‘The Igbo have no king, as the saying goes, and that absence of a central authority figure has allowed us to flourish in some ways while limiting us in others. Ohanaeze was meant to fill that void, to be the voice that speaks when the people cannot speak as one. But a voice that is silent when it should speak, that is absent when it should be present, that allows impostors to hijack its message without consequence, is a voice that is slowly strangling itself’ (Agbeze Ireke Kalu Onuma’s ‘Ohanaeze at 50,’ p. 236).
Introduction
A new Colonial Master looms large on the economic horizon of 21st Century Igboland. He is the militant Arab expansionist, hand in glove with the Islamist Nigeria, that captured the Ohaji/Egbema gas fields through the Nigeria-Morocco Gas Pipeline, NMGP, also known as the African Atlantic Gas Pipeline, AAGP. His resource terrorism against Ndigbo has been going on since 2016. Once completed, the pipeline will place the economy of Ndigbo in the hands of Morocco for as long as gas powers human civilisation. What has Ohanaeze Ndigbo Worldwide, the apex socio-cultural group representing some 80 million Igbos, done to halt the construction of this illegal pipeline?
It is also instructive that in September 2026, days before Ndigbo gathered in Lagos to receive Agbeze Ireke Kalu Onuma’s major work, ‘Ohanaeze at 50: The Burden of Memory. The Politics of Relevance,’ overwhelmed Igbo traders in Lagos protested against the new Chinese economic conquistadors. Ohanaeze should have known a day would come when Asian retailers would enter Nigeria. The same traders demonstrating against the Chinese allowed Lebanese syndicates to operate gambling machines in Igbo markets targeting our apprentices (see my ‘The Igbo Apprentice Addicted to Gambling and Other Matters: Open Letter to Leaders of Igbo Traders’ Associations’).
In ‘Capitalist Nigger,’ Chika Onyeani warned us the economy was everything because an economically self-reliant black community could never be easily dominated politically. He forewarned Ohanaeze about how the Chinese Spider-Web Economic Doctrine operates: China would enter Nigeria, sell everything to Nigerians and buy nothing from Nigerians. In the past two decades, the powerful Lagos chapter of Ohanaeze did not address the possibility of Asians dislodging Igbo traders. Instead, it consumed itself with infighting. Asian retailers are here, and our response is carrying placards. That is weakness.
Ohanaeze appears not to understand the Igbo problem because it is still trapped in the post-bellum mindset of the 1970s. It lost the plot refusing to look at the global scene. Any discourse on Ohanaeze must avert intellectual foreclosure by looking at the big picture to understand the place of Ndigbo in the economic timetable of the 21st Century. Limiting ourselves to the actions and inactions of the association will ensnare one into the treadmill Ohanaeze found itself. Onuma escapes this trap by admitting the Igbo Diaspora in his argument. He also gives the Igbo economy the attention it deserves (Onuma: 387).
Understanding the Onuma Argument
Onuma examines the deployment of mechanics of power by the Ohanaeze leadership (human factor) and how the monolithic body became the elephant in the room (institutional failure). He believes the association suffers a crisis of legitimacy due to poor performance. Legitimacy is not a permanent certificate. It is renewable with every milestone covered. The moment Ohanaeze stops performing, it loses legitimacy before Ndigbo. It suffers a crisis of legitimacy because its elite leadership suffers from a survivalist complex; just as Ndigbo, especially young Igbos, it serves have their own resistance complex.
The founding fathers formed the association in 1976 as ‘a response to deep trauma. The founders were reacting to the anti-Igbo pogroms, the horror of the civil war, the dislocation and suffering that followed…. They preferred negotiation to confrontation, because survival required it’ (Onuma: 245). Their survivalist complex meant they ‘see no evil, hear no evil and speak no evil’ in a hostile Nigeria if they must remain alive and serve Ndigbo. Their collective self-abnegation was typical of any marginalised group.
In ‘Souls of the Black Folk,’ W. E. B. Du Bois identified a survivalist complex in the emancipated Negro living in the racist southern part of the United States. He called this survivalist complex ‘patent defence,’ first noticed in the Medieval Jews living in anti-Semitic Europe. The marginalised Southern Negro resorted to flattery and deception to survive white racism. Onuma agrees with Du Bois on how a violent environment emasculates the individual. Such a victim is alienated as a mental exile. He is in an environment yet does not feel he belongs, as many young Igbos feel about Nigeria (Onuma: 203). The victim’s response is either acquiescence or resistance. For Igbos who experienced the war, their response is acquiescence conditioned by their survivalist Complex. But for the latter generations, their resistance complex aims to factionalise Ohanaeze or secede from Nigeria.
‘Deep trauma,’ ‘Igbo Psyche,’ ‘horror,’ ‘war,’ ‘dislocation’, and Suffering’ constitute a unique register indicating abnormal conditions. ‘Ohanaeze at 50’ engages Psychology of Oppression, defined as the abnormal behaviour oppression produces in the victim, consistent in Frantz Fanon’s ‘Black Skin, White Masks;’ Steve Biko’s ‘I Write What I Like’ and Onyeani’s ‘Capitalist Nigger.’ Fanon diagnosed the colonized did not aspire for self-liberation but to be assimilated into the white dominant culture. Biko saw the same syndrome in those blacks he called ‘non-whites,’ who aspired to be whites instead of being proud of their black identity. He reminded them that by trying to be whites, they were insulting the intelligence of God who created them blacks. Onyeani ridiculed those blacks prepared to pay any price to live among whites instead of fixing their degraded black neighbourhoods. Onuma sees the ambivalence in Ohanaeze appeasing the rabidly anti-Igbo establishment instead of confronting it.
