Sseggirinya effect still felt in Kawempe North

The battle for Kawempe North MP seat is two-fold: there is a battle going on at the Court of Appeal between National Unity Platform (NUP) Elias Luyimbazi Nalukoola and National Resistance Movement (NRM) party’s Faridah Nambi, just a few months to the next election. Nalukoola defeated Nambi earlier this year in a by-election that was organised after the death of NUP’s Muhammad Sseggirinya, who had been elected in 2021.

Nalukoola’s victory, which came after security personnel battered voters both before and on the election day, was challenged in the court. The High Court cancelled Nalukoola’s victory because ‘illegal campaigns had been conducted on polling day, and more than 16,000 registered voters were disenfranchised when ballots at 14 polling stations were not tallied.’

The polling stations whose votes were never tallied, Nalukoola insisted, had been ransacked by NRM goons, but still the High Court’s Justice Bernard Namanya nullified the election, saying Nalukoola was the beneficiary. Instead of going back for another by-election, Nalukoola played hardball when he appealed, a process that’s still ongoing, with the Court of Appeal asking him to file necessary documents so that the case is heard by a panel of three justices.

‘The ruling undermined basic tenets of electoral justice. The judge chose to ignore established legal precedents and instead built the case on assumptions,’ Nalukoola said.

While they are locked in a court battle, both Nalukoola and Nambi have started campaigning ahead of the 2026 poll. Unlike other NUP members who have been waiting for the parties’ Election Management Committee (EMC) to give them a green light as NUP’s official candidates for different constituencies, Nalukoola has been under no sure pressure since no person bothered to contest against him within NUP. Umar Magala, who had put up a serious contest in the first primaries, had focused on being the Kawempe Division mayor before he eventually settled for being a councillor at City Hall. Besides the court battle, during the short period he has been in Parliament, Nalukoola has been battling with the legacy of Sseggirinya, who had a god-like status in Kawempe North.

As soon as he was voted into the House, Sseggirinya set up a medical facility that he claimed was free of charge for all constituents. It’s not clear if at all the medical facility indeed provided the health services that Sseggirinya had claimed, but it folded as soon as he was incarcerated. To make sure his constituents don’t see him as a mismatch to Ssegirinya’s legacy, Nalukoola, on setting foot in Parliament, opened up a health facility of his own called ESKEL Medical Services (EMS).

‘The High Court ruling didn’t scare me. The people legitimately elected me. Even if the fresh elections are ordered, we will return with a knockout,’ Nalukoola said, adding that delivering on the promise of the health centre was the clearest indication that NUP would deliver on its promises once it’s entrusted with power.

Another challenge that Nalukoola has to face is that as a former Democratic Party (DP) member, he was always seen with suspicion due to his loyalty to NUP or its principal, Robert Kyagulanyi Ssentamu, being questioned. To end any doubts, when Nalukoola was launching his medical centre, he ensured that Kyagulanyi was the chief guest.

‘This is what servant leadership looks like. Healthcare shouldn’t be a campaign promise but a public right. This centre shows what we can do if we are entrusted with national resources,’ Kyagulanyi said.

NRM on the back foot?

For Nambi, who is the daughter of NRM’s eternal vice chairperson Moses Kigongo, there was the usual drama in the NRM primaries. Nambi defeated her perennial arch-rival, Hanifah Karadi, but even before the votes were counted, Karadi was already complaining. She claimed that the process was tilted in favour of Nambi.

‘We need a levelled ground where everyone votes. We need to look for votes and then people decide such that if you lose, you know it’s as a result of a fair process,’ Karadi said before petitioning, in vain, the NRM’s legal committee that handled election grievances.

Despite Karadi’s grievances in which she claimed that, among others, declaration forms were fabricated, Nambi has moved on with her campaign. She, however, faces a history of NRM losing in Kawempe North since 2001 when Latif Ssengondo Ssebaggala toppled Jamad Luzinda, the father of socialite Desiree Luzinda. Ssebaggala would represent Kawempe North from 2001 to 2021 before being ousted by Sseggirinya.

In 2021, Sseggirinya won the constituency by a landslide when he garnered 41,197 votes. His closest rival, Suleiman Kidandala, who defied NUP and stood as an Independent, polled 7,512 votes. Sseggirinya’s victory soon turned into a nightmare after he spent most of the term either in prison or in hospital. Arriving in Parliament in 2021 was a dream come true for Ssegirinya, who had started his political career back in 2006, when he started making the phone calls discussing the political events of the day.

Still a student at Pimba Secondary in Kyebando, Kawempe North constituency, Sseggirinya often shredded the ruling NRM party. At first, whenever he would make a phone call, Sseggirinya would introduce himself as the ‘eddoboozi ly’e Kyebando’, loosely translated as ‘voice of Kyebando.’ Later, when his ambition grew, he started signing in and off the radio calls by describing himself as the ‘MP to be for Kawempe North.’

Sseggirinya legacy

Sseggirinya would go on to beat the odds by making it to the House before being arrested alongside fellow lawmaker Allan Ssewanyana (Makindye West) in connection with the machete killings in the Greater Masaka districts. The two were granted bail on September 21, 2021, but were immediately re-arrested from the outskirts of Kigo prisons on fresh murder charges preferred against them stemming from the Lwengo District machete killings, where more than 20 people were killed. For the one-and-a-half years Sseggirinya and Ssewanyana spent on remand, rumours circulated that their imprisonment had nothing to do with the crimes they had allegedly committed but rather with their dealings with powerful people within the NRM party. Even after their release, rumours persisted that the shackles were broken after they reportedly struck a deal with President Museveni.

Then Leader of the Opposition in Parliament (LoP) Mathias Mpuuga, who was at the forefront of having the MPs released, denied participating in any such deal. But by the time the two MPs were released, sources say they had been ostracised by the Kamwokya/Kavule leadership.

In fact, anybody from NUP who associated with them was seen as a pariah. The situation was made worse when both Sseggirinya and Ssewanyana were unusually mute after their release. When Sseggirinya died this year, NUP apportioned blame to the NRM regime, saying it quickened his demise through incarceration.

In the Kawempe North elections, Nambi, as the NRM candidate, will have to carry the cross of Sseggirinya’s death.

Enjoy a Guinness beef stew

Guinness gives this hearty beef stew it’s rich, brown colour and adds a lot of flavour.

