The main opposition People’s Party (PP) may be calling on Pheu Thai to abandon the Bhumjaithai-led coalition government, but rebuilding trust between the two parties could prove considerably harder than bringing them together against a common political adversary.
PP deputy leader Wiroj Lakkhanaadisorn recently urged Pheu Thai to leave the government and join the opposition, a move that could increase parliamentary pressure on Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul and undermine Bhumjaithai’s dominance.
But for Pheu Thai, the proposal raises a question that goes beyond the current balance of power: why should it trust PP now, after the two parties have repeatedly put their own political interests ahead of their relationship?
The trust deficit is not new, according to a political source.
The decisive rupture came when Pheu Thai abandoned the possibility of forming a government with the PP and instead joined forces with Bhumjaithai, resulting in the formation of the Srettha Thavisin administration.
For the PP, that decision was more than a tactical setback. It reinforced the perception that Pheu Thai was prepared to put its own political survival and access to government ahead of cooperation with a party that had emerged as a major electoral force.
The PP subsequently found its own opportunity to settle the score.
Ahead of the Feb 8 general election, it supported Mr Anutin, the Bhumjaithai leader, as prime minister of a minority government, a move viewed as partly political retaliation against Pheu Thai. In doing so, the PP effectively overlooked Pheu Thai’s own leadership aspirations.
That history makes Mr Wiroj’s latest appeal politically awkward, the source said.
The PP is now asking Pheu Thai to reverse course and join forces against the very government that the PP itself once helped facilitate. From Pheu Thai’s perspective, the proposal may therefore be viewed with considerable caution.
Political parties can forgive electoral competition. They are less likely to forget being strategically abandoned, the source said.
The problem is compounded by the fact that Pheu Thai and the PP are not simply competing parties. They are competing for overlapping territory in the broader anti-conservative and reform-oriented political space.
Any Pheu Thai decision to leave the government and join the opposition would therefore benefit the PP as much as, or potentially more than, Pheu Thai.
The PP would gain a larger opposition partner and greater parliamentary weight. It could also present itself as the natural centre of an alternative government.
Pheu Thai, meanwhile, could find itself playing second fiddle to the PP at precisely the moment when it needs to rebuild its own political identity. That is a particularly unattractive prospect for a party recovering from a serious electoral decline.
The Feb 8 election exposed the extent of Pheu Thai’s political erosion. The party suffered a major setback after years of dominance, while the fallout from the so-called ‘uncle audio clip’ episode further damaged its credibility and contributed to its diminished electoral standing.
Pheu Thai has little incentive to make another high-risk political move before it has rebuilt itself.
This is where the question of Yodchanan Wongsawat, nephew of former premier and Pheu Thai spiritual leader Thaksin Shinawatra, becomes significant.
Pheu Thai is not merely trying to survive the current parliamentary term. It needs to prepare for a leadership transition and cultivate a new political generation capable of restoring the party’s electoral competitiveness, the source said.
Mr Yodchanan could be an important part of that strategy.
If the party ultimately wants to groom him for the leadership and potentially develop him into a future prime ministerial candidate, he needs things that cannot be acquired overnight: political experience, public exposure and a track record.
Remaining in government can provide all three.
A coalition position gives Pheu Thai an opportunity to place its emerging politicians in positions where they can demonstrate competence, build networks and develop policy credentials.
It also gives the party time to gradually introduce a new generation to voters without forcing them immediately into a high-stakes opposition contest against a much stronger PP.
For Mr Yodchanan in particular, the political value of this period could be substantial.
A future prime ministerial candidate cannot be created simply by announcing his candidacy. He needs to establish a political identity of his own, demonstrate that he can handle policy and parliamentary responsibilities, and convince voters that he represents more than the legacy of the Pheu Thai political family.
That requires careful cultivation, according to the source.
A premature departure from government could complicate that process.
If Pheu Thai were to join the PP-led opposition, Mr Yodchanan would immediately be drawn into a much more confrontational political environment. Rather than being given time to develop his own profile, he could become part of an opposition struggle dominated by PP’s political agenda and leadership.
The risk is that Pheu Thai would once again be defined by its relationship with another party rather than by its own political proposition.
Staying in government gives the party greater room to manoeuvre.
Pheu Thai can use the coalition period to rebuild its organisation, revamp its public image and prepare its next generation while monitoring Bhumjaithai’s performance. It can support government policies that benefit the party politically while distancing itself from measures that are unpopular.
Most importantly, it retains the option of leaving later. That makes remaining in government less a declaration of loyalty to Bhumjaithai than a strategic holding position.
The source said Pheu Thai may calculate that its best political asset at present is time and patience.
It needs time to recover from the Feb 8 defeat. It needs time to rebuild voter confidence after the audio-clip controversy. It needs time to nurture new leaders. And it needs time to determine whether Mr Yodchanan can eventually establish himself as a credible successor capable of carrying the party into the next electoral cycle.
