When the European Political Community (EPC) was established in 2022, its ambition was to create a broader political space in which European countries, regardless of their membership in the European Union, could discuss common security challenges, economic interests and the continent’s geopolitical future. For Azerbaijan, however, the initiative offered something more than an opportunity to advance its national interests in a diplomatic environment where the country’s relations with Armenia, European energy security and the future of Eurasian connectivity could be discussed at the highest political level.
Four years later, the results of Baku’s engagement are becoming increasingly visible. Azerbaijan has used the platform to reinforce the international recognition of its territorial integrity, challenge approaches it considers inconsistent with the principles of sovereignty, strengthen its position as an energy and transport partner, and secure an agreement to host the EPC summit in 2028. The evolution of this engagement also reveals an important feature of Azerbaijani diplomacy, where participation in international institutions is treated as an instrument whose value depends on the political outcomes it can deliver.
The first and arguably most consequential chapter began in Prague in October 2022. On the sidelines of the inaugural EPC summit, President Ilham Aliyev met Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in the presence of French President Emmanuel Macron and then European Council President Charles Michel. The resulting statement confirmed the commitment of Armenia and Azerbaijan to the United Nations Charter and the 1991 Alma-Ata Declaration, under which the two countries recognised each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.
The political significance of this formulation extended beyond the immediate diplomatic language. For Baku, the reference to the Alma-Ata Declaration established a framework for the mutual recognition of internationally recognised borders, including Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. President Aliyev subsequently described Pashinyan’s position at the meeting as recognition of Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan, a point he identified as one of the principal reasons for considering the Prague negotiations positive.
The meeting also exposed the limits of European involvement in the security arrangements between the two countries. Although the initial agreement provided for an EU civilian monitoring presence along the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, Azerbaijan agreed to cooperate with the mission only insofar as it concerned its side. The EU subsequently deployed its monitoring capacity on the Armenian side of the border, rather than on Azerbaijani territory. For Baku, this distinction was important: international monitoring could not automatically translate into an external presence on its sovereign territory.
The second summit, held in Moldova’s Bulboaca in June 2023, demonstrated that the Prague format had not been a one-off diplomatic exercise. President Aliyev attended personally and participated in discussions with Pashinyan, Macron, Michel and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. The agenda extended beyond territorial questions to include border delimitation, the normalisation of relations, regional transport communications and the broader security environment.
Yet the following summit in Granada in October 2023 demonstrated that Baku was equally prepared to use non-participation as a political signal. President Aliyev declined to attend amid disagreements over the diplomatic approach towards Azerbaijan, particularly following criticism of its September 2023 military operation that restored its control over the remaining parts of its internationally recognised territory. The planned meeting involving the Azerbaijani and Armenian leaders, France, Germany and the European Council did not take place.
This decision illustrated a recurring principle in Azerbaijan’s approach to the EPC: the value of a diplomatic platform is closely connected to the conditions under which negotiations take place. Baku has maintained that mediation requires impartiality and has objected to formats in which it believes its position is prejudged. Whether European capitals share that interpretation is a separate question, but the Granada episode demonstrated that Azerbaijan was unwilling to participate simply for the sake of maintaining a diplomatic presence.
By July 2024, the emphasis of Azerbaijan’s engagement had broadened considerably. At the fourth EPC summit in Oxford, President Ilham Aliyev participated in a roundtable on energy and connectivity, highlighting the country’s growing importance to Europe’s energy security. He reiterated Azerbaijan’s ambition to double its gas supplies to Europe by the end of 2027, building on the strategic partnership in the energy field established with the European Union.
The figures presented by the Azerbaijani leader illustrated the scale of the ambition. Azerbaijani gas supplies to the European continent had increased from approximately 8 billion cubic metres in 2021 to a projected 13 billion cubic metres in 2024. Total gas exports were also expected to rise from 18 billion cubic metres in 2021 to 25 billion cubic metres in 2024. The objective was to reach annual deliveries of 20 billion cubic metres to the EU by 2027, provided that the necessary commercial and infrastructure conditions were maintained.
The significance of this energy relationship extends beyond the volumes themselves. Following Europe’s efforts to diversify its energy supplies after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Azerbaijan has acquired additional strategic relevance as a supplier connected to European markets through the Southern Gas Corridor. For Baku, this has created an opportunity to translate its energy resources into diplomatic influence and a more substantial role in European economic and security calculations.