Ingredients

500ml bottle of Guinness

1½ kg boneless beef

150g bacon, diced

4 large tomatoes, finely chopped

2 tbsp tomato paste

2 medium-size onions, sliced

4 large cloves garlic, minced

1 tsp beef masala

2 celery stalks, finely chopped

3 large carrots

2 small chicken stock cubes

2 heaped tbsp corn flour

1 tbsp Royc, 3 tbsp oil

Salt and freshly ground black pepper

Method

Season the beef with 1 tsp each of salt and black pepper. Heat 2 tbsp oil in a large, heavy bottom saucepan and brown the beef all over on high heat, for a few minutes. Do this in batches until all the beef has been browned. Transfer to a clean plate, cover and set aside.

Heat the remaining oil in the same saucepan and fry the bacon until crispy. Remove from the pan and set aside.

Fry the onions and garlic in the bacon fat over medium heat, until golden. Add the beef masala and chicken stock cubes and cook stirring for a few seconds.

Add the tomatoes, carrots and celery and cook stirring, scraping all the bits stuck to the bottom of the pan into the sauce. Reduce the heat and simmer until the tomatoes are cooked. Add the tomato paste and continue cooking for a few minutes, stirring all the time. Mix the Royco and corn flour with 4 tbsp of water, making sure there are no lumps and add this to the tomato mixture. Cook stirring for a few minutes.

Add the Guinness, stir well and simmer for a few minutes. Return the bacon and beef to the pan and give everything a good stir. Add enough water to just cover the beef. Bring to the boil and then reduce the heat to very low. Cover the pan and cook over low heat until the beef is tender.

Serve piping hot with your favourite staples and a fresh vegetable salad.

Journalists warned to report sensibly on GBV matters

The Executive Director of the Uganda Media Women Association (UMWA), Ms Margaret Sentamu, has implored journalists to report sensitively on issues of Gender-Based Violence (GBV) to help eliminate the vice in Uganda.

While launching the 2025 Gender Media Awards at UMWA offices on October 3, Ms. Sentamu emphasised the media’s responsibility to report on GBV issues with fairness, objectivity, and sensitivity.

“A 2019 UMWA study revealed that 90% of GBV story sources were men, while over 90% of survivors were women and girls,” she said. “This gap demonstrates how much work remains for our media to amplify women’s voices and report on gender issues with depth, balance, and empathy.”

Ms Sentamu noted that journalists often rely on police statements and narrations from others instead of survivors, which can perpetuate judgment and hinder the fight against GBV.

“The media can play a key role in shaping public opinion and changing attitudes, deconstructing existing gender stereotypes and ending violence against women and girls,” she added.

The awards aim to motivate journalists and media houses to adopt gender-responsive journalism. Ms Joanita Sanyu Nankya, Program Officer at UMWA, stated that the awards will cover stories published between August 1, 2025, and October 15, 2025, and will recognize outstanding reporting in three thematic areas: GBV, Sexual Reproductive Health Rights, and Refugee Rights.

“The awards come at a critical time in Uganda’s media landscape,” Ms. Nankya said. “Responsible reporting can play a significant role in challenging gender stereotypes, influencing attitudes, shaping policy, and protecting rights.”

Ms Cotilda Babirekere, Project Officer Gender at UMWA, added that the awards will not only celebrate outstanding journalism but also build a movement of responsible journalism that prioritizes human dignity, equality, and justice.

Award recipients will receive certificates and trophies, and their work will serve as a standard and inspiration for journalists in Uganda and beyond.

Ugandan entrepreneurs urged to look beyond borders

Entrepreneurs in Uganda have been challenged to broaden their horizons and look beyond domestic and regional markets if they hope to achieve sustainable growth over the next two decades.

The message came on Monday, September 29, during a training session organised by Enterprise Uganda in Kampala, which brought together a mix of business owners, exporters, and sector leaders.

Mr Charles Ocici, the Director General of Enterprise Uganda, outlined the country’s ambitious ’10-fold growth strategy,’ emphasising the need for Ugandan businesses to target continental and global markets.

‘As a country, we have come up with a 10-fold growth strategy. This 10-fold growth strategy will not work out if you are looking at the domestic market,’ Ocici told participants.

‘The timeline for this growth is within the next 15 to 20 years. This cannot happen when we focus just within Uganda or even within the smaller East African region. We have the ability to sell what we have been selling on a modest scale on a much bigger scale, within Africa and beyond,’ he added.

Ocici pointed to examples such as Singapore and Senegal, which leveraged their limited resources to make a global impact, urging Ugandan businesses to identify unique advantages and expand them internationally.

Ms Prisca Beesigomwe, the Acting Executive Director of the HortiFresh Association, a body representing Uganda’s fresh fruits and vegetables sector, said smaller players can also participate in export markets by integrating into established value chains.

‘Many people think the export market is only for established brands,’ Ms Beesigomwe explained.

‘But smaller players can latch themselves into the value chains of the export market. Even a coffee producer in Masaka can be part of the export market if they connect to the market value chain. Size doesn’t matter; what matters is your role in the chain,’ she added.

Ms Beesigomwe highlighted regional markets such as Kenya, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and South Sudan as accessible starting points before targeting stringent markets in the Middle East and Europe.

Mr Apollo Ssegawa, the Managing Director of CURAD (Consortium for Enhancing University Responsiveness to Agribusiness Development), emphasised that successful exports begin with understanding market demand.

‘A Ugandan exporter can maximize the current demand by knowing what the market wants. You must always start with the market. What standards are expected there? What products do they want? Then work backwards to deliver exactly that,’ Ssegawa said.

He noted that exporters often make the mistake of producing what they grow best locally rather than what international buyers demand, resulting in low returns. Ssegawa advised compliance with global standards such as GlobalGAP and obtaining Uganda National Bureau of Standards (UNBS) certification.

‘For export markets, first, develop a good product suitable for the local market. Then, package it professionally, brand it, get UNBS certification, and only then look to regional and international markets,’ he said.

Mr Ssegawa also warned against over-promising to buyers, particularly for seasonal products. ‘You cannot promise an export market 100 tonnes when you know your capacity is only 10 tonnes. Manage your production capacity and sign contracts that match your available supply.’

The training highlighted the critical need for Ugandan entrepreneurs to professionalise production, adopt global standards, and carefully plan supply chains to avoid under-delivery while capitalising on expanding regional and international opportunities.

Mr Ocici concluded with a call to action: ‘If we leverage our advantages and sell on a bigger scale beyond our borders, we can transform Uganda’s economy, just as smaller countries have done. The opportunity is here; it is up to us to take it.’

The session formed part of Enterprise Uganda’s broader agenda to equip local entrepreneurs with the knowledge, networks, and tools to compete in regional and global markets, supporting the country’s long-term growth ambitions.

