Despite its status as the biggest example of regional integration, the European Union remains greatly affected by internal divisions. These continue to threaten the EU’s pursuit of strategic actorness, a complex process whose primary aim is to establish Brussels as an autonomous decision-maker on the international stage. Divisions between member states are wide-ranging, affecting multiple policy areas. Whether regarding the EU’s still-evolving enlargement agenda or the extent of its engagement with partners such as Trkiye, member state divergences threaten to undermine the EU’s ability to act swiftly and strategically in the most crucial and pressing moments. Given the scale of unpredictability which characterizes contemporary affairs, and also the considerable ground the EU must still make to close the capabilities gap with other major global powers, this uncertainty threatens to further weaken the EU’s global influence.
The fragmentation which is regularly assigned to the EU’s actorness can be placed in two overarching categories. The first concerns strategic divergence between key member states on several essential aspects of EU policy, including defence and security, enlargement and even migration. The second factor concerns internal dynamics in leading EU countries, which could alter the EU’s overall course and nature as an institution. In addition to present-day disagreements between key members on existing policy issues, the EU faces equally challenging long-term obstacles in the face of domestic political uncertainty experienced by its leading actors. This deserves just as much recognition as the ongoing divisions between key EU leaders.
External partners – the Trkiye case
Disagreements between member states continue to span a range of areas. One of the most notable and consequential examples for the EU’s status as an actor are its relations with states which are not members but widely considered to be indispensable partners. The relationship with Trkiye is a useful and prominent example. For several years, the EU and its member states have struggled to voice a unanimous and clear-cut position on its relationship with Ankara. Even if officials in Brussels publicly recognize Ankara’s strategic importance for the European continent and voice support for closer ties, it is apparent that this remains a relationship with considerable untapped potential. Altering dynamics in the transatlantic relationship and the United States’ reconsideration of its role in NATO have urged the EU to reexplore some of its other important relationships. Nevertheless, in the case of Trkiye, this has not occurred in line with a consistent strategy. For instance, the backbone of the relationship remains the EU-Trkiye Customs Union, which, since entering into force in December 1995, has not been modified or upgraded. Undeniably, the two sides are major economic partners, with Ankara ranking as the EU’s fifth-largest trading partner in the second quarter of 2026. However, politically and institutionally, the relationship remains underexplored. Over the course of recent years, the EU’s political approach to Trkiye has failed to reflect the magnitude of their economic ties and Ankara’s growing geopolitical significance for the European continent. On the one hand, there is recognition that without Trkiye’s involvement in key defence and security programmes, the EU will be unable to achieve the operational independence it desires. This stems from both Ankara’s status as NATO’s second-largest military power and its highly influential position in various regions of the world, making it an indispensable partner at this moment in time. However, in practice, member state opposition to Trkiye’s involvement in schemes such as SAFE (Security Action for Europe) demonstrates that the EU remains insufficiently united on the Trkiye matter. Certain individual leaders, namely French President Emmanuel Macron, have on multiple occasions adopted highly confrontational positions which have attempted to depict Trkiye as a negative force for NATO and other Western institutions. Moreover, France’s involvement in matters directly relating to Trkiye’s national interests, most notably in Ankara’s relations with Greece and Cyprus, has served as a step directly undermining the broader EU-Trkiye relationship.
Internal dynamics – persisting and wide-ranging division
Relations with external partner states are just one example of the underlying dynamic. EU member states, including those considered the most powerful and influential, regularly disagree and fail to align in the most critical moments. The recent migration crisis that affected Spain, when hundreds of migrants crossed the border from Morocco into Ceuta, Spain’s North African exclave, was another demonstration. First, diplomatic tensions erupted as several member states, including France, criticized Spain for the management of its border security and reinstated border checks on travel to and from the country. Further examples of disjointed responses to crises include the war in Ukraine, where issues such as the use of frozen Russian assets regularly cause public disagreements between member states. Only recently, four member states (the Netherlands, Spain, Poland and Sweden) proposed to reopen conversations on using the frozen assets for sending support to Ukraine. However, only last year, Belgium firmly rejected the idea due to potential legal complications. This reignites the decades-long conversation about the nature of the EU as an actor, which focuses on the complex balance between state sovereignty and national interests and the ‘sacrifices’ which come with regional integration.
