ASEAN Summit Manila 2026: Energy, Myanmar and a bloc under pressure

The 49th ASEAN Summit opened in Manila this weekend, as a crisis outside Southeast Asia forces the Philippines to rethink how it hosts-and underscores the bloc’s broader test of relevance.

When the conflict involving Iran disrupted shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, the shock reached Southeast Asian fuel pumps, food supplies and migrant workers within weeks.

In the Philippines, an energy emergency was declared in March. Weeks before ASEAN’s May summit in Cebu, with fuel supplies tight, there were calls to scrap or drastically cut the country’s hosting of the chairship to save on fuel and costs.

‘There was a proposal initially that we scuttle the whole hosting,’ said Undersecretary Leo Herrera-Lim, the Philippines’ ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting leader.

Other members pushed back, arguing that ASEAN had to stay relevant to the day’s problems. The Philippines kept the chairship but scaled it down.

Some of its roughly 650 meetings moved online to cut costs, and leaders narrowed their focus to food security, energy security and the safety of ASEAN nationals.

That crisis shapes the 49th Summit and Related Meetings on November 15 to 17, setting up the larger question: can ASEAN’s consensus model still deliver as energy, scams, maritime tensions and Myanmar compete for attention?

A middle-power success story

Since its founding in 1967, ASEAN has grown from a Cold War-era grouping into a market of roughly 700 million people.

As a single economy, it would rank among the world’s largest blocs. Timor-Leste is now its 11th member.

Its deeper record is peace.

Border clashes have flared, including between Thailand and Cambodia, but Southeast Asia has avoided the large-scale interstate wars analysts once feared.

Ambassador Elizabeth Buensuceso, a former Philippine permanent representative to ASEAN, credits last year’s Malaysian chair with brokering the Thai-Cambodian peace arrangement.

She argues that a chairship lets a country turn its own concerns into regional ones.

‘The national interest becomes the regional interest, and sometimes it becomes the global interest,’ she said.

Integration still lags behind the size of the market.

Herrera-Lim says only about 22 percent of ASEAN’s trade is among its own members.

The energy shock pushed the region to look inward, to consider buying food and fuel from neighbors.

Outsiders keep lining up regardless.

Slovakia, Slovenia and Cyprus are expected to accede to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, its foundational peace treaty and the usual first step toward deeper ties.

Slovakia and Slovenia are both from the European Union and NATO, and Cyprus is from the EU.

The path leads from sectoral partnership to full dialogue-partner status, which brings a seat in the summit process and, as Herrera-Lim put it, the chance to meet 22 leaders without arranging a thing.

ASEAN added Trkiye as its 12th dialogue partner this year, under stricter, published criteria.

Myanmar: The unfinished business

For nearly six years, Myanmar has tested ASEAN’s tools of persuasion and engagement, and it is the bloc’s most serious challenge.

The military leadership has pressed ahead with the elections it says will restore legitimacy and order.

International organizations, election observers and civil society groups have questioned their credibility, and armed conflict persists across large parts of the country.

The fallout crosses borders.

Thailand manages humanitarian and security pressures along its frontier. Bangladesh shelters hundreds of thousands of Rohingya refugees.

Parts of Myanmar’s borderlands have become hubs for scam compounds, human trafficking and cyber-fraud networks that reach across the region.

Leaders will review and decide on implementation of the Five-Point Consensus, the bloc’s main framework on the crisis.

East Asia Summit leaders are also expected to adopt a statement on strengthening cooperation against cyber-enabled fraud and related offenses.

Asked whether ASEAN would decide on accepting Myanmar back into the fold, DFA ASEAN spokesman Dominic Xavier Imperial pointed only to the negotiated leaders’ document, which will record whatever leaders decide.

Great powers at the table

The summit also tests ASEAN’s relevance amid the rivalry between Washington and Beijing.

US President Donald Trump will attend. He was first due to arrive shortly before the gathering’s formal close, so ASEAN made room for an ASEAN-US Special Summit to cap the final day.

The chairship handover to Singapore still goes ahead at the closing ceremony.

Imperial said the ‘special’ label refers only to the format: leaders only, for a more candid discussion.

Chinese Premier Li Qiang is also expected, despite continuing disputes with Manila in the South China Sea.

Leaders of Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand will attend.

UN Secretary-General António Guterres, IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney attend as guests of the chair.

Herrera-Lim said Canada is aggressively pursuing an ASEAN free trade agreement, to be signed ‘hopefully soon.’

For ASEAN officials, the crowd underscores ‘ASEAN centrality.’

‘It should be the ASEAN agenda,’ Buensuceso said.

Herrera-Lim explained it more vividly: ‘So it’s not discussed from the perspective of China, not discussed from the perspective of the US, it’s discussed from the perspective of the ASEAN member states.’

South China Sea: Movement, but no deal

Negotiators are unlikely to finish the Code of Conduct in Manila.

‘The self-imposed deadline is around this year,’ Herrera-Lim said, but ‘if I’m a betting person, the code of conduct will not be concluded by November.’

He remains guardedly optimistic about substantial completion within the year and noted that negotiators have held about nine meetings, as opposed to once or twice a year before.

‘We’ve probably accomplished a lot more than during the last 5 years combined,’ he said.

Imperial put progress at about 70 percent, but stressed that the figure is a rough gauge, not a count of agreed paragraphs.

He said some elements still need clarification and refinement, and that Manila wants the code to be a guide for the behavior of all parties and to respect the rights of third parties, even those outside the talks.

Building the next ASEAN

Leaders are expected to sign the Digital Economy Framework Agreement, which Herrera-Lim called probably the first of its kind for any region.

