Category: Business Daily

Centum Investment Company is taking a third stab at buying back 10 percent of its issued shares after previous attempts fell short due to the market price surpassing the buyback execution price.

The Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE) listed investment firm is targeting 55.7 million shares in the third buyback, which is equivalent to 10 percent of its issued shares.

The company is asking shareholders to approve the buyback in its upcoming annual general meeting (AGM) on September 29, where it has assigned the offer at a minimum price of Sh15.10 and a maximum of Sh15.51 per share.

The buyback price cap however represents a 14.1 percent discount on the company’s closing share price of Sh18.05 as of Monday, potentially exposing the latest buyback to the pricing conundrum that hurt the previous efforts.

At the NSE, Centum has traded above the Sh15.50 level since July 29, with the price peaking at Sh19.30 on August 4. The stock has gained 30 percent this year, and is trading at levels last seen in October 2020.

‘As an ordinary resolution, that the company be and hereby is authorised to undertake a share buyback programme and purchase up to 55.7 million ordinary shares of the company…through on market purchases at the NSE at a maximum price of Sh15.51 per ordinary and minimum price of Sh15.10 per share, over a period of 18 months from the date of this resolution,’ said Centum in its notice for the AGM.

Ahead of its potential approval by shareholders, the planned buyback would be hard to execute under normal trading rules of the NSE, unless the share price comes down in the coming weeks.

The market is governed by a daily price movement limit of 10 percent in both ways relative to the previous day’s closing price, unless there is a material announcement relating to the company in question.

For instance, a share that closes the day at Sh18 would trade within a corridor of between Sh16.20 and Sh19.80 in the following day’s trading session.

The company also retains the right to amend the terms of the buyback ahead of the AGM, before it is formally approved by shareholders.

The company took the buyback route after deeming its shares to be undervalued at the NSE for years in relation to its net assets.

Share buybacks have the effect of reducing the volume of outstanding stock, potentially boosting the market valuation besides increasing the stakes for continuing shareholders.

Centum first ran a buyback programme between February 6, 2023 and September 20, 2024, targeting 66.54 million shares which represented 10 percent of its 665.44 million issued shares. The issue had a price cap of Sh9.03 per unit, and a floor of Sh0.50.

The offer netted 10.84 million shares, representing 16.3 percent of the buyback target, largely due to the price of its share in the market rising past the buyback cap for a period within the 18 months the sale was open to shareholders.

Centum then extended the offer for a second phase running until March 2026, while capping the execution price at Sh9.51 per unit.

By the time the second sale opened on October 1, 2024, the stock was trading at a low of Sh9.40 and a maximum of Sh10.40. The price rallied further through 2025 and into 2026, trading at a range of between Sh10.30 and Sh15.60 within the offer period.

This meant that Centum was only able to add 150,800 shares to the buyback pile, meaning the company clawed back a cumulative 10.99 million shares in the three years, representing an achievement of 16.76 percent of its original buyback target.

In an earlier article, I set out perspectives on getting the basics right for Kenya’s Sovereign Wealth Fund, based on comparisons with funds in other jurisdictions. This piece goes a layer deeper, examining how governance is shaped by the capital sources the 2026 Act assigns to the Fund.

Sovereign wealth funds worldwide tend to originate from two sources. The first, which applies to most nations, is natural-resource revenue. For instance, oil sustains Norway’s and the UAE’s funds, while diamonds fund Botswana’s and copper underwrites Chile’s. The second is when funds are sourced entirely from elsewhere. Singapore’s Temasek, for example, was created to manage the government’s shareholding in state enterprises, not to bank resource windfalls.

Kenya’s fund, as established, is primarily anchored in mineral and petroleum wealth and comprises three components: the future generations fund, the stabilisation fund and the infrastructure fund. This represents a narrowing from earlier proposals. The bills that preceded the 2026 Act – notably the 2014 draft – envisaged a mixed commodity and non-commodity fund, drawing capital from both petroleum and mineral income and from other sources such as asset sales and dividends from State enterprises.

However, the 2026 Sovereign Wealth Fund Act does not entirely close that door. Section 6(1)(h) permits the Cabinet Secretary to identify additional sources, subject to Cabinet and National Assembly approval and publication in the Gazette – a controlled, but real, pathway back toward the earlier mixed design.

Factors shaping SWF performance

Several factors shape how well a sovereign wealth fund performs its role: the approach to establishing and building it, informed by its capital sources and the country’s social, economic, and political context. It also includes the policies, laws, and guidelines governing its structuring and use, and its broader contribution as an instrument of national development.

Examples of how other countries structure fund governance around their capital source points to some clear differentiating principles.