Unlike Fanon and Biko, however, Onuma stops short of lampooning those Igbos who aspire to be Binis while repudiating their Igboness as a burden. Instead, he turns his attention to the fragmentation of the association and the resistance complex that produced such schism: ‘When nothing changes, when the suffering continues, when the roads are still bad, when the schools are still neglected, when the appointments still bypass the Southeast, people lose faith’ (Onuma: 245). Alienation forces impatient young Igbos to take their destiny into their own hands. Welcome to the factional Ohanaeze and separatist Indigenous People of Biafra, IPOB.
Onuma concedes that the two self-defeating mindsets/complexes put the association and Ndigbo under serious stress. It is like the proverbial falcon no longer hearing the falconer. He wonders if Ohanaeze is actually a socio-cultural entity, a political lobby group or what? This is because an amorphous Ohanaeze creates identity and audience problems for itself and Ndigbo:
Is Ohanaeze a cultural association that is inward-looking or a pressure group that is outward-looking? In the former, success is in the number of children who can speak Igbo, and in the latter, the number of policies positively influenced. If political broker success is in the number of appointments and contracts secured. Each role requires different structure, incentive, form and accountability. You can’t be all three without creating institutional contradiction and atrophy. Ohanaeze has tried to be all, only to end up being none’ (Onuma: 431).
Fear on the part of Ohanaeze leadership and anger on the part of its followership lead us to a deadlock: If Ohanaeze moves fast in ameliorating the Igbo condition as demanded by young Igbos, the suspicious Nigeria could proscribe it. But if it goes slowly about it not to alarm the establishment, Igbo youths could opt for factionalism, if not outright secession. Things are not helped, as Ohanaeze must not only remain a single entity but also keep Ndigbo in Nigeria. Failure could dent the Igbo man’s leadership credentials, a prospect the association can ill afford. Onuma’s solution, inter alia, is democratising the Igbo traditional philosophy of ‘ako-na-uche,’ or wisdom and intelligence, to make the association more responsive.
My point of divergence with Onuma is his aversion to factionalism. The author is against a parallel Ohanaeze even when elections are rigged and the constitution is violated. He favours an in-house arbitration mechanism like the Committee of Igbo Archbishops and Bishops on Peace and Conflict Resolution. The problem is that none take this committee seriously. Did former President-Generals Dr Joe Irukwu and Professor George Obiozor/successors respect episcopal arbitration in 2006 and 2023?
I conscientiously believe in the necessity of some form of counter-force to Ohanaeze if Ndigbo must see the light of the next fifty years. Socio-Cultural includes the economy, oil, gas, banking, Maritime, etc., which Ohanaeze is not addressing. The association was created to serve Ndigbo and not the other way round. The day it abdicates this crucial duty, or dallies when Igbo lives and properties are at risk, then Ndigbo must fashion out an alternative best suited for the challenge at hand.
My modest enquiry is to examine Onuma’s treatment of power within the context of Social Contract. He believes his reforms could set Ohanaeze on the true path of becoming the proactive entity envisaged by our founding fathers, namely, Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe, Eze CC Nwuche (Ekpeye), Chief CD Orike (Ogba), Okogbule Wonodi (Ikwerre), Emmanuel Agwuma (Ikwerre), Obidike Nwonodi (Ikwerre), Francis Ellah (Ogba), Akanu Ibiam, Michael Okpara, Dr Obi Wali (Ikwerre), etc. Citations from the primary text are lifted from the soft copy version.
Mutable Reality Vs Immutable Ohanaeze
Ohanaeze could have been a solution in 1976 when it was established. But the same entity can be the new problem in 2026. This is because no condition is permanent. Professor Donald Nwoga reminded us that every reality changes not only within itself but from one form of reality to another. He simply meant that within five decades, the problem of Ndigbo in Nigeria not only changed in content but also in form. Onuma’s claim that the association suffers identity and audience problem must be understood within the ambit of a changing reality.
An ossified Ohanaeze, trapped in the 1970s political inclusion mindset, when the challenge today is economic terrorism, in my view, is a stumbling block. In this age of Information Revolution that heralds the social media, Ohanaeze has proven itself the elusive ‘Pater remotus,’ or remote father. It is nowhere seen; and when seen is silent. There is nothing like Ohanaeze for Ohanaeze’s sake. Any pragmatic measure within or without the association capable of serving the Igbo interests, I truly believe, must be considered.
I agree with the author’s presentation of the factors that coalesced to reduce Ohanaeze to an albatross. But when you apply deductive calculations to his solutions, you tend to see the same old Ohanaeze emerge at the end of his reforms- an inverted Ohanaeze populated by squabbling elites, patronage network specialists who benefit from the rot, the contractors, the fixers, the gatekeepers who have learned to profit from a weak and distant Ohanaeze (Onuma: 371).