Govt establishes mineral markets to boost trade

The government, through the Minister of Energy and Mineral Development, has announced locations for the proposed mineral markets and buying centres in Uganda.

Ms Agnes Alaba, Commissioner for Geological Survey and Minerals, revealed that the proposed areas are located in selected regions endowed with huge mineral deposits.

“We are looking at establishing designated markets and buying centres around Karamoja region, Busia, Wagagai, Kassanda, Kampala, Buhweju, Entebbe, and Ruhama, among others,” Ms. Alaba told stakeholders during a sensitization workshop on October 3, 2025.

In Karamoja, buying centres will be established in Kaabong and Amudat Districts, while a mineral market will be located in Moroto District. Evaluations are also underway in Kampala and Entebbe to identify suitable locations for mineral markets.

“The areas selected are merely pilot sites, and we will expand to other locations,” Ms. Alaba said. The government targets to establish some markets and centres before the end of the current financial year, with gold, tungsten, and tin being the initial minerals traded.

Ms. Alaba emphasized that only processed and refined minerals will be traded, and prices will be regulated to ensure fair trade. The Ministry of Energy is working with the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs to develop regulations for dealers, miners, and traders.

Minister of State for Mineral Development, Ms Phiona Nyamutoro, noted that Uganda’s mining sector remains predominantly informal, resulting in exploitation and revenue loss.

“Uganda is endowed with minerals, but informal trade, lack of transparency, and limited access to global markets have held us back,” she said.

Participants acknowledged that formalizing the industry will protect traders and investors from scams and suggested clear technical guidance for the private sector.

Mr Blair Michael Ntambi, GIZ Advisor on Sustainable Development of the Mining Sector, welcomed the initiative, saying it aligns with Uganda’s ambitions under the Mining and Minerals Act 2022.

Katende stitches stories through bark cloth

The guest list underscored its significance, with Hon. Anthony Wamala, Minister of Culture, and Nnaalinnya Lubuga Agnes Nabaloga in attendance. Many left convinced that this was the beginning of a new era-where bark cloth could shed its stigma and find renewed relevance in daily life.

‘This exhibition was more than a display of clothing; it was a call to action to challenge the stigma around traditional materials and provide an alternative, innovative way of using them,’ Katende affirmed.

At POATE, Katende was not alone. The showcase became a tapestry of Uganda: Gabriel channelled the warrior traditions of the Lango, his garments evoking resilience and ancestral memory. Aminata Mayanja reimagined the Bagisu Imbaluinitiation, her beadwork echoing the rhythm of the Kadodi dance. Sanvra, from Buganda, crafted a refined bark cloth kanzu adorned with cowry shells for continuity and fertility. The Ankole were represented in garments inspired by their long-horned cattle, symbols of dignity and pastoral pride.

Together, the designers created a living cultural map, proving heritage is not static but alive, adaptive, and globally relevant. Katende’s work carries urgency because of its environmental edge. Bark cloth is harvested without cutting the tree, regenerates annually, and requires no chemicals. Banana-fibre textiles recycle agricultural waste into fabric. Raffia and cowry shells carry symbolism as well as beauty, leaving no ecological footprint.

‘These are not just fabrics. They are knowledge systems,’ Katende insists. ‘They remind us of who we are, and they show us a path forward.’ IGC Fashion embodies this ethos. Many of Katende’s pieces travel beyond the runway into museums and galleries, sparking curiosity and education. His self-taught journey, sourcing bark cloth from Masaka and fabrics from Owino, underscores a grassroots process with a global outlook.

At heritage sites like the Kasubi Tombs, bark cloth continues to serve sacred roles. Yet in Katende’s hands, it is also modern, adaptable, and globally resonant. As the lights dimmed at POATE, and as guests left the Woven Worlds exhibition carrying Mutuba seedlings, the message was the same: awakening. Katende’s manifesto stitched in bark cloth urged Uganda-and the world-to see heritage not as relic but as resource, not as past but as future. Gugumuka-Awaken-was not just a costume. It was a declaration, bold and unapologetically African: ‘Awaken to who we are, to what we have, and to the solutions hidden in our heritage.’

In a tourism expo dominated by safaris, wildlife, and landscapes, Ugandan designers reminded audiences that creativity and culture may be the country’s greatest treasures. Fashion, in their hands, became a bridge between past and future, heritage and innovation, art and activism.

And for Katende, The Evolution of Olubugo and Woven Worlds are more than exhibitions. They are manifestos-stitched in bark cloth, rooted in Mutuba, and carrying Uganda’s fashion renaissance into the future.

Cooperatives: A fallback for Uganda’s smallholder farmers

Agriculture is the backbone of Uganda’s economy, contributing about a quarter of GDP and employing more than 70 percent of the population. Yet, for the millions of smallholder farmers who sustain the sector, farming remains a high-risk venture.

Access to affordable credit is limited, insurance penetration in agriculture is almost negligible, and climate change continues to magnify uncertainties.

Financial institutions have long considered smallholder farming too risky, while insurance companies remain hesitant to cover weather-dependent ventures. With unpredictable rains, prolonged dry spells, and rising input costs, small farmers are often left to absorb shocks alone.

But in the Rwenzori region, spanning districts such as Kabarole and Bunyangabu-cooperatives and Savings and Credit Cooperative Organizations (Saccos) are emerging as a lifeline, offering smallholder farmers a fallback position and an opportunity to grow from subsistence to sustainable commercial agriculture.

For Titus Nuwe, the secretary of Kyankara Burungi Bweka Outside Catering and Farmers Group in Kyankara (Rwenzori region in Fort Portal) collective action has been the difference between despair and survival. ‘Being in a cooperative gives us a fallback position in case of calamities,’ he says.

‘When one part of the project is affected, we still have another to rely on.’ Started in 2017, the group has grown into a multi-activity cooperative, combining outside catering, pumpkin growing, and beekeeping. The latter was introduced in 2024 under the Apero Project, with just 10 beehives. Today, the group manages 30, thanks to support from development partners like the BRAIN project, which provided a honey extractor.

‘Beekeeping needs little attention and gives a high return. With the extractor, we produce cleaner honey without damaging the combs, so bees resume production faster,’ Nuwe explains.

But even beekeeping has its setbacks. Continuous rains this year reduced bee activity, leaving the insects to consume much of their honey stock. Adding that what would have been a devastating blow was softened by the cooperative’s diversified activities. Pumpkins-pollinated by the same bees-offered a safety net, while the catering arm of the group provided additional income.

‘The strength of a cooperative is that even when one project fails, others keep us afloat,’ Titus adds.