It would set common rules for digital trade, e-commerce, cybersecurity, digital payments and artificial intelligence.

‘One of the highlights would be the capacity of micro, small, and medium enterprises to access both markets and supplies under a digital framework,’ he said.

That matters in the Philippines, where 98 percent of economic units are micro, small or medium.

On energy, a study on joint oil stockpiling, approved in May, is still running, with no volume set.

Only four or five members have ratified the ASEAN Petroleum Security Agreement (APSA).

The Philippines was first, and leaders will urge the rest to hurry.

The ASEAN Power Grid would let countries trade electricity across borders, something the Philippines cannot do today.

The Philippines is also promoting RISE, its agenda for the people pillar.

It covers resilient and empowered families, including child-care reform; inclusive development, including a ‘silver economy’ that keeps senior citizens productive; smart youth and innovation, including youth digital resilience; and an environmentally sustainable, food-secure future.

The last of these ties together climate resilience, food security and disaster response. Leaders are expected to adopt the Manila-ASPECT framework to speed regional disaster response.

Imperial said ordinary Filipinos should expect decisions on energy, food security, online scams and transnational crime, and protection for migrant workers.

The Philippines has long championed migrant workers’ rights, going back to ASEAN’s 2007 declaration.

Marcos will hold the closing press conference himself.

Why it matters at home

ASEAN is a bigger trading partner than many Filipinos realize.

Political science Prof. Amador Peleo of the University of the Philippines said ASEAN’s commodity trade with the Philippines in 2025 exceeded Japan’s and nearly rivaled the United States’.

Yet awareness lags.

A survey by ERIA and the ASEAN Foundation found the lowest awareness of ASEAN in the Philippines and Myanmar, Buensuceso noted.

The summit will produce declarations and carefully negotiated statements. The harder test lies beyond them.

ASEAN has shown it can bring the world’s powers to one table.

What Manila must show is that Southeast Asia’s most important institution can solve the problems in its own neighborhood and keep the stability behind its success.

Pakistan sink hosts Bangladesh 1-0 with late win to storm into SAFF final

A late second-half strike enabled Pakistan to edge past hosts Bangladesh 1-0 and shatter their hopes of reaching the final in a fiercely contested semi-final of the 15th SAFF Football Championship played under floodlights at the National Stadium in Dhaka, Bangladesh, on Saturday.

It was a heartbreaking finish for the home side, who came agonisingly close to forcing their way into the grand finale, only to be undone by a clinical Pakistan outfit in the dying stages of the game. Pakistan finally broke the deadlock in the 86th minute, with the solitary goal proving decisive and sealing their place in tomorrow’s (17) final at the same venue.

The much-anticipated semi-final lived up to its billing, with both sides producing an entertaining contest marked by high intensity, tactical discipline, and attacking intent.

Bangladesh, buoyed by their emphatic 4-0 victory over Sri Lanka, entered the contest as favourites, backed by a vociferous home crowd that packed the stadium, waving banners and passionately cheering their beloved Bangali Tigers.

Skipper Hamza Choudhary and Farhan Ali, two overseas-based players from London, were the focal points of Bangladesh’s attacking game, with the home side banking heavily on their creativity and ability to unlock the opposition defence through incisive passing and attacking combinations.

However, the Pakistan technical bench had clearly studied their opponents well and executed a tactical game plan to neutralise the threat posed by Bangladesh’s key playmakers. Their defensive organisation and disciplined marking restricted the hosts from exploiting spaces in the final third.

Bangladesh enjoyed a few promising attacking spells and carved out some scoring opportunities, but their finishing lacked the cutting edge required at this crucial stage of the competition. Despite enjoying periods of possession and pushing forward in search of the breakthrough, they failed to find the back of the net.

With the deadlock remaining unbroken, both teams stepped up the tempo after the interval, as the contest developed into an end-to-end battle, with neither side willing to surrender territorial advantage.

Pakistan, who had shown considerable improvement following their closely fought 3-2 encounter against their traditional rivals in the curtain-raiser, began to dictate the attacking exchanges. Their forwards pressed high up the pitch, putting the Bangladesh backline under mounting pressure and forcing the home defenders into some anxious moments.

The decisive breakthrough came in the 86th minute when Pakistan striker Abdul Samad Arshad capitalised on a well-timed delivery from the midfield. Showing excellent ball control and attacking awareness, he split two Bangladesh defenders before unleashing a fierce left-footed drive that beat the goalkeeper and found the back of the net.

The late goal stunned the home crowd and left Bangladesh with little time to mount a meaningful comeback.

The closing minutes witnessed Bangladesh throwing men forward in a desperate attempt to restore parity, while Pakistan dropped deeper, tightened their defensive net, and protected their slender lead with determination. The visitors successfully weathered the late onslaught to emerge victorious and book their place in the final.

With this memorable semi-final triumph, Pakistan will now face traditional rivals India in tomorrow’s much-anticipated championship decider.

India vs. Bhutan (Semi-Final)

Earlier, India also had to dig deep to overcome Bhutan 2-1 in the other semi-final, booking their place in the final and setting up a mouth-watering showdown against Pakistan.

India will now be targeting their 10th SAFF Championship crown when the two regional football powerhouses lock horns in what promises to be a thrilling finale.

BOI links green industry to FDI at COP31

The Board of Investment of Sri Lanka (BOI) is participating in the 31st Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP31), taking place in Antalya, Trkiye, from 9 to 20 November.