Commodity (oil and mineral-based) funds exist to manage money tied to a finite resource that is prone to price swings. Across the case studies I examined – Norway, Botswana, Chile, and the UAE’s Abu Dhabi – a consistent governance pattern emerges: a binding rule that restrains withdrawals, deliberate insulation from the resource’s price volatility, a depletion horizon built into the fund’s design, a central bank positioned within the governance chain, and constitutional anchoring of the resource itself.

Singapore’s Temasek, a non-commodity case, answers an entirely different problem. Its governance rests on commercial discipline and continuous portfolio management rather than on planning for eventual depletion.

However, both models share the underlying premise of a sovereign wealth fund: that a country’s resources should be used fully and equitably for the benefit of its people, now and in the future.

Kenya’s unique path

This concern about the structuring of the fund on either model is not hypothetical for Kenya. The seed capital identified for the country’s infrastructure fund under the 2026 National Infrastructure Act was the partial privatisation of the Kenya Petroleum Company (KPC) – a strategic national asset that, while linked to the petroleum sector, was structurally a State-Owned Enterprise.

Future sale of government stake in state-owned enterprises, or outright disposal of others, is likely to occur. Each of these needs to be positioned deliberately within the wider architecture of the country’s sovereign wealth ambitions with clear justification on how the proceeds are deployed.

While State-Owned Enterprises are governed by the Government-Owned Enterprises Act, 2025, and their privatisation is legislated by the 2025 Privatisation Act, any profits from their commercialised operations and sales would still be considered Kenya’s non-commodity-based Sovereign Wealth.

The divergence between the two models of sovereign wealth funds has direct implications for Kenya. Wealth built from profitable State enterprises would qualify for deposit in the Sovereign Wealth Fund as informed by section 6(1)(h). The governance of such enterprises, under the Government-Owned Enterprises Act, 2025, would fall within a sovereign wealth fund mandate under the 2026 Sovereign Wealth Fund Act.

The dynamic here therefore becomes the harmonious construction between the various laws seeking to govern non-commodity (profits from state-owned enterprises) based sovereign wealth and ensuring there are no loopholes that lead to the non-strategic utilisation of Kenya’s national wealth.

The relationship between the National Infrastructure Fund, created by the 2026 National Infrastructure Act, and the Infrastructure Fund provided for in the 2026 Sovereign Wealth Fund Act remains to be observed, in view of this clause.

These are matters that require close attention from everyone with a stake in Kenya’s broader sovereign wealth ambitions, whether or not their interest is confined to the natural-resource fund established by the 2026 Act. The source of capital remains a decisive factor in how governance frameworks for these funds are designed, and Kenya is no exception.

Considerable institutional work and due diligence on institutional governance still lie ahead if Kenya’s Sovereign Wealth is to be utilised to deliver the transformation envisaged for the nation. Without clear harmonisation in the application of the relevant laws and an institutionalised ethical approach to implementing the provision in clause 6(1)(h), Kenya may face risks that could derail the noble intention of establishing a Sovereign Wealth Fund.

At one point while watching By Any Means, I caught myself smiling. The movie is not a comedy, the story takes place in 1966. A time when phones were tethered to walls, cars were boxy, big, slow, and difficult to handle, laptops and even computers were not a thing, and people read physical files, cameras were bulky, and their flashes made a distinct pop.

I couldn’t help but think how fascinating it would be for Gen Z or Gen Alpha to watch this film, to wrap their heads around the technology of that era and, more importantly, to witness how deeply divided America was in the 1960s.

Directed by Elegance Bratton and written by Sascha Penn, By Any Means is a historical crime thriller set in 1966. The film stars Yahya Abdul-Mateen II, Mark Wahlberg, Nicole Beharie, Josh Lucas, David Strathairn, and Giancarlo Esposito.

The story follows a young Black FBI agent who teams up with notorious New York mafia hitman Greg Scarpa to investigate the murders of civil rights leaders in Mississippi. It’s a premise that tries to blend history with crime drama; does it work?

First of all, this is ‘based on true events” but we will be examining the film, not the historical element of the story.

Atmosphere and direction

The art direction is impressive. The film doesn’t try to make everything look artificially “old.” Instead, it plants you firmly in the 1960s, creating a world that feels lived-in yet fresh. The cars and room interiors look polished and new, the costumes pop, and the fashion choices distinguish characters with flair.

The cinematography embraces shadows, reminding us that streets and homes weren’t brightly lit at night in that era. There is a warmth to the lighting, especially at night, because obviously this was before LEDs took over. The film is also colourful, with vibrant tones that make the world feel alive rather than sepia-tinted nostalgia.

The opening sequence sets the tone brilliantly.

Archival footage drops us straight into the racial conflict of the time, then it’s followed by a painfully brutal baseball-bat scene leading into a title sequence that sets you up for a film that is “based on a true story,” but shaped by Hollywood’s storytelling structure. Still, those first moments prepare you for the few intense moments to come, especially in the final act, where the violence steps up.

