video. Restrictions on photographing ‘prohibited places’ must be ‘narrowly tailored’ and must not unduly interfere with journalism. Many of these changes follow, sometimes almost word for word, recommendations that seven UN mandate holders sent the Government in February 2026.3

Witnessing remains a risk

The Bill still makes documenting the security forces extremely risky, especially given the enduring militarisation of the North, and the asymmetrical impact of state surveillance against Tamils, Muslims, minorities, and human rights activists. It punishes anyone who gathers or shares ‘confidential information’ knowing, or having ‘reasonable grounds to believe’, that someone will use it to commit an offence under the Act (section 8). The drafters narrowed part of the definition, so information about the whereabouts of officials now counts only if it is not already public and could harm national or public security, but they left another part untouched. Confidential information still includes ‘any information relating to the police or the armed forces, on the conduct of any official activity’, whether planned, under way or finished, with no test of secrecy or harm at all (section 74). A Facebook post about a police raid, a WhatsApp message warning neighbours of a cordon-and-search, or a video of an arrest all fit.

What turns this into a real risk is the phrase ‘an offence under this Act’, which no longer means only terrorism. It includes disobeying a police directive under section 51, which lets the officer in charge of a police station, in urgent cases and before any Magistrate sees it, order people not to gather in a place or hold a meeting, rally or procession, and cordon off the area – something to bear in mind around the potential for pro-democracy movements like 2022’s aragalaya in the future, and mass mobilisation. Read literally, anyone who tells others where the police cordon is, while having reason to believe they will defy the ban, supplies confidential information for use in an offence under the Act and faces up to 15 years in prison. The public-interest defence helps, though it is a police officer who decides, at the moment of arrest, whether the public interest ‘outweighs the harm’, and the Bill never says whether the accused or the state must prove it. Narrowing the definition of terrorism does nothing to close this route.

Recipients as informants

The duty to report, which remains the Bill’s quietest form of surveillance, means that anyone who knows or has ‘reasons to believe’ that another person is preparing, attempting or has committed an offence under the Act, and does not tell the police, faces up to seven years in prison (section 15). The new exceptions cover lawyers, but probably not journalists protecting sources or priests hearing confession, because the Bill does not define ‘professional secrecy’ and Sri Lankan law, as far as I know, treats neither relationship as privileged. They offer nothing to WhatsApp group administrators, moderators of diaspora Facebook pages or family members, and anyone who relies on an exception must prove it themselves. End-to-end encryption keeps material safe in transit, but never from a recipient whom the PSTA compels to report it.

Devices and decryption

Removing section 55 took away a power without touching the capability, since police, soldiers and coast guard officers can still seize any ‘document, thing or article’ on reasonable suspicion and without a warrant (section 20), which includes phones, laptops and memory cards. The officer in charge of a police station can then send them to the Government Analyst ‘or to any other local or foreign expert’, needing a Magistrate’s approval only for a foreign expert (section 49). Wilfully failing to answer a police officer’s questions during an investigation is an offence (section 16), with protection only against self-incrimination. A soldier who makes an arrest has up to 24 hours before handing the person to the police, and the 48-hour limit for reaching a Magistrate starts only after that. Nothing in the Bill stops anyone demanding a passcode, or pressing a detainee’s finger or face to a phone, in that time, and military questioning, unlike police interviews, need not be recorded.

The old section 55 at least placed a Magistrate between investigators and encrypted content. Its removal leaves access to devices with general seizure powers and with laws already in force, since the Anti-Corruption Act and the Proceeds of Crime Act permit the unlocking and decryption of devices and the interception of communications, in most cases on ex parte applications, which means without the affected person knowing or being heard.4

Online content and the diaspora

The new protections for journalism, research and dissent apply only to the two speech offences in sections 9 and 10, and do not reach proscription. A proscription order may bar ‘any person from publishing any material, including printed or online publishing, in furtherance of the objects’ of a banned organisation (section 59), and breaking any order made under the Act is itself an offence. The Bill also folds every organisation banned under the PTA, and every entity designated under United Nations Act regulations, which have at times included Tamil diaspora groups, into its list of proscribed organisations. Because the Act applies to Sri Lankan citizens anywhere in the world (section 2), a dual citizen in Toronto or London whose posts the authorities read as furthering a listed group’s objects sits within its reach. Platforms and internet providers are not out of the picture either, since providing ‘a service’ that lets others obtain a terrorist publication remains an offence (section 10), and every director of a company that commits an offence under the Act is deemed guilty unless they prove otherwise (section 67).