Representing the BOI, Director – Environment Management Asanka Welagedara has set out how Sri Lanka’s industrial sector can decarbonise while continuing to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), generate exports, and create employment.

COP31 is framed around limiting global warming to 1.5°C, strengthening adaptation for vulnerable communities, and reaching net-zero emissions by 2050, with an emphasis on inclusive participation by business leaders, scientists, and civil society.

Last week also saw the launch, on 12 November, of the Net-Zero Recognition Framework, which recognises climate leadership by non-State actors, including companies, financial institutions, cities, and regions.

Against this backdrop, the BOI’s message is clear: sustainability is no longer only an environmental concern. It now shapes international trade, investor decisions, industrial productivity and national competitiveness.

‘Climate change has become a defining factor in international trade, investment decisions, and economic competitiveness. Industrial decarbonisation should not be considered merely a compliance obligation. It must become an integral part of Sri Lanka’s export development and foreign investment promotion strategies,’ said Welagedara.

Sustainable business as a competitive advantage

Global markets are placing growing weight on the carbon footprint of manufactured goods. Mechanisms such as the European Union’s (EU) Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, expanding sustainability-reporting requirements and the expectations of international buyers mean that low-carbon production, responsible resource management and credible environmental performance are increasingly commercial advantages.

Sri Lanka has made encouraging progress. Several leading export-oriented industries have already adopted renewable energy, cleaner production, wastewater recycling, energy-efficient technologies, and environmental management systems. Readiness, however, remains uneven, particularly among small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which face barriers in accessing green finance, modern technology, technical expertise, and reliable carbon-accounting systems.

Sri Lanka’s Third Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC 3.0) aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 20.09% against projected business-as-usual emissions over 2026-2035, with industrial efficiency, circular-economy development, and eco-industrial parks recognised as important components of the transition.

From industrial zones to low-carbon industrial ecosystems

The BOI sees a strategic opportunity to evolve its industrial zones from providers of land, power, water, and wastewater treatment into smart, integrated, resource-efficient, and low-carbon industrial ecosystems, guided by the Eco-Industrial Park concept and the principle of industrial symbiosis, under which waste materials, recovered energy, or treated wastewater from one enterprise become resources for another.

The Seethawaka Export Processing Zone offers potential for integrated resource management, improved common wastewater treatment, environmental monitoring, and industrial symbiosis.

The BOI’s work towards real-time effluent monitoring and improved wastewater and sludge management provides a foundation for stronger environmental performance and future resource recovery.

Proposed new industrial zones can integrate renewable energy, wastewater recycling, sustainable waste management, and climate-resilient design from the planning stage.

A proposed Green Investment Promotion Program would target international investors in clean energy, circular-economy technologies, industrial resource recovery, low-carbon manufacturing, and environmental infrastructure.

‘Sri Lanka can promote not merely industrial land, but a sustainable industrial ecosystem capable of meeting emerging global investment expectations,’ Welagedara said.

Investment opportunities for sustainable investors

COP31 offers Sri Lanka a platform to connect with technology providers, climate-finance institutions, development partners, and sustainable investors. The BOI has highlighted investment opportunities including:

Renewable energy systems within industrial zones

Industrial wastewater recycling and reuse

Cleaner manufacturing technologies

Waste-to-resource facilities

Eco-industrial park infrastructure

The BOI also emphasised that successful international cooperation requires technically sound, financially viable, and investment-ready projects supported by credible institutional arrangements.

SriLankan a Rs. 528 b burden on Treasury: President

President and Finance Minister Anura Kumara Dissanayake has described SriLankan Airlines as a burden on the General Treasury. He told Parliament that the airline’s accumulated losses since the State took it back in 2008 have reached Rs. 528 billion.

‘The accumulated loss of SriLankan Airlines from the date it was taken back in 2008 up to 2025 amounts to Rs. 528 billion,’ President Dissanayake said, presenting Budget 2027 on 12 November. ‘Accordingly, SriLankan Airlines has become a burden on the General Treasury.’

‘The Cabinet of Ministers has already appointed an expert committee to find the necessary solutions in this regard,’ he said. The speech did not give the committee’s membership, mandate or timeline.

The airline’s losses contrast with the turnaround the Government claims across other State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). The President said 52 key SOEs, which posted a combined net loss before tax of Rs. 774.6 billion in 2022, made a profit of Rs. 444.4 billion in 2025. By the end of August 2026 they had recorded a pre-tax profit of Rs. 367 billion.

‘This reduced the pressure on the Treasury. We turned loss-making institutions into profit-making institutions,’ President Dissanayake said.

Budget 2027: The proof of the pudding is in the execution

The intent is progressive. But for three years running, Sri Lanka has budgeted far more for development than it has managed to spend. Is the problem the estimates, or the machinery that is meant to deliver them?

The 2027 Budget, presented on 12 November, reads well. Its stated aim is to strengthen the production economy, protect small and medium industrialists, make room for investment, connect technology to the economy, protect the environment and ensure social justice. It does this while keeping to the fiscal discipline the country has painfully rebuilt since 2022.

I have no quarrel with the intent. It is progressive, and in several areas it is genuinely bold. But budgets are not judged by their speeches. They are judged by what is built, paid for and delivered by the following December. And on that measure, the record of the last two budgets should give us pause.

What the Budget gets right

There is a great deal to welcome:

Public investment of Rs. 2,000 billion, or 5.1% of GDP, up from 4.1% in 2026, covering roads and rail, drinking water, irrigation, the power grid and housing.

Relief for households: Personal

income tax relief rises from Rs. 1.8 million to Rs. 1.95 million a year, the tax bands are revised, and Rs. 230 billion goes to social protection, including Aswesuma.