Another recent example of this tension concerns the EU’s budget, the expansion of which is another major topic for debate. Only recently, it was reported that six member states (Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, Austria, Finland and Sweden) called for the EU’s budget to be scaled down from what they consider to be excessive spending commitments. This particularly concerns areas like security cooperation and migration, which place additional pressure on already strained national budgets. In addition to budgetary issues, conversations about structural reform of the EU’s diplomatic service have also been on the agenda. This is another issue characterized by disagreement, with different member states proposing different models. Some proposals included shifting all foreign policy responsibilities to the European Commission, while another suggests a greater role for the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Hence, one can reasonably conclude that, despite the geopolitical environment facing the EU, which a priori should have resulted in more unity and less fragmentation has instead affected multiple levels of the institution. In addition to member state division on ad-hoc issues, there is also uncertainty surrounding the EU’s broader institutional structure.
Divisions between member states affect more than just projects at the EU level, as they also have implications for bilateral initiatives which are designed to enhance Europe’s overall defence readiness. One such example is the failed FCAS (Future Combat Air System) project between France and Germany. The programme, of which the agreement to develop a joint fighter jet formed an integral part, was launched in 2017 and described as important for the reset of Franco-German relations. However, the project’s development stalled due to disagreements between French and German industry representatives over technical implementation and, crucially, the leading role in the process. This points to a deeper issue: two countries considered integral to the EU’s pursuit of autonomous defence capabilities have adopted divergent approaches. In France’s case, deeper integration under the EU umbrella and greater leadership in advancing the European defence sector are currently among the country’s key foreign policy priorities. In Germany’s case, the country is prioritizing strengthening its national defence industry and boosting its conventional military capabilities. This, logically, may come at the expense of regional integration projects. Hence, even though the geopolitical environment calls for more EU-level unity, member states continue to prioritize their individual agendas, which may ultimately prove incompatible.
Domestic considerations
For various member states, fragmentation also concerns the domestic political arena, which inevitably is linked to a state’s foreign policy. The fragility that characterizes the domestic politics of some leading EU member states threatens to further deepen the EU’s battle with internal fragmentation. Governments in leading countries like France and Germany face imminent challenges from rising political forces, with the AfD’s (Alternative for Germany) rise in the latter developing particularly rapidly. In France, the steady rise of the National Rally, which opposes European integration and criticizes the EU and NATO, is a similar issue. With elections due in 2027, the French political landscape and the subsequent implications for the EU remain unclear. In addition to leading European states, there are several other influential member states which also face defining periods for their domestic political environments. In 2027, general or parliamentary elections are expected in countries like Italy, Spain and Poland, all of which are influential member states in their own right. Therefore, the year ahead promises to be another important test for the EU and particularly its ability to withstand internal pressures and continue its pursuit of strategic autonomy. Electoral results in various key member states will serve as a timely litmus test of the state of European integration.
Implications for the South Caucasus
Despite all the issues discussed, the EU continues to possess major levers of influence and is rightly considered an influential actor in different regions. This extends to the South Caucasus, where the EU undoubtedly has an important role to play. This involves supporting the new regional order being established, at the core of which is the normalization of relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia and the consolidation of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity as the principal norm guiding inter-state relations. The EU, should it make the right choices, has both the financial and diplomatic capability to support these regional processes and ensure their acceleration for the benefit of lasting peace and stability. Politically, institutions in Brussels appear to be more determined than in previous periods to act in accordance with new regional realities. This includes treating actors more equally, accepting new and evolving regional dynamics, and refraining from interfering in bilateral processes that require support rather than one-sided intervention. However, the EU’s track record in the region brings one back to the challenges and inconsistencies which have been discussed above. Too often in previous instances, the divisive and damaging positions of either individual member states or individual politicians undermined regional stability and upheld an already confrontational environment. Given the EU’s recent track record of disagreement and fragmentation, both internally and in its relations with external partners, there is work to be done if it wishes to consolidate itself as an influential player in the region. The South Caucasus is fundamentally different from what it was a decade ago, which is a reality external actors must accept. The EU, despite various efforts to do so, still faces an array of challenges which might prevent it from becoming a genuine contributor to long-term stability in a rapidly changing region.