CALLS to declare China’s ambassador Jing Quan persona non grata deserve more than a shouting match-rather, a meeting of the National Security Council (NSC).
The row began when Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro called Beijing a ‘regional troublemaker.’ Jing hit back a day later, saying China could ‘easily win’ if it chose to use force, but that it chooses peace. The latter also described relations between the two countries as ‘extremely sensitive.’
Many lawmakers heard a threat veiled in a reassurance. Senator Risa Hontiveros said the Chinese envoy should be declared persona non grata unless he clarified, and by the weekend other legislators were demanding his expulsion.
Whether that reading is fair hardly matters. What does is whether the government has measured what a further slide in relations with Beijing would cost.
We have been here before. Earlier this year, when similar calls surfaced, Malacañang said the President’s answer was ‘no.’ The Department of Foreign Affairs described expulsion as a last resort with ‘tremendous implications,’ and reciprocal action. Beijing has already signaled its own response: Its embassy said Jing would leave if Marcos asked, and that other Chinese diplomats would leave with him.
The legal authority is clear. Article 9 of the Vienna Convention lets a host state expel any diplomat at any time without explaining itself. What follows is less clear. Manila should expect Beijing to expel our ambassador in return. Embassies would stay open, and relations would formally survive, but the channels between the two governments would narrow just when they are most needed. In a crisis, less direct contact means more room for misreading and escalation.
Possible aftereffects
THE diplomatic fallout may be the lesser problem. The bigger exposure is economic, and it sits on the import side. In 2025, the Philippines bought $38.22 billion worth of goods from China-28.6 percent of its total imports-and that share has climbed in recent years.
Our country sold China about $9.3 billion-roughly 11 percent of its exports. That left a bilateral gap of nearly $29 billion, more than half of the country’s entire $49.72 billion trade deficit. In this relationship, Manila needs Chinese supply far more than Beijing needs Philippine goods.
Chinese capital is a thinner thread, but not a negligible one. Foreign investment approvals fell by half last year to P272.38 billion, with Singapore leading at P92.78 billion. Yet 189 Chinese firms operate inside the Philippine Economic Zone Authority areas, with cumulative investments of P47.3 billion and more than 46,000 jobs, according to the agency’s figures. Those are Filipino workers whose employers sit on the other side of this dispute.
So the vulnerability is not mainly lost sales or lost capital. It is the factories, builders and retailers that depend on Chinese components, materials and goods, and the jobs tied to Chinese-owned plants. Trade would not stop overnight, and the economy is more diversified than many assume. But a prolonged chill could delay orders, raise input costs, spook investors, and reduce Chinese tourism.
The NSC should ask which supply lines have no ready substitute, how quickly options could be found, and how much disruption key sectors can absorb before jobs and growth suffer. These are national-security questions, as much as economic ones.
Rivalry ripples
SAME goes for Filipinos living and working in mainland China, Hong Kong and Macau-among them professionals, teachers, domestic workers and business executives. No one is saying Beijing would target them, but responsible governments plan for contingencies, not just certainties. If the dispute drags on, will our consular posts have the people and resources to help a Filipino facing a legal, labor, or immigration problem?
Then, there is critical infrastructure. Rivalry between states now reaches the systems that keep a country running: power grids, telecommunications, Internet networks, banks and government databases. Do utilities, telcos, banks and agencies work from a common contingency framework? Could the country ride out a serious disruption to electricity or communications? A failure in either would quickly spread to banking, transport, emergency services, and government.
billboards do the job socmed
The information front deserves attention as well. Influence operations do not always try to persuade. Often the aim is simply to confuse, deepen divisions, and erode trust in institutions.
None of this may happen. The NSC’s task is not to forecast Beijing’s next move. Its task is to find the weak points, quantify the risks, and have responses ready before events dictate the pace.
The Philippines may well decide that defending its interests is worth the price. That is a legitimate choice. But statecraft takes more than resolve. If calls to expel Jing keep gaining ground, Filipinos are entitled to know the consequences to trade and investment, the exposure of our power and telecommunications networks, and the safety of our kababayans in China.
That’s what the NSC is for. Not after Beijing makes its next move, but before it does.