Personal data, and the PDPA

The Bill says nothing about personal data, and that silence matters more now than it did in December. The Personal Data Protection Act (PDPA) of 2022, amended in 2025, requires anyone handling personal data to collect it for a specified purpose, keep only what is necessary, keep it accurate and hold it no longer than needed.5 Data about offences and criminal proceedings, and data revealing ethnicity, religion or political opinion, form ‘special categories’ requiring extra care. The Bill’s new central database (section 64) records every arrest, detention, remand, bail, discharge, acquittal and conviction under the Act, yet says nothing about who may see it, how long records stay, how errors are corrected or whether a person discharged or acquitted can ever have their name removed, so under the PDPA’s own terms it holds special-category data by definition.

The PDPA treats processing for criminal investigations as lawful whenever another law permits it, with safeguards that have never been written, so it offers far less protection than its title suggests. Both laws claim to override all others (PDPA section 3, PSTA section 70), and the newer counter-terrorism law is likely to win. The PDPA also lets organisations refuse requests to see, correct or erase data on national security grounds (section 17), and since 2025 the Data Protection Authority can no longer stop unsafe high-risk processing.

The President’s July 2026 order compounds this by leaving out the parts of the PDPA that give people the right to see, correct or erase their data, along with the requirement that any exemption be ‘necessary and proportionate’, when the rest comes into force on 1 January 2027.6 Someone arrested in 2027 and released without charge could therefore find their name in a police database with no legal way to see or remove it. The Bill also lets investigators share seized devices and evidence with foreign experts and states (sections 43, 49 and 50) without any of the safeguards the PDPA requires when personal data leaves the country.

Interaction design

None of this operates alone, or is designed to, which is why in August I argued that the gravest danger in Sri Lanka’s recent laws lies in what I called interaction design, the way powers in one law can be reached through another.7 The revised Bill slots into that architecture, which is easiest to see through the case of a Tamil journalist documenting a mass grave excavation in the north, a scenario which the Counter Terrorism Investigation Department’s summons of the Mullaitivu Press Club president over reporting on Chemmani in August 2025 shows is not hypothetical.8 The Secretary to the Ministry of Defence could declare the site a prohibited place and restrict photography, and posts about police activity there fall within confidential information. An Online Safety Act complaint could allege a false statement and seek the identity of accounts sharing the material, a seized phone could go to an expert and the journalist’s name into the PSTA database, while the draft NGO law would already have registered the organisation supporting the work, with its staff, funders and premises. A digital identity system and national data exchange then connect each record to the next. The President appoints the Online Safety Commission, would proscribe organisations under this Bill and holds the Defence portfolio whose Minister and Secretary run it, and none of this requires an emergency to be declared.

What should change

If Parliament is to pass a counter-terrorism law, the part of the confidential information definition covering police and military activity should carry the same secrecy and harm tests as the rest. The confidential information offence and the duty to report should attach only to terrorism itself, not to any offence under the Act, and the state should carry the burden of disproving a public-interest or professional-secrecy defence, with journalists and clergy named expressly. Examining a seized device should require a Magistrate’s order naming the device, the data sought and the period covered, and no one should be compelled to unlock a device before reaching a Magistrate. The speech protections should extend to proscription orders. The central database needs defined purposes, access rules, retention limits and deletion on discharge or acquittal, and the Bill should subject all processing expressly to the PDPA, whose remaining parts should come into force before this law does.

Sadly, but unsurprisingly, the revised PSTA Bill is not the fundamental re-conceptualisation I urged the Ministry of Justice to consider in December 2025, since the machinery of executive detention, military policing, proscription and criminalised witnessing survives, placed now alongside a data protection law only partly in force and a constellation of other laws that reach what this one leaves out. Improvement measured against the PTA is a very low bar, and what matters is what these powers could do together, in the hands of any future Government or even the incumbents, given that absolute power corrupts absolutely.

(Endnotes)

1Protection of the State from Terrorism Bill, L.D.-O 37/2026, Supplement to Part II of the Gazette of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka of 18 September 2026 (issued on 22 September 2026). https://www.documents.gov.lk

2’Revised’ Protection of State from the Terrorism Bill: What’s changed and what remains. Dr Ambika Satkunanathan, Daily FT, 26 September 2026, https://www.ft.lk/columns/Revised-Protection-of-State-from-the-Terrorism-Bill-What-s-changed-and-what-remains/4-797767

3Communication OL LKA 1/2026 from seven UN special procedures mandate holders, 9 February 2026. https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=30742

4Anti-Corruption Act No. 9 of 2023, https://documents.gov.lk/view/acts/2023/8/09-2023_E.pdf; Proceeds of Crime Act No. 5 of 2025, https://documents.gov.lk/view/acts/2025/4/05-2025_E.pdf. See also The Anti-Corruption Act, and Prevention of Crimes Act: Putting civil society at greater risk through potential procedural overreach? Sanjana Hattotuwa, 9 December 2025. https://sanjanah.wordpress.com/2025/12/09/the-anti-corruption-act-and-prevention-of-crimes-act-putting-civil-society-at-greater-risk-through-potential-procedural-overreach/

5Personal Data Protection Act No. 9 of 2022, as amended by the Personal Data Protection (Amendment) Act No. 22 of 2025 (certified on 30 October 2025). See in particular sections 3, 6 to 9, 17, 25, 26 and 40, and Schedule IV.