Violence and realism

The film’s approach to violence is what I expected based on what I saw in the promotional materials. The swings and punches have a sense of weight, blood looks believable, and the makeup design enhances the visual perception of torture.

There’s a psychological edge too, like a moment in the third act where a character is almost forced into actions that disturb both them and the audience. It’s dark, but it feels earned.

One particular incident involving Giancarlo Esposito’s character is brutal, and another scene with a female character left me genuinely saddened by the fact that that might have been the reality that African Americans had to live with during that period.

Performances

Yahya Abdul-Mateen II delivers the standout performance. His portrayal of a Black FBI agent in a time when even a badge couldn’t shield him from racism is rather generic but well thought out and executed.

His character evolves across the film, from his first encounter with Wahlberg’s Scarpa to who he becomes in the third act. The arc may lean on familiar Hollywood tropes, but I just went with it and thought it worked, and it’s thanks to Yahya’s presence.

Mark Wahlberg’s mobster persona, complete with a toothpick, glasses, rings, and leather suit, is both stylish and intriguing to follow. He brings charisma to Scarpa, making him fascinating to watch even in quieter moments.

A scene in the back of a car, shot from a low angle, captures him perfectly, toothpick at the corner of his mouth, speaking with the swagger of a man who knows he owns the room. It’s one of those instances where an actor fully embraces a role, and I thought it worked.

The chemistry between Yahya and Wahlberg is the film’s strength. Their dynamic carries the story, and watching their relationship evolve is as compelling as the action sequences in the third act. Nicole Beharie and Giancarlo Esposito add depth to the supporting cast, though the film doesn’t always give them enough space to shine.

Tone and structure

Here’s where my main gripe lies. The film struggles with tone. It wants to be both a historical drama about racism and a Hollywood action thriller. The balance isn’t always smooth.

At times, it feels like the filmmakers were torn between going full popcorn spectacle, machine guns blazing, villains toppled in slow motion, or full historical accuracy. Instead, they hover in the middle, and the tonal shifts are noticeable and frustrating.

The story structure and story beats are formulaic, generic, and surprisingly predictable; if you have ever watched any cop crime drama, there are moments you will see coming from a mile away.

The first hour is heavy on character development. We spend time following Yahya’s agent and Wahlberg’s Scarpa, though Scarpa’s background remains underdeveloped.

For action fans, this stretch might feel slow. The payoff comes in the last 30 minutes, where guns, cars, and torture finally take centre stage for a very short time. Basically, it’s a crime drama first, action second, and that may frustrate viewers expecting non-stop action.

Final thoughts

Despite its tonal imbalance, By Any Means is a good film, just good, slightly above average. The stylistic choices, costumes, set design, and use of colour make the world feel authentic, clean, and fresh, even if it’s the 60s. The moments of violence are brutal but grounded, capturing both the physical and psychological toll of racism and crime.

Most of all, the performances elevate the material.

Yahya Abdul-Mateen II embodies the struggle of a Black agent in hostile times, while Mark Wahlberg’s Scarpa is a stylish, unpredictable wild card. Their chemistry is the anchor, and watching their evolution is the film’s greatest asset.

If you can, don’t wait for it on streaming; it works as a silver screen experience. By Any Means may not perfectly balance history and Hollywood, but it delivers a gripping story, memorable performances, and a world that feels both of its time and alive today.

Imagine investing money for a minority stake in a promising startup or a friend’s business, only to find yourself completely sidelined when the majority shareholders make decisions that harm the company or dilute your investment.

In Kenya, minority shareholders are far from powerless. The Companies Act and other legislation provide a range of protections, and a savvy investor can negotiate additional rights through a shareholders’ agreement and the company’s articles of association before committing capital.

Perhaps the most significant protection is the requirement that certain decisions must be passed by a special resolution, which requires not less than 75 percent of the total voting rights. This means a shareholder holding more than 25 percent of voting shares can veto or block these decisions.

Some of the decisions include amending the company’s constitution, reducing the share capital, amending the share rights of the shareholders, disapplying rights of first refusal for a new issue of shares, and liquidation or winding up of the company.

Secondly, the Companies Act entitles a shareholder to apply to the court, where they believe that the company’s affairs are being conducted in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial.

Examples include the company unfairly withholding dividends or taking actions contrary to its constitution. If you are successful, the court may issue orders to regulate the company’s future conduct, restrain the company from taking certain actions, or even order that your shares be purchased by the company or the majority shareholders.

Thirdly, the Companies Act permits a shareholder to bring proceedings on behalf of the company in respect of wrongs committed by the directors that involve negligence, default, breach of duty, or breach of trust, subject to obtaining the court’s permission through a process known as a derivative action.

