Beware a job interview can now open the door to a bank heist

Most of us assume that someone who has passed an interview, supplied identification and received a company email address has been properly verified. We also assume that a recruiter offering a promising career opportunity represents a real employer. Criminals can exploit both assumptions.

The recent Binance breach offers an alarming example. According to the cryptocurrency exchange’s account, reported by CoinDesk, attackers approached an engineer through a fictitious recruitment process.

During an interview, the engineer was persuaded to download a coding assignment containing malicious software. The reported $6.3 billion theft followed a campaign involving compromised employees and internal systems. The opening was familiar: a better job, a convincing conversation and a seemingly reasonable request.

For many Kenyans, cryptocurrency may seem far removed from the daily business of paying school fees, running a shop or repaying a loan. But the method should concern any organisation whose employees can access money or personal information. A criminal who compromises the right person may gain entry to systems that thousands of customers depend on.

Imagine an accountant receiving an attractive offer from a supposed recruitment agency. Before the next interview, the accountant is asked to download a file. Elsewhere, a company hires a remote technician with an impressive CV, unaware that the applicant is using someone else’s identity. Both situations could begin with an ordinary employment conversation and end with an outsider inside the business.

They are different problems. One involves deceiving a genuine employee. The other involves getting an impostor hired. Employers need to understand the distinction because each requires a different response.

Know Your Employee, or KYE, starts with establishing who a person is and checking the claims relevant to their work. Does their identification belong to them? Can their qualifications be confirmed? Can previous employment be verified through a reliable source?

Across African markets, answering them can require navigating different identity systems, institutions and record formats.

The stakes extend beyond whether someone can perform a job. A payroll officer handles colleagues’ financial details. A customer service employee may see identity documents. A technician may have permission to change systems used throughout a company. For a criminal, the attraction of a position may be the access it provides.

International authorities have documented organised efforts to exploit this opportunity. The FBI has warned that North Korean IT workers using deceptive identities have obtained employment, stolen sensitive company information and extorted employers. Canadian authorities have also warned about workers posing as legitimate freelancers.

For Kenyan businesses, these warnings raise a practical question: would our own processes detect a similar deception?

A sensible response begins before a company issues credentials. Identity and background checks should reflect the responsibilities of the role. References should be checked through independently established contact details. Positions involving payments, sensitive records or extensive control over computer systems deserve particular attention.

The same principle applies to contractors. A business may have a longstanding relationship with its technology provider while knowing little about the individual maintaining its systems. When work passes through several suppliers, responsibility can become blurred. The business still needs to know who has access, what they can do and who approved it.

But checking applicants cannot prevent a genuine employee from being deceived by a fake recruiter. That requires clear guidance about unfamiliar downloads, interview assignments and requests to install software on work devices. Staff should know where to seek help when an approach feels suspicious.

They should also feel able to speak up after making a mistake. If reporting a questionable download invites humiliation, an employee may remain silent. Early reporting gives the business a better chance to investigate and contain the damage.

Access itself should be proportionate. Employees should receive the permissions their work requires, with reviews when responsibilities change and prompt removal when they leave. A trusted employee can still have a compromised account. Sensible limits help protect both the individual and the organisation.

Verification must also respect applicants. Checks should be relevant, personal information should be handled carefully, and people should have a way to correct errors. Honest candidates benefit when they can establish their credentials through a fair and reliable process.

Customers rarely see these decisions. A patient does not know who can open a hospital record. A borrower does not know which contractor maintains a lending platform. They depend on the institution to make those judgments responsibly.

That is why knowing employees belongs alongside knowing customers. Every person granted access becomes part of the chain of trust protecting the public.

Before handing over the keys, businesses need to know who is receiving them.

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