Aliyev did not attend the fifth summit in Budapest in November 2024, citing other important commitments. His absence, however, did not interrupt Azerbaijan’s engagement with the organisation. By the time the sixth summit convened in Tirana in May 2025, the country’s diplomatic priorities had expanded further towards regional connectivity and the political future of the South Caucasus.
Meetings with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa provided an opportunity to reinforce Azerbaijan’s position as an important and reliable EU partner. European leaders highlighted the country’s contribution to energy security and its role in the Middle Corridor, the transport network connecting Central Asia and Europe through the Caspian Sea and the South Caucasus.
Tirana also became an important turning point in the diplomatic arrangements surrounding the future of the EPC. European leaders sought Aliyev’s views on holding the next summit in Armenia in May 2026. He supported the proposal while requesting that a subsequent meeting be organised in Azerbaijan to preserve a balanced approach. The proposal was accepted, establishing the political basis for Azerbaijan to host the 2028 summit.
The reciprocal nature of this arrangement became particularly significant at the seventh summit in Copenhagen in October 2025. Against the background of the ongoing Armenia-Azerbaijan normalisation process, Baku supported Armenia’s initiative to host the following summit, while Yerevan backed Azerbaijan’s candidacy for 2028. This exchange represented more than a procedural agreement between two neighbouring countries. It offered a visible demonstration of how diplomatic cooperation could accompany the transition from decades of confrontation towards a different regional relationship.
The eighth summit, held in Yerevan in May 2026, brought this process into sharper focus. President Aliyev addressed the gathering by video link, marking his first participation in a high-level event hosted in Armenia. His decision to join remotely was itself politically significant. It allowed Azerbaijan to support the Armenian-hosted meeting without requiring the Azerbaijani President’s physical presence in the country.
In his address, Aliyev reaffirmed Baku’s support for holding the summit in Armenia and formally invited EPC members to Azerbaijan in May 2028. He also emphasised that Armenia had supported Azerbaijan’s candidacy. Referring to the principles underpinning the peace process, he stressed that Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity was no less valuable than that of any other state, while criticising what he described as double standards within certain European institutions towards the conflict and its resolution.
The symbolism of the exchange was difficult to overlook. A platform that had initially provided a setting for negotiations over borders, sovereignty and the consequences of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict was now facilitating reciprocal support for the two countries’ hosting ambitions. It does not, by itself, eliminate outstanding disagreements or guarantee that every element of normalisation will proceed without difficulty. Nevertheless, it reflects a change in the diplomatic environment in which bilateral relations are being managed.
The broader significance of Azerbaijan’s EPC engagement lies in the way several national priorities have gradually converged. Territorial integrity remains central to Baku’s diplomatic agenda, but energy security, transport infrastructure and the development of the Middle Corridor have become increasingly important dimensions of its European policy. These interests reinforce one another: Azerbaijan’s geographical position gives it relevance to European connectivity, while its energy resources and regional diplomatic relationships provide additional channels of engagement with European capitals.
There is also a political dimension to the decision to host the 2028 summit. Baku will have an opportunity to bring European leaders together at a time when the South Caucasus is seeking to move beyond the legacy of conflict and establish itself as a more integrated economic and transport space. The meeting could also strengthen Azerbaijan’s visibility in discussions concerning Europe’s relationship with Central Asia, the Caspian region and the wider Eurasian transport network.
Ultimately, the progression from Prague to Baku illustrates how Azerbaijan has approached the EPC as a flexible instrument of foreign policy rather than merely another international gathering. It has participated when the platform offered opportunities for negotiations and strategic cooperation, declined to attend when it considered the diplomatic conditions unacceptable, and used its subsequent engagements to broaden the agenda towards energy and connectivity.
The 2028 summit will therefore represent both a diplomatic milestone and an opportunity to demonstrate the practical results of this approach. For Azerbaijan, the challenge will be to turn the political significance of hosting Europe’s leaders into sustained economic partnerships, stronger regional connectivity and a more durable framework for peace in the South Caucasus. The journey from Prague to Baku has established the diplomatic setting. What happens in Baku will help determine its longer-term significance.