Ordinarily, where a director has breached their duty, the company itself is the wronged party and holds the right to sue. However, since it is more likely that the majority shareholder controls the company, they may prevent the company from taking action. The law allows a minority shareholder to obtain the court’s permission to sue the director through a derivative action.

Fourth, if a company issues new shares, every shareholder has a right of first refusal. This means that the company has to offer the new shares to all shareholders proportionately to their existing shareholding before offering those shares to someone else. This ensures that a shareholder can pay and subscribe for the additional shares to avoid being diluted.

Lastly, the shareholders have the right to inspect the register of members without charge, require copies of company documents (including articles, certificates of incorporation, and statements of capital), inspect directors’ contracts, and receive the company’s annual financial statements and reports.

The Companies Act therefore offers an array of statutory rights that protect minority shareholders, ensuring that smaller investors are not steamrolled by majority control. But the law is only the starting point.

Generally, where there is more than one shareholder in the company, it is advisable for them to enter into a shareholders’ agreement.

A shareholders’ agreement is a contract entered into by the shareholders and the company, that sets out how the company will be governed, including how decisions are made and the rights of the various shareholders. A minority shareholder can thus negotiate for various minority protections to be included in the shareholders’ agreement.

Contractual rights

Firstly, it is important to note that the board of directors is vested with the management of a company. The board generally directs the operations of a company, and hence a key starting point is the involvement of a minority shareholder at the board level.

A minority shareholder will ordinarily negotiate the right to appoint one or more directors to the board. While this will not give the minority control of the board, it ensures they have a seat at the table, enabling them to participate in discussions, access information, and influence decision-making on the board.

If the minority shareholder is unable to obtain a board seat, another tool is negotiating a right to appoint a board observer. An observer does not vote at meetings but may speak and access the same information available to directors.

For a meeting of the board to occur, it requires a quorum and a minority shareholder can negotiate such that any quorum of a board meeting must include the minority shareholder’s director (this also applies to shareholder meetings). In addition, the agreement can provide for the circulation of all board papers to the shareholders.

This ensures that the minority shareholder is fully apprised of the conduct and proceedings of the board, always.

Secondly, and perhaps the most critical protection is the negotiation of what are called ‘reserved matters’, which is a list of key decisions that cannot be taken without the approval of the minority shareholder’s board appointee or, where the decision requires shareholder approval, the minority shareholder itself.

These would typically cover important decisions such as changes to the company’s share capital, spending over certain amounts, entry into material contracts, appointment of key employees, approval of the budget and business plan, et al. This ensures that these very important decisions cannot be passed by the majority shareholder or majority board without the vote of the minority shareholder or their appointed director, respectively.

Thirdly, as highlighted above, the Companies Act has entrenched rights of first refusal where a company issues new shares. Similarly, a minority shareholder can negotiate various protections when it involves the transfers of shares.

The agreement can provide that before a shareholder transfers their shares, they should offer the other shareholders the right to buy those shares. This ensures that new parties cannot be introduced into the company without the existing shareholders having had the first opportunity to acquire the shares on offer.

In addition, a minority shareholder can negotiate a tag-along right. If the majority shareholder decides to sell their shares to a third party and the minority shareholder does not wish to remain in the company with that new party, the tag-along right entitles the minority to require the buyer to purchase their shares on the same terms. It is, in effect, a right not to be left behind.

Finally, it is important for the shareholders’ agreement and the articles of association to be aligned. The agreement binds its parties, while the articles form part of the company’s constitution and bind the company and its members.

Artificial intelligence (AI) generated works cannot enjoy copyright protection in Kenya unless an author can demonstrate sufficient human effort and creative intervention to give them an original character, the Copyright Tribunal has said.

The Tribunal further observed that under Kenyan law, aspects of works generated by AI are not eligible for copyright protection unless an author can distinguish or demonstrate sufficient human intervention or effort giving the work an original character.

The tribunal, however, failed to determine whether the particular literary works at the centre of a dispute involving Aryeh Movement Limited and Cynthia Beldina Akoth were eligible for copyright protection, saying the issue had not been properly placed before it and no evidence had been presented to enable such a finding.

‘With the abovementioned section in mind, indeed, for the Appellant to prove that the said works in the dispute are commissioned, an agreement is imperative and should have been in place to support this assertion. Otherwise, the copyright would still vest in the author or creator of the works,’ the tribunal said in a ruling on August 24, 2026.

The decision provides one of the clearest judicial statements in Kenya on the copyright status of AI-generated material, at a time when the technology is increasingly being used in writing, illustration and other creative works.

The dispute arose after Ms Akoth complained to the Kenya Copyright Board (Kecobo) on May 16, 2025, seeking revocation of copyright registrations for literary works she claimed to have authored.

She complained after Aryeh Movement Ltd presented the works to the board for registration, without her consent or authority.