Support for enterprise: About Rs. 68 billion for interest subsidies and refinancing to support Rs. 174 billion of concessionary lending to micro, small and medium enterprises; a 200% capital allowance for large export-oriented manufacturing and tourism investments; and the abolition of the Tourism Development Levy.

Institutional reform: A draft Investment Protection Bill, a holding company for 34 State-owned

enterprises, a Public-Private Partnership Act, a Digital Economy Bill and a review of labour laws.

Discipline: A primary surplus of 2.3% of GDP and an overall deficit held at 4.5% of GDP.

If all of this is delivered, 2027 could be the year Sri Lanka moves beyond stabilisation to growth. The word that matters in that sentence is ‘delivered.’

The execution gap

Here is the uncomfortable truth. For three consecutive years, the State has allocated far more for capital investment than it has spent.

2024: Capital expenditure was originally estimated at Rs. 1,525 billion. The Treasury’s own report shows Rs. 815 billion was actually spent, about half the original estimate.

2025: according to the Asian Development Bank, capital spending reached 3.0% of GDP against a target of 4.0%, roughly $ 3.3 billion against an envelope of $ 4.4 billion. Over 2022 to 2025, capital spending averaged about 3% of GDP, against the 5% to 6% typically allocated.

2026: Of a capital allocation of Rs. 1,380 billion, only 16.7% had been spent by mid-year, according to the World Bank. By the end of September, sources quoted by EconomyNext put the figure at around Rs. 385 billion, still less than 30%. Only 8% of the Rs. 500 billion budgeted for Cyclone Ditwah reconstruction had been disbursed by mid-year.

Against this record, the 2027 Budget raises the capital allocation to Rs. 2,000 billion, 45% more than the 2026 allocation, and more than five times what had been spent in the first nine months of this year. The Government says most capital spending traditionally happens in the final quarter. That may be so. But that is precisely the problem: money rushed out of the door in November and December is rarely money well spent.

Unrealistic estimates, or a machine that cannot deliver?

The question every reader should ask is why. I see two possible explanations, and the evidence suggests both are at work.

The first is that the estimates are unrealistic. Budgets in Sri Lanka have long served two purposes: as financial plans and as political statements. A large capital allocation signals ambition, even when the projects behind it are not ready. The 2024 estimates assumed that debt restructuring would be completed early and that halted foreign-funded projects would restart quickly. Neither happened in time. An IMF assessment found that only a third of major projects had feasibility studies, and that more than half entered the budget without proper appraisal. When projects are funded before they are ready, under-spending is not an accident. It is built into the budget.

The second is that the line ministries lack the capacity to deliver. The World Bank is explicit on this point. It says the under-execution ‘reflects weaknesses in public investment management, including project selection, procurement, and implementation capacity,’ and not a shortage of finance. That matters. With revenue running ahead of target, money is no longer the binding constraint. The machinery is.

The Citizens Budget itself gives a telling picture of that machinery. The public service employs over 225,000 teachers and more than 100,000 development officers. But its cadre table lists just 1,138 officers in the Sri Lanka Engineers’ Service, 802 in the Planning Service, 1,611 Sri Lanka Accountants and 55 architects. Other technical staff sit in agencies and state enterprises, but this core cadre is the one that plans, procures, supervises and pays for the roads, water schemes and canals the Budget promises. Rs. 2,000 billion of capital investment rests on a remarkably thin layer of technical capacity.

Add to this outdated procurement rules, land acquisition delays, weak coordination between agencies and the long-standing habit of starting more projects than can be finished, and the pattern becomes clear.

There is also a third, less discussed factor. In an environment of heightened scrutiny, which the country rightly demanded after 2022, many public officials have become reluctant to sign. Delay carries no personal risk; a decision that is later questioned does. Accountability is essential, but when it is not matched by clear rules and protection for honest decisions made in good faith, the safest course for an official is to do nothing. The result is a public service that is clean but slow.

Why under-spending is not a saving

Some will argue that unspent money is money saved. It is not.

It is hidden austerity. When capital spending falls short, fiscal targets are met by default, not by design. The deficit looks better, but the investment the economy needed never happened.

It costs growth. Every rupee of public investment that is not spent is a road not built, a canal not repaired, a contractor not paid and a worker not hired.

It damages credibility. Investors, contractors and the capital market plan around announced projects. Equity analysts have already rated construction and building materials companies positively on the strength of the Rs. 2,000 billion programme. If it is not delivered, that confidence will not return easily.

It weakens the case for the next Budget. Development partners watch disbursement rates. When projects stall, so does the next tranche of concessional funding.

A Budget has vision and strategy. Execution needs system, structure competency

In my work with organisations, I often use a simple framework. Vision is where we are going. Strategy is how we will get there. But neither delivers anything without a system, the processes, measures and incentives through which work actually gets done, and a structure that makes clear who owns what.

Budget 2027 has a clear vision and, in most areas, sensible choices. What it does not yet have is a delivery system and a structure of accountability strong enough to carry Rs. 2,000 billion of investment. That is where the Government’s attention must now turn.

What India does differently

On 1 February this year, India’s Finance Minister presented a Budget for 1.45 billion people in 85 minutes. India is at a very different stage, with an economy many times our size and no recent default to recover from. Its capital program of about ?12.2 trillion, roughly $ 130 billion, is beyond anything we can contemplate. But the lesson that matters is not the size of its Budget. It is the delivery.