Saccos as community banks

Beyond farmers’ groups, Saccos have become the rural equivalent of banks-offering credit, savings, and stability. Kijura SACCO, based in Kabarole, is a prime example of how these institutions are reshaping rural finance. According to General Manager Gerald Ngiramahoro, the Sacco has seen exponential growth in recent years. Its assets now stand at Shs6.25 billion, up from just under Shs2 billion before interventions from the Breakthrough Entrepreneurship Project.

‘As of August, our savings stood at Shs 2.7 billion, loans at Shs 4.73 billion, and membership had exceeded 10,000-compared to only 6,000 a few years back. Our share capital has also more than doubled to Shs 1.26 billion,” Ngiramahoro says.

Part of this transformation has been institutional reform. Following recommendations from the project, Kijura Sacco recruited an internal auditor-an unusual move for many community financial institutions.

‘The internal auditor has greatly strengthened our internal controls and transparency,’ Ngiramahoro explains.

‘Members now trust us more, and that trust has been reflected in higher savings and borrowing.’ The Sacco’s ability to extend affordable credit has helped farmers expand farms, invest in livestock, and acquire inputs without turning to exploitative moneylenders. This role has made Saccos indispensable in de-risking agriculture.

Shamim Nalubega, communications manager, BRIGHT Project IFDC, the project has strengthened smallholder farmers’ access to formal financial services, with 5,328 households benefiting from loans and support.

‘Four Saccos secured Shs2 billion for onward lending, while three cooperatives received Shs 300 million through the Blended Finance Facility from Pearl Capital Partners. Five Saccos have also refined their agricultural loan products, including input loans, micro-loans, and green financing,’ she says.

Adding that strategic partnerships have further boosted market access and inputs, with 38 memorandums of understanding signed with private companies, cooperatives, Saccos, and farmer groups, and nine agricultural input sale points established.

Seed multiplication efforts reached 4,373 farmers through 25 training sessions, while seven local seed businesses and a partnership with Farm Inputs Care Centre Ltd support tissue culture plantlets. Additionally, 15 cooperatives and Saccos (65,894 members) and 258 farmer groups (9,983 members) have been empowered to improve production, bulking, market engagement, and financial access.

Partnerships driving transformation

Government and development partners are also playing a catalytic role in helping smallholder farmers transition to modern, resilient agriculture. In Bunyangabu District, the District Agricultural Officer, Gerald Tumwesigye, highlights collaborations with organizations such as IFDC, which have equipped farmers with training, inputs, and financial literacy.

‘We’ve worked with several partners to organize our farmers into cooperatives,’ he says.

Noting that initiatives such as International Fertiliser Development Centre (IFDC) and the BRIGHT project have provided modern beekeeping equipment such as KTB hives, alongside training on value addition. Nutrition-sensitive initiatives like kitchen gardening are helping families grow vegetables at home, addressing malnutrition and reducing dependency on market food.

‘It’s encouraging to see women and youth growing their own food and feeding their families.

‘These simple innovations are sustainable and impactful,” Tumwesigye notes. The district has also tackled land degradation in its highland areas by supporting tree nurseries and replanting bare hillsides, reducing erosion and flood risks.

A collective path forward

For now, cooperatives and Saccos remain the most practical fallback for smallholder farmers. They provide credit where banks will not, pool resources to withstand shocks, and offer a sense of solidarity in a sector vulnerable to climate change.

As Nuwe puts it, ‘Even when one season is bad, the group continues. That’s the strength of working together. With stronger institutional support, reliable extension services, and continued partnerships, the cooperative model could be the key to unlocking the full potential of Uganda’s agriculture-ensuring that smallholder farmers not only survive but thrive.’

From protectorate to quasi-military state

‘I hear political Opposition supporters saying they are going to have a change of government in the upcoming presidential elections. I want to tell you the bitter truth that I don’t expect any change in government,’ Prime Minister Robinah Nabbanja told a meeting of medical staff and local leaders from Kayunga District last week on Thursday.

The proclamation by the country’s eighth most important citizen and Leader of Government business can easily be spurned. After all, the appointing authority said in his State of the Nation Address on June 10, 2021, that his current Cabinet is full of ‘fishermen.’ On the other hand, the PM’s assertion could be interpreted to mean that the January 2026 presidential election, in which President Museveni is up for his seventh elective term against seven contenders, is a foregone conclusion.

Upon shooting to power 39 years ago, President Museveni first ruled for 10 years without elections. He offered himself for the first polls under the new Constitution in 1996 and won with 72 percent of the valid votes cast. He went on to win elections in 2001, 2006, 2011, 2016, and 2021. The former coordinator of intelligence agencies, Gen David Sejusa, even dropped a bomb shell in December 2013 that he and other army officers engineered the 2006 presidential election results in favour of the incumbent against Dr Kizza Besigye, who is currently in jail on treason charges since last November.

All elections since 2001 have been marked by the omnipresent role of the country’s military apparatus. However, even as general crime, which warrants the iron-clad protection for VIPs in government, festers across the country, there is no corresponding response by security forces compared to the response during and after election campaigns.

There are about a dozen security agencies carved out of police and the army, the notable ones being the Defence Intelligence and Security, formerly Chieftancy of Military Intelligence (CMI), Joint Anti- Terrorism Taskforce (JATT), Internal Security Organisation (ISO), Special Forces Command (SFC), Directorate of Crime Intelligence, among others.

Amid the kidnapping and disappearance of Opposition supporters, police, who are charged with everyday law and order, often feign ignorance, while the command structure of the rogue security personnel remains opaque. Lawyer/activist Andrew Karamagi argued that the primary functions of the security agencies seem to be regime protection. ‘The ruling party is modelled along State security agencies. So there is no separation between national security and the longevity of the regime. Now, ideally, we should have an intelligence community that is even suspicious of the President.’

In this land

Promotion of democracy ranked number one on the NRM’s original 10-point programme, the rebel group’s policy blueprint, followed by promotion of security for all people and their property to eliminate state-instigated violence, and consolidation of national unity and elimination of all forms of sectarianism. As President Museveni campaigns for a seventh elective term under the theme

‘Consolidating the gains’, State-sanctioned violence against the population is commonplace. From the Kayunga riots, Walk-to-Work protests, to the November 2020 blood bath during which security personnel killed 54 people.

The right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association, if for political reasons or to express discontentment with government, provided for in Chapter Four of the Constitution, is gagged by the Public Order Management Act, or selectively applied such as in the case of police escorting supporters of the loose Patriotic League of Uganda to protest outside the Germany embassy in July.