Kecobo subsequently issued a letter dated July 15, 2025, asserting its authority under Section 5(g) of the Copyright Act and Regulation 4(7) of the Copyright Regulations, 2020.

The board observed that the first owner of copyright is the author, while a publisher only holds a related right. It further noted that there was no publishing agreement between the parties and directed them to reach a written agreement on the percentage of copyright interests to be registered in respect of the works.

The board warned that the failure to reach an agreement would lead to the quashing of the registration.

Aryeh Movement Ltd then challenged the decision before the Tribunal, arguing that Kecobo had acted beyond its statutory mandate by attempting to determine questions of authorship and ownership.

The Tribunal agreed, holding that Kecobo did not have jurisdiction or legal authority to make the findings contained in its July 15, 2025 letter.

The Tribunal went ahead and set aside the decision, noting that the dispute before it was essentially about the legality of Kecobo’s decision and not a determination of who ultimately owned or authored the works.

Documents contained in Aryeh’s bundle stated that ‘the copyright for the works would be in the name of Aryeh’, while Cynthia Akoth and another author would be acknowledged for their contributions.

The documents also stated that Ms Akoth’s moral rights had been acknowledged in the book blurbs for her role as one of the scriptwriters and as an illustrator ‘through curation and adaptation’ using AI-generated images.

Aryeh, on its part, argued that the literary works were jointly authored, with Ms Akoth contributing as a scriptwriter and AI-image illustrator alongside another author.

None of the parties produced the disputed works as evidence before the Tribunal, while Kecobo did not produce the works that had been lodged with it for registration. Akoth, however, did not dispute the assertion that parts of the works were AI-generated.

The Tribunal observed that the Copyright Act does not expressly provide for or address AI-generated works.

But the Tribunal found that there was no clarity on authorship.

It noted that Akoth had not presented evidence demonstrating that she was the author of the works, while Aryeh Movement Ltd appeared to dispute the legal presumption arising from authorship.

According to the Tribunal, ownership could be transferred from an author to another person through employment or commissioning. But for a work to qualify as a commissioned work, or ‘work for hire’, an agreement must be in place as provided under Section 31(1) of the Copyright Act.

It therefore considered Section 22(3)(a) and (b), which provides that a literary, musical or artistic work is not eligible for copyright unless ‘sufficient effort has been expended on making the work to give it an original character’ and the work has been written down, recorded or otherwise reduced to material form.

‘With the abovementioned section in mind, for the Appellant to prove that the said works in the dispute are commissioned, an Agreement is imperative and should have been in place to support this assertion,’ the tribunal said.

The Tribunal said a factual inquiry would be necessary to determine whether a particular AI-assisted work contains sufficient human effort and originality to qualify for protection.

James Mworia has been named founding CEO of the National Infrastructure Fund (NIF), marking his exit from Centum Investment Company after nearly 18 years.

Mr Mworia’s departure from Centum marked the end of one of the longest leadership tenures at a major Kenyan listed company.

Centum said on Monday that Mr Mworia has stepped down as Group CEO to take up the new role at NIF effective September 7. Thomas Omondi-Achola, Centum’s group chief operating officer and partner for portfolio operations since 2018, has been appointed acting Group CEO.

The departure comes as Mr Mworia takes charge of NIF, a new State-backed vehicle intended to mobilise private and non-traditional sources of capital for infrastructure development and reduce reliance on debt for commercially viable projects.

Mr Mworia’s appointment comes two months after Treasury Cabinet Secretary John Mbadi appointed him to a six-member NIF board.

Other board members are Fahima Ali Ahmed Zein, Christopher Kibui Maranga, Latoya Ouna, Lawrence Kibet and Mohammed Abdirahman Hassan.

‘The board is confident that Mr Mworia’s record of building institutions and enterprises, mobilising capital and bringing investments into the market will enable NIF to deliver critical infrastructure, deepen Kenya’s capital markets, raise productivity and strengthen Kenya’s competitiveness,’ said NIF in a statement.

NIF is at the centre of President William Ruto’s plan to mobilise private capital for infrastructure development, with the government targeting up to Sh5 trillion in investments over time by using public capital to crowd in private investors.

Mr Mworia took over the leadership of Centum in December 2008 and is credited with transforming Centum into one of the region’s largest private investment companies with interests spanning real estate, financial services, manufacturing, energy and agribusiness.

NIF said Mr Mworia’s initial priorities will include establishing the organisation, governance and investment frameworks, developing an investable project pipeline, mobilising co-investment capital and advancing priority projects.

Between August 2001 and December 2006, he served Centum as the investment manager before a short stint at TransCentury as the senior investment officer, before returning to Centum in the CEO role.

‘The board of Centum extends its deepest gratitude to James Mworia for a legendary era of service. His call to national duty at the National Infrastructure Fund is a testament to his exceptional leadership,’ said Centum in a statement.