The usual comparisons between the two budgets mislead more than they inform. Set side by side in dollars, India’s Budget dwarfs ours, and some have even claimed that Sri Lanka spends more per citizen. That ignores the fact that India’s Union Budget covers only its Central Government, while its states run most health, education and policing from their own budgets. The fairer comparison is in ratios, and there the two countries look surprisingly alike. India’s Central Government plans a fiscal deficit of 4.3% of GDP; ours is 4.5%. India spends 26% of its Budget on interest; we spend about a third. Interest absorbs about 40% of India’s central revenue and about 43% of ours. Where the two countries part company is in what happens after the Budget is passed.

In 2024-25, India’s Central Government spent about 95% of its original capital budget, against about 75% in Sri Lanka in 2025. In 2025-26, it spent about ?10.75 trillion, 98% of its revised target, as reported by Construction World citing a senior official. Sri Lanka, by contrast, had spent less than 30% of its 2026 capital allocation by the end of September.

Part of the difference lies in a discipline India has built into its Budget process. Since 2017, every major central scheme has been published with an Output-Outcome Monitoring Framework: about 400 schemes and nearly 4,000 indicators, tracked on a public dashboard and tabled in Parliament with the Budget. This is accountability demonstrated. Under India’s General Financial Rules, a scheme’s performance against those targets helps decide whether it continues and how much it receives the following year. In other words, ministries are funded for outcomes, not just for intentions.

India is not perfect. Its states, which build much of its infrastructure, struggle with capital spending too. But at the centre, it has made one thing clear: an allocation is a promise, and promises are tracked.

What must change

1. Fund only projects that are ready. No major project should enter the budget without a completed feasibility study, appraisal, land and approvals in place. Projects that are not ready should be funded for preparation, not construction.

2. Budget for outcomes and publish execution every quarter. As India does with its Output-Outcome Monitoring Framework, each ministry’s allocation should come with measurable outputs and outcomes. Parliament’s Committee on Public Finance and the public should see allocation, spending and project milestones every quarter, and next year’s allocation should depend on this year’s delivery. What gets measured and published gets managed.

3. Create a delivery unit with real authority. A small, highly skilled unit of professionals under the President, of the kind Malaysia used to drive its transformation program, should track the top 50 projects, unblock bottlenecks across ministries and report progress openly.

4. Fix procurement. Expand e-procurement, update the Administrative and Financial Regulations, set fixed timelines for each procurement stage, and delegate authority to the level where decisions can be made quickly.

5. Buy in the capacity we lack. Engage engineers, quantity surveyors and project managers on contract, use the new PPP framework, and draw on private-sector project management where the state lacks skills.

6. Protect honest decisions. Officials who follow due process and act in good faith must be protected when outcomes are later questioned. Accountability should target corruption and negligence, not judgement.

7. Budget on a realistic baseline. Start each year’s capital allocation from what was actually delivered the year before, plus a credible pipeline of ready projects. Ambition should be shown in delivery, not in the size of the allocation.

The real test

This Government came to office on a promise of a different kind of governance, and its fiscal management has earned genuine credit. Revenue is up, the deficit is under control, and the country is emerging from the IMF program in March 2027 in far better shape than it entered it.

But the next phase is harder. Stabilisation was largely about saying no: to waste, to new taxes on the wrong people, to unfunded promises. Growth is about saying yes, and then delivering. The President’s aspirations can only be realised through ministries, departments and officials who have the competency, the systems and the confidence to act.

The pudding has been well described. By 31 December 2027, we will know whether it was cooked.

Samsung retains No. 5 position in Interbrand’s Best Global Brands 2026 for seventh consecutive year

Samsung Electronics has secured the No. 5 position in Interbrand’s Best Global Brands 2026 rankings for the seventh consecutive year, with its brand value reaching $ 105.2 billion. Samsung remains the only Asia-based company to maintain a place among the world’s top five brands since 2020.

The recognition reflects Samsung’s continued growth and investments in artificial intelligence (AI), including its developments in AI semiconductors and the integration of AI experiences across its product range. Interbrand’s assessment also recognised the company’s customer-focused brand strategy under its One Samsung approach, which connects products and services across its business.

Samsung Lanka and Maldives Managing Director Dongkyun Lee said: ‘Maintaining a position among the world’s top five brands for seven consecutive years is an important recognition of Samsung’s continued focus on innovation and customer experiences. Our investments in AI, connected technologies and product development reflect our commitment to making technology more useful in people’s everyday lives. As we continue to bring these experiences to customers in Sri Lanka, this recognition reinforces the importance of building products and services around their changing needs.’

Samsung’s Device Solutions (DS) Division continued to strengthen its position in the semiconductor industry through its supply of high-value memory products to meet growing demand for AI. The division also achieved a significant technological milestone with the mass production and commercial shipment of the industry’s first HBM4 memory products.

Across its Device eXperience (DX) Division, Samsung continues to introduce AI-powered features and connected experiences across mobile devices, televisions and home appliances. Its latest innovations include the Galaxy Z Fold8, featuring a new form factor and a 4:3 display aspect ratio, expanding the possibilities of its foldable smartphone range.

Interbrand evaluates global brands annually based on financial performance, the role a brand plays in influencing customer purchasing decisions, and its overall competitive strength. The assessment also considers factors such as brand strategy, empathy, differentiation, customer engagement, consistency and trust.