Barely after the NRA/M captured power, the country was sucked in by a welter of rebellions that sprouted in the north and north-eastern parts of the country.

Insurgencies commanded by military figures in the past governments broke out, from Peter Otai’s led-rebellion and other lesser rebel groups in Teso, Alice Lakwena’s Holy Spirit Movement and later Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army that roared until 2005, to the West Nile Bank Front. In the process of stopping the rebellions, egregious human rights violations were committed by NRA, including the Mukura massacre when hundreds of people were burnt alive in train wagons.

During the drafting of the 1995 Constitution between 1988 and1995, many Ugandans were concerned about their peace and the stability of the country.

Ugandans were still nursing wounds inflicted by the security agencies since 1899 when the first armed force, the Uganda Armed Constabulary, was established by the British colonial administration.

Constitutional Law lecturer Kabumba Busingye argues that the manner in which the British colonial government established authority over present-day Uganda explains a lot that has gone wrong since then, not just in Uganda but across many parts of Africa.

‘So you had very few citizens who were really British citizens, for lack of a better word, the European residents of Uganda, but by and large you had subjects. So you have our ancestors who were in Uganda but were for all intents and purposes and by documents called natives and that word was not something that had any dignity to it. That’s again as [Prof] Mamdani argued, defined the rulers and the ruled. So even the Kabaka and other traditional leaders were not called leaders; they were called native rulers. So in effect, we were diminished,’ Dr Kabumba averred.

Colonial house extension

He adds: ‘Museveni is interesting. I think his success, because he has been successful to the extent of, if you measure success by holding onto power, there’s an element of success there. Of course, if you measure it by other metrics, national building, it’s a little bit mixed. But as a political project, he has been successful. I think he has come closest of the leaders, post-independence leaders, in mirroring the nature of the colonial state. Because the colonial state was a violent machine that closed itself with legality.

‘If you just read the colonial documents, it would be difficult for you to know that you’re in a dictatorship. So you had governors, you had the paraphernalia of, you know, even the very colonial project was framed in Christianity, commerce, and civilisation, look at the dehumanising British colonial Africa.’

After promulgation of the Constitution on October 8, 1995, Ugandans saw it as a golden opportunity to put safeguards to control the security agencies from ever turning against the citizenry.

Public views about security agencies to the Uganda Constitutional Commission were so harsh that the team led by Justice Benjamin Odoki recommended some of their demands be dropped or toned down. Constituent Assembly delegates agreed with the Uganda Constitutional Commission recommendations that shaped Chapter XII on defence and national security. In the chapter, the Uganda People’s Defence Forces, Uganda Police Force, Uganda Prisons Service, Intelligence Services and the National Security Council were established. The Constitution put key requirements for all those security agencies that they should be under civilian authority, nationalistic, patriotic and disciplined.

Members of each security agency were to be recruited from each district of Uganda. ‘It shall be the duty of the Uganda People’s Defence Forces and any other armed force established in Uganda, the Uganda Police Force and any other police Force, the Uganda Prisons Service, all intelligence services and the National Security Council to observe and respect human rights and freedoms in the performance of their functions,’ Article 221 in Chapter XII of the Constitution reads.

Thirty years later, Chapter XII has remained intact on paper, but a lot has changed in practice.

Mixed bag of fortunes

Former Makindye East MP Mike Mabike argues that one of the unresolved questions in the post-independence era was the role of the army and security agencies, and the 1995 Constitution intended to solve it.

‘In 1966, when the military came out of the barracks and got involved in what was ordinarily a civilian quarrel between President [Edward] Mutesa and [Prime Minister] Milton Obote, they never left. The framers of the Constitution put the army and security agencies under civilian control. But that hasn’t been enforced because the leader of the National Resistance Army, now UPDF, is now the President, and he has personal interests,’ Mabikke says.

While peace and security is the NRM’s unique selling point, the army and intelligence outfits are commanded at the whims of the Commander-in- Chief, (CDF) which has also led critics to believe that even in the likely event of the incumbent losing elections, peaceful change of power is impossible. Twenty seven years ago, the UPDF was sent to the DR Congo to treat a festering wound in the heart of Africa, a year after the kleptocratic regime of Mobutu Sese Seko had been ousted. The decision to deploy Ugandan troops was taken by the Army High Command, which was chaired by the CDF on September 11.

The President argued that the deployment would secure Uganda’s security interests by denying the Sudanese government an opportunity to destabilise Uganda through eastern Congo; deny habitation to Uganda’s dissidents such as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in the Congo and protect Uganda’s territorial integrity from invasion by Kabila forces. Eight years later, the UPDF deployed to Somalia without approval of Parliament, which pattern was repeated during deployment to South Sudan, where the Executive defended that they hurried to ‘stop a genocide’, and later in 2017 in Equatorial Guinea.

Today, the Kampala regime is a key ally of Washington and its European allies in the restive Great Lakes region, and is involved in mercenary peace missions in South Sudan and Somalia, and continues to play its diplomatic cards favourably to remain in the good books. Mr Mabikke says when it came to establishing law acts to regulate the military as the Constitution had directed, interested parties used the UPDF Act to entrench the personalisation of the military.

‘For a military officer to work well, he or she must be in the good books of the CDF. Therefore, you can’t have professionalism in the forces.’

Mr Mabikke says the impunity of security agencies has taken root as it was before the adoption of the 1995 Constitution. Mr Robert Kirenga, the executive director of the National Coalition of Human Rights Defenders Uganda, says the country is experiencing a contradiction of security agencies that the framers of the Constitution had envisaged.

‘Do we have what you would call a national army? Do we have an army that is non-partisan? Are law enforcement agencies, including the army, doing the things as provided in the Constitution? That is something you have to pose to the citizens and they tell you.’

DPP expresses concerns on Forensic Services Bill, 2025

On September 11, the Clerk to Parliament wrote to the Directorate of Public Prosecutions (DPP) inviting the directorate to submit its views on the Forensic and Scientific Analytical Services Bill, 2025.

The Bill’s key objective is to provide the regulation of forensic and scientific analytical services in the country. Five days later, on September 16, their views were submitted.

The DPP reaffirmed its constitutional mandate of directing the police to investigate any information of a criminal nature and to institute criminal proceedings against any person or authority in any court with competent jurisdiction.

The Directorate also noted the legal role of the Uganda Police Force to prevent and detect crime. And by virtue of this mandate, the DPP is an important consumer of forensic services in the country.

The Memorandum of the Forensic and Scientific Analytical Services Bill, 2025, asserts that there is no legal framework to regulate forensic and scientific analytical services in Uganda.