Centum board credited Mr Mworia for growing the firm’s assets from Sh4 billion in December 2008, when the company was operating on a Sh200 million overdraft, to an asset base of about Sh46 billion currently.

Kenya’s small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are often described as the backbone of our economy. They create employment, support households, drive innovation, and provide livelihoods across almost every sector.

Yet for many entrepreneurs, running a business today requires becoming something else simultaneously: A part-time tax expert.

The public conversation around taxation tends to focus on rates: How much businesses are required to pay. But there is another cost that receives far less attention: The burden of understanding, administering, and remaining compliant with an increasingly complex tax environment.

For a large corporation with a finance department, tax advisers, and enterprise systems, a new compliance requirement may mean simply adjusting an existing process.

For an SME with 10 employees, the same requirement can mean hours away from customers, additional professional fees, new software, uncertainty over interpretation, and too often, penalties arising not from deliberate evasion but from misunderstanding an obligation.

That distinction matters.

Compliance has a cost

Tax compliance is necessary. Governments require revenue to finance infrastructure, healthcare, education, security, and the public services upon which businesses themselves depend.

The question, therefore, is not whether SMEs should pay tax. They should. The more important question is whether we can design a tax environment in which compliance is sufficiently simple, predictable, and proportionate that businesses can concentrate on creating economic value.

Consider the administrative journey of a growing Kenyan enterprise. Depending on its activities and size, an entrepreneur may need to navigate income tax, VAT, PAYE and other statutory deductions, withholding obligations, eTIMS requirements, filing deadlines, and ever-changing regulatory provisions.

Each requirement may be perfectly understandable in isolation. The difficulty emerges from their cumulative effect.

For the business owner, compliance is not simply the tax remitted to government. It includes the time spent understanding requirements, maintaining records, configuring systems, engaging professionals, correcting errors, and responding to queries.

Economists call these transaction costs. For the entrepreneur, they are simply hours and shillings that cannot be invested elsewhere in the business.

Complexity can discourage formalisation

There is also a wider economic consequence.

Kenya wants more businesses to transition from the informal economy into the formal economy. Formalisation improves access to financing, strengthens worker protections, increases tax revenues, and enables businesses to participate in larger supply chains.

But we must consider the experience of the entrepreneur standing at that door.

If entering the formal economy introduces an intimidating web of obligations, processes, and potential penalties, formalisation becomes less attractive.

That creates an unfortunate contradiction. We want to broaden the tax base, yet excessive complexity can make remaining outside the formal system appear easier than joining it.

The long-term solution to increasing revenue cannot rest solely on extracting more from businesses already visible to the tax system. It must also involve making formal participation easier.

Technology must simplify, not merely digitise

Kenya has made significant progress in digitising tax administration. This is welcome.

Digital systems can improve transparency, reduce inefficiency, strengthen record-keeping, and make it easier for tax authorities and taxpayers to interact.

But digitisation and simplification are not the same thing.

A complicated process transferred from paper to a digital platform remains as complex.

The measure of successful tax technology should therefore be not only how much information government can collect, but also how much easier the system makes compliance for the taxpayer.

For SMEs particularly, digital tax administration should ultimately mean fewer manual processes, clearer information, greater certainty, and less time spent navigating compliance.

Predictability matters to business

There is another issue entrepreneurs understand intimately: Uncertainty has a cost.

Businesses make decisions based on expectations about the future. Should I hire another employee? Should I open another branch? Should I invest in machinery? Can I commit to this three-year contract? Should I borrow to expand?

Tax policy inevitably forms part of those calculations.

When businesses cannot predict their obligations, the rational response is caution. Investments are delayed. Hiring decisions are reconsidered. Cash is preserved rather than deployed.

That is why predictability in tax policy is not simply a matter for accountants. It is a component of the investment environment.

We need a different relationship with SMEs

There must, of course, be consequences for deliberate tax evasion and fraudulent conduct. But enforcement should exist alongside education, accessibility, and taxpayer support.

The SME that deliberately conceals income and the entrepreneur who misunderstands a new compliance requirement do not present the same problem and should not be approached as though they do. A mature tax system must be capable of distinguishing between the two.

Government, professional bodies, tax practitioners, and the private sector therefore share a responsibility to improve taxpayer education.

Requirements should be communicated in a language entrepreneurs can understand. Digital platforms should be designed around the realities of users. Changes should allow businesses sufficient time to adjust. And where recurring compliance difficulties emerge, we should ask whether the taxpayer is the problem, or whether the process itself needs improvement.

Simplicity is an economic strategy

As Kenya searches for sustainable ways to expand domestic revenue, simplifying compliance should be viewed as part of the solution, not as a concession to business.