6Order under section 1(3) of the Personal Data Protection Act, Gazette Extraordinary No. 2498/16 of 22 July 2026, appointing 1 January 2027 for sections 2 and 3 and Parts I and III. https://www.dpa.gov.lk/Gazet/2498-16_E.pdf

7A perfect storm: Digitalisation, new laws, draft bills, and threats to civic space in Sri Lanka. Sanjana Hattotuwa, 14 August 2026. https://sanjanah.wordpress.com/2026/08/14/a-perfect-storm-digitalisation-new-laws-draft-bills-and-threats-to-civic-space-in-sri-lanka/

Stress hunger is not real hunger: A toolkit to pause and choose your fuel

It is 4 p.m. You have been in back-to-back meetings since morning, your phone has barely stopped ringing, and you are already thinking about that plate of jollof rice in the fridge. You had lunch only two hours ago, but somehow you feel like you need something to eat.

Then comes the familiar Nigerian solution to a stressful day: ‘Let me just buy something small.’

Perhaps it is a meat pie and soft drink from the office canteen, a doughnut and sweetened coffee, a handful of chin chin, or a plate of fried rice and chicken ordered through a delivery app.

But are you actually hungry?

The answer is not always yes.

Stress can significantly influence appetite, food cravings and eating behaviour. For some people, acute stress temporarily suppresses appetite.

For others, particularly during prolonged or repeated stress, it can increase the desire for highly palatable foods-those rich in sugar, fat and salt.

This is where stress eating can become confused with physical hunger.

When hunger is coming from the body-and when it is coming from stress

Physical hunger is a biological response to the body’s need for energy and nutrients. It generally develops gradually. You may notice stomach rumbling, reduced energy, difficulty concentrating or a general desire for food. After eating an adequate meal, the sensation usually settles.

Stress-driven eating can be different. The urge may appear suddenly and may be directed towards a specific food-perhaps a cold bottle of soft drink, a sweet pastry, fried snacks or a favourite comfort meal.

You may also notice that the urge appears after an argument, difficult workday, financial pressure, family concerns, traffic congestion or an emotionally exhausting experience.

This does not mean that the hunger is imaginary. The appetite and craving are real. The important question is what is driving them.

The Nigerian stress-eating environment

For many Nigerians, food is deeply connected to comfort, hospitality, celebration and social interaction. Food is also readily available in many workplaces, homes and social settings.

A stressful workday can end with ‘Let’s get shawarma.’ A difficult journey through Lagos traffic can be followed by a sugary drink. Long working hours may mean relying on pastries, instant noodles or fast food because they are convenient.

There is nothing inherently wrong with enjoying these foods. The concern arises when food becomes our primary coping mechanism for stress.

Repeated stress eating can contribute to excessive energy intake and may make weight management more difficult, particularly when combined with inadequate sleep, prolonged sitting and low physical activity.

Try the PAUSE approach

Instead of immediately responding to a food craving, create a short pause.

P – Pause.

Stop for 30 seconds to one minute. Take a few slow breaths before deciding what to eat.

A – Assess your hunger.

Ask yourself: When did I last eat? Am I experiencing physical signs of hunger? Would I be satisfied with a balanced meal, or am I specifically craving one food? A simple hunger scale from 1 to 10 can help. If you have not eaten for several hours and your hunger is strong, your body may genuinely need food. Eat.

U – Understand the trigger.

If you recently ate but suddenly want a particular snack, consider what happened immediately beforehand.

Was it a stressful email? A difficult conversation? Boredom? Fatigue? Anxiety? Frustration?

Recognising the trigger is an important part of changing the behaviour.

S – Substitute another response when appropriate.

If you identify stress rather than physical hunger as the trigger, address the underlying need.

Take a short walk around the office. Step outside for fresh air. Practise slow breathing. Drink water. Call someone you trust. Stretch. Listen to music. Take a brief screen break.

If you are exhausted, the answer may be rest rather than another snack.

E – Eat mindfully if you are hungry.

This step is important because managing stress eating does not mean suppressing legitimate hunger.

If you are hungry, eat. Choose a balanced meal containing sources of protein, fibre-rich carbohydrates, vegetables or fruit and healthy fats according to your individual nutritional needs.