To the DPP this is not absolutely correct as some of the elements of forensic services provision are already ring-fenced in the Police Act and the Identification of Offenders Act.

The DPP challenged some of the key definitions in the Bill. In the Black’s Law Dictionary, 10th edition, ‘forensics’ means relating to or involving scientific methods for investigating crime.

Forensic science means a broad range of evidence related disciplines some of which are laboratory based while others are based on interpretation of observed patterns and others are based on a combination of experimental and scientific analysis.

A forensic laboratory carries the same meaning with a crime laboratory and this is defined as a science laboratory that examines and analysis evidence from criminal cases.

To the DPP, therefore, any reference to forensics is in reality about scientific investigative process to solve a crime. Scientific analytical services, on the other hand, involves performing of sophisticated testing and analysis on various samples, to classify, identify and quantify their chemical, biological or physical characteristics.

This analysis is designed to provide crucial data for research, development, quality control and regulatory compliance across diverse sectors. To the DPP, the phase ‘regulation of scientific analytical services’ deals with a wide range of scientific services and involving several components, whose expertise can never be combined in one center.

The DPP cited different laboratories in various departments and statutory bodies that offer scientific analytical services and these include laboratories under the Uganda Bureau of Standards, the National Drug Authority, the National Agriculture Research Organisation, National Environment Management Agency, the National Water and Sewerage Cooperation and the Ministry of Health.

It was the observation of the DPP that enacting a law that has the potential of confining the numerous functions of various agencies should be handled with a lot of care and after wide consultations with the different stakeholders with varying areas of expertise. Lack of a wide spectrum of consultation could result into unintended consequences.

To the DPP, the inclusion of the word ‘forensics’ in the title of the bill creates ripples, as the term carries various ring-fenced mandates especially in law enforcement. As defined in law forensics connotes an investigative process connected to law enforcement and crime.

The title of the Bill, therefore, has a wider scope beyond criminal investigation. And the definition of ‘forensic science’ in the Bill is not in tandem with the recognized definitions.

In the opinion of the Directorate, the definitions in the Bill should be given clearer and broader meanings to cover all possible services as envisioned by the Black’s law dictionary.

The Forensic and Scientific Analytical Services Bill 2025 is basically about the services provided by the Government Analytical Laboratory, to the exclusion of the services offered by other stakeholders. In the United Kingdom (UK), the Government Chemist has a rich history dating back to the 19th Century.

The role of a Government Chemist originated in 1842 when the Department of Excise set up a laboratory in London’s Broad Street to detect adulteration of tobacco.

The major mandate of the Government Chemist encompassed public health, environmental protection and regulatory enforcement. Its key responsibilities were to act as a referee analyst to resolve disputes and to provide authoritative scientific support for government policy and regulations.

During the British colonial era, colonies often established departments modeled on UK structures, adapting to local needs. Countries like Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania established colonial-era laboratories to serve then needs including chemical analysis for agriculture and public health.

This is the reason why prior to the establishment of autonomous laboratories in the various and diverse government departments, all their analytical services were being handled by the Directorate of Government Analytical Laboratories with the police also referring to them some cases for biological and chemical analysis.

The present Directorate of Government Analytical Laboratory in Uganda was established in 1930 as the Chief Government Chemist and Pathologist to support the then Mulago Hospital.

This, over the years, metamorphosed into the Government Chemist headed by the Chief Government Chemist providing a wide range of scientific analytical services to the various government departments. On the sidelines, the police relied on their ability to perform poison analysis.

However due to the internal weakness of the police to establish core specialists in the Scientific Aids Section of the Identification Bureau, some of the personnel of the Government Chemist worked with the police for a number of years at the Police Headquarters under the Identification Bureau.

In the early 2,000s, the Government Chemist was restructured into the Government Analytical Laboratory with two departments of Criminalists and Quality and Chemical Verification. This gave the GAL the opportunity to withdraw its personnel from the police and boost the Criminalists department.

Although there is no legal framework establishing the GAL, it has, however continued to exist as an administrative unit under the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Courts of law have, nevertheless, continued to recognize the reports from the GAL as forensic evidence. It would be interesting to find out what value a new law would add to the GAL, or alternatively what they have been unable to do without a new law.

Can Uganda’s climate goals hold firm in face of oil boom?

Uganda’s 2022 updated climate plan is bold in both ambition and cost. It commits to cutting emissions 24.7 percent below business-as-usual by 2030, up from 22 percent in 2016, with adaptation as the first line of defence. The plan carries a $28.1b (Shs97.1 trillion) price tag to 2030. Government pledges about 15 percent ($4.1b (Shs14.2 trillion)), leaving the rest to external finance, technology, and capacity support. By 2030, Uganda wants electricity access for three in four citizens, up from 24 percent to 28 percent in 2020. Achieving this requires not just Karuma’s generation but distribution expansion, rural connections, and affordable tariffs to avoid stranded megawatts.

What are the key planks of the plan?

Transmission is central: high-voltage lines are set to expand from 2,354km in 2019 to 6,300km by 2030. Per-capita use should rise nearly sixfold, from 100 to 578 kilowatt hours. The logic is that access without consumption is hollow. Connections must power households, businesses, and factories at levels that drive growth.

Agriculture is another priority. Irrigated land is expected to grow from 19,776 to 152,622 hectares by 2030. With farming still Uganda’s largest employer, irrigation is critical for buffering rainfall shocks and boosting rural incomes.

Forests serve as a climate and livelihood safety net. Uganda pledges to restore 2.5 million hectares of degraded land under the Bonn Challenge, alongside new planted forests and agroforestry. These absorb emissions while providing timber, fuel, and other products sustainably-where mitigation and adaptation overlap.

The plan also emphasises awareness and governance. By 2030, at least 11 million people should understand climate change, and half of local governments should have action plans. The message is that technology alone cannot deliver resilience; institutions and communities must plan, budget, and enforce.

The most striking feature, however, is reliance on land use. Agriculture, forestry, and other land use are expected to deliver 82.7 percent of reductions by 2030, compared with transport (7.6), energy (6.4), waste (3.0), and industry (0.4).

Forests and farms are Uganda’s cheapest levers-while renewables and transport electrification are capital-intensive, protecting peatlands or scaling agroforestry can deliver quicker, lower-cost gains. The gamble is fragile. Land-use gains face enforcement gaps, community resistance, and global carbon-price swings. If deforestation outpaces restoration or farmers cannot afford sustainable practices, Uganda could miss its targets even with new dams and grids.