Imagine a tax environment where starting a compliant business is straightforward, obligations are easily understood, digital systems communicate seamlessly, and entrepreneurs can determine with reasonable certainty what they owe and when they owe it.

Such an environment does not weaken tax collection. It strengthens it.

When compliance becomes easier, voluntary participation becomes more achievable. When businesses formalise, the tax base expands. When entrepreneurs spend less time navigating administration, they can spend more time building companies, employing people, and generating taxable economic activity.

Kenya’s SMEs do not need exemption from responsibility. They need an environment in which fulfilling that responsibility does not unnecessarily compete with the very activity that generates the taxes we seek to collect.

Ultimately, we should remember one simple economic reality: A sustainable tax system does not only ask how much revenue can be collected from businesses today, but how tax policy can help create more successful businesses to tax tomorrow.

Kenya Electricity Generating Company (KenGen) has cut its dividend payout by 16.7 percent with the firm instead investing more cash in its plant and equipment to bolster electricity generation to meet rising demand.

Company disclosures show that shareholders will get Sh0.75 per share for the year ended June 2026 amounting to Sh4.94 billion, which will be a drop from the Sh0.90 paid (Sh5.94 billion) for the previous year.

The dividend cut comes at a time KenGen’s net profit marginally fell to Sh10.35 billion from Sh10.48 billion a year ago as the firm tapped its cash-generating investment assets to beef up its electricity generation infrastructure.

Purchases of property, plant and equipment increased by Sh1.94 billion to Sh15.5 billion in the year under review, funded by liquidation of part of its assets including fixed bank deposits. The move reduced the income from its financial assets to Sh2.86 billion from Sh4.11 billion.

‘Profit after tax remained broadly stable at Sh10.35 billion compared with Sh10.48 billion in 2025, a marginal shift of 1.2 percent,’ KenGen said in a statement.

‘This was mainly attributable to a reduction in finance income from Sh4.1 billion to Sh2.9 billion following strategic deployment of cash resources into capital investments intended to expand and strengthen Kenya’s electricity-generation infrastructure.’

KenGen last year started rehabilitation of its Olkaria 1 plant to increase its generation to 63Megawatts (MW) from 45MW. Additionally, the firm is set to expand its hydro power generation and also its maiden solar power production.

‘By expanding renewable capacity and strengthening system resilience, we are helping protect consumers from the volatility associated with fossil-fuel generation while creating the energy foundation for Kenya’s industrial transformation,’ Peter Njenga, the CEO of KenGen said on Monday.

The drop-in net-profit is KenGen’s first in five years with the last one being in the year to June 2021 when it plunged to Sh1.83 billion from Sh18.38 billion the previous year.

KenGen says that the Sh0.75 per share dividend will be paid on January 21, 2027 to shareholders who will be on the firm’s register by October 29, 2026.

KenGen, the single biggest supplier of electricity to Kenya Power disclosed it sold 8,975Gigawatt-hours (GWh) to the national grid in the review period, a rise from the 8,482GWh sold the previous year, helping drive revenues to Sh59.7 billion from Sh56.1 billion.

A fast-rising consumption of electricity has prompted KenGen to start expanding its power generation capacity in geothermal and hydro sources in addition to its maiden solar power production.

The highest amount of power needed in 24-hours, technically referred to peak demand, hit a new high of 2,549MW on July 15, 2026 highlighting the surge in consumption that has now triggered KenGen to unveil expansion of its generation plants.

Besides expansion of the Olkaria 1 plant, KenGen is also set to increase the capacity of the Gogo Hydropower plant to 8.6MW from 2MW, build a 42.5MW solar plant in the Seven Forks besides a 58.42MW leasing of geothermal wellheads. KenGen is the single-biggest provider of electricity to Kenya Power, with the firm saying it accounted for 57.2 percent of the total electricity supplied to Kenya Power in the year ended June 2026.

More than 90 percent of KenGen’s electricity are from geothermal, hydro and wind sources with the company set to deepen this through the planned expansion of some of the plants and the maiden solar power plant.

Jet fuel consumption dropped for the first time in six years, bucking a trend of growth among the other types of petroleum products despite record-high prices.

An analysis of data from the energy regulator shows that aircraft consumed 862.45 million litres of jet fuel in the year ended June 2026, marking a six percent drop from 917.45 million litres a year ago. The drop is a first in six years, with the other fall being a 24.9 percent dip to 543.07 million litres in the year to June 2021.

The drop came at a time when the US-Iran war triggered regional closures of airspace in the Middle East and the grounding of major international flights, hitting traffic of international aircraft at the Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (JKIA) and the Moi International Airport in Mombasa.

Jet fuel consumption dropped for the first time in six years, bucking a trend of growth among the other types of petroleum products despite record-high prices.