The Binari slaughter

THE recent attack on the Binari community in eastern Taraba State, which left at least 80 residents dead, is yet another grim chapter in Nigeria’s unending cycle of bloodshed. According to reports, gunmen suspected to be bandits struck the community shortly after Friday prayers on October 23, killing and maiming residents. Eyewitnesses told news agencies and the police that the death toll had risen to at least 80, with many bodies later recovered from the river. Some of the victims drowned while fleeing their attackers. Reports indicated that the gunmen, riding motorcycles and linked to a bandit gang operating in the Taraba axis, swarmed Binari, killing dozens while looting and burning shops and market stalls. Particularly chilling is the account that the assailants pursued fleeing residents to the adjoining river, where many people drowned. Taraba is in north-eastern Nigeria, the epicentre of the jihadist insurgency, and has long contended with bandits and insurgents. Poorly policed rural communities have repeatedly been targeted for ransom, looting and, in some cases, illegal mineral extraction.

A resident, Bashir Mamuda Musa, described the incident: ‘On Friday, we found seven bodies after the bandits attacked our community. The following day, Saturday, we discovered another 43 bodies in the river, bringing the total to 50.’ His account was corroborated by another resident, Abdullahi Zakari, who said: ‘Many residents, including women and children, fled towards the river in an attempt to escape the gunmen. Unfortunately, several people drowned while trying to flee the attack.’ The Taraba State Police spokesman, Victor Msheliza, was quoted three days after the incident as saying that officers were still searching the area and had recovered more bodies from the river.

The questions that arise are unavoidable. Was there pre-existing ethnic tension in the area, or was this purely an attack by insurgents, possibly Fulani marauders? Given the frequency of such assaults on Nigeria’s north-eastern flank, scrutiny must also extend to the military units deployed to secure the region. Is ethnic tension affecting the leadership or operational effectiveness of the security agencies? If so, how can the repeated incursions of armed groups into vulnerable communities be halted? The Binari massacre is not an isolated event. Taraba State has a long record of communal crises and killings, frequently involving ethnic groups, farmers and herders. These outbreaks typically leave behind deaths, destruction of property, displacement, and livestock losses. The conflicts are complex, rooted in contests over land and resources, ethnicity, politics and, increasingly, pure criminality, including banditry.

History records the Tiv-Jukun conflicts of southern Taraba, centred on Wukari, Takum, Donga and surrounding areas, as among the most protracted. Outbreaks occurred in 1959, the 1980s, 1990-1992, 2001 and again around 2019, resulting in hundreds of deaths and widespread displacement. The Mambilla Plateau crisis in Sardauna Local Government Area, pitting Mambilla farmers against Fulani pastoralists, has flared repeatedly since the late 1970s and early 1980s, with further spikes in 2001-2002 and 2017-2018. Death tolls from these episodes have often run into the hundreds. More recent clashes in 2025 and early 2026 left several dead and destroyed hundreds of homes and livestock. Authorities have identified land and grazing disputes, together with cross-border violence, as key triggers.

There have been recurring herder onslaughts on farmers in Karim Lamido and northern parts of the state, involving groups such as the Bandawa, Munga, Wurkum, Karimjo and Fulani herders. In 2025 alone, dozens were killed amid escalating tensions over farm encroachment and subsequent reprisals. There is also an indication that no part of Taraba is safe from these recurring orgies of violence. In the southern Taraba axis housing the Takum, Ussa, Chanchanji, and surrounding areas, violence involving Tiv communities and herders/armed groups has been reported. There have been attacks on farming communities, with reports of dozens to scores of people killed in recent years. Other flashpoints of violence include Lau and Bali, which are noted for crises over land and fishing ponds as well as chieftaincy and boundary disputes. Reports have also confirmed that banditry, cattle rustling, and cross-border crimes occasioned by the porous borders between Nigeria and Cameroon have increasingly overlapped to complicate the communal tension in those areas. The unprovoked attack on Binari on October 23, which claimed at least 80 innocent lives and was accompanied by looting and arson, adds another blood-soaked entry to Taraba’s catalogue of violent excesses.

What, then, is to be done? We call on the Governor of Taraba State, Agbu Kefas, a retired military officer, to discharge the responsibilities of Chief Security Officer of the state as envisaged by the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria. Rather than merely lamenting each fresh outbreak or repeating casualty figures from his office, the governor can take more decisive action. He should coordinate local vigilante groups capable of supplying the military, the Department of State Services (DSS), and the police with precise, community-based intelligence on the movements and methods of these attackers. Security agencies, for their part, must identify the perpetrators and bring them to justice. It is a well-established truth that failure to punish crime only encourages its repetition. Beyond prosecuting those responsible for the Binari killings, the state and the Federal Government must dismantle the networks and enabling structures that continue to sustain these rampaging terrorists. The time to save Nigerians, whether in Binari, Barkin-Ladi, Zuru, Opobo, or Escravos, is now.

Another $2bn super grid? Like Adelabu, like Tegbe?

NIGERIA has developed a troubling habit of announcing multibillion-dollar electricity projects without first demonstrating why existing infrastructure fails to deliver electricity. On 9 November 2026, Minister of Power Joseph Tegbe announced a $2 billion East-West Super Grid, promising transmission capability of 19,000 megawatts (MW) within 18 to 24 months. The announcement echoed a similarly priced proposal by his immediate predecessor, Adebayo Adelabu, barely thirteen months earlier.

But what precisely is the problem this investment intends to solve? Is Nigeria’s principal electricity challenge inadequate transmission infrastructure, insufficient generation availability, or systemic failures across the electricity value chain requiring an integrated solution?