For a Nigerian meal, this might mean combining beans with vegetables and a moderate portion of whole or minimally processed carbohydrate; rice with vegetables and fish or chicken; or a balanced traditional meal rather than relying predominantly on refined snacks.

Do not turn healthy eating into another source of stress

One of the biggest mistakes people make is responding to stress eating with extreme dietary restriction.

Skipping breakfast after overeating the previous night, starving throughout the day or completely banning favourite foods can create a cycle of restriction, intense cravings and overeating.

Nutrition is not about achieving perfection at every meal.

It is about establishing sustainable patterns.

Regular balanced meals, adequate hydration, sufficient sleep, physical activity and effective stress-management strategies can all support healthier eating behaviour.

And if emotional eating is frequent, feels uncontrollable, causes significant distress or is associated with binge-eating behaviours, professional support may be appropriate. A clinical nutritionist, dietitian, psychologist or other qualified healthcare professional can help identify the underlying factors and develop an appropriate management plan.

The next time you find yourself standing in front of the refrigerator after a particularly stressful day, do not immediately ask, ‘What can I eat?’

First ask:

‘What is my body asking for-and what is my mind asking for?’

You may discover that you need food.

But you may also need sleep, movement, connection, reassurance, a conversation, or simply five quiet minutes away from the demands of the day.

That pause can make the difference between eating automatically and eating intentionally.

The goal is not to fear food. It is to understand your hunger well enough to know when your body needs fuel-and when your mind needs care.

Adaeze Onuabuchi is a Clinical Nutritionist and Corporate Wellness Consultant passionate about helping organizations improve employee health, energy, and productivity through practical nutrition solutions. She is the founder of Noureesh Nutrition, a wellness company delivering tailored corporate meal plans, workplace nutrition audits, and employee health programs across Nigeria. Learn more at www.noureesh.com or follow @noureesh on Instagram.

Netanyahu, under ICC arrest warrant, orders case against Erdogan

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has instructed an inter-ministerial team and the director of Israel’s International Law Department to begin preparing a potential legal case targeting Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan at the International Criminal Court (ICC), i24NEWS reported Sunday, citing sources familiar with the matter.

The reported move comes amid escalating diplomatic and legal tensions between Israel and Trkiye.

According to i24NEWS, the directive followed remarks by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan that Trkiye had approached Interpol seeking a Red Notice for Netanyahu’s arrest. The request was reportedly among several recent developments that prompted Israel to consider a legal response targeting the Turkish president.

The draft case reportedly being prepared by Israeli legal officials would focus primarily on Erdogan’s military operations and policies toward Kurdish groups and communities inside Trkiye.

The alleged case would also include claims concerning the Turkish government’s financial support for Hamas, according to i24NEWS.

Israel and Trkiye are not parties to the Rome Statute, the treaty that established the ICC, and neither country recognizes the court’s jurisdiction over its nationals on that basis.

While Israel could theoretically seek to initiate proceedings through the ICC’s available legal mechanisms, i24NEWS reported that Israeli officials believe any formal effort would be more likely to involve a third-party country that is a member of the court.

Sources cited by the outlet said Israel would prefer not to bring the case before the ICC if possible.

Instead, the reported strategy would involve preparing a complete legal file that could serve as a deterrent against further legal or diplomatic measures by Ankara.

The case would therefore remain a potential legal option rather than necessarily becoming an active ICC proceeding.

Netanyahu and officials from Israel’s Justice Ministry declined to comment on the allegations reported by i24NEWS.

Ukraine says three more settlements liberated, 250 servicemen taken prisoner in Donetsk

Ukrainian forces have liberated three more settlements in the Lyman direction of the Donetsk region during the latest stage of Operation Vivaldi, according to Ukraine’s 3rd Army Corps.

Brigadier General Andrii Biletskyi, commander of the 3rd Army Corps, said Ukrainian troops had taken control of Nove, Ridkodub and Katerynivka, while also restoring control over Karpivka and Novomykhailivka.

According to Biletskyi, Ukrainian forces regained another 51 square kilometres of territory during the third stage of the offensive, bringing the total area retaken since the operation began to 176 square kilometres.

The Ukrainian commander also claimed that Russian forces suffered around 2,000 personnel losses during the latest phase, while more than 250 Russian servicemen were taken prisoner.

The battlefield figures have been announced by the Ukrainian military and have not been independently verified.

Operation Vivaldi is a Ukrainian counteroffensive focused on the Lyman sector of Donetsk region. Earlier stages of the operation resulted in Ukrainian forces regaining control of several other settlements, including Shandryholove, Derylove and Drobysheve.

The Institute for the Study of War reported earlier this month that Ukrainian counteroffensive operations northwest of Lyman had disrupted Russian efforts in the area, while noting that Russian sources had also begun acknowledging some Ukrainian advances.