An analysis of data from the energy regulator shows that aircraft consumed 862.45 million litres of jet fuel in the year ended June 2026, marking a six percent drop from 917.45 million litres a year ago. The drop is a first in six years, with the other fall being a 24.9 percent dip to 543.07 million litres in the year to June 2021.

The drop came at a time when the US-Iran war triggered regional closures of airspace in the Middle East and the grounding of major international flights, hitting traffic of international aircraft at the Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (JKIA) and the Moi International Airport in Mombasa.

Virtual assets, including cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin, stablecoins and Non-Fungible Tokens (NFTs), are digital representations of value that can be traded, transferred or used for payment or investment. Virtual Asset Service Providers (VASPs) support this ecosystem by offering exchange, custody, brokerage and transfer services.

Virtual assets have become an increasingly significant part of the global financial system, with cryptocurrency activity expanding across developed and emerging markets. According to Chainalysis’ 2025 Geography of Cryptocurrency Report, Sub-Saharan Africa received more than $205 billion in on-chain cryptocurrency value between July 2024 and June 2025, making it the world’s third-fastest-growing crypto region.

Kenya ranks among the region’s top five cryptocurrency markets by on-chain value received, driven by retail adoption, mobile-money integration and demand for cross-border payment alternatives.

As adoption grows, so do the risks of fraud, market abuse and money laundering, often involving perpetrators, victims and assets spread across multiple jurisdictions.

Virtual assets operate on decentralised and borderless networks that allow pseudonymous transactions and the rapid cross-border movement of assets.

These conditions inherently constrain any single regulator from effectively discharging its enforcement mandate where misconduct transcends national borders and requires coordinated regulatory intervention. Effective virtual asset regulation thus depends not only on robust domestic laws but also on timely cooperation between regulators across jurisdictions.

Recent cases bear out both the transnational character of virtual asset misconduct and the growing willingness of regulators to coordinate their responses across borders.

The collapse of FTX in 2022 prompted securities and financial regulators in at least five countries to act simultaneously, with the United States SEC and Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the Securities Commission of the Bahamas, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission and the Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission each launching separate enforcement responses, underscoring how a single platform failure can engage multiple regulatory authorities across different jurisdictions at once.

In 2023, Binance agreed to a $4.3 billion settlement with the US Department of Justice while regulators including the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority and Japan’s Financial Services Agency also took action against the exchange, underscoring the complexity of supervising global virtual asset platforms.

Closer to home, the Mirror Trading International fraud in South Africa prompted action by the country’s Financial Sector Conduct Authority and the US’s CFTC, illustrating how even locally orchestrated crypto fraud can require cross-border regulatory and enforcement cooperation.

While virtual assets have heightened the need for cross-border cooperation, international regulatory collaboration is by no means new, having long been anchored in the International Organisation of Securities Commissions’ (IOSCO) Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MMoU).

More recently, IOSCO introduced the Enhanced Memorandum of Understanding (EMMoU) to provide a stronger framework for cross-border information sharing and regulatory cooperation among securities regulators.

The EMMoU expands regulators’ access to critical cross-border information including beneficial ownership data, banking and transaction records, internet subscriber data, audit work papers and witness evidence, tools especially critical for virtual asset enforcement where tracing ownership, identifying controlling persons, following transaction flows and obtaining records held abroad are central to effective action.

Kenya’s accession to the EMMoU on May 14, 2025 marked a significant milestone, signalling commitment to international regulatory standards in an era of increasingly transnational virtual asset activity.

This international commitment has been complemented by domestic reforms. The 2022 ESAAMLG Mutual Evaluation Report recommended that Kenya establish a formal regulatory framework for VASPs, while the 2023 Virtual Assets andVASPs Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing National Risk Assessment Report underscored that the cross-border nature of virtual assets compounds money laundering and terrorism financing risks.

These developments, together with the AML/CFT deficiencies that contributed to Kenya’s placement on the FATF grey list in February 2024, provided further impetus for action. Kenya responded by enacting the Virtual Asset Service Providers Act in October 2025, establishing its first comprehensive legal framework for VASPs and bringing its regulatory architecture closer to international standards.

The Act adopts a dual regulatory model, with the Central Bank of Kenya overseeing payment and stablecoin activities and the Capital Markets Authority supervising investment and trading-related virtual asset services. Later, the Virtual Asset Service Providers Regulation of 2026 which operationalize the VASP Act, were promulgated on July 22, 2026.

EMMoU membership sits at the intersection of these domestic and international threads. As virtual asset transactions cut across borders, the capacity of Kenyan regulators to seek and provide cross-border assistance is no longer optional.

It is essential. Domestic regulation alone cannot address the challenges of a globally interconnected marketplace. The rise of virtual assets has transformed securities enforcement from a domestic exercise into a transnational enterprise. International cooperation is no longer supplementary to effective regulation. It is becoming a foundational pillar.