Adelabu’s Proposal, Tegbe’s announcement

On 6 October 2025, Adelabu disclosed that the Federal Government was negotiating a $2 billion loan from the Export-Import Bank of China to construct a Super Grid linking eastern and western Nigeria. The Federal Executive Council had reportedly approved the financing proposal, intended to strengthen transmission infrastructure and attract industrial consumers back to the national grid. Tegbe’s proposed network would traverse Funtua, Gwagwalada, Ikot Ekpene, Benin, Epe and Ilorin. Presidential approval has reportedly been secured, and procurement initiated. The parallels are striking: the same administration, identical price tag and east-west transmission objective, but a different minister.

Is Tegbe implementing Adelabu’s proposal, redesigning it, or introducing another project? What became of the Chinese financing negotiations? Was any loan agreement concluded? Has an independent feasibility assessment established the project’s economic viability? The financing structure remains unclear. Nigerians deserve to know whether it involves sovereign borrowing, private investment, public expenditure or contingent liabilities that future taxpayers may inherit.

The forensic evidence the minister cannot ignore

In my earlier forensic investigation into Nigeria’s power-sector physical and financial losses, I examined 28 grid-connected power plants between April 2025 and March 2026. The findings exposed a troubling generation crisis.I classified 11 plants as Critical, with time-weighted availability of 25 per cent or less, and another nine as Poor, with availability above 25 but not exceeding 50 per cent. Altogether, 20 plants, representing 71.4 per cent of Nigeria’s grid-connected generating stations, fell within these categories.

These plants possessed approximately 9,896 MW of installed capacity, yet their combined average available capacity was only 2,467 MW. The 11 Critical plants alone accounted for 4,816 MW of installed capacity but contributed approximately 427 MW on average. Across the April 2025-March 2026 study period, national average available generation capacity was approximately 5,174 MW, while actual generation averaged just 4,312 MW. Available capacity declined from 5,400.38 MW in the fourth quarter of 2025 to 4,457.96 MW in the first quarter of 2026. Thus, only 32.7 per cent of Nigeria’s 13,625 MW installed generation capacity was available on average during that quarter. Installed capacity represents a generating plant’s rated output; available capacity reflects what it can supply under prevailing operating conditions, accounting for equipment failures, maintenance, fuel shortages and other constraints.

Some reports defending the Super Grid have described Nigeria’s installed generation capacity exceeding 13,000 MW as available for evacuation. This confuses installed capacity with operational availability. Transmission investment must be justified against electricity that generating plants can realistically produce, not merely their nameplate capacity. These findings, documented in my four-part series published in this column between 24 August and 21 September 2026, should be on Tegbe’s desk before he advances another multibillion-dollar transmission proposal.

How does a transmission network targeting 19,000 MW address Nigeria’s severe generation constraints? On 8 June 2026, TCN Managing Director Sule Ahmed Abdulaziz stated that Nigeria’s transmission network possessed 8,700 MW of wheeling capacity, against a historical peak of just 5,801.84 MW recorded on 4 March 2025. He maintained that transmission was not the principal constraint in the electricity value chain. Transmission lines do not manufacture electricity. Transformers cannot compensate for unavailable turbines. Additional corridors cannot independently restore defective generating units, guarantee gas supply, or resolve financial obligations undermining electricity production.

The minister may argue that transmission bottlenecks prevent available generation from reaching consumers. But where is the evidence? Which plants are constrained, how many megawatts are stranded, for how long, and at what financial cost? Low generation availability does not establish that every transmission corridor is underutilised; some may experience serious congestion. Moreover, TCN’s 8,700 MW capacity estimate was based on network simulations, not a demonstrated nationwide operating capability. Nevertheless, localised constraints do not automatically justify a $2 billion expansion.

The economics of expanding transmission capacity without electricity

At an illustrative exchange rate of ?1,350 per dollar, the proposed $2 billion investment represents ?2.7 trillion. Nigeria undoubtedly needs a stronger transmission network. Long-term demand growth, new generation projects, regional electricity trade and grid resilience may justify investment ahead of present supply. But where is the independently verified development plan demonstrating that a 19,000 MW-capable network is necessary, appropriately phased and economically preferable to targeted upgrades?

Suppose Nigeria rehabilitates existing generating plants, resolves gas-supply constraints and restores several thousand megawatts of unavailable capacity. What targeted transmission upgrades would be required to evacuate that electricity? Conversely, if the Super Grid is completed while generation availability remains around 4,500 MW, how much additional electricity would consumers actually receive? Answering these questions requires integrated power-system planning, including generation-mix optimisation, transmission load-flow and contingency studies, and independently verified cost-benefit analysis.

The government must quantify the additional electricity consumers would receive, expected network utilisation, transmission-loss reductions, financing costs and economic returns. These benefits must be compared with the costs and delivery timelines of generation rehabilitation, targeted transmission upgrades and distribution-loss reduction. The decisive measure should be the additional reliable kilowatt-hours delivered per naira invested.

A broken electricity value chain

Nigeria’s electricity crisis extends beyond generation and transmission. My forensic investigation also classified six of the country’s 11 electricity distribution companies as Critical or Poor based on their aggregate technical, commercial and collection losses. Even where electricity is generated and transmitted, distribution companies must have the capacity to deliver it and recover payment. A Super Grid cannot independently resolve overloaded distribution transformers, defective feeders, electricity theft, inadequate metering, poor revenue collection or accumulated sectoral debts. Indeed, Tegbe has acknowledged substantial outstanding financial obligations and serious underperformance at existing generating plants. These admissions reinforce the need for disciplined investment prioritisation.

What would it cost to restore approximately 3,000 MW of unavailable generation capacity and undertake the complementary transmission upgrades necessary to deliver that electricity reliably? What investment would substantially reduce distribution losses? What investment would substantially reduce distribution losses?