In effect, the plan is only as strong as the governance of forests and fields-sectors long underfunded and weakly managed. This explains why land-use measures are paired with infrastructure and awareness. Irrigation, electrification, and climate literacy aim to reduce the social and economic pressures that drive deforestation. Without reliable power, resilient farming, and alternative incomes, forests will remain Uganda’s fall-back fuel and frontier.

What promises on the same are being made in party manifestos ahead of the 2026 polls?

The ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) party, under whose watch the climate plan was updated in 2022, in its manifesto ahead of the 2026 General Election, has consequently promised to ‘invest in more energy transmission infrastructure.’ It has vowed to ‘rehabilitate and refurbish our existing energy transmission and distribution infrastructure to improve grid reliability.’ It also plans to ‘construct more electricity generation plants, including Buyende Nuclear Power Plant (8,600MW), Kiba Hydropower Plant (400MW), a solar power plant (500MW), and wind energy systems (70MW).’

In priority 10 of its manifesto, the leading Opposition party, National Unity Platform (NUP), makes the grand promise to ‘ensure sustainable management of natural resources and climate resilience.’ Using government statistics that indicate that ‘annual economic losses due to climate change could range between $3.2b (Shs11 trillion) and $5.9b (Shs20.4 trillion) between 2025 and 2050,’ NUP has proffered seven solutions. They include strengthening international climate finance partnerships; adopting a climate-responsive budgeting framework; establishing a dedicated National Adaptation Fund; and commissioning long-term climate-fiscal analysis.

Other solutions are accelerating early warning and early action systems; promoting green jobs and climate-smart enterprises; and scaling up nature-based solutions and ecosystem restoration. The commitments of the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), another Opposition party, include promoting ‘responsible sourcing of forest products through certification and labelling.’ It is also keen on encouraging ‘economic diversification to reduce dependence on a single industry or sector, making communities more resilient to natural disasters’ as well as promoting ‘sustainable land use practices, including agro-forestry and conservation agriculture’ to mention but two.

Will Uganda’s climate goals be hard work as many fear?

Unfortunately, yes. And two baselines show why. The first is electricity. Access stood at 51.5 percent in 2023, according to World Bank data. To reach 75 percent by 2030, Uganda must climb another 23.5 points. It is a steep rise, but not impossible-especially after the 600MW Karuma hydropower plant came online in September 2024, pushing installed capacity past 2,000MW.

The catch is that capacity alone does not deliver connections. Karuma’s testing phase exposed this when a nationwide blackout in June 2024 highlighted weaknesses in grid stability and maintenance. To move the numbers, generation must be matched with reliable transmission, expanded distribution, and tariffs that households can afford.

Distribution remains a problem. Former distributer Umeme’s filings long showed efficiency gaps: in 2000, only 50 of every 100 units received from transmission were converted into cash. By the time it handed over to Uganda Electricity Distribution Company Limited in March 2025, that had improved to about 80 units.

‘If you compare between 2020 and this year, the network is carrying over 70 percent more power than five years ago, around the Covid-19 period. Now, we are pouring all that power into the system which requires investments,’ said Mr Selestino Babungi, former Umeme chief executive officer and managing director.

‘The network requires it to be invested in and expanded to carry the load that is being driven by economic development, being driven by the number of connections we are making through various government programmes. The challenge we are experiencing now is that we are loading the network with more volume power without opening the arteries to carry that power,’ he added.

The second baseline is irrigation. Uganda’s Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) puts it at 19,776 hectares, though broader estimates suggest about 77,000 hectares in 2022-still under 2.0 percent of potential. Reaching 152,622 hectares by 2030 will require sustained investment in water storage, distribution, and farmer support to ensure irrigation translates into yields and incomes.

Forests are the third pressure point. Uganda’s updated NDC shows protected forest cover shrinking from 8.0 to 6.0 percent of land area, with even sharper losses outside reserves. Restoring 2.5 million hectares is therefore both urgent and uphill and without clearer land rights, stronger enforcement, and alternative livelihoods, the target risks slipping out of reach. The direction of travel is right-more power, more irrigation, more trees-but the gap between paper targets and field realities remains wide.

How important is finance architecture?

To deliver the paper targets, Uganda needs financial machinery that channels capital into projects-connections, irrigation, and forest recovery-at scale. That is the role of the new climate-finance architecture. The first piece is institutional muscle. A Climate Finance Unit (CFU) was set up in the Ministry of Finance in 2023 with UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) and the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) support. Its mandate is to mobilise and track climate finance and, crucially, weave climate priorities into the national budget-giving projects a seat at the fiscal table rather than being treated as add-ons.

The second is transparency. Uganda is rolling out Climate Change Budget Tagging (CCBT), a system that tracks climate spending across public accounts. It makes it harder for funds to disappear into general expenditure and lets government and donors see if allocations reach power lines, water systems, and forest programmes.

The third is standards. With the EU’s Support Programme to Enhance Access and Retention of Climate Finance in Uganda backing, Uganda launched a National Green Taxonomy and a National Climate Finance Strategy (2025-2030). The taxonomy defines what counts as ‘green,’ reducing disputes between lenders and ministries, while the strategy outlines how to draw in private capital and improve reporting. For banks and pensions, it provides a rulebook for compliant loans and investments; for the government, it ensures comparability across projects. The fourth is markets. In 2025, the government issued Climate Change Mechanisms Regulations, providing a legal base for Article 6 and voluntary carbon projects. This gives developers and verifiers the certainty to build forest-restoration or cookstove projects that generate revenue from credits. With GGGI’s support, Uganda is also working on fee frameworks and fiscal design.

Taken together, these reforms form the backbone of a modern climate-finance system: definitions (taxonomy), a plan (National Climate Finance Strategy [NCFS]), a treasury-side engine (CFU), budget tagging (CCBT), and market regulations (carbon). If they work, they reduce friction for lenders, help local banks originate compliant green projects, and give Uganda credibility with global funds.

More importantly, they connect directly to delivery challenges. Budget tagging and taxonomy alignment can ensure Karuma’s megawatts are matched with financed grid expansion and last-mile connections. The CFU and NCFS can structure blended finance that pairs public risk buffers with private irrigation investment. And carbon-market rules can create revenue streams that make forest restoration bankable, while budget tagging ensures those revenues are reinvested locally.

In short, if Uganda’s climate-finance architecture functions, it becomes the system that can turn power plants into connections, canals into irrigated fields, and restoration pledges into living forests.

What is the trickiest macro variable?