The PP, by contrast, has an obvious interest in forcing Pheu Thai to make a decision now.
Bringing Pheu Thai into the opposition would solidify the PP’s parliamentary position and potentially accelerate the collapse of the Bhumjaithai-led coalition. It would also allow the PP to turn the page on its own past cooperation with Mr Anutin and present itself as the centre of an anti-government alliance.
But Pheu Thai sees little reason to make the PP’s strategic objective its own. The two parties may share an interest in challenging Bhumjaithai, but that does not mean they share a common political future.
Indeed, their previous dealings provide Pheu Thai with ample reason to remain wary. If the PP was prepared to abandon Pheu Thai when circumstances changed before the election, Pheu Thai can reasonably ask what would prevent the same thing from happening again.
There is therefore a paradox at the heart of Mr Wiroj’s appeal.
The PP needs Pheu Thai to trust it at a time when the PP has not yet demonstrated that it can be trusted as a long-term political partner.
And Pheu Thai, having already paid a heavy price for its previous strategic miscalculations, may be reluctant to take another gamble.
For now, the safer calculation may be to stay put, the source said.
EC ruling fails to settle doubts
The Election Commission’s decision to refer 77 people in the Senate election collusion case to the Supreme Court’s Election Cases Division has done little to settle the controversy.
After all, the commission spared Bhumjaithai Party executives and key party figures accused of involvement, citing a lack of credible evidence against them.
The decision has drawn criticism from the opposition People’s Party (PP) and Democrat Party, as well as the civil society group iLaw, which has campaigned on the Senate election issue for almost three months.
The full commission’s decision has also raised questions about whether the EC, an independent public agency, is being influenced by political interests.
EC chairman Narong Klanwarin has insisted that the EC considered the case independently and within the framework of the law, rather than at its own discretion or under pressure from society or any particular group.
Critics point out that the 77 people referred to the Supreme Court are lower-level participants, while those believed to have played more important roles have been left untouched.
The investigation involved 67 complainants and 427 respondents, with allegations covering seven offences under the organic law on the acquisition of senators.
Of the 77 people referred to the Supreme Court, 26 are sitting senators, 36 are Senate voters, and 15 are other individuals. No reserve senators, political party executives, MPs or political office-holders were referred.
From a legal perspective, independent legal scholar What Tingsamitr said the EC appears to have applied the criminal law standard of proving a case ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ when deciding whether to refer cases to court.
Mr What, a former senior Supreme Court judge, said the EC had applied a much stricter standard than that required in the Senate election case. The law only requires ‘reasonable grounds’ for a case to be submitted for judicial review.
He also questioned whether the legal standard was being applied in a way that ran counter to the intent of the law.
According to Mr What, the Supreme Court’s approach in election-related cases has generally involved considering circumstantial evidence, voting patterns and digital evidence together.
There is not necessarily a need for a direct financial trail to establish wrongdoing, he said, adding that the EC’s claim of insufficient evidence to dismiss the cases against the others runs counter to the approach normally taken in such cases.
However, he noted that the commission has exposed itself to legal risks of its own.
If it could be proven that the commissioners deliberately acted to help certain individuals avoid scrutiny, the EC could potentially face charges of dereliction of duty under Section 157 of the Criminal Code and Section 69 of the law governing the EC.
From a political perspective, the EC’s decision is understandable, said Olarn Thinbangtieo, deputy dean of political science and law at Burapha University and chairman of the Campaign for Popular Democracy.
Referring the cases against 21 Bhumjaithai figures and executives allegedly involved in the case could have a much wider impact on the political arena, as it could put the party at risk of dissolution, he said.
Bhumjaithai is seen as an important political ally of the political establishment, making the party an asset that cannot easily be put at risk, he noted. Mr Olarn believes the Constitutional Court’s Sept 28 ruling on the use of barcodes and QR codes on ballots is likely to favour the government. The case centres on whether the systems could be used to trace ballots back to individual voters.
If the court rules that the Feb 8 election was conducted in secret, the issue will be settled. But if it finds that ballot secrecy was compromised, the election could be declared invalid and a new poll ordered, although this would affect only the party-list system.
Mr Olarn said Bhumjaithai would have only a slim chance of winning despite being the best prepared for a new election and having extensive political resources. The PP is expected to emerge stronger, making the prospect of a new election a risk that the political establishment would be reluctant to take, he added.
Political tensions are likely to remain high, with the PP expected to push hard for charter amendments, Mr Olarn said.
However, constitutional amendment requires the support of one-third of the Senate, creating a dilemma for the main opposition party, which may have to take a more flexible approach and negotiate with both senators and Bhumjaithai to reduce political tensions.
According to Mr Olarn, the two sides could work together on constitutional changes, particularly on issues such as decentralisation of power.