Minister Tegbe, show nigerians the business case

Presidential approval is not a substitute for technical feasibility, nor does Federal Executive Council authorisation establish economic viability.

Before committing public resources, the Ministry of Power must publish the project’s engineering specifications, independently reviewed feasibility studies, procurement framework, financing arrangements and projected economic returns.

The National Assembly must scrutinise any proposed borrowing, sovereign guarantees, foreign-exchange exposure and contingent liabilities. Independent assessments must establish whether the proposed 19,000 MW transmission capability is justified by realistic generation expansion, electricity demand and distribution-network capacity. After all, transmission capability is not electricity generated, dispatched or delivered.

Nigeria does not lack ambitious electricity announcements. It lacks reliable delivery, integrated infrastructure planning and accountability for existing assets.

President Tinubu and Minister Tegbe must demonstrate that this $2 billion investment addresses identifiable electricity-system constraints, delivers greater economic benefits than alternative interventions and increases reliable electricity supply to consumers. Nigeria needs independently justified infrastructure investment, not another multibillion-dollar exercise in political image-building.

Equality before the law is not an assault on Buddhism

The ugly scenes witnessed in Anuradhapura last week were not merely an embarrassment involving a handful of unruly Buddhist monks but a disturbing reminder of how far the institution of the Sangha has fallen from the moral authority, dignity and public respect it once commanded.

For centuries, the Buddhist Sangha occupied a position of extraordinary respect in Sri Lanka. Its authority rested not on political power, wealth or the ability to intimidate, but on discipline, restraint, learning and spiritual example. Monks commanded the devotion of ordinary people and the patronage of political leaders because they represented something above the petty ambitions of worldly politics. Their influence was rooted in moral authority.

That relationship began to change as Buddhist monks increasingly entered the political arena, particularly following the watershed year of 1956. The politicisation of the Sangha progressively blurred the distinction between religious leadership and political activism. Instead of standing as a moral conscience capable of holding governments accountable, sections of the clergy became participants in political mobilisation, ethnic nationalism and struggles for power.

The entry of Buddhist monks into Parliament in 2001 accelerated this deterioration. The sight of monks engaging in parliamentary politics was a powerful departure from the traditional understanding of their vocation. The consequences have been profound. Political loyalties, ideological divisions and the pursuit of influence have increasingly displaced the qualities that should define religious leadership.

This process reached another level during the Rajapaksa years, when a distinctly political-religious establishment took shape. Patronage extended to selected monks and temples became increasingly intertwined with political allegiance and support for the regime’s projects. Religious institutions were drawn into the machinery of political power, while sections of the clergy became enthusiastic defenders of a particular political order. Buddhism was too often deployed as an instrument of political legitimacy rather than protected as a universal moral tradition.

That political-religious arrangement is now under strain. The Government of President Anura Kumara Dissanayake has signalled a departure from the established practice of using religion as an instrument of political patronage. Its rejection of preferential political relationships with sections of the Buddhist clergy represents an important test of whether Sri Lanka can finally establish a more equal relationship between the State and its religious institutions.

The Government must not retreat in the face of pressure, intimidation or accusations that enforcing the law against Buddhist monks amounts to an attack on Buddhism. Such arguments are fundamentally dishonest. No religious robe should provide immunity from the law, and no institution, however historically respected, should be permitted to place itself above the Constitution.

Indeed, equality before the law is not an assault on Buddhism. It is entirely consistent with the principles of justice, compassion and restraint that underpin the Buddha’s teachings. The responsibility, however, does not rest with the Government alone. The wider Buddhist establishment must confront the crisis within its own ranks. The Sangha needs to reclaim its independence from political parties, restore meaningful standards of monastic discipline and demonstrate that those who repeatedly bring the institution into disrepute cannot continue to hide behind the authority of the robes they wear.

If the Sangha is to recover its dignity, it must rediscover the discipline that once made it worthy of public respect. The Government must uphold the law without fear or favour. And the Buddhist establishment must recognise that the greatest threat to Buddhism today may not come from outside, but from those within who have abandoned the very principles taught by the Master 25 centuries ago.

Eleven die in choking smoke from Phuket fire

Fire gutted five shophouse in tambon Patong of Kathu district early Monday morning. Eleven people died in the smoke and flames and 16 others were injured.

Some of those who died had phoned friends or relatives as they desperately fought the thick smoke, trying to escape the blaze.

The fire on Phangmuang Sai Kor Road began about 3.15am when a roadside transformer exploded and the flames hit a coin-operated fuel dispenser in front of a motorcycle rental business.

The flames first spread into the shop and then to four adjacent shophouses. Firefighters took about two hours to control the fire.

Patong deputy mayor Sanakorn Keesin said there were about 100 motorcycles stored there for rent. The thick smoke choked and suffocated people living in the buildings as they tried to reach the rooftop.

The Phuket Public Relations Office said petrol and lubricants were also stored in the motorbike shop and workers lived on the upper floors of the premises.

Eight women and three men were confirmed killed and 16 people injured, four men and 12 women. One was from Myanmar and the rest Thai.

Phuket police commander Pol Maj Gen Surachai Suksai said police had CCTV footage and witnesses and had already ruled out arson.

Phuket governor Chotenarin Kerdsom said an initial investigation found that a short circuit probably occurred on a substation power pole in front of the motorcycle shop during a storm.

He said all those killed were apparently trying to escape the fire, as they had their bags with them. Investigators learned that they had phoned friends and relatives during their desperate attempt to escape. They had no obvious injuries and apparently died from inhaling the thick, choking smoke, the governor said.