It isn’t rainfall; it’s oil. Government timelines have slipped from ‘first oil in 2025’ to 2026, even as the East African Crude Oil Pipeline (Eacop) secures financing from African lenders. Uganda expects to earn $1.5 billion (Shs5.1 trillion) to $2 billion (Shs6.9 trillion) annually once production begins, though revenues will depend on global prices and contract terms.

The National Treasury hopes to use oil money to cut budget stress and build infrastructure, but the revenues also risk raising emissions and undermining trust in its climate pledges, which rely more on forests and land than on cutting oil use. That is why investors, think-tanks, and development partners are watching closely. The question is whether a share of oil inflows will be ring-fenced for adaptation, electrification, and resilience-or absorbed into recurrent spending.

Petroleum Authority of Uganda data suggests priorities include the Standard Gauge Railway, highways, health and education investments. These are strategic but do not automatically advance climate goals.

Uganda’s Petroleum Fund, created under the Public Finance Management Act, is meant to prevent rapid drawdown and promote long-term stability. How prudently it is used will matter as much as the inflows themselves. Equally critical are the social and environmental risks along the Eacop corridor, where livelihoods, land rights, and biodiversity face scrutiny from local communities and international campaigners. Poor management could undercut Uganda’s ability to access concessional climate finance, regardless of oil revenue. Handled well, oil could provide the fiscal cushion to underwrite a green transition. Mishandled, it risks reinforcing the ‘oil versus climate’ narrative and weakening Uganda’s case for global capital to support its 2030 targets.

Can the numbers add up?

The financing math sets the strategy. Uganda’s climate bill is $28.1 billion (Shs97.1 trillion) by 2030, according to its updated NDC, with only about 15 percent expected from domestic sources. That leaves an external gap of roughly $24 billion (Shs82.9 trillion)-too large for any single instrument or funder.

Closing it requires a stacked capital approach: concessional anchors to absorb early risk, guarantees to unlock local banks and pensions, and market instruments like green or sustainability-linked bonds once cash flows are proven.

The new NCFS and taxonomy matter only if they channel projects into that stack. In effect, the taxonomy must serve as a credit manufacturing standard for lenders, not just a policy paper. Fiscal consolidation also reshapes the sequence. Plans to cut domestic borrowing in 2026/2027 by the National Treasury are aimed at easing crowding-out and lower yields-good for macro stability-but could leave the State with less room for equity-style co-financing. A couple of energy economists reached out for this article note that public funds need to move from being owners to acting as risk buffers: first-loss capital, guarantees, viability-gap grants, and results-based subsidies that catalyse private investment, with the budget serving more as a risk warehouse than a chequebook.

Execution risk lies in sequencing, not just money. The commissioning of Karuma hydropower supports the headline access target, but generation alone does not create livelihoods. Without distribution build-out, loss reduction, tariff clarity, and last-mile investment-the ‘unsexy middle’-connections lag, cash flows disappoint, and lenders-re-price risk upward.

Can you size up the payoff?

Clean cooking is tougher than it looks-but it offers the biggest social payoff. Cutting biomass use from 88 percent to 40 percent by 2030 is less an engineering problem than a demand-side finance and logistics problem: getting affordable stoves and fuels into homes at the moment people need them.

That means making costs bite-sized and predictable. Using results-based finance that pays on verified adoption and sustained use; pairing it with PAYGo (pay-as-you-go) so households buy energy the way they already buy electricity or mobile data-small top-ups via mobile money, using only what they can afford at a time. Add local manufacturing to bring prices down and shorten supply chains so restocking fuel or parts is easy.

Carbon revenue can be the catalyst, but only if contracts share value with consumers and last-mile distributors and if monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) is solid. Without that, projects look good in pilots and then stall when the subsidies fade. Scaling itself requires embedding the taxonomy inside financial institutions. For banks, that means adjusting credit policies, loan templates, and management information systems so climate screens are built in at origination.

For pensions and insurers, it means explicit allowances for taxonomy-aligned infrastructure debt and equity within prudent limits. Supervisors such as the central bank and Insurance Regulator must oversee risks and volumes system-wide.

Pair this with climate-tagged budget data and outcome reporting, and investors won’t need thousands of projects but a handful of bankable deals with hard numbers-capital expenditure, revenue model, risk mitigants, and timetables-as the World Bank has noted. Carbon markets add another lever. Their regulations have just been released. If structured properly, Article 6 can turn verified mitigation into hard-currency inflows and credit enhancement. But order matters.

What needs to be done?

Uganda needs to first build monitoring and verification systems, then set a transparent revenue-sharing system with communities, and keep transactions on-budget and visible. Three clean pilots-a forest-restoration project with benefit-sharing, a distributed solar aggregation, and a municipal waste-to-energy scheme-could then prove credibility before scaling.

Oil adds both risk and opportunity. Modelling by Rystad Energy and the Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI) shows government earnings could average $1.9 billion (Shs6.5 trillion) a year under a slow transition, or $1.0 billion (Shs3.4 trillion) under a moderate one. The hedge does not offer better forecasts but stronger rules. Ring-fencing a share of oil inflows for grids, clean cooking, and resilience-and codifying it in Public Finance Management Act regulations-would flip oil from ‘versus climate’ to ‘backstopping climate.’ ‘The Petroleum Fund should be treated as risk capital to guarantee climate deals, not a rainy-day drawer for recurrent spending,’ NRGI’s July 2025 energy research notes.

So, what next?

With capital scarce, Uganda is looked at as one that should prioritise a first wave of projects already close to bankable: distributed solar with last-mile grid extensions, irrigation and water-storage clusters tied to committed off-takers, and forest landscape restoration under the 2025 carbon rules with verified credits and community benefit-sharing.

These combine cash-flow potential with strong mitigation and adaptation impact. Governance can be the multiplier. A dedicated Climate Transactions Project Management Office could shepherd deals from concept to close-issuing standard term sheets, pooling procurements, building shared data rooms, and publishing a weekly traffic-light dashboard for Cabinet and the Finance Ministry. Quarterly scorecards tracking dollars mobilised, megawatts connected, households adopting clean fuels, hectares restored, and losses reduced would give markets visibility. And markets price what they can see.

Uganda has already put its climate ambitions on the table: a 24.7 percent cut in emissions, millions more on the grid, forests restored, and irrigation expanded. The numbers are bold, the architecture is taking shape, and the oil windfall could provide the fiscal cushion. Yet the real test is not how much money arrives, but how credibly it is used. If petroleum revenues are ring-fenced, if banks and pensions internalise green rules, and if carbon markets deliver real projects, Uganda could prove that a resource-rich African economy can grow and decarbonise at once. If not, the pledge risks becoming another statistic-grand on paper, fragile in practice.